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Abstract 
 
 
 The topic of my research is the ShÐÝÐ jurist MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh’s (1935-
2010) conception of power, its uses and its functions. FaÃlallÁh was a prominent figure 
of the Lebanese ShÐÝÐ movement and of the Islamic revival as a whole. Specifically, I 
examine his book al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa (Islam and the Logic of Power, 1976),1 
in which he presents power as a coherent and sophisticated system, and definies the 
principles that legitimise the aspirations to power and the use of force.   
 FaÃlallÁh defined power as essential in constituting and maintaining the social and 
political structure through which the message of Islam can be put into practice and the 
continuity of the call to it guaranteed. The various elements and dimensions of power – 
spiritual, social, political – are interrelated as they secure the reproduction of quwwa, 
which in turn sustains the social-political order and the spiritual strength of the 
community. My contention is that, through his concept of power, FaÃlallÁh reconsidered 
the political role of modern ShÐÝism. 
 The dissertation is divided into nine chapters. In the first chapter, I describe the 
historical and intellectual context in which FaÃlallÁh expounded his theory of power. 
The second chapter provides an intellectual biography of the author. The third chapter 
presents quwwa as a system and its different components. The fourth chapter describes 
his reinterpretation of the ShÐÝÐ creed as a creed of force. The fifth chapter analyses his 
reinterpretation of the spiritual components of power. In the sixth chapter, I examine the 
social aspects of empowerment, followed by the seventh chapter dedicated to his 
conception of political power. The eighth chapter studies FaÃlallÁh’s ethics of power. 
The final chapter analyses his rhetorical tools and strategies. 
 I have paid special attention to the ways and means by which FaÃlallÁh re-
interprets the ShÐÝÐ tradition and through them the Islamic principles regarding force and 
power. For a better understanding of ShÐÝÐ revivalist thought, I suggest to read it through 
a transformative paradigm which allows us to perceive the radical change in ShÐÝÐsm 
from quietism to activism as a multi-faceted and complex process. 
  
                                                             
1 MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa (Beirut: al-Mu’assasa al-JÁmiÝiyya li’l-
DirÁsÁt wa’l-Nashr, 3rd ed., 1985). 
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System of Transliteration 
 
 
In the dissertation, I apply the system used in the Encyclopædia of Islam 3rd edition. All 
the dates are set according to the Common Era. As for words ending in tÁ’ marbÙÔa I do 
not use “t” or “h” in the end. 
 
 
 
 
 
Note on Terminology 
 
In the following I differentiate between the notions of ShÐÝa, ShÐÝÐ and ShÐÝism. I use the 
word ShÐÝa as a collective noun to denote the followers of Twelver ShÐÝism. ShÐÝÐ is used 
as an adjective for persons, groups – when mentioned non-collectively –,   ideas, 
institutions, and estblishments. ShÐÝism stands for the belief system, practices, and 
intellectual tradition of the followers of the Twelver ShÐÝÐ creed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Over the past thirty years, there has been a remarkable development in ShÐÝa 
studies. Our knowledge of ShÐÝÐ thought has considerably improved thanks to 
groundbreaking research on the sources, ShÐÝÐ history and modern movements. This 
scholarly interest is increasingly stimulated by the ShÐÝÐ revival in its various centres 
inside and outside Iran. Since the middle of the 20
th
 century, the ShÐÝa has risen to 
prominence in several Arab countries, including Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait and 
Syria. Thus, it might be argued that ShÐÝÐ communities have become a real focus of 
attention both as a subject of history and as an object of study. Particularly, in political 
thought and activism, one can claim that an “impulse of power” moves the ShÐÝa 
towards empowerment both in religious thought as well as in body politic.  
 Western scholars have not yet reached a consensus regarding a variable or set of 
variables which could provide a holistic explanation for this “impulse of power” in 
modern ShīÝism. Western scholarship predominantly considers the Iranian revolution 
and its leader ÀyatullÁh KhumaynÐ’s personal charisma as the main initiators of activist 
ShÐÝism. More generally, revolutionary ShīÝism is considered as an outcome of the 
Iranian revolution. For example, Michael Cook in his seminal book Commanding Right 
and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought states that after the Safavid period, 
KhumaynÐ was the first who asserted the right of qualified jurists to undertake the duty 
of forbidding wrong even if this implies violence.
2
 Thus, for Cook, KhumaynÐ changed 
the ShīÝī mindset from quietism to political activism. This perspective could be labelled 
as the revolutionary paradigm and it is endorsed by most scholars working on modern 
ShīÝism.3 
 Additional paradigms do not contest KhumaynÐ’s major role in the Iranian 
revolution and in the ShÐÝa revival after 1979, but suggest that the shift in ShÐÝÐ political 
thought transcends KhumaynÐ. The apocalyptic paradigm states that the primary urge of 
ShÐÝÐ activism lies in the hastening of the return of the Mahdī and the restoration of the 
                                                             
2 Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 286.  
3 See for example: Hamid Dabashi, Shi‘ism: A Religion of Protest (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2011).  
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just world-order.
4
 The sectarian paradigm, another perspective that has flourished in the 
last decade, perceives the roots of the ShÐÝÐ pursuit of power mainly in the historical 
grievances of the ShÐÝa and their current political marginalisation in countries with 
SunnÐ majority.
5
  
 The juristic paradigm that focuses on the role of ijtihÁd and the question of 
authority is well exemplified by H. Mavani’s work Religious Authority and Political 
Thought in Twelver Shi‘ism. Mavani argues that the evaluation of KhumaynÐ’s wilÁyat 
al-faqÐh among ShÐÝÐ jurists showed great diversity due to the various interpretations of 
the notions of imamate, wilÁya, and the meaning of juristic authority in ShÐÝism. Those 
jurists who opposed wilÁyat al-faqÐh claim that there is room for the renewal of ShÐÝism 
in a non-theocratic order.
6
 Another example of the juristic paradigm is Ahmad Vaezi’s 
Shi‘a Political Thought. Vaezi studies the concept of wilÁyat al-faqÐh as a competitive 
response of modern ShÐÝÐ thinkers to the challenges posed by the Western concepts of 
democracy and liberalism.
7
  
 In his book on Modern Islamic Political Thought, H. Enayat dedicates a chapter to 
ShÐÝÐ modernism in the context of SunnÐ theories and various ideologies such as 
nationalism, democracy, and socialism. In particular, he examines three elements of 
ShÐÝÐ revivalism: constitutionalism, taqiyya, and martyrdom as joint notions deeply 
embedded in ShÐÝÐ culture. This work fits into the modernist paradigm since it examines 
the contemporary social, political, and economic matrix in which the formulation of the 
new ideas took place. Enayat believes that it was the inherently democratic content of 
the reinterpretations that turned ShÐÝism “from an elitist, esoteric and passive sect into a 
mass movement.”8  
                                                             
4 See for example: Abbas Amanat, Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi‘ism (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009). 
R. Scott Appleby ed., Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997). Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dabashi, and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, 
eds., Expectation of the Millennium: Shi‘ism in History (New York: SUNY Press, 1989). 
5 See for example: Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 2007). 
6 Hamid Mavani, Religious Authority and Political Thought in Twelver Shi‘ism (New York: Routledge, 
2013). 
7 Ahmad Vaezi, Shi‘a Political Thought (London: Islamic Centre of England, 2004). 
Another example of the juristic paradigm is: Mohsen Kadivar, NaÛrÐeh-hÁ-ye da½lat dar feqeh'e shÐÝah 
[Theories of state in the Shi‘ite jurisprudence] (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1998). 
8 Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (London: Macmillan, 1982), 164. 
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 Yet, none of the aforementioned paradigms can cover the breadth and the depth of 
the “impulse of power” in the modern ShÐÝÐ worlds. Because of their focus on single 
factors, whether theological, political or juristic, they failed to fathom the complexity of 
the ShÐÝÐ momentum of revivalism. Moreover, in many ShÐÝÐ movements, the apocalyptic 
and the sectarian paradigms play barely any role, and a few cases cannot provide proof 
for generally valid explanations. On the contrary, outside of Iran, the ShÐÝa do not 
promote the apocalyptic rhetoric as one can clearly see in the Lebanese case. As for the 
revolutionary paradigm, it fails to identify the causes of changes and focuses instead on 
their outcome. Besides, it cannot explain the great sense of pragmatism that 
characterises the ShÐÝÐ movements all over the Middle East. The revolutionary paradigm 
in itself cannot explain why revolution occurred in Iran and not elsewhere. Since 1979, 
the idea of a ShÐÝÐ revolution has lost its uncompromising radicalism. A recent example 
of ShÐÝÐ political pragmatism is when the ShÐÝa became the allies of the United States in 
2003 in Iraq, accepting the American roadmap, including democratisation and power-
sharing with the Kurds. 
 My contention is that only a holistic, transformative paradigm can explain the 
ShÐÝÐ “momentum of power”. I argue that the changes occurred, to a great extent, in the 
ShÐÝÐ narrative of power. This new narrative displays characteristics of 
comprehensiveness, compositeness, and coherence of thought and action. A 
transformative paradigm is the only perspective that explains the evolution of ShÐÝism in 
the modern period from quietism to revolution in Iran and their empowerment in other 
places. Transformation – which includes the layer of ijtihÁd as a vehicle of change – 
also gives a well-founded answer to the phenomena of pragmatism and hesitation that 
generally mark today’s ShÐÝism. Furthermore, it takes into account the intellectual and 
political challenges as well as quietism as a long ShÐÝÐ tradition and manner of action 
deeply rooted in political history and its narratives, and which cannot be changed 
abruptly. 
 The transformation of ShÐÝism has taken place gradually in Iran since the advent 
of modernity – bringing the impact of various Western intellectual notions to Muslim 
countries. It was intensified by external and internal factors such as civil wars, 
authoritarian ideologies, social inequalities, political and economic crises, but more 
importantly by appropriating a new narrative of power. ShīÝī authorities such as 
MuÎammad BÁqir al-Ñadr (Iraq), Khumaynī (Iran), MÙsÁ al-Ñadr, and later MuÎammad 
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Íusayn FaÃlallÁh (Lebanon) became emblematic leaders of this transformation. A new 
narrative of power could only be justified if it responds to challenging and powerful 
competitive ideologies, such as communism, Arab nationalism and SunnÐ 
fundamentalism. Against this background, ShÐÝÐ jurist-thinkers suggested intellectual 
solutions to strengthen the identity of their communities and to establish their self-
confidence to acquire power. By reinterpreting ShÐÝÐ traditions, they changed the nature 
and the essence of ShÐÝism and transformed them into a narrative of revolution and 
resistance. ShÐÝÐ authorities allowed an inter-crossing of traditional references with 
modern ideologies. They integrated these elements into a new ShÐÝÐ narrative of 
resistance, composed of leftist western notions and the ideology of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in its QuÔbist tendency. 
 At the heart of this transformation, it is possible to identify three mechanisms: 
comprehensiveness, compositeness (or hybridity), and strategies of empowerment. Its 
comprehensiveness meant that it went beyond its traditional framework of law and 
theology to address social and political issues already dealt with by Marxists and SunnÐ 
Islamist thinkers. ShÐÝÐ jurists-thinkers became organic intellectuals, to use a Gramscian 
concept, while entertaining the aura of ShÐÝÐ traditional authority.
9
 This shift requires 
them to lead their communities in all sectors of life. As a result of comprehensiveness, 
which entails borrowing in some or most areas from other sources of knowledge, ShÐÝÐ 
authorities inevitably adopted and integrated foreign elements into ShÐÝÐ thought. Thus, 
compositeness was also instrumental in making ShÐÝÐ thought a source of empowerment. 
Finally, the quest for power, driven by subjective as well as objective considerations, 
necessitated the religious justification of its political projects, and the empowerment of 
their communities. Thus, ShÐÝism became a movement of power more than a religious 
denomination. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
9 In my understanding, a ShÐÝÐ organic intellectual counteracts political and religious competitors by 
articulating a theory and a program of action in order to produce and organise a social power for his 
community and achieve radical change in the prevailing order. He speaks primarily for the interests of his 
denomination and is actively involved in the mobilisation and indoctrination. 
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1. Aim and significance of the study 
 
 In this dissertation, I argue that MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh’s theory illustrates 
that the ShÐÝÐ revival could be best explained through a transformative paradigm. My 
aim is to reveal the various aspects of the multi-faceted transformation of ShÐÝism 
through an in-depth analysis of FaÃlallÁh’s al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa. In particular, 
I consider how FaÃlallÁh reinterprets ShÐÝism as a comprehensive and composite project 
of power. I will also refer to FaÃlallÁh’s insights on power in his other writings.  
 FaÃlallÁh’s thought consists of promoting new modes of thinking and action to 
initiate and sustain an “impulse of power”. In this context, FaÃlallÁh’s theory of power 
is an important contribution to ShīÝī political thought due to its comprehensive criticism 
of passivity and quietism, its reinterpretation of Islam as a religion of power as well as 
for its emphatic and elaborate call to action.  
 FaÃlallÁh’s later books on the Islamic resistance are practical elaborations and 
adaptations of his theory of power in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa. His oeuvre deals 
with all aspects of modern life as a potential source of personal and communal 
empowerment. FaÃlallÁh’s published works exceed 150 printed volumes. They consist 
of his legal rulings on various matters, a 22-volume Qur’Án-commentary, writings on 
Islamic resistance and social issues, essays and treaties on various – particular social, 
historical, political – subjects. In addition, collected and edited interviews, his lectures 
given in Damascus in eighteen volumes, and various collections of his Friday sermons 
are available in print. His recurrent topics embrace Islamic practice with special 
attention to rituals and gender issues, resistance, ShÐÝÐ beliefs and historical events as 
well as the most burning contemporary social and political matters. 
 FaÃlallÁh’s thought and action form a coherent unity, a phenomenon of viable and 
competitive ShÐÝism in a multi-cultural context. As for his social institution-building 
activities, he established secondary and vocational schools, Islamic educational centres, 
cultural centres, orphanages, clinics, in various regions of Lebanon and a medical centre 
(BahmÁn Hospital) in South Beirut. He founded an Islamic Higher Institute, a public 
library attached to his mosque (al-ImÁmayn al-Íasanayn), a TV and radio station (al-
ÏmÁn), and a printing house (DÁr al-MalÁk). He was also a practising actor of power, in 
its spiritual and political sense, while he left the armed resistance to ÍizbullÁh. 
  11 
 FaÃlallÁh is unequivocally considered to be the spiritual guide of the Lebanese 
resistance. However, his influence on and relationship with ÍizbullÁh went through a 
series of changes over time. He was the target of several assassination attempts, the 
most devastating of which was in Bi’r al-ÝAbd in 1984, allegedly plotted by the CIA 
through its local agents.
10
  
 In 2013, during my visit to Lebanon I had informal conversations about FaÃlallÁh, 
three years after his death, with people of various denominational and professional 
backgrounds. My goal was to detect FaÃlallÁh’s present day reception in his home 
country. His followers emphasised FaÃlallÁh’s unique ability to reinterpret the religious 
principles in view of the reality on the ground but without distorting the essence of the 
Islamic message, his openness to engage in dialogue, the absolute primacy that he gave 
to the Qur’Án above all other sources, and his commitment to promote intra-Islamic 
reconciliation.  
 Lebanese ShÐÝÐ intellectuals consider his book al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa as a 
pioneering work that aimed to provide a theoretical ground to the urgent need for 
mobilisation and organised activism. They stress FaÃlallÁh’s conviction that coexistence 
with various communities affects the interpretation of rules, dogmas and their 
implementation. During his lifetime, he enjoyed the biggest influence and popularity in 
the ShÐÝÐ community due to his pro-activism in Lebanon, his charity network, and his 
role in the formation of the ShÐÝÐ resistance. It is a good indication of his importance that 
even three years after his death people regarded his legal opinions as relevant and his 
institute continued to answer legal enquiries based on his earlier statements.
11
 
 In al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, FaÃlallÁh systematically explored the causes of 
weakness in the community and challenged the quietist mentality with sharp and open 
criticism, and also offered solutions for the prevailing problems. He put forward an all-
encompassing philosophy of action. He did not propose detailed plans; instead, he set 
the guiding principles for elaborating such plans. His theory offered an explanatory 
framework for the necessity of power. He interpreted historical events, political 
                                                             
10 David Kenner, “The Sheikh Who Got Away,” Foreign Policy, July 6, 2010. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/06/ 
11 See Morgan Clarke’s article on this phenomenon: “Neo-Calligraphy: Religious Authority and Media 
Technology in Contemporary Shiite Islam,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 52 (2010): 351–
383.  
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phenomena, and the scriptures in such a way as to prove his narrative of power as 
inevitable in realising the tenets of Islam.  
 In FaÃlallÁh’s fundamentalist thought, the comprehensiveness of Islam 
necessitated its realisation in all domains of life. He asserted that in this process, 
believers must make use of power to respond to the various challenges. FaÃlallÁh 
believed that without power Islam becomes paralysed. For him, aspects of quwwa as 
manifested in the spiritual, social/structural, and political spheres are interrelated. No 
aspect of human existence is feasible without power to sustain it, and in turn each aspect 
of life is a potential source of power that is essential for the implementation of Islam. 
Thus, quwwa is a set of tools but also the essence of the Islamic message, embracing 
theology, spirituality, social order, and political system. In FaÃlallÁh’s pragmatic 
philosophy of power, the theological aspects prepare the community for acquiring 
material power. 
 FaÃlallÁh’s philosophy of power builds on various – SunnÐ, Christian, and Marxist 
– sources. Then, it blended and harmonised them in a coherent narrative of power. He 
appropriated these elements in order to realise the actual political goals of the day, 
skilfully and cautiously. He maintained this compositeness in his use of diverse 
rhetorical devices and a wide range of references. His resort to quietist ShÐÝÐ, Orientalist 
and other Western sources further reflects the composite nature of modern ShÐÝism and 
its ability to adopt and integrate various ideologies. This heterogeneity contributes to the 
pragmatism of his system of power as it allows an adaptation to various situations and 
strengthens its responsiveness to challenges.  
 
 
2.    Literature review  
 
 Despite the importance of FaÃlallÁh in the modern history of ShÐÝism, few scholars 
have studied his biography and thought. In particular, to date, no comprehensive study 
of his thought has been undertaken. Publications on FaÃlallÁh could be divided into 
three areas: political thought, law, and his influence on ÍizbullÁh. 
 
 
 
  13 
 2.1      FaÃlallÁh’s political thought 
 
 One of the earliest reflections on FaÃlallÁh was written by Fouad Ajami in his 
book on MÙsÁ al-Ñadr.
12
 Ajami, without engaging in a detailed analysis, remarks that al-
IslÁm wa- manÔiq al-quwwa “foreshadowed the militant thought of radicalised Shi‘ism 
(…) [and reflects] the intellectual and psychological change (…) [that turned ShÐÝÐ 
quietism] into a doctrine of rebellion and confrontation.”13  
 Olivier Carré, an expert on Sayyid QuÔb dedicated an important article to the 
study of FaÃlallÁh.
14
 In it, Carré examines some key concepts of al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-
quwwa such as “the pride of the oppressors”, “the use of force”, “the necessity of the 
Islamic state”, and “the plight of the oppressed”, and analyses them as rhetorical 
patterns. Carré assumes that combining the conditions of necessity and tyrannicide 
excludes the call to terrorism, but sanctions the use of force in a revolutionary process. 
Carré does not relate the rhetorical elements he singled out to their frame of reference 
such as concepts of ethics, society and jihÁd, but makes them appear mostly as political 
slogans. Also, he criticises FaÃlallÁh’s lack of originality without attempting to detect 
how he reinterpreted some key concepts of ShÐÝism and SÙfism in order to present them 
as instrumental to a strategy of empowerment.  
 The shortcomings of Carré’s study are evident in his criticism of FaÃlallÁh’s “anti-
imperialist” and “anti-Orientalist” reasoning, blaming him for falling short of source 
criticism and for showing a tendency towards the use of “anti-Semitic” clichés. 
FaÃlallÁh’s use of Orientalist sources is at least twofold and purposeful: he rejects their 
biases but quotes those who favoured Islam. Carré’s study thus stays descriptive and 
partial and fails to identify the systemic nature of FaÃlallÁh’s thought.  
 In another article, Carré equates the approaches of ShÐÝÐ and SunnÐ “extremism” as 
represented by FaÃlallÁh and Sayyid QuÔb.
15
 Carré claims that the ideas of both thinkers 
are rooted in “prophetic fundamentalism”, providing action programmes for an Islamic 
revolution against “contemporary paganism”. It is noteworthy, however, that in most of 
                                                             
12 Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1987). 
13 Ajami, The Vanished Imam, 215. 
14 Olivier Carré, “Quelques mots-clefs de Muhammad Husayn Fadlallâh,”Revue française de science 
politique 37 (1987): 478-501. 
15 Olivier Carré, “Khomeinisme libanais: Qutb, Fadlallâh, même combat,” Social Compass 38 (1991): 
187-200. 
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his writings and speeches FaÃlallÁh avoided the “prophetic” tone or any reference to 
apocalyptic Messianism. Furthermore, FaÃlallÁh did not consider the contemporary 
reality as paganism; he was prepared to accept the complex realities of Lebanon and the 
Muslim world in general.  
 For Carré, the “dynamic fiqh” of Neo-Hanbalism and uÒÙlism as represented by 
QuÔb and FaÃlallÁh challenge the mainstream ShÐÝÐ and SunnÐ tradition. He claims that 
their objective was to establish an Islamic state as soon as possible, which is why “the 
revolutionary Islamic militantism” in Lebanon – both SunnÐ and ShÐÝÐ – can be referred 
to as a “Lebanese Khomeinism,” which is an equivalent to “Syro-Lebanese QuÔbism”. 
Therefore, the divide for Carré is not between Sunnism and ShÐÝism, but between 
Islamic political extremism and traditional quietism. This idea is partially sound; 
besides the fact that FaÃlallÁh in practice never hastened the establishment of an Islamic 
state in Lebanon, Carré pays no attention to the significant differences in the goals and 
means of ShÐÝÐ and SunnÐ activism. The sectarian flavour of activism has proved to be as 
significant as the divide between quietism and activism. Carré seems to equate activism 
with extremism, while he does not elaborate on the difference in the tactics suggested 
by the two thinkers, nor on the differing argumentation applied by them. 
 In her comparative analysis of Íassan al-TurÁbÐ and FaÃlallÁh, Judith Miller 
considers the two figures as representatives of “Islamic literarism” that inspired militant 
Islamism in its modern form.
16
 Miller claims that both FaÃlallÁh and al-TurÁbÐ adopted 
Western techniques and arguments in their criticisms of the West, distanced themselves 
from Saudi Arabia as well as from Iran, from communism as well as from capitalism, 
and held the view that the best way to grasp power is through democratic means rather 
than revolution. Besides omitting precise definitions Miller makes no attempt to 
reconcile the contradiction between “literarism,” militancy and democratic means. 
 In his book on the Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab 
World, Ibrahim Abu-Rabi‘ devotes a chapter to FaÃlallÁh, entitled “Toward an Islamic 
Liberation Theology: Muhammad Husayn FaÃlallÁh and the Principles of Shi‘i 
Resurgence”.17 He focuses on FaÃlallÁh’s ideas on resistance and revolution as rooted in 
the situation of the Lebanese ShÐÝa. Abu-Rabi‘ provides a detailed description of al-
                                                             
16 Judith Miller, “Faces of Fundamentalism: Hassan al-Turabi and Muhammed Fadlallah,” Foreign 
Affairs 73 (1994): 123–142. 
17 Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi‘, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World (New 
York: SUNY Press, 1996). 
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IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, and considers FaÃlallÁh as the foremost “liberation 
theologian” in contemporary Arab Islam. Abu-Rabi‘ pays no attention to the fact that 
liberation theology is a Christian term for a political theology which combines religious 
teachings with a Marxist revolutionary action plan. For FaÃlallÁh, the “theology of 
liberation” is not revolutionary Messianism; it is rather a process of social 
transformation that aims at acquiring power as a political project. 
 Martin Kramer’s essay “The Oracle of Hizbullah: Sayyid MuÎammad Husayn 
Fadlallah” (1997) is the first significant study on FaÃlallÁh in a Western language.18 As 
the title suggests, Kramer’s perspective is political as he focuses on the interplay 
between FaÃlallÁh’s words and ÍizbullÁh’s deeds. Following an insightful description 
of FaÃlallÁh’s formative years, Kramer analyses a list of controversial issues, such as 
FaÃlallÁh’s possible involvement in the hostage crisis,19 suicide bombings and 
hijackings in the 1980s, his links to Syria, and to the Iranian clergy. Kramer evaluates 
FaÃlallÁh’s approach as a mixture of pragmatism and skilful rhetoric that he deems 
more characteristic of a realistic politician than of a moral guardian. He finds an 
inherent contradiction between FaÃlallÁh’s radicalism and his quest to find balanced 
solutions to sensitive issues. However, in a rather self-contradictory manner, he 
acknowledges that FaÃlallÁh did not always have direct influence on the organisation.  
Furthermore, in his evaluation, Kramer does not take into consideration that the role of 
FaÃlallÁh as marjaÝ is fundamentally of political importance.  
 Kramer’s essay is informative; however it is embellished with rhetorical questions 
and comments the aim of which is to raise doubts about the credibility of FaÃlallÁh’s 
statements and the consistency of his ethics. Kramer devotes a chapter to FaÃlallÁh’s al-
IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, and to the context of its publication. He evaluates the book 
as FaÃlallÁh’s “most systematic polemic in favour of the empowerment of Islam”20 to 
which the empowerment of the ShÐÝa is instrumental.
21
 This remark downplays the idea 
of empowering ShÐÝa for its own sake, which for FaÃlallÁh, was a theological as well as 
a political project.  
                                                             
18 Martin Kramer, “The Oracle of Hizbullah: Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah,” in Spokesmen for 
the Despised, ed. R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 83-181. 
19 It was a series of kidnappings between 1982 and 1992 by Islamist groups, the victims of which were 
mostly American and Western European citizens working in Lebanon. 
20 Kramer, “The Oracle of Hizbullah,” 97. 
21 Kramer, “The Oracle of Hizbullah,” 98. 
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 Jamal Sankari’s book Fadlallah: The making of a radical Shi‘ite leader (2005) is a 
detailed biography of FaÃlallÁh. Sankari provides a thorough insight into the Iraqi and 
Lebanese intellectual-political context that formed and influenced FaÃlallÁh’s views.22 
The book vividly describes FaÃlallÁh’s quest to develop a strategy that allows for the 
gradual Islamisation of Lebanon and the empowerment of the ShÐÝa but with respect to 
the ideological and sectarian diversity of the Lebanese society. Sankari’s standpoint is 
based on FaÃlallÁh’s writings as primary sources and interviews, several of which were 
conducted by the author. It also makes use of a broad selection of Arabic secondary 
literature published prior to 2005. Since then, Sankari’s work has remained the only 
book on FaÃlallÁh in English. He aims to describe FaÃlallÁh’s life and work in 
continuous interaction with the social-political circumstances of the day.  
 Sankari interprets the evolvement of FaÃlallÁh’s public discourse and actions as 
responses to the changes and challenges in the national and international arena 
presupposing – in a somewhat apologetical way – firm moral confines never 
transgressed by FaÃlallÁh. He dedicates a short paragraph to al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-
quwwa, and considers it a work on Islamic theory and praxis of “power” from a judicial 
and ethical perspective. Sankari notes that the book provides “a scheme for the 
empowerment of the ShÐÝÐ community;” and explains that power for FaÃlallÁh was 
indispensable “as a legitimate, and at times necessary, recourse in order to combat 
aggression and oppression.”23 Sankari’s statements are correct. Nevertheless, it is worth 
noting that FaÃlallÁh attempted to justify purposeful and righteous violence not for the 
world public, but rather for his own ShÐÝÐ quietist co-religionists. 
 In The Shi‘a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties and Clerics, Rodger Shanahan places 
FaÃlallÁh in the Lebanese ShÐÝÐ context together with MuÎammad JawÁd Mughniyya, 
and MuÎammad MahdÐ Shams al-DÐn.
24
 The author asserts that these thinkers developed 
the theoretical and material grounds for a distinctly ShÐÝÐ form of political activity, based 
on the specific demands of the Lebanese community. Shanahan, without differentiating 
between the various Najafi trends, claims that FaÃlallÁh’s activism was triggered by the 
civil war and not by the Najafi tradition.  
                                                             
22 Jamal Sankari, Fadlallah: The Making of a Radical Shi‘ite Leader (London: SAQI, 2005). 
23 Sankari, Fadlallah, 157.   
24 Rodger Shanahan, The Shi‘a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties and Clerics (London: Tauris Academic 
Studies, 2005). 
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 Stephan Rosiny in his article “As-Sayyid Muhammad Husain Fadlallah: Im 
Zweifel für Mensch und Vernunft” deals with the link between FaÃlallÁh’s 
jurisprudential method and his concept of religion.
25
 In another article, Rosiny describes 
the FÁÔima al-ZahrÁ’ controversy between FaÃlallÁh and JaÝfar MurtaÃÁ al-ÝÀmilÐ.26 He 
describes it as a clash of two tendencies within ShÐÝÐ historiography, with far-reaching 
implications for the political power struggle over the marjaÝiyya and over the control of 
the Lebanese ShÐÝite community.  
 Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr in her ShÐ‘ite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and 
the Making of National Identities27 claims that FaÃlallÁh promoted an alternative, ShÐÝÐ - 
Arab understanding of tradition and modernity in order to define himself and establish a 
reputation as a specifically Arab marjaÝ, and to separate himself from the overtly 
emotional and thus backward Iranian ShÐÝism. For Shaery-Eisenlohr, FaÃlallÁh’s official 
statements of solidarity and appreciation were mere “lip service (…) to the legacy of 
Khomeini”,28 while his reservations regarding processions and the ÝAshÙrÁ’ rituals 
distanced him from ÍizbullÁh. The author’s argument is exclusively based on a 
distinction between the Arab and Persian “character” that affects the various 
manifestations of religiosity and, therefore, provided the sole ground for FaÃlallÁh’s 
grand-scale project. Her argument underestimates the differing geo-political contexts, 
the contrasting ambitions, and the identical goals and elements of ShÐÝÐ revivalism for 
which expression is only of secondary importance. Similarly, attributing the tensions 
between FaÃlallÁh and ÍizbullÁh to the organisation’s Persian ShÐÝism is at least 
arguable. 
 Sedighe Ghadiri-Orangi’s analysis MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh – Schiitischer 
Gelehrter oder politischer Führer? is written from a political-science perspective.29 The 
author is interested in FaÃlallÁh only insofar as his ideas influenced ÍizbullÁh in terms 
of legitimising the use of armed force for political ends, setting the party’s pragmatic 
                                                             
25 Stephan Rosiny, “Muhammad Husain Fadlallah: Im Zweifel für Mensch und Vernunft,” Der Islam am 
Wendepunkt: Liberale und Konservative Reformer einer Weltreligion, ed. Katajun Amirpur and Ludwig 
Ammann (Freiburg: Herder, 2006), 100-108. 
26 Stephan Rosiny, “The Tragedy of Fatima al-Zahra in the Debate of two Shiite Theologians in 
Lebanon,” in The Twelver Shia in Modern Times: Religious Culture & Political Culture, ed. Rainer 
Brunner and Werner Ende (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 207-219. 
27 Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, Shi‘ite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making of National 
Identities (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 
28 Shaery-Eisenlohr, Shi‘ite Lebanon, 76. 
29 Sedighe Ghadiri-Orangi, MuÎammad Íusayn Fadlallah - Schiitischer Gelehrter oder 
politischer Führer? (Hamburg-Schenefeld: EB-Verlag, 2009). 
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approach to the idea of Islamic state and the impact of FaÃlallÁh’s positioning as marjaÝ 
al-taqlÐd. Ghadiri-Orangi considers FaÃlallÁh as the theologian of resistance, who in fact 
imported the key ideas of the Iranian revolution to Lebanon. Similarly to M. B. al-Ñadr 
and MuÎammad MahdÐ Shams al-DÐn, FaÃlallÁh invested SunnÐ political 
fundamentalism with a ShÐÝÐ character. However, in Najaf, he endorsed al-KhÙ’Ð’s ideas 
on the apolitical religious leadership. For Ghadiri-Orangi, FaÃlallÁh became a 
representative of anti-imperialist Pan-Islamism inspired by the Iranian revolution and 
the Lebanese situation of the time. The author’s chronological approach in considering 
ÀyatullÁh KhumaynÐ as the founding father of activist ShÐÝism while neglecting 
FaÃlallÁh’s early writings with a clearly activist undertone underestimates FaÃlallÁh’s 
intellectual efforts and reduces him to a Lebanese representative of Khumaynism. 
 Hilal Khashan’s article “The Religious and Political Impact of Sayyid M. H. 
FaÃlallÁh on Arab ShÐÝism” focuses on four aspects of FaÃlallÁh’s approach: his 
emphasis on the use of rationality and critical thinking, his call for interfaith dialogue, 
his advocacy of Islamic solidarity and unity, and his position on political change and 
revolution.
30
 Khashan’s approach highlights some crucial points of FaÃlallÁh’s thought 
but identifies them more as parts of a political strategy rather than as a coherent theory. 
Thus, the essay lists a collection of interrelated characteristics but without critically 
examining them – for example FaÃlallÁh’s commitment to interfaith dialogue or the 
nature of his “rationalism”.  
 S. E. Baroudi dedicated an article to FaÃlallÁh’s views on international relations 
and in particular to his concept of jihÁd.31 He rightly pointed out that for FaÃlallÁh, 
power is the currency of social political life, the acquisition of which is a religious 
duty.
32
 Baroudi points out that for FaÃlallÁh, the Islamic use of power is controlled by 
ethical rules and should not serve corruption or exploitation. Baroudi claims that 
FaÃlallÁh’s primary concern was the formation of a united Muslim position against 
Western (and Soviet) hegemony in the region, and his counter-hegemonic language 
shares major similarities with secular Arab nationalist authors.
33
  
                                                             
30 Hilal Khashan, “The Religious and Political Impact of Sayyid M. H.  Fadlallah on Arab Shi‘ism,” 
Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies 3 (2010): 427–441. 
31 Sami Emile Baroudi, “Islamist Perspectives on International Relations: The Discourse of Sayyid 
Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (1935–2010),” Middle Eastern Studies 49 (2013): 107-33. 
32 Baroudi, “Islamist Perspectives on International Relations,” 110-111. 
33 Baroudi, “Islamist Perspectives on International Relations,” 125. 
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 The fact that Baroudi evaluates FaÃlallÁh’s concept of jihÁd as different from 
qitÁl, and labels his thought as utopian in some cases while considering him as “a 
religious realist,”34 shows that Baroudi fails to make a clear distinction between 
FaÃlallÁh’s rhetorical tools and his actual message. The author’s supposition that 
FaÃlallÁh consciously reduced ShÐÝÐ elements and that some of his goals corresponded to 
those of the secular nationalists is well proven. However, playing down the use of ShÐÝÐ 
concepts even in reduced quantity to mere stylistic tools is questionable. 
 In a recent article “Two modern Shi‘ite scholars on relations between Muslims 
and Non-Muslims,” Rainer Brunner analyses what FaÃlallÁh meant by interreligious 
dialogue.
35
 Based on FaÃlallÁh’s commentary on 2:256, Brunner discerns daÝwa and 
niÛÁm as key notions in FaÃlallÁh’s argument. Brunner asserts that for FaÃlallÁh, Islam 
was a religion of permanent, offensive daÝwa. As for niÛÁm, FaÃlallÁh’s commentary on 
9:29 proves his assertion of the unity of government, “since Islam does not allow 
society to be outside of its dominion, and sovereignity, non-Muslims have no other 
choice but to submit to the political supremacy of Islam.”36 By exploring the link 
between jihÁd and daÝwa, Brunner concluded that for FaÃlallÁh such as for QuÔb, 
religious freedom meant the freedom to propagate Islam. Therefore the guiding 
principles behind FaÃlallÁh’s “modern” terminology were anything but novel.37 
 
 
 2. 2       FaÃlallÁh’s fiqh  
 
 Numerous book chapters and articles focus on FaÃlallÁh’s importance as a jurist. 
Some authors like Lara Deeb,
38
 Sophie Chamas,
39
 and Talib Aziz
40
 emphasise 
                                                             
34 Baroudi, “Islamist Perspectives on International Relations,” 115. 
35 Rainer Brunner, “Two modern Shi‘ite scholars on relations between Muslims and Non-Muslims,” in  
Islam and globalisation: historical and contemporary perspectives; proceedings of the 25th Congress of 
L'Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants, ed. Agostino Cilardo (Leuven: Peeters, 2013): 143-
153.  
36 Brunner, “Two modern Shi‘ite scholars,” 150. 
37 Brunner, “Two modern Shi‘ite scholars,” 152-153 
38 Lara Deeb, “Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah and Lebanese Shi‘i Youth,” Journal of Shi‘a Islamic 
Studies 3 (2010): 405-426. 
39 Sophie Chamas, “Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah: Muslim Cleric and Islamic Feminist,” Journal 
of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences 1 (2009): 246-257. 
40 Talib M. Aziz, “Fadlallah and the Remaking of the Marja‘iyya,” in The Most Learned of the Shi‘a, ed. 
Linda S. Walbridge (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 205-215. 
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FaÃlallÁh’s dynamic fiqh as responsive to present-day challenges and granting scope for 
individual choice. FaÃlallÁh’s critics such as Rola el-Husseini, in her comparison of the 
new gender discourse in Lebanon and Iran, stressed that his opinions were phrased in 
the traditional ShÐÝÐ manner, declared from the position of a male clerical authority, thus 
fossilising the established power structures within the society.
41
  
 Morgan Clarke’s articles analyse the application of FaÃlallÁh’s rulings on gender 
and bio-ethical issues such as kinship, sexual morality, and reproduction, including 
artificial insemination and cloning.
42
  
 Scholars differ in their assessment of his jurisprudential method as well. Some 
scholars emphasise that FaÃlallÁh evaluated aÎÁdÐth on the basis of their accordance 
with the Qur’Ánic statements: thus, in his ijtihÁd he gave precedence to the Qur’Án over 
the tradition.
43
 Others, like Miqdaad Versi claim that in FaÃlallÁh’s argumentation the 
general Qur’Ánic principles were superseded by specific authenticated traditions, and 
thus his method represents mainstream ShÐÝÐ jurisprudence even if he arrives at unusual 
conclusions.
44
 
 
Joseph Alagha emphasizes FaÃlallÁh’s “novel reading of the sources” 
and specifically his use of the notion of maÒlaÎa (public interest) in allowing for female 
artistic dancing for mixed audience, and his impact on the perception of “resistance art” 
by Íizbullah.
45
 
 
 
 
                                                             
41 Rola el-Husseini, “Women, Work, and Political Participation in Lebanese Shi‘a Contemporary 
Thought: The Writings of Ayatollahs M. H. Fadlallah and Shams al-Din,” Comparative Studies of South 
Asia, Africa and the Middle East Volume 28 (2008): 273-282.  
42 Morgan Clarke, “Kinship, Propriety and Assisted Reproduction in the Middle East,” Anthropology of 
the Middle East 2 (2007): 70-88. “Closeness in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction: Debating Kinship 
and Biomedicine in Lebanon and the Middle East,” Anthropological Quarterly 80 (2007): 379-402. “New 
Kinship, Islam, and the Liberal Tradition: Sexual Morality and New Reproductive Technology in 
Lebanon,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 14 (2008): 153–169. 
43 For example: al-Sayyid ‘AbdallÁh al-GhurayfÐ, and al-Sayyid Íasan al-NÙrÐ, “al-Manhaj al-istinbÁÔÐ 
‘inda al-Sayyid MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh,” [The method of deduction according to Sayyid M. Í. 
FaÃlallÁh] al-Ma‘Árij 8 (1997): 46-48. Ja‘far al-ShÁkhÙrÐ al-BaÎrÁnÐ, “NaÛra fÐ’l-manhaj al fiqhÐ li’l-
Sayyid MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh” [A look at the jurisprudential method of Sayyid M. Í. FaÃlallÁh], 
al-Ma‘Árij 8 (1997): 49-53.  Al-Ma‘Árij’s editorial team, “ al-Manhaj al-istidlÁlÐ li-fiqh al-Qur’Án ‘inda 
ÀyatullÁh al-‘UÛmÁ MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh” [The deductive method for the Qur’Ánic 
jurisprudence according to M. Í. FaÃlallÁh], al-Ma‘Árij 4 (1996): 453-462. 
44 Miqdaad Versi, “Fadlallah: A Mainstream Radical,” Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies 3 (2010): 443-
464. 
45 Joseph Alagha, “G. Banna’s and A. Fadlallah’s Views on Dancing,” Sociology of Islam 2 (2014): 60-
86. 
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 2.3  FaÃlallÁh’s influence on ÍizbullÁh 
 
 Books on ÍizbullÁh usually dedicate some paragraphs to FaÃlallÁh’s presumed 
impact and role in the movement. Some scholars emphasise FaÃlallÁh’s impact on 
ÍizbullÁh’s use of political violence as the murshid rÙÎÐ (spiritual guide) of the 
organisation. For example, Martin Kramer,
46
 Magnus Ranstorp,
47
 Judith Miller,
48
 Fouad 
Ajami,
49
 James Piscatori,
50
 Ann Byers,
51
 Emmanuel Sivan,
52
 Scott Appleby,
53
 Graham 
Fuller
54
 claim that FaÃlallÁh was instrumental in the formation of ÍizbullÁh and his 
influence remained decisive later on. While others, such as Hala Jaber,
55
 Chibli 
Mallat,
56
 Augustus Richard Norton,
57
 Judith Palmer Harik,
58
 Daniel Sobelman,
59
 As’ad 
Abu Khalil,
60
 A. Nizar Hamzeh,
61
 and Joseph Elie Alagha
62
 find this claim simplistic 
and their relationship too complex to label it either as interdependency or as rivalry. 
One of the most recent studies is by Michaelle Browers
63
 who attributes the conceptual 
divergence between FaÃlallÁh and the cadres of ÍizbullÁh to a generational difference. 
                                                             
46 Kramer, “The Oracle of Hizbullah,” 83-181. 
47 Magnus Ranstorp, “The Strategy and Tactics of Hizbullah’s Current ‘Lebanonization Process’,” 
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48 Miller, Faces of Fundamentalism, 127. 
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Memorandum (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, January, 2004), 49. 
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She claims that the former’s primary concern was the formulation of a ShÐÝÐ Islamist 
worldview against the rival and secular ideologies while the latter showed more affinity 
to acting according to pragmatic political interests.
64
  
 In Hamid Algar’s view, FaÃlallÁh’s focus switched from the concept of wilÁyat al-
faqÐh to a new interpretation of marjaÝiyya.65 He defined the post of the marjaÝ al-taqlÐd 
as an exclusive, supranational, non-ethnic and merit-based authority. His claim of 
marjaÝiyya in 1995 and his consideration of it as a primary means to make his voice 
heard in the remotest ShÐÝÐ communities and to contest the authorities based in Najaf or 
Qum resulted from this new concept. 
 Adham Saouli’s article “Intellectuals and Political Power in Social Movements: 
The Parallel Paths of Fadlallah and Hizbullah” is the most recent analysis on the topic.66 
His aim was to detect FaÃlallÁh’s impact on the political strategies and actions of the 
organisation, but he evaluates FaÃlallÁh’s thought through the actions of the party even 
though he repeatedly admits that as time evolved, they pursued separate routes. 
 One of the most objective assessments of FaÃlallÁh’s thought and action is to be 
found in Chapter 16 of Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought, an essay followed by 
two illustrative interviews, one on Islamic unity and political change (1995), and the 
other on the events of 9/11 (2001).
67
 
 The secondary literature on FaÃlallÁh in Arabic can be grouped into interviews 
and analyses by his disciples and former colleagues, and critiques of his ideas on 
coexistence. The interviews are informative but repetitive; they present him as a 
constructive thinker, open to dialogue.
68
 The analytical studies are apologetic, meant to 
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Íusayn FaÃlallÁh [Questions and responses from the heart with Sayyid M. Í. FaÃlallÁh] (Beirut: DÁr al-
MalÁk, 2004). 
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prove the uniqueness, originality, and rationality of his reasoning.
69
 There is only one 
volume of overt criticism that questions his commitment to religious dialogue,
70
 and a 
few essays written by rival ShÐÝÐ scholars who viewed him as a radical whose religious 
ideas reflect compromise with the West and accused him of bargaining away some of 
the essential aspects of ShÐÝÐ identity and thus destroying ShÐÝism from within.
71
  
 The available literature on FaÃlallÁh fails to study his thought comprehensively 
and critically. My aim is to provide such an examination by an in-depth analysis of his 
theory of power. In particular, my contention is that a study of this kind can identify his 
significance in the history of ShÐÝism as well as help us understand better the recent 
history of ShÐÝÐ political thought and movements. 
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3.     Theory and method  
 
 For FaÃlallÁh, quwwa is a system of power in which the theological, the spiritual, 
the social and the political components are interrelated.
72
 Each of these elements plays a 
specific function, creating an organic unity that links the part to the whole. To prevent 
quwwa from becoming unrestrained violence, FaÃlallÁh stresses the importance of 
ethics. The ethics of power set the conditions that necessitate and the rules that regulate 
the use of force. Therefore, any study that aims to grasp FaÃlallÁh’s system of power 
should consider his systemic, functionalist and ethical theoretical frameworks of power.
 To address the three aspects of FaÃlallÁh’s theory of power: power as system, its 
organic unity and its ethics, I use three theories of power to be found in social sciences 
and political philosophy: Functionalism, Stuart Clegg’s Circuits of power and Just War 
Theory. On the one hand, Functionalism and Stuart Clegg’s Circuits of power provide 
useful concepts to understand FaÃlallÁh’s views on the systemic functions of power that 
regulate the community and guarantee the effectiveness of its parts. On the other hand, 
Just War Theory explains better FaÃlallÁh’s ideas on ethics of power, jihÁd, resistance, 
and revolution. This latter aspect particularly provides accurate answers to the question 
of the legitimacy of violence in contemporary Islamic thought. 
 
   
3. 1        Theory 
3.1.1      Functionalism 
 
 Functionalism, and in particular the social paradigm of Emile Durkheim
73
 
considered society as an organic unity and examined the factors of social coherence and 
social integrity. From among Durkheim’s core theses, three assumptions are applicable 
in the analysis of FaÃlallÁh’s ideas.  
 First, his model corresponds to the notion of society as a unity based on organic 
solidarity applied by the Functionalist approach.
74
 FaÃlallÁh compares Muslim society 
                                                             
72 FaÃlallÁh asserts “that the social and collective life of Muslims is an organic unity (…) just like the 
human body (…). This suggests to man that he does not represent an independent entity, but rather a part 
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to the human body in which the individual does not represent an independent entity; 
rather it is a part of a whole.
75
 This model corresponds to Durkheim’s concept that 
compared the advanced social structure to a living organism made up of various parts 
with distinct functions.
76
  
 Second, social solidarity is the basis for social equilibrium, which is essential for 
the proper functioning of the society.
77
 Durkheim differentiates between “mechanical” 
and “organic” solidarity. The former was “typical of early, segmentary, relatively 
homogeneous society when sentiments and beliefs are shared in common, where 
individuation is minimal, and collective thinking is maximal.”78 In contrast, “organic 
solidarity could develop from spontaneously arising consensus between individual 
actors who, just because they were engaged in different roles and tasks, were dependent 
on one another.”79  
 Third, in Durkheim’s analysis, social change is a gradual process by which 
conflicts and dysfunctions can be adjusted.
80
 Since the system is “homeostatic” or self-
regulating, it tends to adjust towards equilibrium.
81
 FaÃlallÁh considered the 
transformation of the individual, and the reform of the society as interdependent, and as 
prerequisites of the fight against injustice. This process presupposes individual 
(spiritual) preparation as well as social organisation, therefore, it must be gradual. In 
FaÃlallÁh’s view, the core message of the divine plan is justice and solidarity that create 
equilibrium in the society and thus transform the old pre-Islamic ties – the Durkheimian 
mechanical solidarity – into an organic one.82 As such, balance is essential in the 
empowerment of the community. 
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 3.1.2       Circuits of power by Stuart Clegg 
 
 A theory particularly useful for understanding FaÃlallÁh’s vision of power as a 
complex system in motion is Stewart R. Clegg’s model called the “circuits of power”.83 
The phrase expresses Clegg’s idea that the production and organising of power are 
manifested in three interrelated circuits like that of an electric circuit board. Clegg call 
these “circuits” the episodic, the dispositional, and the facilitative. His theory provides a 
dynamic view of power “as a phenomenon which can be grasped only relationally”.84 
Clegg considers organisation as agency of power
85
 in which negotiation, contestation 
and struggle between organisationally divided and linked agencies is a routine 
occurrence.
86
  
 Episodic power is manifested in concrete but momentary situations where 
different social agents interact and power is exercised by a certain group or 
organisation. Its practical accomplishment is based on alliances, and strategies.
87
 
Episodic power is sustained by “translat[ing] a phenomenon into resources, and 
resources into organization networks of control, of alliance, of coalition, of antagonism, 
of interest and of structure.”88 “Translation” consists of four instances: identifying a 
problem, presenting the agent as the provider of the only valid solution, constructing 
alliances, and mobilisation to ensure that the partners act in accordance with the 
interests of their representatives.
89
 For Clegg, power is not about obtaining resources, 
but rather “depends entirely on how they are positioned and fixed by the players, the 
rules, and the game.
90
  
 For FaÃlallÁh, the status quo is no more than an expression of episodic power. He 
strives to demystify the impact of the outward manifestations of power on the 
marginalised minority. He questions the basis of the prevailing order – episodic power – 
and points out its vulnerability. At the same time, FaÃlallÁh is engaged in constructing 
his own episodic power by translating the problems on the ground into a political 
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program. In this, he gives a comprehensive analysis of the problems, presents viable 
solutions, urges the forging of new alliances, and calls to action. 
 Clegg’s dispositional power denotes rules of practice that fix membership, 
relations and meanings. It is about the authority to set the rules of the game and to have 
the privilege of (re)interpreting them.
91
 For him, power is “accomplished by some 
agency as a constitutive sense-making process whereby meaning is fixed.”92 
Dispositional power governs social integration
93
 in which “rules of practice are at the 
centre of any stabilization or change. Through them, all traffic must pass.”94 This means 
that any change in the episodic power presupposes changing the “rules of the game” that 
govern the organisation. 
 FaÃlallÁh based his project of political empowerment on his conviction that in 
order to gain power, the “rules of the game” that operate and maintain the unjust status 
quo must be challenged and altered. He claimed that power comes from inside, the rules 
of the status quo are prone to change, therefore “dispositional power,” the rules that 
govern such systems are not absolute.  
 Facilitative power in Clegg’s model is the innovative potential that is capable of 
changing the power structure by empowering or disempowering certain agencies. It 
assures that “domination is never eternal, never utterly set in time and space: it will 
invariably be subject to processes of innovation.”95 Facilitative power affects the system 
integration by providing “a source of new opportunities for undermining established 
configurations of episodic circuits of power, as it generates competitive pressure 
through new forms of technique, new forms of disciplinary power, new forms of 
empowerment and disempowerment.”96 Thus, facilitative power is accessible for those 
who are currently deprived of episodic or dispositional power. It prompts change in the 
system by empowering a so far marginalised agent.  
 FaÃlallÁh, therefore, used this “facilitative power” to introduce “inventions” that 
prompt “empowerment from inside” in a bottom-up process. Facilitative power is the 
locus of force that directly affects the system and consequently the society, and finally 
prepares the ground for a change in the episodic, visible power. Therefore, he started the 
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process by reinterpreting ShÐÝÐ tradition and transformed the doctrines of quietism and 
Messianism into a creed of activism.  
 Clegg identifies nodes in the system of circuit as “obligatory passage points” 
through which episodic expressions of power are channelled.
97
 They assist social 
integration by securing context-dependent interpretations of meanings and rules. For 
him solidification of power presupposes “a stable organization field of extensive, 
coherent and solidaristic alliances and nodal points.”98 In FaÃlallÁh’s system of thought 
I consider religious doctrines as “nodes” or “obligatory passage points” that must be 
passed in order to convey his message of empowerment and solidarity to the ShÐÝÐ 
public. The overall impact of reinterpreting dogmas as taking control of an obligatory 
passage point was that it allowed and prompted the ShÐÝa to exercise their interests 
through activism, mobilisation and use of force. 
 Clegg’s “circuits of power”, therefore, helps to understand the complexity of 
power in FaÃlallÁh’s thought, and helps to grasp FaÃlallÁh’s strategy of reinterpretation. 
At the facilitative level he spiritually empowered the marginalised community and 
opened up previously hidden resources of activism. It also meant taking control of an 
“obligatory passage point” by linking ShÐÝism to power, and, therefore, altered the 
charge of all three circuits of power. The knock-on effect at the dispositional circuit was 
that it questioned the validity of the prevailing order and changed what it meant to be a 
ShÐÝÐ. At the episodic circuit, it opened the way towards getting their share of authority 
and resources by legitimising the use of force.  
 
 
 3.1.3        Just War Theory 
 
 FaÃlallÁh’s al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa was written in 1976 at the first phase of 
the Lebanese civil war, in the midst of heavy bombardments targeting FaÃlallÁh’s 
immediate neighbourhood. The situation in Lebanon determined his goal: to validate 
ShÐÝÐ participation in the Lebanese war, to argue for the use of force according to the 
Islamic system of norms, and to activate the activist understanding of the ShÐÝÐ political 
tradition. For FaÃlallÁh, the use of force must be purposeful and controlled. However, 
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when social justice is endangered or its realisation is hindered or made impossible by 
foreign or domestic powers, resort to violence is not only permitted but it is an 
obligation. In understanding the rules that govern FaÃlallÁh’s ideas on the use of force I 
applied Just War theory. It provides a set of principles applicable to FaÃlallÁh’s 
taxonomy on the various forms of power and to his insistence on the moral purposes of 
resorting to violence. 
Just War Theory in its original Christian understanding served to legitimate: 
experts of religious law designed sets of rules that were meant to guide the 
considerations that precede the declaration of war. These norms – at least in theory and 
discourse – had to be respected, because the legitimacy of politics depended on its 
correspondence to the respective religious ideals. Nevertheless, these theories did not 
exclude intra-religious wars resulting from mutual accusations of apostasy, thus turning 
warfare into a religious obligation. This could take place because in monotheistic 
religions “Faith” and “Truth” have always been higher values than peace. In depth, 
religious cultures cannot differentiate between offensive and defensive wars.
99
  
Classical Just War Theory is rooted in scholastic philosophy and canon-law. 
Augustine linked just war to the love for others. He stated that war is a consequence of 
sin and remedy for it. It becomes an act of love when its aim is to prevent evil doers 
from doing further wrong. Hostile act is a criterion of warfare, also, ecclesiadtical 
authority had the right to coerce heretics. Augustine limited the sorts of persons and 
restricted the conditions of declaring war to proper motivation, legitimate – especially 
divine – authority, and the just cause of avenging injuries.100These considerations are 
meant to control both jus ad bellum and jus in bello.  
In Augustine’s system, the justification of the fight depended upon the parties’ 
relation to the divine truth. St. Thomas of Aquinas went a step further in his Summa 
Theologica by defining the criteria to measure one’s closeness to divine truth such as 
just reason, right intention, and the legitimacy of the authority. Other medieval sources 
add to them that the goal of the war must be peace, it can be declared only if other 
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solutions proved to be useless, and it should be proportionate with the aim of the fight. 
Thus appeared the principles of jus in bello: proportionality and differentiation.101  
However, the content of the principles listed above was diverse. Just cause could mean 
intervention to defend the innocent (Augustine), the tool of divine punishment (Thomas 
of Aquinas), self-defense (this was refused by Augustine as a sign of sinful 
selfishness),
102
 or free warfare against enemies outside Christendom (such as the 
Crusades). Right intention meant belief in the supreme goals of the fight, a criteria that 
was difficult to prove. Legitimate authority meant the ruler and later the sovereign state. 
It was Calvin who first vindicate the right of sub-state actors to rebel against a 
despot.
103
 Proportionality aimed to control the use of violence.  
As Hugo Grotius pointed out, “when it is evident that the belligerent waging a 
just war is acting with rightful force, it follows that the enemy against whom the just 
war is waged must necessarily be disposed in the opposite fashion.” 104 This remark 
makes it clear that Just War Theory is exclusive, it justifies the claims of only one of the 
parties. In Western history the era of Just War ended with the immense destruction of 
the Thirty Years’ War in which both sides accused each other of heresy. The consequent 
destruction resulted the acknowledgemnt that “that a certain degree of right might exist 
on both sides [and] and with positivism and the definitive establishment of the European 
balance of power system after the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, the concept of the just 
war disappeared from international law as such.”105 
 My choice for applying Just War Theory in my analysis of FaÃlallÁh’s concept of 
jihÁd is in line with John Kelsay’s argument that “[t]he judgments pertaining to jihad 
and the just-war tradition have much in common, in the hands of a conscientious 
interpreter.”106 Just war theory seeks to answer the question of what makes armed 
struggle a justifiable method of attaining communal goals, or of achieving the 
implementation of regulations and ideals based on creeds and ideologies. It also defines 
the rules that must be consciously observed and systematically accepted in the course of 
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the combat. Finally, it provides aspects to judge when the use of violence – as means – 
ceases to justify the ends declared at the outset as legitimate. According to Emile 
Nakhleh, the just war tradition as “a more or less conceptual parameter (…) [serves to 
avoid] the trap of circular repression, which initially was to be broken by the 
employment of violence (…) [and] to guarantee a minimum level of objective vision 
during the violent process”.107 
 Just War Theory relies on a set of norms accepted within a given society. 
Therefore, armed struggle or the resort to violence can only be justified from distinct 
and recognizable moral perspectives. These perceptions are rooted in secular or 
religious systems of thought. I agree with Steve Bruce who claims that religion is 
related to political violence in as much as it sets a “cultural background from which 
political actors, in considering the possibilities of political violence, construct 
vocabularies of motives”.108 Religion, thus, is not the primary cause of violence but nor 
is it independent from its manifestations. 
 That Just War Theory is a suitable framework for a study of Islamic political 
thought was confirmed recently by a number of scholars. For instance, Adam L. 
Silverman contends that “In both the West’s conception of just war and Islam’s 
conception of jihad and shahada, one can find concepts of proportionality, redress, 
limitations on combat, defence, and the need to exhaust other methods before resorting 
to violence.”109 Another scholar, Khalid Yahya Blankinship attempts to prove that the 
set of criteria that serves to define what is legitimate and illegitimate in the Western 
tradition provides useful and applicable aspects for analysing a theory on just war that 
belongs to the Islamic tradition.
110
  
 The principles of Western just war tradition are traced back to the Middle Ages 
when two different but interconnected sets of criteria were laid down: rules that govern 
the justice of war (jus ad bellum) and those that govern just and fair conduct in war (jus 
in bello). As a later development, a third category of criteria was established focusing 
on the responsibility and accountability of the opposing parties after the war (jus post 
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bellum).111 However, in the history of wars, one set of criteria gained and lost 
importance with respect to the others according to the religious, philosophical or 
political requirements qualified as governing principles.
112
   
 The jus ad bellum principle requires a just cause, a proper authority to decide on 
the launch of armed struggle, and specification of the right intention.
113
 In relation to the 
jus ad bellum criteria my inquiry is aimed at answering how FaÃlallÁh defines “just 
cause,” eligible authority, and “right intention”. How does he prioritise among these 
principles? How does he re-define political concepts and support political claims in the 
light of religious precepts? How much attention does he pay to practicalities and 
consequences?  
 The jus in bello principle requires discrimination between legitimate and 
illegitimate targets in war and proportionality to minimise overall suffering. In relation 
to the jus in bello criteria, I am going to answer the following questions: How much 
attention does FaÃlallÁh pay to “proportionality” and “discrimination”? How does 
FaÃlallÁh define responsibility? 
 As far as the jus post bellum criteria are concerned, my analysis focuses on the 
question of proportionate punishment and the link between the “re-education of the 
aggressor” and the call to Islam (daÝwa). Finally, I aim to identify the governing 
principle of FaÃlallÁh’s system of thought with respect to warfare, and to clarify how 
this governing principle influenced his elaboration of the rules of jus ad bellum, jus in 
bello, and jus post bellum. 
 
 
 3.2  Method 
 
 In my analysis, I apply a qualitative content analysis combined with a study of 
rhetorical argumentation. My aim is to provide an integrated view of the text by 
identifying the specific interrelated themes in their specific – social, historical – 
contexts. This method requires inductive reasoning – in detecting themes and categories 
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– as well as deductive reasoning that tests my hypothesis concerning the functional and 
ethical characteristics of FaÃlallÁh’s theory.  
 The process of the analysis contains three steps. The identification of individual 
themes as units of the study is based on the message they carry: doctrinal, spiritual, 
social, political, and ethical. This is followed by a comparative analysis of FaÃlallÁh’s 
reinterpretation of the relevant traditions and terms with respect to that of other 
prominent thinkers and trends. The third step is a summative content analysis regarding 
the references quoted by FaÃlallÁh and the terms used, extended by an attempt to point 
to latent meanings and messages to the readers. In the concluding sections, I aim to 
detect the role of the particular thematic unit in FaÃlallÁh’s system of force, and the 
consequences of his interpretation in the given social-political context. 
 In the final chapter, I analyse FaÃlallÁh’s rhetoric by which he justifies and 
legitimises power and constructs a new narrative of violence. FaÃlallÁh’s aim is to prove 
that under certain conditions a violation of a moral rule is not immoral but morally 
justified and even required by the religious law. Accordingly, FaÃlallÁh’s al-IslÁm wa-
manÔiq al-quwwa endorses a specific rhetoric of violence. Through a set of arguments, 
he justifies an internal logic of power in the ShÐÝÐ Islamist political perspective. The 
chapter explores the various forms and tools of his reasoning and attempts to answer the 
following question: What is peculiar in his reasoning in terms of its premises, 
conclusions, and implications? 
 The method that is relevant to classify the tools and strategies of FaÃlallÁh`s 
argumentation should emphasise FaÃlallÁh’s functionalism and ethics. For this reason, I 
found an article by Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberley Hutchings entitled “Argument and 
Rhetoric in the Justification of Political Violence” to be particularly useful.114 The 
authors define key aspects for argument analysis and offer a useful typology for the 
various tools of reasoning. Also, they emphasise that the message can be conveyed only 
“to the extent that the reader both shares the values being put forward in the text, and 
agrees with the author’s association of certain values with certain political positions.”115 
Thus, the text becomes “part of a universe of meaning that is (or at least may be) shared 
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by the reader.”116 All through the dissertation, I examined FaÃlallÁh’s rhetoric and its 
meaning for his audience. My analysis and critical study is meant also to discover the 
internal contradictions of his reasoning. 
 The aim of the analytical methods described above is to help the understanding of 
FaÃlallÁh’s reasoning as a political theory that considers violence not as a violation but 
as an ethical act within the system of quwwa. The theories I rely on serve as a 
framework to understand FaÃlallÁh’s justification, while the method of my analysis 
provides a complex multi-layered approach to his text. 
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Chapter I: MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh: An Intellectual Biography 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
 Understanding ideas requires familiarity with the personality of the instigator who 
articulated them, and with the context in which they were formulated. In FaÃlallÁh’s 
biography, we can detect the roots of the three major features characteristic of his 
thought: compositeness, comprehensiveness and the concern with empowerment. 
FaÃlallÁh’s life could be divided into four stages: formative years in Iraq, mobilisation 
and institution-building in Lebanon, the rise to prominence during the civil war, and 
intense – juristic – involvement in social affairs and inter-denominational dialogue. In 
the last phase of his life, he increasingly addressed contemporary challenges and social 
transformation parallel to his fading influence on politics and emerging divergences 
with ÍizbullÁh. 
 
 
 1.  1935-1966: Formative years in Iraq 
 
 Sayyid MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh was born in 1935 in Najaf, in a religious 
and scholarly family of Lebanese origin.
117
 After finishing his elementary education he 
enrolled in a newly established modern religious school maintained by the JamÝiyyat 
MuntadÁ al-Nashr, an association that set up schools in various Iraqi cities with the aim 
of providing Islamic education “in a more systematic way than was characteristic of the 
Îawza, and of integrating the study of Islam with the modern sciences.”118 Although 
FaÃlallÁh had to leave this modern school due to his family’s financial difficulties, the 
novel method and the curriculum of the institute had a formative impact on his 
thought.
119
 It gave him an early impetus to break down the barriers that separate 
                                                             
117 See: http://arabic.bayynat.org.lb/sira/shakhseya_29102010.htm. Accessed March 28, 2011. 
118 Robert W. Hefner, Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds., Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of 
Modern Muslim Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 244. 
119 al-Íulw and al-FaqÐh, As’ila wa-rudÙd min al-qalb, 12-13. 
  36 
tradition from modernity, to critically consider diverse trends and approaches, and to 
use them in support of his own idea.  
 FaÃlallÁh continued his higher education in the Íawza of Najaf from 1946, and as 
a young man he regularly participated in the cultural and literary activities organised by 
the JamÝiyya. He was familiar with all the major Arab literary and cultural magazines 
and trends of the 1940s and 1950s, and as a talented young poet he contributed to the 
religious and social events of Najaf.
120
 Among his readings at that time we find the 
works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Frantz Fanon and Paolo Freire.
121
 His interest and 
talent in literature contributed to the sensitivity and versatility of his approach in 
perceiving the human condition. 
 In the Íawza, he attended the baÎth al-khÁrij courses of ÀyatullÁh Abu’l-QÁsim 
al-KhÙ’Ð (d. 1992) a formative scholar and head of the Íawza at that time, praised, for 
his detailed, clear, and logical argument, his tactic of debate in which he turned the 
argument of his opponents to his own advantage.
122
 Among others from the high-
ranking ÝulamÁ’, we have to mention ÀyatullÁh MuÎsin al-ÍakÐm (d.1970), a fervent 
anti-Marxist who paid special attention to the ShÐÝÐ communities living far away from 
the religious centres,
123
 ÀyatullÁh MaÎmÙd ShÁhrÙdÐ (d.1974) and Shaykh Íusayn al-
ÍillÐ (d.1974),
124
 disciples of the great constitutionalist Mirza MuÎammad Íusayn 
NÁ’ÐnÐ (d.1936), and MullÁ ÑadrÁ al-BÁdkÙbÐ (d.1972),125 a prominent philosopher of 
his time.
126
 FaÃlallÁh emphasised the interactive style, the emphasis put on sound, and 
multi-layered reasoning as characteristics of the Íawza of Najaf, where students worked 
in study groups and were encouraged to enter into discussions and arguments with their 
teachers, thus providing ground for developing the skills of argument and discussion.
127
  
 It can be, therefore, assumed that FaÃlallÁh’s education, and the lively intellectual 
atmosphere in Najaf largely contributed to the compositeness of his thought, to his 
readiness to reinterpret and redefine traditional concepts, and engage in debates. In 
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1965, FaÃlallÁh received a certificate of ijtihÁd issued by his primary mentor, ÀyatullÁh 
al-KhÙ’Ð.128 
 The animated political environment from the late 1940s onwards also deeply 
influenced FaÃlallÁh, from his teenage years. He was shaken by the fall of Palestine,
129
 
and aware of the rise of the communist movement in Iraq. Besides, he was profoundly 
influenced by the stimulating journeys he made with his father to Lebanon from the age 
of 16, and his meetings with prominent ShÐÝÐ intellectuals there.
130
 As some of 
FaÃlallÁh’s early writings prove, by his late teens he had formed some convictions that 
he kept throughout his life. At his first visit in 1952, he wrote a poem in memory of the 
deceased Shaykh MuÎsin al-AmÐn (d. 1952) in which he dealt with the dangers of 
colonial ambitions, the question of Islamic unity and the identity crisis of young 
Muslims.
131
  
 From the late 1950s the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and radical secular 
ideologies were spreading quickly and won over a large number of ShÐÝÐ due to socio-
economic factors and to the fact that in the crucial decades between the 1930s and 
1950s the majority of the ShÐÝÐ ÝulamÁ’ had abstained from involvement in political 
affairs. Another major factor accounting for the decline in Islamic consciousness was 
the spread of modern public schools from the 1930s, while the Islamic educational 
institutions remained unreformed. Furthermore, as JamÁlÐ noted, in the 1950s there was 
no control of attendance and consequently no fixed criteria to define “whether a 
religious man is worthy of his claim or not.”132 As a result, Islam as a comprehensive 
social-political system lost its appeal for the young, educated generation, a process also 
mirrored by the decline in the influence of the ShÐÝÐ ÝulamÁ’.133 
 As his articles written in Najaf illustrate, FaÃlallÁh was aware that there was a 
need for a comprehensive and responsive Islamist ideology that was capable of 
competing with Marxism and at the same time unifying and mobilising Muslims for 
their common interests. Along with like-minded fellows such as MuÎammad BÁqir al-
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Ñadr he started to work on transforming the traditional Najafi environment into one that 
is responsive to the new social-political challenges. In an interview, FaÃlallÁh identified 
the spread of communism, Western colonialism, and the fate of Palestine as issues for 
which he and his peers strove to present Islam as a valid solution, by emphasising 
universal responsibility supported with activism in which Arab nationalism and 
Islamism complement each other.
134
  
 Before the formation of Íizb al-DaÝwa and prior to the ground-breaking work of 
MuÎammad BÁqir al-Ñadr, ShÐÝÐ Islamists studied and interpreted only the works of 
SunnÐ intellectuals and ideologues such as Íasan al-BannÁ, AbÙ’l-AÝlÁ al-MawdÙdÐ, 
ÓaqÐ al-DÐn al-NabhÁnÐ, and Sayyid QuÔb.
135
 However, the theory and programme of 
transnational SunnÐ Islamist movements in Iraq were hesitant; their actions 
uncoordinated and ineffective and the responses of Islamist intellectuals to the 
communist ideology were inadequate.
136
 Since ShÐÝÐ activism was sporadic, lacked 
cohesion both in structure and in ideas, and did not pay attention to build up significant 
mass support, the primary concern of FaÃlallÁh and al-Ñadr was the spiritual and 
political empowerment of the ShÐÝa. They – and like-minded reformists such as 
members of the JamÁÝat al-ÝulamÁ’ – realised the need for a new, dynamic Islamist 
discourse and organised political activity, in order to enable ShÐÝism to provide adequate 
solutions to the contemporary social and political problems.
137
 
 This enterprise required intellectual as well as organisational efforts. FaÃlallÁh and 
al-Ñadr regularly contributed to the journal al-AÃwÁ’ al-IslÁmiyya [Islamic lights] by 
writing its first and second editorials.
138
 In light of his theory of power articulated in the 
1970s in Lebanon, these writings already show two important characteristics prevalent 
in his al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa. First, FaÃlallÁh’s themes and terminology address 
an Islamist audience. Second, in terms of ideas, FaÃlallÁh’s articles show his 
overwhelming concern with power and activism. It is reflected in statements such as 
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that complying with the precept of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” obligates 
Muslim individuals to oppose un-Islamic laws and governments that separate religious 
values from political affairs.
139
 
 In his article, “al-ÝAmal awwalan” [“Action comes first”] he stated that Islamists 
in Iraq before all have to focus on individual transformation, then on organising 
themselves, and finally on the construction of an Islamic entity.
140
 Here, FaÃlallÁh 
argues that the formation of conscious Muslim individuals who are committed to social 
justice, equality and solidarity is indispensible in creating the Islamic society that 
embodies and guarantees these values. He urged the transformation of Islam into a 
dynamic force and a comprehensive theory valid in all fields of contemporary life.  
 In another article published in AÃwÁ’ in August 1964, entitled “Min mashÁkil al-
Ýamal li’l-IslÁm” [“Some problems of action in the service of Islam”] FaÃlallÁh 
emphasised the need for co-operation between the various Islamist movements in order 
to halt the exploiting ambitions of Western imperialism, to diminish the appeal to 
communism, and to create a unified action plan for the Palestinian problem.
141
 
 In 1960, FaÃlallÁh published his first treatises entitled UslÙb al-daÝwa fÐ’l-Qur’Án 
[The manner of calling to Islam in the Qur’Án], in which he opposed linking daÝwa to 
jihÁd142 as well as to “commanding right and forbidding wrong”.143 For FaÃlallÁh, daÝwa 
exercised by an Islamic movement serves the peaceful mission of Islamisation. In this 
work, he set out the ethical and moral principles of daÝwa, “and demonstrated the 
immediate relevance of the Qur’Ánic and Prophetic paradigms to the needs and 
aspirations of Muslim activists.”144 
 The series of political events that took place in the 1950s and 1960s and the 
struggle between the various political and ideological trends influenced FaÃlallÁh’s 
perception of the challenges that Islam had to face and the need to develop viable tools 
to confront them. In Najaf, FaÃlallÁh was exposed to various influences and trends that 
shaped his consciousness and argumentation. He became acquainted with foreign and 
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secular currents and saw their influence on young Muslims. He learnt how to stay loyal 
to the tradition and – at he same time – use the tool of reinterpretation in order to 
transform it into a theory of activism and empowerment, and enable it to respond to the 
rival trends and ideologies. In the field of activism FaÃlallÁh – together with 
MuÎammad BÁqir al-Ñadr – is considered as one of the fourteen founding members or 
pioneer activists of Íizb al-DaÝwa in 1957 or 1958.
145
 However, officially he never 
became a member of the party.
146
  
 We can identify three characteristics in FaÃlallÁh’s Islamist discourse and 
activities formulated in Najaf and preserved all through his life. These are: 
compositeness of ideas put at the service of his Islamist thought, comprehensiveness 
coupled with pragmatism, and the concern with power and empowerment as inevitable 
even for the mere survival of the ShÐÝÐ communities.
147
 Moreover, his commitment to 
SunnÐ-ShÐÝÐ rapprochement, his sensitivity to social problems, and his emphasis on the 
importance of education were all shaped by his Iraqi experience. 
  
 
 2.     1966-1976: Years in Lebanon prior to the publication of al-IslÁm wa-  
               manÔiq al-quwwa 
    
 FaÃlallÁh arrived in Lebanon in 1966 and settled in NabÝa, which was part of the 
so-called “Belt of Misery”. As reasons for his settlement in Lebanon, he mentioned the 
invitation of Lebanese ShÐÝa affiliated to a cultural society named JamÝiyyat usrat al-
ta’ÁkhÐ [Society of the Family of Fraternity] and the complex circumstances in Iraq – 
the hostile conditions under Colonel ÝAbd al-SalÁm ÝÀrif (1958-66).
148
 In addition, 
FaÃlallÁh could count on the support of his maternal relatives, the influential BazzÐ 
family of Bint Jbayl.
149
 I find Aziz’s assumption that FaÃlallÁh was able to gain more 
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influence from the periphery than he would have had from one of the traditional ShÐÝÐ 
centres of learning,
150
 to be perceptive.  
 NabÝa was the most populous slum quarter of east Beirut, shared by Lebanese 
ShÐÝÐ migrants from the South, Armenians, Palestinian refugees, Kurds, and Syrian 
foreign workers.
151
 With the financial backing of the JamÝiyya, FaÃlallÁh started his 
work with the systematic construction of institutions – such as mosques, schools, 
orphanages, clinics, and hospitals – that answered to the spiritual, educational and 
health needs of the community. He focused his attention on the local, overwhelmingly 
poor youth who – alienated from religion and abandoned by their religious leaders – had 
become affiliated to secular or leftist organisations.
152
 Some of these establishments, for 
instance a muÒallÁ (prayer hall), a Îusayniyya (a community place for commemorating 
the martyrdom of ImÁm al-Íusayn), a library, and a women’s club provided forums for 
various cultural activities as well as for religious education.
153
  
 In FaÃlallÁh’s view, the ÝulamÁ’’s detachment from the daily affairs, and the 
abstract interpretation of the dogmas resulted in the alienation of the common people 
from religion and in the conviction that religion did not offer relevant answers to 
contemporary problems. In his lectures he attempted to introduce the image of the ÝÁlim, 
who is aware of the contemporary challenges and engaged in finding relevant answers 
to them.
154
 FaÃlallÁh did not become involved in overtly political activism; rather he 
devoted himself to the formulation and dissemination of a modern, updated Islamist 
ideology. As part of this strategy, FaÃlallÁh established The Islamic Legal Institute (al-
MaÝhad al-sharÝÐ al-IslÁmÐ) modelled on Najaf’s religious seminaries, in order to offer 
advanced juristic education. The best students were sent to Najaf or Qum to finish their 
specialisation, and later returned to teach in the MaÝhad.155 
 Besides providing sermons, legal guidance, and managing the construction 
projects, he gave lectures and initiated intellectual debates on the prevailing cultural, 
religious, social and political issues. FaÃlallÁh later started to pay regular visits to the 
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villages and small towns of Bint Jbayl and al-NabaÔiyya. These events were open to the 
public and were followed by question-and-answer sessions.
156
 He frequently organised 
debates with activists of various leftist political organisations as well, particularly the 
Lebanese Communist Party for whom Bint Jbayl was a stronghold. 
 FaÃlallÁh’s aim was to prepare the intellectual ground for a new generation of 
activist ÝulamÁ’, whose role in the social and political life was essential for the desired 
social transformation.
157
 In the MaÝhad besides classical readings, the curriculum 
comprised BÁqir al-Ñadr’s IqtiÒÁdunÁ and FalsafatunÁ as well as FaÃlallÁh’s own 
writings.
158
 The institute provided the first qualified activists for the ShÐÝÐ Islamist 
movement in Lebanon.
159
 FaÃlallÁh’s vision of the all-inclusive Islamisation of the 
society is also manifest in his encouragement of a group of Islamist students from the 
Arab University of Beirut to form the Lebanese Federation of Muslim Students (al-
IttiÎÁd al-LubnÁnÐ li’l-Óalaba al-MuslimÐn). The Federation’s bimonthly journal al-
MunÔalaq became an important mouthpiece for FaÃlallÁh’s ideas from the mid 1970s.160  
 It becomes clear from a reading of the collections of his lectures and answers to 
the public that the recurring themes and reasoning characteristic of FaÃlallÁh’s view all 
through his life had been crystallised by the start of his Lebanese mission. The topics 
that he covers in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa appear in his talks collected in a volume 
entitled MafÁhÐm islÁmiyya ÝÁmma. The recurring questions raised by the audience and 
collected in separate sections at the end of each chapter seem to have determined 
FaÃlallÁh’s nodes of interest in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa. 
 In the lectures a recurrent theme is detecting the reasons for the present decay of 
Muslim societies. At his first public lecture “al-TahdhÐb al-ijtimÁÝÐ fÐ’l-islÁm” [The 
social education in Islam], he stressed the importance of congruence between the 
professed faith and the daily practices.
161
 FaÃlallÁh claimed that the oppressed bear 
responsibility for submitting to the oppressors. Islam by essence of its divinely ordered 
and comprehensive legal system offers a perfect social paradigm but political leaders 
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distorted religious values.
162
 He stressed the destructive effects of the rigidity and 
passivity of the ÝulamÁ’, the Muslim rulers’ abuse of human freedoms, and the impact of 
Western materialism and individualism.
163
 In another lecture entitled “QaÃiyyat al-Ýizz 
wa’l-dhull fÐ’l-islÁm” [“The issue of glory and degradation in Islam”], FaÃlallÁh pointed 
to the collaboration with alien powers, and the lack of personal and social strength as 
major reasons of the problem.
164
  
 In another talk “al-Amal wa’l-ya’s fÐ’l-islÁm” [Hope and Despair in Islam]165 
FaÃlallÁh claimed that the political, military, economic and cultural dominance of the 
Great Powers was the result of many factors, among them the prevailing misperception 
of dependence on foreign patronage in the Third Word.
166
 In his radical assessment 
FaÃlallÁh concluded that those who support in any form or for any reason the unjust 
status quo cannot be considered as believers.167 He saw the mission of Islamists in 
reinforcing the sense of a common Muslim identity – that transcends state borders and 
the SunnÐ-ShÐÝÐ divide – and in creating a realistic evaluation of the moral, intellectual 
and economic resources available to Muslims. On the grounds of this realpolitik they 
can become qualified actors on the international stage and take their share in the social 
and scientific-technological progress. Only after having acquired the needed inner 
strength and confidence can Muslims enter in any form of cooperation with a non-
Muslim power on a footing of equality.
168
  
 Among other topics that re-appear in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa we find 
FaÃlallÁh’s emphasis on Islam as a comprehensive system169 and his refutation of the 
Marxist perception of religion as a paralysing force.
170
 He stressed that Man, as God’s 
vicegerent on earth, is bestowed with responsibility and power and thus a human being 
is the agent of transformation and melioration.
171
 Another recurring theme in FaÃlallÁh’s 
thought is that change in the status quo presupposes human effort.172 He argued for 
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human freedom in decision-making and for Man’s responsibility of action.173 FaÃlallÁh 
claimed that the human being is empowered through faith, self-discipline, and 
observance of the sharÐÝa.174 He dealt with the problem of change in relation to the use 
of force
175
 and analysed its social aspects.
176
  
 Kramer claims that in his discourse FaÃlallÁh did nothing but combine “the 
traditional Islamic themes and the fashionable rhetoric of anti-imperialist nationalism”, 
by substituting “Muslims” for “Arabs” and “Islam” for Arabism”.177 However, before 
the outbreak of the civil war he did not outline specific political goals and strategies for 
Islamist activists.
178
 The next step in his intellectual activism came with the publication 
of three remarkable volumes, the first being al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa. The book on 
the importance of power and the legitimate use of force was finished in May 1976, 
based on the crystallised and edited version of his lectures delivered in the previous 
decade. As Fuad Ajami remarks, there is no record of the reception of al-IslÁm wa-
manÔiq al-quwwa when it was first published. The ideas that the book set out seemed 
more wishful thinking than a realistic assessment of the ShÐÝÐ Islamist potential. Ajami 
adds that “FaÃlallÁh’s book acquired a new kind of authority several years later.”179 
 The publication of al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa was followed by al-ÍiwÁr fi’l-
Qur’Án [Dialogue in the Qur’an] written with the aim of demonstrating that the Qur’Án 
is a resource for conducting dialogue as a means to convey the divine message to 
humanity.
180
 In the third book from the same period, entitled KhaÔawÁt ÝalÁ ÔarÐq al-
IslÁm [Steps on the Path of Islam], FaÃlallÁh provided principles and methods for 
Islamists engaging in religious-political activism.
181
 Among others he dealt with the 
social (ethical), political (mostly economic), and jihÁdi (in the sense of activist) aspects 
of daÝwa.182 He stressed that the Islamist transformation is a gradual process,183 and 
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underlined the importance of realistic assessment,
184
 for which cohesion between theory 
and practice, organisational skills, and mindful planning are essential.
185
 As for the 
means, he admitted that they must be varied and based on realistic assessment of the 
circumstances.
186
 He dedicated an extended sub-chapter to the problematic of taqiyya.187 
 In early July 1976 FaÃlallÁh was compelled to leave his constituency when the 
Phalangists overran and destroyed NabÝa.
188
 As Kramer remarks, “These Shiites, 
including FaÃlallÁh, had become some of the first refugees of Lebanon’s civil war.”189 
The fall of the district and the displacement of its inhabitants had a devastating impact 
on a decade’s intellectual and material efforts.190 He spent the rest of the year 1976 in 
Bint Jbayl. The situation, however, was no less dangerous in the South.
191
 FaÃlallÁh thus 
returned to the capital and settled in the neighbourhood of Bi’r al-ÝAbd in the Southern 
Suburbs (al-ÃaÎiya al-janÙbiyya).192  
 Due to his appointment in the same year as the official representative of AbÙ’l-
QÁsim al-KhÙ’i, and his widespread activity in lecturing and institution-building, 
FaÃlallÁh’s reputation and influence considerably increased. At the same time, a group 
of talented students returned to Lebanon from Najaf because the Ba’athist regime 
expelled many of the foreign students following a series of rebellions in 1977.
193
 
FaÃlallÁh’s organisational and theoretical contributions to the Lebanese ShÐÝÐ social and 
political scene prior to, and at the outset of the civil war had a formative impact on the 
perception of the radicalised youth and thus – in the following decades – influenced the 
entire Lebanese political milieu. His ideas set out in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa 
ensured his place among the leading Islamist theoreticians of the 20
th
 century.  
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 3.        Some aspects of FaÃlallÁh’s importance as the foremost Lebanese ShÐÝÐ 
jurist-theologian (1976-2010) 
 
 
 In describing the years between the publication of al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa 
in 1976 and his death in 2010, I focus on four issues that were decisive in assessing 
FaÃlallÁh’s importance. 
 
 
 3.1        FaÃlallÁh and the concept of wilÁyat al-faqÐh 
 
 In order to understand FaÃlallÁh’s claim to the title of marjaÝ al-taqlÐd, first we 
need to consider the repercussions of KhumaynÐ’s definition of wilÁyat al-faqÐh 
(guardianship of the Islamic jurists) for the ShÐÝÐ community worldwide. The principle 
with regards to Lebanon implied that KhumaynÐ and his successor are to be vested with 
extra-territorial authority over the ShÐÝa, and also the quest for the immediate 
establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon.  
 From among the abundant number of hypotheses on FaÃlallÁh’s stance, I find 
three ideas worth consideration. Clarke pointed out that “FaÃlallÁh moved to allowing 
the possibility of multiple ‘guardian jurisprudents’ for distinct regions with distinct 
concerns”, and later “abandoned the notion altogether in favour of the rule of law 
(wilÁyat al-fiqh) over that of the jurist (wilÁyat al-faqÐh)”.194 Aziz and Shaery-Eisenlohr 
emphasised the link between FaÃlallÁh’s claim of marjaÝiyya and his rejection of the 
institution of wilÁyat al-faqÐh.195 Hamid Algar elaborated the problem of this connection 
by drawing attention to the fact that the constitution of the Islamic Republic was 
amended in 1989, and the requirement that the walÐ al-faqÐh has to be a marjaÝ al-taqlÐd 
(the primary source of emulation) was removed, thus, the institution of wilÁyat al-faqÐh 
– coinciding with FaÃlallÁh’s interpretation became more confined to the political 
system of the Islamic Republic. Accordingly – in Algar’s view – FaÃlallÁh’s focus 
switched from the concept of wilÁyat al-faqÐh to a new interpretation of marjaÝiyya. 196  
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3.2         FaÃlallÁh’s understanding of ShÐÝism and his claim to marjaÝ  
        al-taqlÐd 
 
 FaÃlallÁh assumed the title of marjaÝ al-taqlÐd in 1995. This claim was related to 
two core ideas. First, to his attempt to find a new basis for the self-definition of the 
ShÐÝa, one that is not reactionary or based merely on historical grievances against the 
Sunnites, but rather provides theological support to the fight against “imperialism” and 
oppression. Second, it was related to his conviction that living on the margins of the 
ShÐÝÐ world in a multi-denominational, cosmopolitan, culturally “composite” region he 
had the means and the freedom to work out a modern ShÐÝism that provides 
comprehensive answers to the challenges of the day. His own empowerment as a 
religious scholar was inevitable in this process. However, FaÃlallÁh, for practical 
reasons strongly opposed the excessive veneration of charismatic leaders, and urged 
focus on the message without yielding to the appeal of the leader-hero.
197
 
 FaÃlallÁh’s reinterpretation of ShÐÝÐ tenets in view of Muslim ecumenism triggered 
both support and condemnation in his own community. Stephan Rosiny describes the 
FÁÔima al-ZahrÁ’ controversy as a clash of two tendencies within ShÐÝÐ historiography 
represented by JaÝfar MurtaÃÁ al-ÝÀmilÐ and FaÃlallÁh.
198
 In Rosiny’s view, the debate 
had strong social and political implications because it coincided with a religious and 
political power struggle over the marjaÝiyya and over the control of the Lebanese ShÐÝite 
community.  
 With respect to FaÃlallÁh’s efforts to reinterpret some ShÐÝÐ tenets and his claim to 
be a source of emulation, there are three dominant and interrelated hypotheses. Shaery-
Eisenlohr claims that FaÃlallÁh’s emphasis on “Arab Islamism”, and considering 
himself a representative of “the rationalist school” (al-madrasa al-Ýaqliyya) of religion 
served to define himself and establish a reputation as a specifically Arab marjaÝ. In 
Hamid Algar’s view, FaÃlallÁh defined the post of the marjaÝ al-taqlÐd as an exclusive, 
supranational, non-ethnic, merit-based authority. His claim of marjaÝiyya in 1995 
resulted from this new concept and his consideration of it as a primary means to make 
his voice heard in the remotest ShÐÝÐ communities and to contest the authorities speaking 
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from the religious centres such as Najaf or Qum.
199
 Roy Mottahedeh pointed out that 
FaÃlallÁh added another important criterion besides that of the excellence in Islamic 
sciences, namely that the marjaÝ is required to be capable and willing to visit the various 
ShÐÝÐ communities worldwide. This condition obviously suited FaÃlallÁh’s character and 
capacities at that time.
200
  
 In his lifetime FaÃlallÁh was considered the foremost and most influential ShÐÝÐ 
jurist in Lebanon. However, his status as a marjaÝ was widely contested for reasons 
which can be attributed to his commitment to the SunnÐ-ShÐÝÐ rapprochement, his 
“Levantine” cosmopolitan ShÐÝism, as well as to the ÝulamÁ’’s reluctance to accept 
universal leadership from an ÝÁlim living outside the traditional religious centres.201 
FaÃlallÁh, however, argued that “it is not possible to transpose scholarly opinions 
(fatÁwÁ) wholesale from Tehran to Lebanon”.202 
 
 
3.3         FaÃlallÁh’s relation to ÍizbullÁh 
 
 The relationship between FaÃlallÁh and the organisation was probably the most 
widely discussed topic in the media as well as in the Western secondary literature. In the 
jungle of arguments and counter-arguments based on the reconstruction of oblique 
historical events, Joseph Elie Alagha, in his book The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, 
provides useful aspects for an objective evaluation of FaÃlallÁh’s impact on HizbullÁh. 
He claims that at a theoretical level FaÃlallÁh’s views – especially those set out in his 
books al-Íaraka al-IslÁmiyya: humÙm wa-qaÃÁya [The Islamic movement: concerns 
and issues] and IrÁdat al-quwwa [The will to power] – were inspiring for the formation 
and justification of ÍizbullÁh’s strategies and militant actions – for instance his 
sanctioning of “martyrdom operations” as “self-sacrificial defensive jihÁdi acts”203 – as 
well as the movement’s decision to integrate in the parliamentary system of Lebanon 
after the ÓÁ’if Agreement (1989).  
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 However, Alagha asserts, their views diverged on many practical issues. He 
recalls that, “during the 1980s, FaÃlallÁh has openly called for the rationalisation and 
routinisation of (...) ÍizbullÁh’s enthusiastic-unbalanced discourse” and spoke out 
against the hijackings and kidnappings attributed to the organisation.
204
 FaÃlallÁh later 
differed from ÍizbullÁh on issues such as the adherence to the principle of wilÁyat al-
faqÐh, the timing of the implementation of the Islamic state in Lebanon, as well as 
certain electoral policies, for instance declaring the vote in favour of ÍizbullÁh at the 
2005 elections as al-taklÐf al-sharÝÐ (legitimate and religious responsibility).205 FaÃlallÁh 
did not endorse ÍizbullÁh’s use of religious rituals and public processions as tools of 
mobilisation, while the movement did not back his statements in which he reinterpreted 
some core tenets of ShÐÝism. Therefore, we cannot regard FaÃlallÁh’s reluctance to relate 
himself officially to the organisation as a merely tactical step,
206
 or as motivated by 
fear.
207
 
 With respect to the differences of views between FaÃlallÁh and ÍizbullÁh, I 
assume that FaÃlallÁh’s guidance for ÍizbullÁh represented a set of general principles 
that could be set aside according to the requirements of the day. It is a fact that 
FaÃlallÁh’s theoretical and institution-building activities were decisive in the education 
and politicisation of a generation of young ShÐÝÐ, who joined the emerging ÍizbullÁh 
during the civil war. However, while the generation to which ÍizbullÁh’s current 
leaders belong was primarily tuned to militant activism financed by Iran, FaÃlallÁh’s 
vision of resistance was much broader and aimed at the comprehensive reform of 
religious perception and mentality. As Clarke reminds us, his “avowed ‘open-
mindedness’ (infitÁÎ) has challenged and alienated some within the upper echelons of 
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ÍizbullÁh.”208 After the death of KhumaynÐ, ÍizbullÁh named ÀyatullÁh KhameneÐ as 
their new marjaÝ, and this implies their adherence to the direction envisaged in Tehran.  
 
 
 3.4  FaÃlallÁh and the Islamic State 
 
 The establishment of an Islamic state was an issue on which FaÃlallÁh’s views 
proved to be the most varying and versatile in the course of his life. Most scholars agree 
that with regards to the necessity and method of implementing the Islamic state, there 
are well distinguishable stages in the evolvement of FaÃlallÁh’s thought.  
 In al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, FaÃlallÁh suggested that religious minorities 
were to be governed by the “dhimmÐ contract”,209 but he did not specify the Lebanese 
case. Khashan claims that after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon FaÃlallÁh set the 
creation of an Islamic republic as a long-term goal.
210
 Browers defines FaÃlallÁh’s 
theory of al-ÎÁla al-IslÁmiyya that he developed in the late 1980s as a project with the 
aim of unifying the ShÐÝÐ community and activists in order to establish an Islamic state 
under the banner of an overarching Islamic ideology.
211
 Sankari remarks that already in 
1985 during a visit to Iran, FaÃlallÁh opposed the immediate establishment of an Islamic 
state in Lebanon.  
 His position changed again in the post-ÓÁ’if era, and became more cautious and 
tactical due to “the multi-confessional composition [of the Lebanese state], the distaste 
of non-Islamists, and the hostility of regional powers”.212 His ideas became more 
realistic and less definitive towards the end of his life. This phase is well illustrated by 
an interview that Joseph Alagha conducted with him in 2005. By that time FaÃlallÁh had 
developed a framework called al-sÁÎa al-insÁniyya, an “humanistic milieu” that 
transcended the sectarian lines of Lebanese politics. He designed it as a pluralistic 
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Islamic cultural sphere built on the concept of citizenship (muwÁÔana) in which notions 
such as the Islamic state and ahl al-dhimma become bygone constructs.213  
 In the evolvement of his views we can notice a tendency in which the question of 
Islamic state in Lebanon became more that of an “exercise” in daÝwa through 
intellectual debate and finding new ways to spread Islam in the West. FaÃlallÁh’s 
approach of gradual and almost inconspicuous Islamisation of a multi-confessional 
society could serve as an experiment for the same process in the similarly multi-
confessional region and, over the long term – through the diasporas – could provide a 
“road map” for the Islamisation of the entire world.  
 
 
 Concluding remarks 
 
 FaÃlallÁh’s intellectual biography reveals his concern to transform Islam into a 
religion of empowerment. His ideas and social-political activities were focused on 
turning Islam into a viable and comprehensive answer to the issues of the day, and at the 
same time on empowering his community. Due to his upbringing and education in Iraq 
and his rise to prominence in Lebanon, his system of thought was formed by a sufficient 
knowledge of Sunnism, Marxism, and Christianity as well as first-hand experience in 
the pitfalls and opportunities of political activism. Witnessing the same problems and 
challenges in Iraq and in Lebanon urged him to find comprehensive answers. FaÃlallÁh 
realised the importance of empowerment while facing the persecution of the Iraqi ShÐÝa 
and later on the vulnerability of the ShÐÝÐ community in pre-war Lebanon. His personal 
fate that brought him unique opportunities as well as extreme calamities goes a long 
way towards explaining his resourcefulness. 
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Chapter II: Historical and Intellectual Background:  
Transformation of ShÐÝism in Modern Times 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
 In the shifting, challenging and complex Lebanese political environment, the ShÐÝÐ 
community needed a project of power. This would provide a road map to attain its 
goals: a comprehensive theory of empowerment composed of all instruments available 
for the Lebanese ShÐÝÐ community. This chapter is dedicated to the socio-political and 
intellectual context of FaÃlallÁh’s theory of power. In particular, I examine the factors 
that determined the social posture of the ShÐÝÐ community prior to and in the course of 
the civil war, the major intellectual trends and reformist ideas concerning political 
representation and the Lebanese state. 
 
 
1.     Lebanon in the 1960s and 1970s and the transformation of the ShÐÝa  
 
 The redefinition and reinterpretation of ShÐÝÐ tenets and their adaptation to 
contemporary issues gained momentum in three countries with significant or majority 
ShÐÝÐ population, namely in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. In Iraq, the BaÝathist regime 
eliminated the ShÐÝÐ movement between 1977 and 1980, hamstringing the political 
implementation of a reformed ideology.
214
 Conversely, in Iran and Lebanon, the 
loosening grip of the central authority encouraged ShÐÝÐ activism. The failure of political 
reforms, the enforced westernisation and imposed prominence of secular values in 
everyday life, the increasing social disparities in spite of the radical growth in state 
revenues considerably weakened the ruling regimes. The ÝulamÁ’ took the opportunity 
and claimed an increased interference in politics. The Iranian and Lebanese clerics re-
interpreted the ShÐÝÐ religious heritage with a clear social agenda.  
 In Iran and in Lebanon, the political system lacked any ground for legitimacy. In 
Lebanon the framework set by the 1943 National Pact – based on the ratios laid down 
by the 1932 census – was no longer suitable for the socially, economically, 
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demographically transformed country. In Iran, there was a profound resentment over the 
old-fashioned autocratic rule, disrespectful of human rights and freedoms.
215
  
Second, in both countries the failure of the economic reforms was aggravated by the 
widespread dissatisfaction with the economic inequalities, and the glaring stratification 
was made obvious by the rapid urbanisation.
216
  
 The third factor was the misappropriation of western values and ideals in Lebanon 
just as in Iran. It meant the westernisation of administrative management and the 
economy, and widespread concessions given to foreign investors. In Lebanese as well as 
in Iranian intellectual circles this caused a fear of losing identity under the pressure of 
Westernisation and colonial ambitions.
217
 Marxist ideas were gaining ground, but in 
these countries communists did not form a well-organised, influential opposition. 
However, Marxist ideology steadily permeated the ideas of the secular and some of the 
religious reformers.   
 The ShÐÝa in Lebanon had no meaningful political representation while in Iran 
religious principles were not put into practice in public life nor in political practices. 
Against such a background there was need for a new discourse that emphasised the 
importance of social justice but distanced itself from Marxist ideology and world-view, 
condemned foreign imperialist ambitions, substituted the discredited nationalism with 
potent Islamism, urged the political participation of the ÝulamÁ’, and before all, 
reinterpreted the tenets of ShÐÝism thus preparing the way for organised political and 
social activism.  
 In Iran this project was carried out by KhumaynÐ, while in Lebanon the initiative 
was taken by MÙsÁ al-Ñadr. Both adopted a discourse based on ShÐÝÐ history, and 
abundant in ShÐÝÐ symbolism, such as transforming the events and actors of KarbalÁ’ 
into a paradigm through which contemporary politics was interpreted. Thus, ShÐÝÐ 
religious discourse became closely intertwined with national identity, as well as 
becoming a means of mobilisation against social and economic deprivation.
218
 
                                                             
215 Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (San Bernardino: 
Millefleurs, 1991), 9, 11. 
216 Jahangir Amuzegar, The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution, The Pahlavis’ Triumph and Tragedy. 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 5. Halawi, A Lebanon Defied (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1992), 143, 163. 
217 Amuzegar, The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution, 41. Mallat, “Aspects of Shi‘i Thought,” 25. 
218 Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent. The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran  (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 195. 
  54 
 Shaery-Eisenlohr describes al-Ñadr’s rising influence as based on “the dialectic 
intersection between class and religious national identity”.219 In this, the three-fold and 
simultaneous experience of economic impoverishment, religious oppression and 
political marginalisation “help[ed] to constitute an identity primarily couched in 
religious terms”,220 as well as to construct the politics of the “deprived” (maÎrÙmÐn).221 
Al-Ñadr – who was a man of action rather than a theoretician – thus provided the ShÐÝa 
with a sense of community and made their voice heard on the Lebanese political scene. 
As Ajami points out, he supported the engagement of the ÝulamÁ’ in everyday and 
political affairs beyond the scope of their scholarly commitments.
222
 FaÃlallÁh’s 
enterprise was closely connected to al-Ñadr’s achievements. However, he went further 
and interpreted Islam as the source of empowerment embedded in a comprehensive 
theory of power. 
 
 
2. The Plight of the Lebanese ShÐÝa 
 
 By the end of the 1980s the ShÐÝa formed the largest denomination in Lebanon 
amounting to approximately 30%.
223
 However, in the Parliament they held only 19 seats 
out of 99, and among the high-ranking officials of the army, the internal security, and 
the diplomatic corps they were heavily underrepresented due to the gerrymandered 
consociationalism asserted by the National Pact.
224
 The traditional leaders (zuÝamÁ’) and 
their clientele monopolised positions of authority in local and national politics, and were 
more concerned with the preservation of their own social and economic standing than 
with the grievances of their community.
225
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 In the South, the ShÐÝÐ population had a hierarchical structure consisting of 
landlords and tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and agricultural labourers. After the 
proclamation of the state of Israel in 1948, commercial ties with Palestine were cut. In 
addition, while in 1974 20 percent of the country’s population lived in the South, it 
received less than 0.7 percent of the budget for investment and development.
226
 From 
the early 1970s, due to the escalating clashes between the PLO and the Israeli army, the 
security environment deteriorated so severely in the South as to put the residents’ life at 
risk on a daily basis.
227
 In the BiqÁÝ Valley the ShÐÝa dealt with livestock farming and 
lived in a more egalitarian social system.
228
 The crisis of the agrarian sector and the 
aggravating security situation gave impetus for internal as well as external migration. 
Both regions belonged to the neglected zones of the country, outside the scope of 
infrastructural developments and governmental or private investments.  
 Due to the continuous exodus, by 1975 about 40 percent of the population of the 
predominantly ShÐÝÐ south Lebanon and about 25 percent of the population of the BiqÁÝ 
had settled in the slum suburbs of the capital, called the “Belt of Misery” in the vicinity 
of the Palestinian refugee camps where they lacked the basics of sanitation and public 
infrastructure.
229
 Thus urbanisation among the ShÐÝa became a source of new tensions 
and frustrations because in Beirut they had to deal with the institutionalised form of 
discrimination and neglect, while being exposed to the prosperity of the privileged 
segments of the society.
230
 The sobriquet applied to the ShÐÝa by other communities was 
mutawallī, a word used to refer to “everything that was considered low-class, tasteless, 
and vulgar”.231 
However, it was in the capital that the ShÐÝa coming from the southern and 
northern parts of the country first lived in the same environment and shared the same 
difficulties. As opposed to the Sunnites of Lebanon who had strong urban traditions, 
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and beyond family ties developed firm professional and ideological bonds,
232
 in the case 
of the Maronite and ShÐÝÐ communities, the rapid urbanisation radically changed the 
traditional socio-political structure of the two communities. Among the marginalised 
urban ShÐÝa two major trends emerged. For some, family ties were replaced by stressing 
religious-sectarian connections.
233
 The annual ÝÀshÙrÁ’ festivals provided an 
opportunity to express their religious identity and to form bonds with other members of 
the community. While others – especially the youth – joined left-wing parties and 
radical Palestinian organisations that proclaimed equality, social justice and Arab unity. 
The most attractive of these was the Lebanese National Movement (1969) led by KamÁl 
JunblÁÔ, with a membership of socialists, communists, Arab nationalists and other left-
wing secular activists.
234
  
 By the 1970s, the ShÐÝÐ religious-political discourse and activism of MÙsÁ al-Ñadr 
had provided an authentic framework to express the grievances and aspirations of the 
community and thus gradually replaced “class consciousness among the ShÐÝa 
workers”.235 The policies pursued by Fu’Ád ShihÁb (1958-1964) aimed at national unity 
to be reached through social justice, political and administrative reform and as such 
provided good grounds for cooperation between MÙsÁ al-Ñadr and the president.
236
 
However, as the security situation worsened, al-Ñadr’s tone became harsher and armed 
struggle became a significant theme of his mobilising discourse.
237
 His aim was to 
pressure the government to implement a comprehensive reform programme and to set 
up “a new social contract”.238 The breakthrough occurred with the outbreak of the civil 
war in 1975, and with the consequent collapse of the Lebanese political system. This 
provided the ShÐÝa with an unprecedented opportunity to assert their interests through 
forceful means.
239
 The weakening of the LNM and the strengthening ShÐÝÐ identity 
prepared the way for the formation of the Amal in January 1975. 
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3.       Intellectual trends amongst the Lebanese ShÐÝa in the 1970s 
 
 Before the arrival of MÙsÁ al-Ñadr to Lebanon in 1959, the ShÐÝa had two main 
venues for asserting their interests: through their traditional zuÝamÁ’, or affiliation to 
left-wing secularist movements and parties that pooled into the Lebanese National 
Movement. The internal division of the community was also due to the geographical 
conditions of the country that separated the regions in which the majority of the ShÐÝa 
lived, namely Jabal ÝÀmil, the BiqÁÝ and the slums of Beirut. The circumstances, 
lifestyles and daily concerns of the various segments of the community differed, and so 
did the strategy they opted for to improve their conditions. Thus the ShÐÝa were “caught 
in the political space” between the reformist MÙsÁ al-Ñadr, the old elites – led by KamÁl 
al-AsÝad – and the secular radicals mainly affiliated to the Lebanese National 
Movement.
240
 The wealthy ShÐÝÐ expatriates were eager to acquire positions in the 
political hierarchy and mostly shared MÙsÁ al-Ñadr’s vision of reform.241  
 Due to the activism of MÙsÁ al-Ñadr and FaÃlallÁh, the religious opposition gained 
strength. However, there were further discords among the leading clerics regarding the 
three red-hot issues of the day: the nature and extent of support provided to the 
Palestinians, the political representation of the ShÐÝÐ population, and the status of the 
community in the Lebanese society.  
 
 
 3.1       The Reformist ÝulamÁ’ and the question of political representation 
 
 In Lebanon, it was MuÎammad JawÁd Mughniyya (1904-1979) who first raised 
his voice against the government’s discriminative policies and the resulting miserable 
condition of the ShÐÝa living in the South. He dealt with this problem in his first book 
entitled The Present Situation of Jabal ÝÀmil, published in Beirut in 1947. Mughniyya’s 
discourse was openly revolutionary, and he equally criticised the local population for 
accepting the discriminatory policy without any meaningful objection. His criticism was 
accompanied by “a concomitant program of social and economic change” as well.242 
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Chibli Mallat in his seminal study “Aspects of ShÐÝÐ Thought from the South of 
Lebanon” drew attention to the fact that ShÐÝÐ thinkers and leaders in Lebanon after 
Mughniyya offered no specific economic programmes, and the demand for change 
became simply the common denominator of the competing groups. “The talk on poverty 
and on the deprived (maÎrÙmÐn, mustaÃÝafÐn) has turned into a ritualistic element of 
speech among the new ShÐÝÐ forces.”243    
 Right after his arrival to Lebanon in 1959, MÙsÁ al-Ñadr engaged in institution-
building and political activism. In his discourse he aimed to “position Shiites within the 
Lebanese national narrative” asserting “that the labels of underclass and rural are in fact 
the two components that make the ShÐÝa the most authentic Lebanese citizens”.244 Al-
Ñadr in his rhetoric successfully applied the traditional ShÐÝÐ self-image of rebels against 
oppression to the contemporary Lebanese ShÐÝa as a downtrodden and disadvantaged 
community in an unjust political system.
245
 Also, he stressed that their struggle, 
similarly to that of the first followers of ImÁm ÝAlÐ, serves the interests of the larger 
community to which they belong, that is in general the entire Lebanese nation, and in 
particular all the deprived regardless of their denominational background.
246
 Al-Ñadr did 
not provide a coherent ideological plan, but rather focused on forging inter-sectarian 
alliances – through actions – thus improving the image of the Lebanese ShÐÝa in the eyes 
of the other communities, as well as their self-perception by using an activist rhetoric. 
 The formation of an autonomous administrative institution, the Supreme Islamic 
ShÐÝÐ Council was al-Ñadr’s initiative.247 The Council – like the similar institutions set 
up earlier by the Sunnites and Druze – was supposed to organise the religious, legal, and 
social affairs of the community.
248
 The agenda for the Council was made public in May 
1969 stating among its aims the improvement of the socio- economic conditions of the 
community, cooperation with all Lebanese denominations, protection of the integrity of 
Lebanon, and support to the Palestinian resistance. The principles did not have specific 
references to ShÐÝÐ history and tenets, rather – as universal religious values –they 
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referred to combating social injustice and improving morals in the society.
249
 The fact 
that it was headed by both clerics and lay intellectuals challenged the authority of the 
zuÝamÁ’, who, therefore, firmly opposed it. It created controversy within the ShÐÝÐ 
ÝulamÁ’ as well, its strongest opponent was MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh. He opted for 
the reinforcement of the already existing Higher Islamic Council as a unifying body for 
all Muslims in the country.
250
   
 In late 1973, the Council prepared and presented a list of twenty Demands. In the 
document great emphasis was put on the protection of South Lebanon with 
simultaneous support to the Palestinian resistance, on the investigation of government 
abuses, on the proportionate representation at every level of the state administration, and 
on the demand for social and economic policies based on equality.
251
 Both the Demands 
and the Charter of the Movement promoted gradual transformation, commitment to the 
Palestinian issue and national unity.
252
 According to Shaery-Eisenlohr the apparent lack 
of ShÐÝa specific discourse served to “position themselves at the center of the nation and 
as ‘true patriots’”.253 For A. AbuKhalil, the vagueness of the ideology presented in the 
documents made it more flexible for the growing radical mood of the ShÐÝa.
254
 
 However, neither of these documents suggested concrete solutions or provided an 
action-plan for the implementation of the desired changes. The next step was the 
formation of the ÍarakÁt al-MaÎrÙmÐn (Movement of the Deprived) in March, 1974.  
There are no available records on FaÃlallÁh’s public comment concerning the Charter 
and the Demands. His strategy was that of “cadre indoctrination in Islamist ideology” 
rather than mobilisation or the exercise of political pressures – a tactic pursued by al-
Ñadr.
255
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 3.2  Ideas on the nature of the Lebanese state 
 
 Ideas concerning the political system of the country varied a great deal among the 
religious ShÐÝÐ leaders. Mallat quotes one of Mughniyya’s last articles entitled “Our 
Weapon is the Qur’Án” in which he argues that “The salvation of Arabs and Muslims 
lies in the return to an Islam valid for all times and places.”256 However, for Mughniyya, 
until the return of the MahdÐ no one could claim supremacy over the body politic. 
Therefore, the foundation of an Islamic state was out of question.
257
 For him, the South 
was “an integral part of Lebanon with its rights and its duties”.258  
 MÙsÁ al-Ñadr argued that religion is the basis of morality for a society. He 
opposed the secular Pan-Arab inclination of the zuÝamÁ’ as well as the idea of a totally 
secular state propagated by the Left.
259
 Also, he strongly opposed the confessionalist 
system of parliamentary representation.
260
 For him, sectarianism was not bad in itself 
because it mirrored the composition of the society and it was transformable into a valid 
mode of coexistence. In the Charter of the Íarakat al-MaÎrÙmÐn, the metaphor of 
“cultural window” appears as a basis for a united Lebanese cultural identity.261 
 Those, who supported overtly Islamist tendencies, such as Shams al-DÐn and 
FaÃlallÁh first welcomed KhumaynÐ’s doctrine on the wilÁyat al-faqÐh. However, the 
fact that the political role of the supreme guide was to oversee the Islamic Republic and 
in Lebanon there was no chance for establishing it prompted FaÃlallÁh to make use of 
the emerging distinction between the offices and functions of marjaÝ and walÐ al-faqÐh 
after the demise of the Imam.
262
 FaÃlallÁh and Shams al-DÐn started to emphasise that 
the model of the wilÁyat al-faqÐh is not adaptable without meaningful alterations in the 
multiconfessional Lebanon where the ShÐÝa is a minority.
263
 As Mallat remarks, “For 
Fadlallah and Shamseddin, too much ShÐÝÐ popular feeling in Lebanon [was] identified 
with Imam Khumaini … their alignment with the Islamic Republic of Iran [was] 
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inevitable, although a careful reading of their advocacy shows that they rarely miss[ed] 
an occasion to praise Syria along with Iran.”264 
 As a young scholar, Shams al-DÐn dedicated his first book NiÛÁm al-Îukm to the 
system of governance in Islam, arguing for the ShÐÝÐ model as the only way to establish 
a divine-human state (dawla ilÁhiyya bashariyya). However, on his return to Lebanon 
from Najaf, his arguments shifted towards a unified ‘Christian-Muslim’ stance against 
communism and secularism.
265
 He did not oppose the confessionalist political system, 
rather urged a “return to the souls of both Christianity and Islam” and promulgated a 
proportionate representation (al-Ýadadiyya), based on the ‘principle of consultation’ – an 
idea supported by the ‘secular’ opposition as well.266 Although he took part in the 
conference in 1986 in Tehran that drafted an Islamic constitution for Lebanon, later he 
overtly opposed the implementation of the Iranian model in Lebanon.
267
 
 FaÃlallÁh at that time upheld a more radical position than that of his colleagues. It 
was partly due to his close relationship with those members of the al-DaÝwa who were 
forced to leave Iraq and found refuge in Lebanon. Chibli Mallat calls his position “a 
universalist Islamic appeal, in which ShÐÝism is portrayed as one further school of Islam, 
neither superior nor inferior to the other Sunni schools”.268 According to most 
assessments, FaÃlallÁh became the most important intellectual guide for al-DaÝwa 
affiliates in Lebanon.
269
 The Party espoused a long-term revolutionary agenda, and with 
FaÃlallÁh’s consent infiltrated the Movement of the Deprived (and subsequently the 
Amal) to promote radicalisation and Islamist orientation.
270
 FaÃlallÁh suggested the 
gradual implementation of an Islamic State – but did not make any specific remarks on 
the Lebanese case.
271
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3.3     The Palestinian problem 
 
 There was a unanimous consensus among the Lebanese Muslims that support 
must be provided to the Palestinians. However, concerning its modes and extent there 
were differences of opinion even inside the ranks of the ShÐÝÐ ÝulamÁ’. For Mughniyya, 
Israel was the primary enemy and he emphasised the need for unity and strength among 
Arab countries. However, he shared the residents’ anxiety about the Palestinian attacks 
against Israel launched from South Lebanon, and deemed the attitude of the Palestinians 
inconsiderate and selfish.
272
  
 By the mid-1970s, the situation worsened considerably, many ShÐÝa, who at first 
supported the Palestinian resistance, became hesitant. For al-Ñadr, the aspects to be 
taken into consideration were manifold. The most important were the security of the 
South, the Iranian policy towards the Lebanese ShÐÝa, and – closely related to this – the 
cooperation between the Iranian dissent movements and the different Palestinian 
fractions operating in Lebanon. The Shah – who maintained strong political and 
economic ties with the United States and Israel – provided financial support to the 
Lebanese ShÐÝa.
273
 MÙsÁ al-Ñadr’s declared position was “to support the Palestinian 
cause but simultaneously not to endanger the interests of Shiites in Lebanon – whose 
fate he considered his first priority.”274  
 Shams al-DÐn called for a common Arab strategy worked out by a group of 
specialists in education, communication, psychology, sociology, military experts and 
ÝulamÁ’ in order to offer “a comprehensive plan that secures the protection of the Arab 
individual and the umma”.275  However, as the situation in the South deteriorated, “his 
tone became increasingly ‘Islamic’ (sic)” and more focused on the need to protect the 
inhabitants of Jabal ÝÀmil.
276
  
 For FaÃlallÁh, the Palestinian issue kept its central importance for political action 
in both an Arab as well as in an Islamic framework. For him, the plight of the Lebanese 
South was inseparable from the Palestine question and consequently he claimed that any 
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meaningful solution must be reached on the ground by exercising pressure on the 
international powers. Thus the struggle for the liberation of Palestine had precedence 
over the security of the South that – in FaÃlallÁh’s assessment – would remain unstable 
due to the strategic territorial ambitions of Israel that covered south Lebanon as well.
277
 
 
 
 4.        The Impact of the civil war (1975-1977) on the Lebanese ShÐÝa 
 
 In March 1975 the civil war broke out in Lebanon. In the following I am going to 
refer to a few episodes that immediately preceded – and, therefore, partly inspired – the 
writing and publishing of FaÃlallÁh’s al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa.  
Palestinian armed groups – deployed in Lebanon following their expulsion from Jordan 
in 1971 – attacked Israel from their military bases in the South. Furthermore the PLO 
commandos controlled and harassed the locals at roadblocks and even detained or 
kidnapped Lebanese as well as foreigners, assuming that they constituted a danger to the 
Palestinian resistance.
278
 Thus the attempt of the ShÐÝa to stay neutral in the fighting, 
failed. In April 1975, they entered the conflict formally on the side of the Lebanese 
National Movement.  
 In June 1975, following a bomb explosion in a training camp in the BiqÁÝ al-Ñadr 
announced the formation of the “Amal” militia as the military wing of the Movement of 
the Deprived.
279
 Amal received weapons and training from the Palestinians,
280
 and the 
majority of ShÐÝÐ fighters at that time were still affiliated with the secular leftist parties 
and the PLO, thus Amal played only a marginal role in the first phase of the civil war.
281
 
However, MÙsÁ al-Ñadr did not support the endeavour of the Lebanese Left and the 
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Palestinian factions to overthrow the entire political system and turn Lebanon into a 
secular republic.
282
 
 In Beirut, the areas with majority or significant ShÐÝÐ population were torn 
between the Palestinian refugees and the inimical Christian districts.
283
 The 
vulnerability of the ShÐÝa is well exemplified by the transformation of the strategically 
situated portside slum districts of KarantÐnÁ and Maslakh – with a population of 
approximately 30,000 mostly ShÐÝÐ – into PLO bases for sniper attacks against Christian 
lines of communication and military convoys.
284
 The Phalangists launched retaliatory 
assaults on these localities in December 1975 and January 1976, wiping out the 
population of the predominantly ShÐÝÐ inhabited districts of ÍÁrat al-GhwÁrina, Maslakh, 
and KarantÐnÁ. The death toll of the ShÐÝÐ victims of the first two years of the civil war in 
1975-76 amounted to more than 30,000 lives.
285
  
 By 1976 NabÝa – situated on the vital supply-line that connected east Beirut to the 
predominantly Christian suburbs 
286
 – and Tall al-ZaÝtar were the two remaining 
bastions for the Palestinian fighters. Both of them had been under blockade since the 
previous autumn but it was eased somewhat during a break in the fighting in February 
1976. The units stationed there participated in the successful mountain offensive of the 
PLO-leftist Muslim alliance in March 1976.
287
 The impending full-scale Syrian military 
invasion in early June that aimed to help the Maronite militias and to prevent the 
partition of the country, and the emergence of a Muslim-Palestinian-dominated de facto 
state,
288
 opened the way for the Maronite militias to impose a total blockade on NabÝa 
and Tall al-ZaÝtar in June 1976.
289
 Of the two districts, NabÝa, FaÃlallÁh’s constituency 
was the more vulnerable to a prolonged siege and it suffered from an almost incessant 
and indiscriminate shelling. In the area there was only one hospital for almost 100,000 
people, shortages of food, water and medicine were common.
 290
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 By mid-1976 relations between the ShÐÝa and the Palestinians became more 
strained.
291
 In the midst of the devastating Christian offensive in July, MÙsÁ al-Ñadr 
entered into secret negotiations with AmÐn Jumayyil, the leader of the Christian 
Phalange (KatÁ’ib) resulting in an agreement on the withdrawal of the ShÐÝÐ population 
in NabÝa without a fight.
292
 However, Jemayel broke his promise and made no 
distinction between the ShÐÝÐ and Palestinian residents. Following the deportation of the 
surviving inhabitants to west Beirut, their properties were subjected to looting and 
destruction.
293
 With the fall of NabÝa and the subsequent subjugation of Tall al-ZaÝtar, 
with its 30,000 Palestinian and ShÐÝÐ inhabitants, the last areas in Beirut’s eastern 
suburbs with heterogeneous confessional communities were destroyed.
294
  
 
 
 Concluding remarks 
 
 The social and political predicament of the ShÐÝa community became a major 
concern for the ShÐÝÐ clerics and intellectuals in the 1960s and 1970s. Transformations in 
the region and especially in the nature of the Lebanese political system intensified the 
ShÐÝÐ quest for power. Moreover, Israeli and Palestinian pressures on Lebanon led the 
ShÐÝÐ religious authorities to realise the necessity of an effective and comprehensive 
project of power. In 1975, as the civil war began, it was a matter of time before such a 
project came into existence.  
 FaÃlallÁh participated in all the debates among ShÐÝÐ authorities with regard to the 
best response to these internal and external challenges, and he was particularly sensitive 
to quietism among ShÐÝa. He formulated his answer in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa 
which became, and still is, the most comprehensive account by a ShÐÝÐ scholar on power. 
As his stance towards the Supreme Islamic ShÐÝÐ Council showed, he preferred to treat 
the problems not as a ShÐÝÐ but as a universal Islamic issue. Thus, his project of power 
had several challenges to meet; it should counter Western adversaries, maintain an 
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Islamic character and persuade the quietist ShÐÝa to join the ShÐÝÐ military and political 
movement.   
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Chapter III:  Power as a System 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
 
 This chapter is dedicated to power as a system, its components and its relation to 
Islam in FaÃlallÁh’s thought. I argue that in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, the notion of 
power is constructed and presented as a system that represents an inherent and 
interdependent component of Islam. That is to say, Islam is the power which permeates 
all domains of life with a new system of values and – through organisation – transforms 
them into a complex and coherent force that puts these supreme values into practice. 
According to this perception Islam is the controlled enactment of power. This claim is 
supported by considering the entirety and complexity of FaÃlallÁh’s argument even if he 
does not endorse explicitly this proposition. This systemic perception of power is the 
lens through which faith, ethics, spirituality, and social order as elements of power are 
understood. In FaÃlallÁh’s concept, power provides the frame to human action, a sphere 
in which, and a tool through which Islam is realised. Both power and Islam are 
comprehensive and they are inseparable and inherently related. However, FaÃlallÁh 
would only subscribe to the proposition “Islam is power” under certain conditions. In 
particular, only just power stands for Islam.  
 In what follows, I will explain this characteristic complexity and systemic acuity 
of power in FaÃlallÁh’s thought. S. Clegg’s theory on the “circuits of power” helps 
shaping the contours of quwwa and examining how it is manifested in its various 
aspects. Subsequently, I will discuss the intellectual-historical contexts of his 
conception. In this, I highlight his indebtedness to the ideas of Sayyid QuÔb, Marxist 
philosophy, and that of modern ShÐÝism. On the one hand, QuÔb’s ideas are particularly 
relevant due to his perception of Islam as a system, the centrality of tawÎÐd, and his 
interest in power, features shared by FaÃlallÁh. On the other hand, Marxism as a rival 
and popular ideology of power and ShÐÝÐ revivalism provided the immediate intellectual 
context in which FaÃlallÁh formulated his ideas. 
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1.      FaÃlallÁh’s activist interpretation of power 
 
 As has been explained by Michael Cook, the quietist attitude prevailed in the ShÐÝÐ 
tradition for a long time.
295
 However, the rising ShÐÝÐ contestation in Iran, Iraq and 
Lebanon in the sixties and seventies transformed the overall attitude of modern ShÐÝism 
into a revolutionary one through figures such as ÀyatullÁh KhumaynÐ, MuÎammad 
BÁqir al-Ñadr and FaÃlallÁh with their attention to fostering ShÐÝÐ thought in order to 
protect the community and to triumph over the prevailing secular ideologies and 
regimes.
296
 
 In al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh constructs and 
displays an all-encompassing view of power. He addresses force as a general and 
universal issue,
297
 which includes all aspects that guarantee the stability of Islam and its 
capacity to survive and expand. With this concept in mind, FaÃlallÁh rejects partial 
conceptions of power and propagates a holistic one. This perspective has two major 
elements. First, he claims the complementarity of material and spiritual power. It is only 
their simultaneous presence that can secure the victory of the Muslim community in the 
battlefield of arms as well as that of the ideas.
298
 For FaÃlallÁh, victory must be 
definitive in the long term. However, the process might contain failures in the short 
term. The second element is the link between fragmentation and weakness in a given 
society.
299
 Comprehensiveness in this sense means that justice and solidarity is the basis 
of social balance which, in turn, is essential to the empowerment of the community.  
 FaÃlallÁh’s systematic conception of power is rooted in and embodies the 
principles of Islam. His aim is to discredit the quietists’ conviction which states that 
change by the use of force is non-Islamic. Rather he adopts another perspective, the one 
known commonly today as “fundamentalist”. It claims that Islam as the last divine 
revelation is the most complete way of life. In accordance with its comprehensiveness, 
one has to seek the tools to implement it in all domains of human existence. In this, 
today’s Muslims are encouraged to seek inspiration in the first Islamic experience which 
used both peaceful persuasion and violence according to the given situation.  
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 FaÃlallÁh holds that without the simultaneous presence of the varied and multi-
layered aspects of power, the message of Islam is deprived of its essence. In his view, 
the absence of power and its realisation in the individual, social and political spheres, 
results necessarily in a corrupted or deviant order. Thus, power has a double function. 
First, as a set of tools it guarantees the realistic and adequate response of the Islamic 
movement to the challenges of the day. Second, power is the core of the Islamic 
message, a comprehensive system that effectuates the divine will in the course of life.  
 
 
2.      Definitions of quwwa in FaÃlallÁh’s theory 
 
 In FaÃlallÁh’s terminology, quwwa is a multi-layered concept. In his book, one 
can distinguish between three frequent uses. First, quwwa conveys the sense of 
‘strength’ when FaÃlallÁh discusses spiritual qualities at the individual or social level. 
Second, in a political context, for FaÃlallÁh quwwa means ‘power’ that enables the 
authority to exercise monopoly on the use of force in a given territory. Third, FaÃlallÁh 
uses quwwa as ‘force’ when the emphasis is put on its outward – most often material – 
manifestations. As a rule, the context helps the understanding of the intended meaning. 
Since FaÃlallÁh’s focus is on the empowerment of the Muslim community, in the 
majority of cases I translate quwwa as power. 
 In the definition of quwwa, FaÃlallÁh emphasises the general meaning of power as 
a great value and an objective, but also as an instrument which is essential to the 
acquisition of other Islamic values, and their realisation.
300
 In another passage, FaÃlallÁh 
defines quwwa as an indispensible life-energy that permeates all aspects of the 
individual, social, and political life. It is potential – as part of natural human disposition 
– and becomes actual – as a form of rizq – through one’s faith in God.301  
 For FaÃlallÁh, the individual and the collective quest for power complement each 
other in creating a strong society. He argues that the problem of power is present in 
every aspect of human interaction, in one’s self-perception and relationship with other 
human beings.  
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Not only has God given Man force but He continually nourishes, renews and 
protects it. Thus man gets to the point where he feels that life is open to him with 
all the abilities he possesses, the abilities upon which he can depend to acquire his 
means of sustenance, to defend himself, to build his future, to develop new talents 
and make new discoveries each day that provide him with new means of 
subsistence, new strength and life.
302
 
 
 
 FaÃlallÁh encourages the individual’s aspiration to power because it gives the 
human being self-contentment and the competence necessary to shape one’s personality 
and the surrounding reality.
303
 However, he perceives power “not only as a virtue 
(faÃÐla) but also as an expression of the integrated entity of human existence”.304  In 
other words, power as a potential is not simply a positive quality but the characteristic 
of humanity as such. Thus, FaÃlallÁh is rather close to the collective conception of 
power which implies more affinity with Marxist and religious interpretations than with 
the liberal individualistic understanding.  
 The rationale behind FaÃlallÁh’s emphasis on power as a collective quality for 
human beings is that it is a gift from God. This gift has a purpose and bestows 
responsibility on the human being. It is a set of “capacities (qudrÁt)” that provides Man 
with an “outlet to make use of his energies (ÔÁqÁt)”,305 and “abilities upon which he can 
depend to acquire his means of sustenance.”306 Power is also an attitude that provides 
life with a new charge, internally and externally, in order to push it forward towards a 
new phase in realising the Islamic ideal.
307  
 Power is not an absolute gift. God nourishes and protects human strength as long 
as Man assumes the responsibility of being God’s vice-regent on Earth. The strength 
available to human beings is in this sense the emanation of the divine power insofar as it 
is used in harmony with divine goals. That said, power as a potential becomes actual 
only in a person who is dedicated to act and fight in order to implement Islam in its 
fullest sense. 
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3.    Power as the message of Islam 
 
 A central feature in FaÃlallÁh’s understanding of power is its perception as the 
core of the message of Islam itself. For him, the Islamic message is “the deep meaning 
of life with all its conditions and necessities that maintain its continuity”.308 Power is 
both a great value in itself and a means to acquire other values.
309
 Moreover, it is a tool 
to defend the Message and life.
310
 Therefore, the Islamic message (risÁla), life (ÎayÁt), 
and power (quwwa) form an inseparable unity. They cover roughly what a secular 
thinker would call existence, nature or energy. FaÃlallÁh insists that there is an explicit 
correspondence between the divinely set laws of nature (al-sunan al-kawniyya)311 and 
the Islamic law as the latter provides normative meaning to the vitality of natural force.  
 In other words, FaÃlallÁh recognises the natural status of power, but wants to 
subordinate it to the rules and goals set by the Islamic message. Since the Message 
requires from the believer to implement the principles of Islam in its entirety, the 
faithful must be empowered for the task of securing the power of Islam. The Message is 
about actualising the absolute power of the divine law in each segment of human 
existence. In this manner, FaÃlallÁh equates quwwa with the risÁla, the message of 
Islam: there is no Islam without power. The Islamic message must be the governing 
principle of all human choices, in order to construct and maintain the Islamic “order”. In 
this process, power is also an instrument, a means by which order is effectuated. As 
such, power must be studied on two levels: as the Message itself, and as a tool in the 
realisation of the Islamic order. To discover the systemic characteristics of power, first 
we have to identify the components of Islam as a system. 
 
 
 3.1         Islam as a system 
 
 In his article “Islam as a System in Sayyed Qutb’s Writings”, William Shepard 
asserts that for QuÔb “Islam can be independent only because it is comprehensive, and 
can be comprehensive – capable of application in all times and places – because it is 
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systematic and thus capable of ‘systematic extension to meet new situations.”312 
Furthermore, Shepard states that describing Islam as a system stresses its ability to 
combine and reconcile elements that stand in tension with each other and, at the same 
time – through controlling the overall structure – it channels them into an Islamic 
form.
313
  
 In this respect, as already shown by Olivier Carré, FaÃlallÁh and QuÔb display 
several similarities in terminology and conception.
314
 Thus, it is convenient to compare 
QuÔb’s concept of Islamic message with that of FaÃlallÁh. For this reason, I apply 
Shepard’s criteria by which he defines the essential characteristics of a concept as 
system. In the above-mentioned article, system is defined as comprehensive, 
independent – distinct from various Western ideologies – able to combine and reconcile 
opposing elements, flexible – it responds to the challenges of the day by offering a solid 
framework within which humanity can develop new answers – and organic – its 
function and dysfunction result from the operation of its components.
315
 This definition 
also corroborates my theoretical framework in which functionalism helps us understand 
FaÃlallÁh’s view of the ideal strong Muslim society as based on solidarity. 
 FaÃlallÁh uses mainly three terms to denote the notion of system: manhaj 
(method), khaÔÔ (guiding line), 316 and niÛÁm as order in the sense of control and system 
in the sense of an integrating framework. FaÃlallÁh asserts that Islam sets: 
 
a pattern (manhaj) for educational and change. Through its major concepts (al-
mafÁhÐm al-kabÐra) and the encompassing sharÐÝa which deals with all practical 
areas of life, this pattern teaches us how to approach and confront the universe 
correctly and sensitively, how to face God with awareness and knowledge, and, 
finally, how to undertake the general responsibility for life and other human beings. 
According to the new model (ÒiyÁgha IslÁmiyya) that Islam has given the human 
being, intellectual change, therefore, reflects practical change, which makes Man 
righteous.
317
  
 
 
                                                             
312 William E. Shepard, “Islam as a ‘System’ in the Later Writings of Sayyid Qutb,” Middle Eastern 
Studies 25 (1989): 38. 
313 Shepard, “Islam as a ‘System’,” 45. 
314 See Carré’s article: “Quelques mots-clefs de Muhammad Husayn Fadlallâh.” 
315 Shepard, “Islam as a ‘System’,” 38. 
316 The full phrase is KhaÔÔ al-risÁla which means the guiding line of the message (Islam). al-IslÁm wa-
manÔiq al-quwwa, 64. 
317 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 256. 
  73 
 Here, FaÃlallÁh’s argument resembles that of Fascism: the need for “a ruling 
system (niÛÁm ÎÁkim) is a natural one to stave off chaos”.318 He explicitly mentions the 
“Islamic system / order” (al-niÛÁm al-IslÁmÐ) as “righteous”,319 as opposed to the “order 
of disbelief” (al-niÛÁm al-kÁfir),320 and as the “ultimate goal” of Islamic revolutions.321 
Considering Shepard’s criteria, it is obvious that for FaÃlallÁh the Islamic message is by 
nature comprehensive (shÁmil).322 It offers a method of self-perception, an 
understanding of the universe, and regulates daily practice and attitudes. 
In this framework, “the legal, moral, theoretical bases cannot be separated or 
reduced”.323 They construct an organic unity of thought and action. FaÃlallÁh’s 
perception of the various elements of power as complementary is rooted in his 
functionalist point of view. Fundamentalism is a natural consequence of his systematic 
perception of Islam: what is non-Islamic is by essence corrupt and unjust. It is only the 
Islamic model that guarantees the righteousness of believers and provides the sole gauge 
of any action. As such, it can combine and reconcile opposing elements such as leniency 
and violence.
324
 For FaÃlallÁh, this model is flexible nd assures adequate responses to the 
challenges that humanity faces.   
 
 
 3.2     The Islamic order as a generator and as a product of power 
 
 As stated above, for FaÃlallÁh, Islam is the most complete realisation of human 
potentials under the guidance of God. FaÃlallÁh believes that the unity of God (tawÎÐd) 
guarantees the purity of the Islamic order which generates and also constrains power. 
He clearly indicates that the unity of the community is an extension of the unity of God. 
Non-monotheistic and materialistic orders are perceived as deviations not only in terms 
of religion but also in the use of power. This is the case with the use of force by a 
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polytheist (mushrik) or a non-believer (kÁfir). FaÃlallÁh is emphatic about the divine 
role in generating power as the following passage proves:  
 
The Qur’Án mentions quwwa in several verses, as an attribute of the Almighty 
God. It also talks about those who had some aspects of it but [for them] it was no 
protection against God’s strength. It also emphasizes Man’s weakness due to his 
being created, but calls on him to overcome the constituents of weakness by 
acquiring the constituents of strength.
325
 (...) [God] is the creator of this power and 
its constituents (asbÁb) that help its continuity and extension.326 
 
 
 FaÃlallÁh argues that faith in the Islamic message produces human power, which 
in turn defends and implements the Islamic order. This means that the empowerment of 
the individual and the community guarantees the credibility of the Islamic message. It is 
then legitimate to conclude that power is the locus of Islam. FaÃlallÁh adopts a gradual-
spiritual approach to the generation of power. Faith produces power and the resulting 
spiritual or personal strength is the basis of social strength that enables the community 
to correct deviation and stand up against oppression. On the one hand, quwwa provides 
a vertical axis that connects the empowered human being to the source of power: God. 
On the other hand, it is a horizontal axis that connects the individuals, and integrates 
them into the organic social unity. For FaÃlallÁh, there is an organic complementarity 
between the two axes of force. 
 At this level, FaÃlallÁh’s functionalism is clearly detectable in the text: power is 
functional in the implementation of Islam while Islam provides the only environment in 
which power can be justly applied. Furthermore, both the individual and the society 
must fulfil divinely prescribed functions – the implementation of Islam as world order, 
and the realisation of the strong Islamic society based on justice. The continuity of 
power-flux outwards (spiritual strength into material force) and downwards (from 
divine omnipotence to human power) guarantees that the Islamic individual and the 
Islamic collective are constantly and mutually empowered. 
 Stuart Clegg’s “circuits of power” - as described above in the section on theory - 
helps to further understand FaÃlallÁh’s elaboration on the various types and functions of 
power. The idea that faith generates power and power maintains the religious order 
reveals that for FaÃlallÁh power was a relational concept manifested in the interaction 
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between God and Man and among human beings. Islam as a system provided the 
organisation and the primary agency of power. In this frame, the episodic, momentary 
power is guaranteed by the continuity of the vertical and horizontal power-flux.  
 However, the Islamic message and consequently the religious law is the sole valid 
source of the rules that operate this system and define its membership. Therefore, 
dispositional power is the privilege of the sharÐÝa. Facilitative power that has the 
capacity to empower and weaken belongs exclusively to God. This is the spiritual venue 
through which Islamic faith can empower the believer and the community of the 
faithful. While inaccessible for outsiders, it provides Muslims with the indispensable 
energy to change the reality in accordance with the tenets of Islam. The simultaneous 
presence of the episodic, dispositional, and facilitative aspects of power guarantees its 
flexibility. Furthermore, their contribution to the implementation of Islam secures the 
comprehensiveness of Islam as a spiritual, legal and political system. 
 
 
3.3         Power as a tool 
 
 FaÃlallÁh maintains that Islam is implemented and protected by power in the 
individual, social and political spheres. These three levels are to be divided into 
different interrelating constituents (asbÁb / ÝawÁmil) of the system of power. At the 
personal level it implies conviction, faith as articulated in the ÝaqÐda, and greater jihÁd 
(jihÁd al-nafs). In the social sphere it requires responsibility, solidarity, justice, and 
balance. Finally in the political realm defensive jihÁd (al-jihÁd al-difÁÝÐ), and preventive 
jihÁd (al-jihÁd al-wiqÁ’Ð) can be applied in the proper circumstances. Each of these 
constituents is indispensible and instrumental in establishing and implementing the 
Islamic system of law and order.  
 In this construction, power is an instrument that serves the end system, the Islamic 
order. It is only Islamic values “that make power a means to protect both mankind and 
the message from its enemies”.327 The constituents or aspects are embodiments of major 
Islamic values – such as justice, self-perfection and spreading the Message – each of 
which carries and represents the essence of Islam: subjugation to God. Consequently, all 
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manifestation of power including jihÁd, and the obligation of “commanding right and 
forbidding wrong” – are nothing but tools to the achievement of this end. 
 
Conscious faith in the divine mission [turns] that (the mission) into a driving force 
in the human heart and physical existence. It is also a preventative force in 
accordance with its responsibilities and the life of all human beings (...) [R]eligious 
duty is transformed into human power (...) when it comes to confronting injustice 
and oppression, which are the most conspicuous forms of evil in the reality of 
human life.
328
 
 
 Since power is interpreted and evaluated only in the framework of the Message, it 
is not an independent conceptual entity. The flexibility of its means – peaceful or 
violent – is controlled by the principles of Islam. This indicates the normative 
philosophy of power in FaÃlallÁh’s thought. He does not believe in the use of force for 
mere political and social purposes neither does he display a self-serving cult of power. 
His concept is a classic example of religious thought in which the ultimate meaning of 
power is to serve the divine order, as represented by Islam. 
 To characterise power as organic is closely related to its being comprehensive, but 
it goes a step forward, implying that the system functions well only if its components 
fulfil their task in harmony with the basic principles. When both the individual and the 
society operate corresponding to the Islamic principles, a symbolic ray – starting from 
the origo of the two axes (faith and human interaction) – shows a straight, steady 
average growth towards the ultimate goal, the implementation of justice on Earth. This 
indicates that it is a system of balance between the various elements of force. Any 
deviation or hindrance on one axis upsets the equilibrium. In FaÃlallÁh’s words:  
 
[I]f the spiritual strength becomes separated from the physical force, the latter is 
transformed into evil acts (Ýamal shirrÐr) that oppose the Islamic values and 
preferences.
329
 (…) This is the case because in life the various phenomena are 
linked in the way the stem is an extension of the branch. If it is separated it will 
turn into an atom that is lost in a vacuum.
330
 
 
 The various aspects of power can be accomplished only if the spiritual / 
individual, and the social / political spheres operate in harmony with the principles of 
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Islam. The process of one’s decision-making with regards to the proper means of action 
involves a three-fold investigation. First, one needs to identify the place of the current 
situation with respect to the desired long-term goal. In pursuing this end, the present 
situation represents only one stage. Second, the applied means must fit in the current 
stage of action and be in harmony with the goal. Third, the action must not be detached 
from the moral principles prescribed by Islam. The notion of power, therefore, embraces 
a wide range of actions that are implemented with flexibility and awareness. 
Consequently, we can assume that a truly Muslim individual and community are by 
essence powerful, and in turn, only the rightly and fully actualised Islam can guarantee 
the real power of a person or a society.  
 As we can see, FaÃlallÁh emphasises the constantly changing nature of reality, 
because the human being as its principal actor (essential force) is a dynamic entity. 
Considered in terms of Clegg’s “circuits of power,” quwwa as a tool has an episodic 
aspect which lies in its capacity to translate the principles of Islam into a political 
programme. Power as a tool in the dispositional sense serves to change the rules of the 
actual status quo since they are – in contrast with the sharÐÝa – not absolute. Therefore, it 
is only sharÐÝa that supersedes power. Empowerment is actualised in the realm of 
politics by putting the Islamic principles into practice. 
 
 
 4.       The objectives of power 
 
 FaÃlallÁh considers power as essential for the three major aspects of human life: 
for the empowerment of the individual who thus becomes capable to rule life as God’s 
vice-regent on Earth;
331
 to defend the right of Islam to spread, and to protect one’s own 
life and possessions.  
 
We, therefore, need strength (quwwa) to build personalities capable of controlling 
things in life and who are in full control of themselves. There is a need to transform 
the rules and principles we believe in into a reality that governs our lives, 
overcomes difficulties and, at the same time, provides us with the opportunity to 
build, plan and act.
332
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 On the one hand, the “strong Islamic personality”333 is the key actor in the 
implementation of the Islamic Message. It is power that vests human action with the 
capacity to transform principles into reality, a quality that determines thought, attitude 
and practice.
334
 Therefore, power is inherently linked to change and transformation: it is 
the guarantee of self-perfection, of ruling the world based on principles, of facing 
challenges and of carrying out one’s duty in life. On the other hand, FaÃlallÁh insists on 
the protective capacity of power in spreading Islam. As we can observe below, he is 
explicit about the functional relation between power and Islam:  
 
(…) it is the right (of Islam) to act on the basis of producing power that challenges 
obstacles and faces challenges by considering power as the only condition for its 
capacity to maintain its existence. For power is protection (ÎimÁya) against its 
enemies (…)335 
 
 Acquiring power is an existential necessity that secures the continuous presence of 
the Message and secures its implementation in the face of its enemies. Power serves to 
deter the enemy and to protect the realm of Islam. In other passages, FaÃlallÁh talks 
about the defensive and preventive use of force. For instance, he argues that: “deterring 
(radÝ) enemies and protecting the future is not a question of the Call or conviction, but 
that of response to aggression”.336  
 In the context of the theoretical and practical aspects of the moral dimensions of 
power, FaÃlallÁh differentiates between preventive (al-Îarb al-wiqÁ’iyya) and defensive 
war (al-Îarb al-difÁÝiyya).337 By preventive war, FaÃlallÁh means a Muslim attack that 
aims to weaken the force of the unbelievers in order to hold them back from 
endangering the Muslim community and its beliefs. While preventive force is directed 
against the power of the unbelieving oppressors – “who have always been waiting for 
the best opportunity to destroy this religion”338 – defensive use of force is a response to 
actual attacks.  
 FaÃlallÁh’s claim that power is an essential means of protection could be 
explained by the ShÐÝÐ experience in Lebanon (and elsewhere) as a minority surrounded 
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by SunnÐ (and Maronite) political dominance and injustice. In his introduction, 
FaÃlallÁh clearly states his will to convince the quietists who reject the use of force and 
hesitate to aspire to power as a legitimate way of change. FaÃlallÁh asserts that the use 
of force in the Islamic sense is legitimate only in these two forms and as such they can 
be considered as part of smaller jihÁd. The notion of preventive force implies that the 
use of force is justified even if the threat represents only a potential impediment to the 
Islamic order. In this sense, violence is legitimate due to the general validity of using 
force to secure the implementation of Islamic values. 
 
 
 5.        ShÐÝÐ elements in FaÃlallÁh’s concept of power as a system 
 
 Although it appeals to a general Islamic audience, FaÃlallÁh’s reasoning follows a 
specific ShÐÝÐ pattern by emphasising the inevitable clash between the opposing forces 
of corruption and righteousness, and the inherent moral aspect of this combat. In the 
following, I describe his interpretation of these tenets and how he related them to the 
comprehensiveness of power.  
 
 
 5.1       Universal combat as a religious obligation 
 
 FaÃlallÁh has a dichotomist view of history, perceiving it as a battleground in 
space and time between the followers of righteousness (Îaqq) and those of falsehood 
(bÁÔil). He believes that after the Prophet it was the members of ahl al-bayt who set 
examples for this legitimate combat. This universal struggle emerges in all fields of life 
from the individual to the communal spheres, and from the theoretical domain to the 
actual battlefield. 
 
Even history, is the history of war and peace, in knowledge and wealth and in other 
domains. It is the history of the strong and their adversaries from among the 
followers of truth and the followers of falsehood. However, the weak and 
oppressed were not able to win battles in support of their principles, thoughts and 
interests until they eventually had the means or were in a position of power.
339
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 FaÃlallÁh asserts that only the strong can influence the events of history. He 
implicitly identifies the weak and the oppressed with the followers of righteousness and 
calls them to utilise the tools that facilitate their empowerment. This implies awareness 
and action, and also readiness to use force in order to realise their legitimate rights. 
Moreover, empowerment and the use of force is not only an option or a suggestion, 
rather an existential necessity and an explicit religious duty. FaÃlallÁh quotes ImÁm ÝAlÐ 
saying that “commanding right and forbidding wrong”, (al-amr bi-’l-maÝrÙf wa’l-nahy 
Ýan al-munkar) takes precedence over all other duties,340 and asserts that the ImÁms in 
their battles fulfilled this responsibility.  
 
We notice (…) the close link between the mission of commanding right and 
forbidding wrong and the all-encompassing Islamic plan that aims at achieving the 
change (…) including revolt against the corrupt entities and oppressive rule in the 
context of carrying out God’s law and order in everything. Similarly, the three 
traditions of the ImÁm ÝAlÐ and al-Íusayn stress the practical aspect of that 
principle illustrated in their revolutionary or reformist movement. In fact, ImÁm 
ÝAlÐ regarded his battle at ÑiffÐn against MuÝÁwiya, who was a corrupt governor, as 
a practical implementation of the principle of commanding right and forbidding 
wrong. In the same way, ImÁm al-Íusayn regarded his revolt against the deviated 
Umayyad dynasty as a transformation leading towards the just Islamic rule.
341
 
 
 FaÃlallÁh refers to the combats of ImÁm ÝAlÐ and ImÁm al-Íusayn as a movement 
of revolution and a reform (Îaraka thawriyya wa-iÒlÁÎiyya) and as part of the Islamic 
plan that aims to change the corrupt reality and implement God’s law in every sphere of 
human existence. He describes ÝAlÐ and al-Íusayn primarily not as victims of injustice 
but as the warriors of justice. The change in the emphasis is significant in view of the 
fact that FaÃlallÁh’s primary concern was to urge the quietist ShÐÝa to act.  
 
 
 5. 2 The morality of combat and the consistency of power 
 
 The concept of power remains coherent and the use of force is justified only if it is 
rooted in the principles of Islam. FaÃlallÁh reinterprets the attitude of ÝAlÐ and al-
Íusayn as examples of the righteous perception of the use of force in order to achieve 
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the Islamic goals. He dedicated a chapter to the issue of the ImÁms’ rejection of some 
revolutionary movements that deviated from the Islamic principles.
342
 He asserted that 
“any kind of encouragement to fighting that does not spring from the spiritual means of 
Islam would be considered as support to the means of aggression and deviation”.343 The 
means of resistance are determined by the principles of Islam that demand rational 
answers to perceived deviations. The ImÁms’ decision-making considered the 
circumstances, situations, available means, and capacities at the disposal of their 
followers. 
 
The ImÁms of ahl al-bayt (…) focused their instructions, directions and teachings 
on fighting oppression and oppressors by passive and peaceful means, such as non-
cooperation with them or by active opposition, or by establishing righteousness and 
annihilating evil, even by the sword (…).344 
 
 Without merging principle and realism any claim to legitimacy would be a fallacy. 
FaÃlallÁh transformed his concept of power as a system into a framework of carefully 
planned political action and a means of mobilisation through his explication of the 
practice of the Prophet and the ImÁms. The idea of power as a totality served a specific 
purpose for FaÃlallÁh; it compels the quietist to accept the legitimacy of power in both 
its violent and non-violent forms. Since both forms are related in the notion of quwwa 
and that quwwa is equivalent to Islam, accepting the totality of Islam leads necessarily 
to accepting the totality of power. 
 
 
6.        The intellectual-historical contexts of FaÃlallÁh’s concept of power as a 
           system 
 
 FaÃlallÁh wrote his book al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa in 1976. At that time, a 
major challenge to which every Islamist thinker, whether SunnÐ or ShÐÝÐ, had to respond 
was Arab Marxism. Its followers endorsed Marxism for its claim to be a science, a 
movement for the oppressed and a comprehensive philosophy. This set the standards 
high. Islamist thinkers had to craft Islamic answers to the Marxist challenge with equal 
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intellectual sophistication in order to sound credible and reasonable, and thus convince 
the youth. As‘ad AbuKhalil drew attention to this Marxist environment in which the 
identity of the new generation of Lebanese ShÐÝa developed in the seventies.
345
 Although 
his argument that Lebanese ShÐÝism organised itself based on the model of Marxist-
Leninist parties is exaggerated, it is still the case that the Lebanese ShÐÝa had to compete 
with this model. Some of this Marxist influence can be discerned in FaÃlallÁh’s 
insistence on the collective nature of power in Islam, on the idea of power as a 
comprehensive system, on the necessity of a revolutionary transformation, and on the 
formation of a new Islamic character. 
 As has been seen throughout the description of FaÃlallÁh’s ideas, there are echoes 
of Sayyid QuÔb in many answers given by FaÃlallÁh. It is evident from the perspective 
applied by William Shepard in “Islam as a System in Sayyed Qutb’s writings” that 
FaÃlallÁh employs some of QuÔb’s devices to address the issue of Islam and power. For 
example, the emphasis put on equilibrium, tawÁzun, realism, wÁqiÝiyya, the relationship 
between the individual and God, and the role of tawÎÐd in the regulation of quwwa 
display a QuÔbian horizon on which FaÃlallÁh formed his concept of power. Some 
aspects of the similarity between QuÔb and FaÃlallÁh were explored by Olivier Carré.
346
 
 In KhaÒÁ’iÒ al-taÒawwur al-IslÁmÐ wa-muqawwimÁtuh, QuÔb maintains that tawÎÐd 
is a space that includes the unity of God in the realm of belief as well as in all spheres of 
life whether moral or practical. According to QuÔb, tawÎÐd is not only a matter of belief. 
Instead, it covers a larger area, extending to many aspects such as feelings, morality, 
behaviour, organisation of life, law, general and particular issues, latent and patent ones, 
individual and collective action, the herein and the hereafter. In sum, the main 
characteristic of tawÎÐd is comprehensiveness, shumÙl. In fact, tawÎÐd encompasses the 
totality of the Muslim conception of the universe and existence. It also extends to the 
understanding of power inherent in Man and nature that are but reflections and aspects 
of the omnipotence and absolute unity of God.
347
     
 As for the impact of modern ShÐÝÐ thought on FaÃlallÁh, he definitely fits in the 
trend represented – among others – by ÀyatullÁh KhumaynÐ, MuÎammad BÁqir al-Ñadr 
and MÙsÁ al-Ñadr. FaÃlallÁh reinterpreted the tenets and symbols of ShÐÝism – in 
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Clegg’s term – the “nodes” or “obligatory passage points” through which expressions of 
power are channelled.
348
 He made a formative contribution to this modernist movement 
by setting out a systematic theory of power in his al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa. In this 
he provided a comprehensive, activist, non-mystical understanding of ShÐÝÐ Islam, put 
forward in a universalist manner. The differences between him and other formative 
thinkers are detailed in the thematic chapters of the present dissertation. 
 Regarding the nature and importance of power, FaÃlallÁh seems to embrace 
Sayyid QuÔb’s approach. In al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa he does not use QuÔb’s terms 
neither quotes him, still their vision share a considerable amount of similarities that 
make it highly probable that FaÃlallÁh was inspired by QuÔb and integrated his ideas 
into his own system.  
 To support this argument with an example, I refer to QuÔb’s commentaries on 
Surat al-AnfÁl. In this QuÔb lists some of the key notions that appear in FaÃlallÁh’s work 
as well. These are the following: Islam has the power to confront corrupt systems, and 
the source of this power is God’s omnipotence.349 Therefore QuÔb differentiates between 
two kinds of powers. The one which is to be confronted is the attribute of oppressors 
(ÔÁghÙt).350 This oppressive power cannot be stopped only by Muslims’ taking power.351 
Islam must aspire to attain global reach based on its own power resources.
352
 Islam has 
no option but to fight tyrannical power.
353
 Muslims must be confident because God 
empowers those who implement the sharÐÝa.354 God wanted the Muslim community 
powerful that has authority forms a nation and a state.
355
 Both real power and the 
reputation of having power are important.
356
  
 Regarding Verse 60 in specific, QuÔb reminds Muslims to get ready with all 
elements of power and turn it into jihad with a twofold aim in mind: liberation from 
oppression, and securing God’s exclusive sovereignty.357 QuÔb asserts that knowing that 
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the source of their power is God, multiplies their strength.
358
 He emphasises the 
importance of forming an organised movement, viable community, close ties between 
the individuals, social organization, and powerful strategy.
359
 Muslims must dedicate all 
their efforts and resources to establishing an Islamic society.
360
  
 Notwithstanding the conceptual similarities, it was FaÃlallÁh who combined these 
elements – among many other – into a coherent system of power. QuÔb’s aim was to 
create an ideology that competes with nationalism and socialism and serves as an 
intellectual, theological basis for the political framework designed by Íasan al-BannÁ 
and embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood. FaÃlallÁh in contrast had to invent a theory 
that gave impetus for the revolutionary movement in a fragmented community that 
lacked Islamic perspectives all through the 20
th
 century. 
 
 
 Concluding remarks 
 
 In the above, I explained how Islam as the final and most complete divine 
message generates power in FaÃlallÁh’s thought. In al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, he 
highlights the interference of power with the Islamic message. Both are comprehensive 
because Islam as he perceives it has to respond to different challenges imposed by the 
logic of power that prevails in the universe. Furthermore, I studied the role of power as 
a tool in combining the spiritual and material realms of the created world. Here, 
FaÃlallÁh seems particularly attentive to reality, wÁqiÝ indicating his obvious interest in 
the dynamics of power. In this regard, it has been shown how the implementation of 
Islam as an actualised social order necessitates power. This could be achieved only if 
both the individual and the community are empowered. 
 The community FaÃlallÁh is concerned about was the ShÐÝa of Lebanon. He 
echoes ÀyatullÁh KhumaynÐ and MuÎammad BÁqir al-Ñadr in their endeavours to 
revolutionise ShÐÝism. In addition, I demonstrated that QuÔb’s radical conception of 
Islam, tawÎÐd and power, and Arab Marxist ideology had a noticeable influence on 
FaÃlallÁh’s thought. 
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 In reference to FaÃlallÁh’s comprehensive power and its equivalence to Islam, two 
caveats must be noted. First, it replaces the modern and multi-confessional state – the 
legitimate holder of power over individuals and society – with an imagined Islamic 
normative authority. Second, it sets the foundations for a totalitarian order in which 
every aspect of life gets subjugated to the sacred power.   
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Chapter IV: FaÃlallÁh’s Theology of Power 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
 Since the first modern revivalist movements in the Muslim world, theology has 
been a key foundation of reform. The reform projects led by M. b. ÝAbd al-WahhÁb, M. 
ÝAbduh, S. QuÔb, or MurtaÃÁ MuÔahharÐ, to name only few of them, laid emphasis on 
tawÎÐd and justice as theological principles the content of which should guide the rising 
community. Both are believed to lead to empowerment. As a mechanism for community 
unity, tawÎÐd consists in dedicating worship and sacralisation to one divinity. Political 
division in the umma is thought of as a sign of lack of tawÎÐd. Related to the centrality 
of tawÎÐd is the rejection of deterministic views of Islamic belief and the assertion of 
divine justice and human responsibility. 
 The prominence of theology in FaÃlallÁh’s thought can be observed in his several 
writings dedicated to this subject. Suffice here to mention his book MasÁ’il ÝaqÁ’idiyya 
in which FaÃlallÁh provides answers for almost all questions of belief including 
imamate, eschatology and apostasy.
361
 In al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, FaÃlallÁh 
dedicates two chapters to elucidating the role of the system of Islamic belief – ÝaqÐda – 
and faith – ÐmÁn – in empowering the Muslim community.362  
 These theological distinctions need to be analysed in order to grasp FaÃlallÁh’s 
conception of tawÎÐd and justice as elements of power. For this reason, I will examine, 
first, FaÃlallÁh’s terminology and his distinction between belief (ÝaqÐda) and faith (ÐmÁn) 
in relation to power. Second, I will highlight FaÃlallÁh’s concept of human power in 
relation to God’s omnipotence, and his argument for free will. Third, I will analyse 
FaÃlallÁh’s refutation of the Marxist view of religion, his response to the accusation of 
Islam as engendering weakness, the interconnectedness of faith and power, the 
significance of causality, and the revolutionary aspects of FaÃlallÁh’s theology of 
power. 
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 1.     ÏmÁn and ÝaqÐda in FaÃlallÁh’s theological vocabulary  
 
 FaÃlallÁh uses mainly the terms ÝaqÐda and ÐmÁn to convey his theology of force. 
FaÃlallÁh draws on the polysemy of the Arabic language, using different meanings of 
one specific term. Often, he distinguishes ÝaqÐda – in the meaning of creed and firm 
belief – from faith (ÐmÁn) and treats them as two different aspects of quwwa. Belief is 
frequently synonymous with thought, conviction, truth and religion.
363
 In various 
contexts, FaÃlallÁh uses the term with the meaning which can be best translated as the 
embodiment of the transformative ‘power of faith’.364  
 As for ÐmÁn (faith), it is used most often in the form of a transitive verb (Ámana 
bi), suggesting that it is a concrete action with practical consequences rather than an 
abstract feeling. It denotes above all a state of mind, the source of spiritual strength that 
is able to create tangible, concrete reality. As such, it is essential for the completion of 
human potentials. However, sometimes it also refers to creed, thought, conviction, 
opinion.
365
 To level out this inconsistency my observations consider the contexts in 
which FaÃlallÁh uses these notions. 
 First, he elaborated on belief and force. He is explicit about the power of belief to 
shape the mind of the believer. After 250 pages, he further developed this question 
stressing the importance of faith on practical attitudes. FaÃlallÁh’s motivation for 
separating ÝaqÐda (1st chapter) from ÐmÁn (9th chapter) is not clear. Probably, he felt the 
need to write an additional chapter (Chapter 9) to illustrate Chapter 1 with practical and 
historical examples, pointing at the function of faith. This strategy gives the book a 
certain frame and highlights the special importance of theology; however it leads to 
structural randomness and repetitions. 
 
 
 2.      Man’s power 
 
 In refuting the deterministic interpretations, the empowerment of the human being 
is to be explained by answering two counterarguments, that of the inherent weakness 
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and vulnerability of human beings, and the negation of human free will. Accordingly, 
FaÃlallÁh first defines the sources of human power in Islam, and the Islamic perception 
of Man as a formative agent of life. Second, he affirms the reality and clarifies the role 
of Man’s free will in terms of its scope and limits. 
 
 
 2.1      The sources of human power 
 
 In the first chapter of al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa FaÃlallÁh defines his aim to 
clarify the Islamic concept of human power in relation to God’s power. For FaÃlallÁh, 
power is not a mere attribute; rather it is an essential human quality. Consequently, he 
claims that the Islamic creed does not argue for human weakness as a necessary 
consequence of God’s omnipotence. On the contrary, the Islamic doctrine establishes 
divine power as an originator and sustainer of human potentials. At the outset of his 
exposition, he lists views that promote the perception of human being as weak and 
vulnerable. In this, he delineates two major trends: the religious – that attributes human 
weakness to creation – and the materialist that emphasises human weakness in the face 
of the power of nature. In the following, I present his criticism of both.  
 Defining the goal of his analysis, FaÃlallÁh stresses that thought (fikr) and 
emotions (ÝawÁÔif) determine self-perception and, therefore, they are decisive in the 
process that leads to success or failure.
366
 FaÃlallÁh details the social consequences of 
human self-esteem in various chapters that deal with confronting oppression, realising 
change and the definition of social strength. In order to avoid the pitfalls of religious 
determinism, he stresses the importance of objectivity in assessing human potentials. 
FaÃlallÁh refutes any religious thought that interprets Man’s creation as a cause of 
vulnerability. Contesting this understanding, he discusses two aspects of deterministic 
thought: Man’s incapacity to act and plan, and the full dependence on God’s will with 
respect to the results of human action.  
 FaÃlallÁh argues that human strength is inevitable for the “major role that God has 
set out for man as His vice-regent on Earth”.367 This concept of Man’s role is based on 
the Revelation. All things on Earth are subjugated to Man who is superior to the rest of 
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the Creation. Thus, Man’s mission as vice-regent implies an ongoing interaction 
between the Creator and the human being. This interaction would not be possible 
without Man’s empowerment. In view of this prominent role of Man, FaÃlallÁh 
challenges the soundness and credibility of the interpretational tradition that proclaims 
human weakness based on religious texts. He claims that 
 
Man’s consciousness of God’s absolute power should not lead him to believe that 
he is powerless. On the contrary, awareness of God’s strength should reinforce 
Man’s own inner strength. Man should feel confident and secure, as long as this 
source of power is still there. The more he is aware of God’s power, the more sure 
he will be of his own strength.
368
 Indeed, Divine power provides man with all 
elements of strength.
369
 
 
 FaÃlallÁh’s argument contains two premises: God is powerful, and He is the 
source of human strength. Therefore, Man is empowered, but this is not a static 
character of the human being. FaÃlallÁh explicates that a human being can use his / her 
strength only with the awareness that it is a gift from God and the degree of this 
awareness determines one’s strength. Through their belief in God, human beings are 
granted their share from the divine absolute power that is needed to exercise self-control 
and to minimise fear of the strength of other humans.
370
 Thus, submission to God – 
acknowledging divine force as the ultimate source of human force – is the guarantee of 
the fullest possible empowerment of Man. 
 Awareness and knowledge of the revealed guiding principles secures one’s 
relationship with God. In turn it provides an infinite source of human power. FaÃlallÁh 
relates Man’s unique status to his / her unique mental capacities, saying that “God 
provided him with the capacity to become aware (…) of the universe as a whole”.371 
Therefore, faith-based knowledge and understanding enable human beings to realise 
their ambitions without committing transgression. As such it is only knowledge that can 
enable Man to control life in harmony with the laws of nature set by God.
372
 On this 
basis God demands responsible answers from Man all through his life. 
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 In the ShÐÝī sphere, MurtaÃÁ MuÔahharÐ an Iranian religious authority (d. 1979) is 
the author of some of the most influential writings in this field. As for FaÃlallÁh, power 
and knowledge is a central notion in MurtaÃÁ MuÔahharÐ’s concept of “Man and 
Universe.” He claims that knowledge and faith illuminate human beings from inside, 
and thus empower them to shape their personality as well as to change the reality. As 
MuÔahharÐ says “knowledge and faith are the two basic parts of the humanity of 
man”.373 The two processes are intertwined and take place simultaneously.   
 FaÃlallÁh admits that there are certain verses in the Qur’Án that inspire 
determinism and the notion of human weakness. He examines the relation between the 
religious concept of strength and social weakness. 
 
There are many verses that talk about the various stages in Man’s life, describing 
him as helpless and unable to do any good. Such views can influence Man’s 
thinking to an extent that he loses self-confidence and becomes almost 
paralyzed.
374
 This can be interpreted as meaning that it is useless to plan since Man 
can neither accomplish nor do anything unless it coincides with God’s will.375  
 
 For FaÃlallÁh, the everyday tangible human experience of oppression and 
helplessness is the starting point of every observation, however it is not constant. Thus, 
he immediately shifts the emphasis to the dangers of de-contextualised interpretation of 
the relevant Qur’Ánic verses since it leads to considering human efforts futile, and the 
exemption of Man from any responsibility. Further on he states that the idea of human 
weakness is rather a political invention to generate and maintain submissiveness to 
worldly powers.
376
 He asserts that such perception feeds “the logic of those 
philosophisers who tried to attribute to religion the idea of Man’s weakness and 
helplessness in the face of oppression”.377 FaÃlallÁh considers deterministic 
interpretation as tendentious and manipulative, and that it serves the interests of 
oppressive rulers. In this framework, Man’s actions cannot be initiated or carried out by 
human potentials, only by God.
378
 As a result, such thinking reduces the value of the 
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human being to a mere slave not only in front of God but in face of mortal, oppressive 
powers as well.   
 FaÃlallÁh proposes a “holistic, realistic picture of humankind” (ÒÙra kÁmila 
wÁqiÝiyya)379 that eliminates any contradiction between God’s omnipotence and human 
power: human beings are empowered even though their capacities are limited and 
cannot challenge God’s power. His analytical approach is well exemplified by the 
following passage: 
 
There is a big difference between surrendering to death as a real unchangeable 
phenomenon, and surrendering to the causes of death, which could be eliminated, 
or fought against or controlled by a superior power. You must not give up in such 
cases, since you have the ability and the duty to control and face the challenge with 
all the knowledge God has given you. However, you must submit to death since it 
is one of the inevitable facts of our material existence.
380
  
 
 FaÃlallÁh makes a distinction between changeable phenomena – illness – and the 
“inalterable existential phenomena” (ka ÛÁhira kawniyya la taqbal al-taghyÐr) like 
death.
381
 He claims that the human being possesses the means and the abilities to deal 
with the elements of nature, to recognise, understand and apply the universal laws, but 
he / she cannot challenge them. It is essential for success to learn how to distinguish 
between the unalterable basic principles set by God and the amendable phenomena that 
result from human action. For this, FaÃlallÁh claims it is essential that believers develop 
a sense for reality (wÁqiÝiyya) and realistic perception.  
 FaÃlallÁh resorted to a twofold concept of reality. He interpreted the actual 
political events and human experience – the relative and changeable reality – in light of 
the absolute, intangible, transcendental reality. This ultimate reality is that the world is 
governed by an omnipotent Divinity who has designed a plan for humankind which is 
redemptive in the sense that it liberates from injustice and oppression. The link between 
these two realities is human power that turns the intangible into tangible. The divinely 
ordered law of causality that governs and operates the universe is cognisable through 
revelation and experience. However, FaÃlallÁh clearly differentiates between the law of 
causal relation as determined, and the actual events that are contingent. This perception 
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secures God’s primacy but at the same time provides scope for human power and free 
will.  
 The expression “realistic” occurs approximately thirty times in the book. 
According to FaÃlallÁh, it is a primary attribute of the Islamic view of life and the 
human being.
382
 However, at the outset he makes a careful distinction:  
 
Although we are using the terminology and language of philosophy, these are not 
philosophical theories that are subject to debate and discussion but are the living 
reality and the very nature of life itself.
383
  
 
 In other words, it is the understanding of human experience in light of the 
revealed truth that unfolds reality in the deepest sense. This reasoning is based on a 
combination of human experience and the contextual interpretation of revelation and 
tradition. Realism as a method for FaÃlallÁh means that he does not base his conclusions 
merely on Qur’Ánic verses deemed to be thematically relevant. Rather, in the first place, 
he takes human experience as a starting point for any analysis.  
 Second, he looks for a similar situation in the sacred texts of Islam and highlights 
the parallels between the two contexts. His focus at this stage is the divine intention as 
unfolded in the particular situation. Finally, he assesses the present experience in light 
of the divine message. Through this process he aims to uncover the deep meaning of the 
given situation in light of the divinely assigned human mission. He claims that this 
mode of reasoning eliminates contradictions by providing a horizon that harmonises 
divine and human power. 
 For FaÃlallÁh realism  
refers only to a realistic idea of how the universe functions with its changeable 
and unchangeable laws comparing them with what man can or cannot do.
384
  
 
 As such, being a realist is most importantly the ability to distinguish between the 
constant and the variable, as opposed to idealists who profess limitless human power.
385
 
Only in light of this is Man able to assess the possibility, the scope, and the means of 
change. In this regard FaÃlallÁh’s line of thought echoes some of the salient features of 
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Sayyid QuÔb’s (d. 1966) assertions. QuÔb and FaÃlallÁh maintained the role of belief in 
strengthening the Muslim community. For QuÔb – as set out in his MaÝÁlim fi’l-ÔarÐq – 
as for FaÃlallÁh, the oneness of God and the exclusive submission to the omnipotent 
divinity expressed in the ÝaqÐda leads Muslims to transform themselves and the society 
they live in. Both QuÔb and FaÃlallÁh claim that the Islamic approach towards the 
universe and Man is realistic and objective.
386
  
 In his KhaÒÁ’iÒ al-taÒawwur al-IslÁmÐ, QuÔb dedicates a chapter to realism.387 For 
him, the realism of the Islamic approach is based on two pillars. First, he takes the 
existence and the presence of God as the absolute reality. Second, the Islamic system 
based exclusively on the revelation is in perfect harmony with the nature of the universe 
and that of humankind.
388
 To realise it the use of force is permitted, without any demand 
to rationalise it.
389
 
 Compared to QuÔb’s approach, FaÃlallÁh offers a “down-to-earth” perspective. As 
a ShÐÝÐ jurist, he had to convince his followers to resort to radical activism. Moreover, he 
had to give practical guidelines for it. His aim was to persuade his ShÐÝÐ audience that – 
in spite of the physical limits they experience in their everyday life –- they should not 
submit to the imposed circumstances without adequately studying the possibilities to 
change them. FaÃlallÁh addresses the self-perception of the believers by encouraging 
them to explore their capacities and to act as co-creators of the situation in which they 
live. He took the spiritual route with the common believers from their experience and 
emotions to a new conviction based on tradition and reason. With this he provided 
encouragement and religious justification to ShÐÝÐ activism. 
 Having this goal in mind, he used Twelver ShÐÝÐ references to offer an alternative 
reading to statements that were considered not only as authoritative but also proverbial 
in the quietist tradition. At the outset, talking about the feeling of weakness and 
powerlessness, FaÃlallÁh quotes ImÁm ÝAlÐ from the Supplication of Kumayl, and his 
grandson ÝAlÐ Ibn al-Íusayn’s words from al-ÑaÎÐfa al-SajjÁdiyya. Both express the 
fragility and impotence of human beings without being supported by God. Later on, the 
                                                             
386 QuÔb’s understanding of realism was explored by Ronald A.T. Judy in: 
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central question of the chapter: “Does not this imply powerlessness and submission?” is 
answered by ImÁm ÝAlÐ’s words from Nahj al-balÁgha “Do not be a slave to others as 
God has created you free”.390 It affirms that it is only God to whom a human being owes 
submission, which implies that Man is strong in face of any other natural or political 
force.  
 FaÃlallÁh refers to Nahj al-balÁgha three times. In the first two instances he uses 
ImÁm ÝAlÐ’s comments on two widely quoted sayings: “There is no strength or power if 
not from God” (based or Qur’Án 18:39)391 and “To God we belong and to Him shall we 
return” (based or Qur’Án 2:156).392 Both statements serve as titles that introduce 
sections (or sub-chapters). Also, they are widely used to support determinist opinions. 
In each instance, FaÃlallÁh supports his voluntarist reading by referring to ImÁm ÝAlÐ. 
The first comment connects Man’s empowerment to his / her being commissioned by 
God. The second commentary states that human beings are possessed by God and our 
life in this world is temporal. These statements emphasise two notions that are crucial in 
FaÃlallÁh’s line of thought: Man’s exclusive dependence on God; and his being invested 
with a special duty as well as with the means to accomplish it. 
 Although the Twelver ShÐÝÐ references thus give a frame to the whole chapter, the 
abundant Qur’Ánic references give the impression that FaÃlallÁh wanted to provide a 
novel ShÐÝÐ interpretation to this problem, which is acceptable to a non-ShÐÝÐ audience as 
well. 
 
 2. 2       Free will 
 
 For FaÃlallÁh, justice is not only demanded by the divine will, but it is also 
dependent on human will and action. He offered a radical answer to the shattered self-
perception of the ShÐÝÐ community: Man is not only a servant of God; he is also a 
partner, a co-creator of the reality. As such, Man is a significant contributor in making 
the transcendental unity apparent in the created world. Divine intention – a world built 
on justice and truth – as revealed in the Qur’Án and elaborated in the ÎadÐth ensures that 
                                                             
390 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 50. 
391 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 46. 
392 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 47. 
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the will of the Divinity cannot be arbitrary and oppressive. Therefore, FaÃlallÁh focuses 
on the negation of determinism. 
 FaÃlallÁh emphasised freedom of will at the first mention in his book of the 
importance of the human role and knowledge. Besides the capacity to gain knowledge, 
human beings must be free to make decisions and to engage in action or refrain from it. 
He reiterates that 
 
[M]an is strong, effective and free to make his own choices. He controls and 
dominates many forces and secrets of this world.
393
 (...) God is the Merciful 
Compassionate Creator Who has given man his will and mind, as well as his 
existence.
394
 
 
 Thus life, freedom of the will, and ability to gain knowledge are the channels 
through which human strength is realised. These three aspects are inseparable and are 
considered as part of rizq, the divine sustenance that provides Man with all the 
necessary means and guidelines for righteous action. 
 Freedom of will entails that human beings bear full responsibility for their 
choices.
395
 FaÃlallÁh asserts that human freedom of consciousness (ÃamÐr) and freedom 
of will (irÁda) are essential Islamic principles. Therefore, Muslims must declare war on 
anything that endangers these freedoms.
396
 However, like human power, human 
freedom is not absolute because Man’s physical and intellectual capacities are limited 
by the natural laws.
397
 God does not pressure human beings; His decrees aim to shape 
circumstances that guide Man’s choice in the right direction.398 
 FaÃlallÁh’s position regarding human free will follows the MuÝtazilite tradition. 
The MuÝtazilites deduced that “man must have the ability to choose” from their concept 
of God’s justice.399 FaÃlallÁh’s theology of power is rooted in his conviction that Man 
has freedom of will and, therefore, possesses the capacity to shape his / her environment 
and destiny. The question of human free will appears as inherently related to Man’s role 
in the salvation history.  
                                                             
393 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 31. 
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The idea of God’s power does not want to pressure man’s thinking, will and 
choices (...) As for having goals and searching for ways to achieve them, or the will 
to make the difficult choice on the basis of truth and falsehood, in all these Man 
enjoys vast freedom (...)
400
 
 
 For FaÃlallÁh, Man enjoys freedom in terms of goals and means. In this 
framework, making choices and exercising will power appear as synonymous. The act 
of search implies creativity as a primary attribute. The special weight given to the 
notion of Man as free agent implies that the process of choice in itself is an occasion to 
make goodness win over falsehood. The demand of making decisions implies the 
existence of a clear predictable, precise system of criteria that distinguishes between 
what is good and what is evil. The logic that governs this set of criteria is not arbitrary: 
actions are valued in terms of their consequences: whether they serve the divine plan or 
not. Man, however, is free to obey or to infringe these laws, but he cannot ignore them 
since he is part of this system. This freedom is present in each instant of human life. It 
demands constant awareness and a perception that considers life as a continuous 
universal combat between goodness and evil. 
 For FaÃlallÁh, the duty of al-amr bi’l-maÝrÙf wa’l-nahy Ýan al-munkar cannot be 
conceived and implemented in a deterministic framework. This obligation implies that 
human beings can make choices and they are able to use or abuse the power bestowed 
upon them. Commanding right and forbidding wrog is based on a transcendental system 
of values, and, therefore, the idea of human free will – without which this obligation 
cannot be fulfilled – asserts the perception of Man as a two-dimensional being. This 
logic separates his ideas from the majority of SunnÐ activist thinkers, among them YÙsuf 
al-QaraÃÁwÐ one of the most influential representatives of SunnÐ legal and political 
thought.  
 In his book al-ĪmÁn wa’l-ÎayÁt, al-QaraÃÁwÐ dedicates a chapter to the notion of 
quwwa in which some of the ideas remind us of those set forth by FaÃlallÁh.401 Both 
jurists regard the use of force as an inevitable necessity, and consider God as the source 
of human strength, a fact that obligates human beings to act. Faith, spiritual strength, 
fraternity of the believers, and social strength are clearly interrelated in their 
                                                             
400 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 37. 
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argumentation. The coherence of belief and action – especially with regards to 
resistance – and its implementation in the fulfilment of the duty of “commanding right 
and forbidding wrong” is another shared feature.402  
 However, there are differences in their approaches. Although al-QaraÃÁwÐ’s 
starting point, like FaÃlallÁh’s, is human experience he does not emphasise the law of 
causality that involves human beings as formative actors in the chain of events. He 
stresses qadar, the divine ordinance that eventually determines the victory of Islam. For 
al-QaraÃÁwÐ, Islamic conquests would never have happened without the belief in divine 
decree and destiny: al-qaÃÁ’ wa’l-qadar. He explicitly states that human beings cannot 
alter what God allotted to them. This means that tribulations happen only with God’s 
permission and Man’s power can never replace God’s power.403 For this reason, when 
studying the elements of victory, al-QaraÃÁwÐ seems to put aside the material 
conditions, and stresses the role of faith and reliance on God’s omnipotence.  
 For FaÃlallÁh, the laws of the universe (al-qawÁnÐn wa’l-sunan al-ÔabÐÝiyya)404 
provide a frame and assure the contiguity of causes and effects within which human 
beings are expected to operate and entitled to use their power in order to fulfil their 
divine mission. FaÃlallÁh’s idea in this respect shows many common elements with that 
of ÝAlÐ SharÐÝatÐ’ (1933-1977) and Bint al-ShÁÔi’ (1913-1998).405 Yudian Wahyudi 
argues that for both thinkers, salvation history and Man’s role as God’s vice-regent on 
earth served as a starting point of their analysis.
406
 Similarly, they connected human free 
will to Man’s creative intellect,407 to his / her two-dimensional character,408 and to the 
fact that he / she is an active “maker of history”.409 
 However, there are disagreements with FaÃlallÁh’s argument. Bint al-ShÁÔi’ and 
SharÐÝatÐ held that in order to transcend history, human beings “should not only discover 
its deterministic laws, but also revolt against them using science”.410 For FaÃlallÁh, 
natural law is not deterministic; it is the eternal system of cause and effect as set by 
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God. Human free will is part of this system. Another crucial difference is that for 
SharÐÝatÐ “Man can make his own choices, even when they are contrary to his 
physiological and psychological drives and desires”.411 In FaÃlallÁh’s thought, Man’s 
deepest desires are always in harmony with the divine will. 
 
 
 3.       Refutation of the Marxist view of religion  
 
 In his refutation of the Marxist criticism of religion FaÃlallÁh counters arguments 
that attribute the feeling of weakness to religiosity. He derives Man’s empowerment 
from faith and argues for the resulting human responsibility as a consequence of this 
empowerment. Furthermore, FaÃlallÁh extends this responsibility to revolutionary 
activism reinforcing the fact that in the framework of the divinely ordered causality both 
success and failure are dependent on human volition and action.  
 
 
 3.1 Religion and weakness 
 
 In his comment on the ideas of the Lebanese thinker HishÁm NashshÁba, FaÃlallÁh 
targets the materialistic view that associates religion with human weakness.
412
 
NashshÁba published an article in the well-known Lebanese journal “MawÁqif”413 in 
which he argues that the “bourgeois mentality” and religiosity lead to the same feeling 
of human weakness.
414
 Such ideas strongly challenged FaÃlallÁh’s intellectual authority 
as a ShÐÝÐ jurist in the Lebanese confessional environment. FaÃlallÁh admits that the 
feeling of vulnerability is rooted in the everyday human experience of facing 
oppression, aggression, and the forces of nature. He also acknowledges that materialist 
(“bourgeois”) and religious thought agree in stating that Man can act only within the 
limits of his / her abilities.
415
 However, he refutes that such perception implies Man’s 
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weakness or lack of capacity. To refute any relationship between limited power and 
incapacity he raises the following question: 
 
Are those materialistic thinkers trying to suggest that Man’s weakness against the 
needs of nature and his subjection to natural laws cause him to submit to all other 
forms of power in the world? We do not think there is a way to answer such a 
question affirmatively.
416
  
 
 FaÃlallÁh’s aim here is to highlight the difference between the so-called 
“bourgeois” mentality – that generates corruption and opportunism – and religion. 
Further on he affirms that in contrast to materialism, religiosity is able to “show how 
Man can exercise his [/ her] strength naturally and realistically”.417 He claims that as far 
as religion is concerned, the Marxist analysis is simplistic and partial.
418
 FaÃlallÁh 
denies any link between religiosity and incapacity or between faith and the acception of 
subjugation. For him, nature is not an oppressive power; once its laws are respected, it 
provides human beings with the essentials of life. Therefore, FaÃlallÁh rejects the idea 
that human beings are inevitably vulnerable in face of nature or of any worldly 
power.
419
  
 FaÃlallÁh’s polemic against Marxism fits into a long tradition of antagonism 
between Marxism and Islamism in the Middle East. Since the thirties in Egypt, 
Communists and Islamists have competed in attracting young militants of the rising 
lower middle class. Sayyid QuÔb and his brother MuÎammad QuÔb wrote some of the 
classics of anti-Marxist Islamist literature.
420
 The rivalry continued in the sixties in Iraq, 
with Communists recruiting largely young ShÐÝÐs.
421
 The phenomenon was so significant 
that ÀyatullÁh MuÎsin al-ÍakÐm issued a fatwÁ in which communism was accused of 
atheism, ilÎÁd, and strictly forbade ShÐÝÐs to join the Communist party. In the same 
context, M. BÁqir al-Ñadr published his FalsafatunÁ (Our Philosophy) and IqtiÒÁdunÁ 
(Our Economy), which quickly became the references of Islamist criticism of Marxism. 
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Similarly, in Iran some intense intellectual conflicts emerged between the leftists and 
ShÐÝÐ thinkers on history and evolution.
422
 
 FaÃlallÁh, similarly to MurtaÃÁ MuÔahharÐ
423
 put forward an extended criticism of 
the revolutionary concept of Marxism. Both thinkers claimed that righteous action 
requires a mental disposition, a commitment to immaterial values that liberate one from 
outside pressures and generates internal harmony in the individual. This logic urges to 
change first the immaterial, the attitudinal factor, then, in the second step the material 
reality. In this argumentation the renewal of the believer was a prerequisite to social 
change. 
 
 
 3.2 God the Almighty and human power 
 
 One of the strongest arguments in Communist criticism of Islam is the doctrine of 
God’s omnipotence in the Qur’Án.424 In order to respond to this criticism, FaÃlallÁh 
evolves his discourse by commenting on the following Qur’Ánic verses that reveal 
various aspects of divine power. “I fear God; and God is terrible in retribution” 
(8:52);
425 “Assuredly God will help him who helps Him” (22:40);426 “Surely God is the 
All-provider, the Possessor of Strength, the Ever-Sure.” (51:58);427 “Say: I have no 
power to profit for myself; or hurt, but as God will.” (7:188).428 In each case, FaÃlallÁh 
draws attention to the context of the revelation, and concludes that divine power is 
protective and supports human power. The only instance at which God’s power 
intervenes against humans is when God punishes them for disobeying divine 
obligations.  
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 FaÃlallÁh reiterates that Man is in need of God’s power, which has two basic 
functions: deterrence and education.
429
 Both serve to hold back human beings from 
deviance and the abuse of power that would harm others as well as themselves. Also, 
one cannot find the source of one’s strength in oneself only in God’s power. These two 
factors shape a balanced view of human capacities. Islamic legislation, therefore, serves 
not to paralyze but to help Man fulfil his / her potentials. FaÃlallÁh asserts that sharÐÝa 
mobilises the elements of strength in all aspects of human life430 which provide tools for 
human beings to accomplish their role as God’s vice-regents on Earth. For FaÃlallÁh, 
Islam is the natural and the most complex realisation of human potentials operating in 
harmony with the divinely set order of the universe. 
 
God is the merciful compassionate Creator who has given Man his will and mind, 
as well as his existence. Besides, God has provided Man with all he [/ she] needs to 
follow the straight path and keep away from the evil one. God also shows man that 
He does not need any of Man’s words or deeds, since He has power over 
everything. Accordingly, God’s will could never (lÁ yumkin) oppose the interest 
(maÒlaÎa) of Man in this world because the contradiction between the strength of 
the strong and the interest of the weak is generated by the urge of the strong to 
exploit the weak and impose their will on them.
431
 
 
 FaÃlallÁh seeks to provide a rational explanation, which is rooted in everyday 
human experience rather than in theological speculation. FaÃlallÁh makes an essential 
distinction between God’s power and human force: since God is omnipotent and self-
sufficient, He is not in need of any human contribution. His premise is that it is the 
conflict of interests that generates tensions between the wills of two entities. Since God 
assists human efforts to eliminate oppression and injustice in accordance with the 
Islamic message, there cannot be any conflict of interest between the Creator and the 
human being.
432
 It is Man’s interest to act in accordance with the divine decrees that 
thus provide a source for human empowerment. Thus, God’s will cannot oppose Man’s 
best interests.
433
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 In this context, the first question that arises refers to God’s purpose with the act of 
creation and with imposing moral obligations. In the view of the MuÝtazila, God is 
transcendent and just, therefore, His acts and decisions must serve Man.
434
 As for 
conclusions that imply imposing any obligation on God, the MuÝtazila held varying 
views. On the one hand, the BaÒrans argued that complying to His attribute as “just,” 
God gives Man a chance “to earn a reward” by fulfilling the moral obligations.435 On 
the other hand, the Baghdad school emphasised God’s “generosity and nobility”,436 and 
claimed that God considers the best interest of the community as overruling that of the 
individual.
437
  
 FaÃlallÁh’s denial of God’s will as contradicting the well-being of Man is not by 
any standards an obligation imposed on God. It is out of generosity that God provides 
Man with all the necessary means to “follow the straight path”. Will and intellect are 
such tools that enable Man to earn his reward. However, for FaÃlallÁh the motivation 
behind this divine gift is to be evaluated in light of the message of Islam as a divine 
project that aims at the well-being of humanity in this world and its salvation in the 
hereafter through an exclusive and strict monotheist order. FaÃlallÁh’s emphasis through 
his book is on the communitarian aspects of individual behaviour.  
 The term “maÒlaÎa” for FaÃlallÁh as for the BaghdÁdÐ thinkers, implies that God’s 
care covers both secular and religious affairs.
438
 Man is in a one-sided dependency with 
regards to God, but this does not make human beings vulnerable; rather it is a call to 
trust. As God revealed religious truth He also revealed how individual and social life 
must operate built on exclusive monotheism. Divine providence is universal and divine 
omnipotence is a guarantee against any arbitrariness in the divine will. 
 The rules regarding the relationship between the Creator and the creation are set 
by God in the system of natural laws (al-sunan al-kawniyya).439 The principles of this 
system of laws are not arbitrary; they are rational and comprehensible. Therefore, God’s 
sovereignty is maintained, but the result of human actions is determined by the response 
of Man to the divine rules. This perception bears the characteristics of MuÝtazilÐ thought.  
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 However, it is important to note that FaÃlallÁh was not a MuÝtazilÐ or “free 
thinker” in its modern sense.440 From the five principles of classical MuÝtazilism, he 
echoes two: God’s justice and the “obligation of commanding right and forbidding 
wrong”. However, the guiding principles behind these notions are not based on the 
rationalist reading of the sources. FaÃlallÁh was not a rationalist, rather he was an 
Islamic Fundamentalist thinker, whose peculiarity lied in his pragmatic approach that he 
called “realistic”. In specific, ÝadÁla for FaÃlallÁh was not an obligation imposed on 
God, rather it was the framework within which he could situate the obligation on human 
being to be a responsible actor. Regarding al-amr wa’l-nahy, it is not restricted to the 
MuÝtazila and as we will see in later sections of the present dissertation, FaÃlallÁh’s 
approach shared much with the KhÁrijÐ understanding of this obligation.  
 
 
 3.3 Faith and Force 
 
 In the ninth chapter of al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa devoted to the relationship 
between faith and force, FaÃlallÁh studies the role of faith in successful social and 
political action. Based on Qur’Ánic verses, FaÃlallÁh reiterates that faith has a decisive 
role in the empowerment of the human being.
441
 It multiplies moral strength and unifies 
the fighters’ goals based on their religious value, provides them with the feeling of 
protection and prevents them from submission to human powers. Such commitment puts 
the person in the winner’s position regardless of the actual outcome since it assures 
victory, if not in this world then in the hereafter.
442
  
 At this point FaÃlallÁh resorts to widely a used fundamentalist argument that 
considers life in this world and in the hereafter as an unbroken unity. This is a common 
notion in monotheistic religions; however, it has been given special emphasis in the 
Islamist discourse as a means of mobilisation and reducing the fear of death. Such a 
perception not only asserts the continuity of existence after death, but also gives greater 
weight to human effort and commitment (by which Man earns salvation) than to 
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tangible achievements. This tactic implies that a spiritual disposition, as potential 
energy is transformable into action that can bring about concrete accomplishments. For 
FaÃlallÁh, patience and perseverance are essential elements of faith; they intensify the 
strength of Muslims even if they are numerically weaker than their enemy.
443
 Thus, 
faith unites the individual and communal dimensions and links ambitions to 
responsibilities.
444
 Non-believers lack this coherence.  
 Taking the example of the Battle of Badr, FaÃlallÁh asserts that one fighter with 
high spirits and faith can face a large number of soldiers and make them psychologically 
defeated even before the actual fight starts.
445
 The Qur’Ánic descriptions of the battle 
stress the importance of divine intervention, while secular sources emphasise 
MuÎammad’s skilful tactical plan against the much bigger Meccan army. The encounter 
had been preceded by Muslim raids on QurayshÐ caravans that MuÎammad’s followers 
justified by their expulsion from Medina.
446
 FaÃlallÁh merged the two above-mentioned 
interpretations and equally emphasises the importance of divine intervention and adept 
tactics.  
 According to Marshall Hodgson the victory at Badr turned Muslims into 
“challengers and potential inheritors to the prestige and the political role of the 
[Quraysh]”.447  Following Hodgson’s logic we can assume that striving for dignity and 
power provides legitimate causes for combat. Combining this idea with the 
encouragement for “resistance until martyrdom” proved to be a call and a long-lasting 
action plan for radical ShÐÝÐ activism that was taking shape from the late seventies. 
 For FaÃlallÁh, faith turns into a formative life energy that puts human capacities 
into motion and provides man with new perspectives. In this framework, FaÃlallÁh links 
quwwa to faith, and defines strength as an attribute of the faithful. Apart from declaring 
that “practical action is the only real proof of the sincerity of belief”;448 FaÃlallÁh asserts 
in a straightforward statement that it is “faith [that] obligates (min aÎkÁm hÁdha’l-ÐmÁn) 
resistance in the battle till martyrdom”.449 In this line of thought the measure of faith is 
                                                             
443 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 295. 
444 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 296. 
445 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 293-296. 
446 See: W. Montgomery Watt, “Badr,” in The Encyclopedia of Islam, edited by H. A. R. Gibb et al., vol. 
1 (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 867-868. 
447 Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol.1: The Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1977), 176. 
448 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 142. 
449 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 291. 
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action. The conscious use of the word “resistance” (muqÁwama) specifies the notion of 
action: it is resistance to (in a sense of forbidding) what is wrong in general, such as 
oppression. It also means resort to armed resistance when “forbidding” injustice is not 
effective or not possible. Resistance implies that the initiator of the conflict is not those 
who resist; their action is mere reaction to defend values, life and properties.  
 By connecting resistance to martyrdom FaÃlallÁh provided a potent catchphrase 
for the radical ShÐÝÐ movement in Lebanon. Recalling the victory of a minority over a 
majority conveys the essence of FaÃlallÁh’s message and vision regarding the potentials 
of the Muslim world in general and the Lebanese ShÐÝa in particular. Faith sets the 
objectives and forms the attitudes of Man, while the lack of faith makes the fight 
detached from its “roots”, that is, from its deep reasons and major goals.450 It is only 
through faith that quwwa remains purposeful and controlled and, therefore, justified 
even if it is violent (Ýunf). 
 FaÃlallÁh elaborates the difference between the virtuous and vicious use of force. 
Muslims had both “personal” and “general” reasons for their fight. He claims that the 
Muslims’ fight at Badr “on the one hand was linked to themselves and on the other hand 
to the [defence of the]
451
 Divine message”.452  The meeting of the personal and divine 
aspects invests the particular action with redemptive power. Besides having the just 
cause, their actions were governed by faith. “There was no gap (…) between their 
personal desires and religious responsibilities”.453 This harmony guaranteed the moral 
value of their fight. For FaÃlallÁh, the central value of virtuous violence is its being in 
accordance with the realisation of the divine plan for humankind. Furthermore it must 
be guided by positive emotions not hatred. As he says: 
 
The party of God (Îizb AllÁh) firmly follows His will (…) and is linked to it with 
the bonds of love, submission to God, and faith.
454
  
 
 FaÃlallÁh in these passages extols the unity of personal motivations and divine 
goals, the unity of the movement, and the unity of the objectives of the movement with 
that of the divine plan. The name Îizb AllÁh is a Qur’Ánic expression referring to those 
                                                             
450 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 292. 
451 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 295-296. 
452 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 295. 
453 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 296. 
454 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 295. 
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who are with God. All through the book FaÃlallÁh emphasises the significance of 
emotional commitment. Sentiments (ÝawÁÔif) are primary in constructing spiritual and 
rational convictions.
455
 Feelings bind the members of any community into one “body” 
that acts united.
456
  
 In interpreting the Qur’Ánic verses FaÃlallÁh does not miss the opportunity to 
stress the difference in material power between Muslims and their enemies, and that the 
confrontation was very risky by all human measures. He asserts that it is this faith that 
turned Muslims into instruments of change, and overruled the numerical superiority of 
their enemies. However, FaÃlallÁh also emphasises the “objective causes” of victory in 
Badr. The latter, as he sees it, is the outcome of the “natural chain of causes and effects 
set by God”.457  
 In this framework, humans are the fully equipped agents of the divine plan. 
FaÃlallÁh’s claim is that at Badr Muslims did not rely only on faith, but prepared 
objectively for the battle. The elements of force – faith and organisation – complement 
each other. By explicating the reasons of the Muslims to resort to arms, the battle of 
Badr is described as a necessary event of violence in correcting the disequilibrium 
resulting from the corruption and injustice of the Quraysh. From this angle, the Battle of 
Badr and the use of force by the Muslims was instrumental in the realisation of Islam. 
 
 
 3.4 Responsibility and causality 
 
 FaÃlallÁh puts great emphasis on human responsibility, since his concept of force 
and empowerment requires a responsible actor who can deal with force and power with 
full awareness. This is the sphere where Man has the opportunity to co-operate with 
God. In FaÃlallÁh’s system of thought, free will, knowledge, responsibility and causality 
form an inseparable quadrangle: 
 
Man’s limited power is not governed by his limited experience, because this would 
lead only to partial results. It is governed by the natural laws of life and the 
universe that man usually discovers in the course of making great efforts. A human 
                                                             
455 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 255-6. 
456 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 143. 
457 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 296. 
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being has to submit his life and decisions (aÎkÁm) to these laws, so that he can 
harmonize his life with them.
458
 
 
 Without a predictable and fixed law that operates the universe, there would be no 
scope for human responsibility. The tangible and the intangible aspects of human life 
operate on a strict causality in which causes and effects are linked by the natural laws 
set by God. For Man’s freedom is not absolute, his / her primary responsibility is to 
acquire the necessary information – from the Revelation as well as from science – 
regarding the logic that governs this law. This awareness enables Man to predict the 
direct and the indirect consequences of any action. Submission to God is a life-long 
mental disposition through which Man is empowered in each instant to acquire the 
necessary knowledge and to act on its basis. The effort to gain this awareness and the 
decision to engage in an action is, therefore, is Man’s responsibility.  
 Physical causality was a concern of the MuÝtazilÐ thinkers as well. Their interest in 
the matter was raised by the problem of responsibility, especially with regards to the 
unforeseen consequences of human acts.
459As McDermott says, “both the Baghdadis 
and the BaÒrans were defending the basis of man’s responsibility for his acts and at least 
some of their consequences”.460 
 FaÃlallÁh repeatedly asserts that God provides help (as part of rizq) to the 
oppressed (even if they are non-believers),
461
 to those in hardship and poverty
462
 and to 
those who fight for His cause.
463
 Strength and guidance in this context are God’s grace 
to mankind. God’s help is actuated by Man’s submission to him, which is thus part of 
the cause-effect chain. However, the outcome depends on the spiritual, tactical and 
material preparedness of the individual and the community.   
 
The case of victory and defeat is influenced by many objective causes related to the 
nature of the battle.
464
 (…) [T]he relation of power to faith is represented in its role 
in providing the battle with a new and essential power added to the rest of the 
powers bringing about victory.
465
  
                                                             
458 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 34. 
459 McDermott, The Theology of al-Shaykh al-Mufid, 169. 
460 McDermott, The Theology of al-Shaykh al-Mufid, 170. 
461 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 185. 
462 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 38. 
463 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 62. 
464 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 289. 
465 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 292-3. 
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 God’s help thus evolves in the framework of causality, that is, only if the human 
being fulfils its objective conditions. The battles referred to by FaÃlallÁh, especially that 
of Íunayn,
466
 show a dynamic relationship between God and Man. In this sense human 
behaviour can change and affect the outcome in every situation, and the results of 
individual events are not determined beforehand. However, the final success of the 
divine project can never be doubted. 
 The idea of causality is also present in MuÔahharÐ’s thought. He refers to the 
system of the creation that is shaped to make a natural distinction between good and 
bad.
467
  Furthermore, he asserts that “the system of the creation supports those who 
make efforts for the cause of truth, justice and integrity”.468 This idea recalls FaÃlallÁh’s 
notion of causes and effects governed by the natural laws. Human effort in this sense is 
independent from the immediate welcoming or unwelcoming circumstances; rather it 
mobilises the positive energies that bring about success even if indirectly. The idea of 
causality is a recurrent theme in modernist Islamism and related to the obligation of 
activism. The main difference between the SunnÐ and ShÐÝÐ readings is the SunnÐ 
emphasis on predestination that embraces causality. The resemblance between 
MuÔahharÐ’s and FaÃlallÁh’s thought does not imply direct influence or borrowing, 
simply the emphasis they both put on human effort, that gained key importance in the 
ShÐÝÐ activism. 
For FaÃlallÁh, sin, punishment and remittance fall under the scope of natural laws. 
Deviation from what is right or abstaining from the required action brings about its 
natural consequences. Thus, punishment and calamity come as results of human action. 
He asserts that:  
 
Punishment is not far from the Earth to make it heavenly. Rather it is a natural 
consequence of the deviation that creates social disintegration as well as the 
                                                             
466 A battle fought between MuÎammad and his followers against the Bedouin tribe of HawÁzin and its 
subsection the ThaqÐf in 630. The battle ended in a decisive victory for the Muslims, although they were 
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Hafez Kamal, “Íunayn”, in The Encyclopedia of Islam, edited by H. A. R. Gibb et al., vol. 3 (Leiden: 
Brill, 1986), 578. 
467 MuÔahharÐ, “Man and Universe,” chap. 2.  
468 MuÔahharÐ, “Man and Universe,” chap. 3. 
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weakening of the control and cohesion within a community… Thus, punishment is 
a threat in the beginning, it acts as a deterrent, but when it becomes reality, it is an 
act of rectifying.
469
 
 
 In this framework, punishment both in the forms of natural disasters, defeats or 
those imposed by sharÐÝa have a double function. First, they serve to deter Man from 
committing sin, and remind him / her to keep to what is right. Second, once the 
deviation has taken place, punishment serves to correct and re-establish justice and 
balance.
470
 God is not obliged to forgive, but remittance is inherent in the system of 
causality set by Him. The condition is that human beings exercise all their effort to 
realise, repent and correct the deviation. Their efforts bring divine forgiveness. It is a 
process that must be completed on all three levels: the intellectual, the emotional and 
the practical. In this interpretation – given that the system is designed by God – divine 
generosity invests human effort with rectifying power.
471
  
 
 
4.    The revolutionary aspects of FaÃlallÁh’s theology of power 
 
 One final question that arises here is whether FaÃlallÁh’s theology of force has 
any revolutionary implication. To answer this question, we have to examine the 
following aspects of FaÃlallÁh’s concept: the status of religious knowledge in pushing 
for activism, the relevance of piety for politics, whether “revolutionary Islam is 
considered as a necessary doctrine of the true faith” and whether theology was used to 
mobilise the masses.
472
 The relationship between faith and force in FaÃlallÁh’s thought 
is that of cause and effect. Faith as a spiritual disposition necessarily empowers the 
believer, but also guarantees that the use of force remains in harmony with Islamic 
morality.  
 The ideas expounded in the book are responses to political and theoretical 
challenges rooted in Western thought and practice. However, FaÃlallÁh took care not to 
transform Islam into an ideology of mass mobilisation. The strategy he elaborated was 
                                                             
469 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 112-3. 
470 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 35-37. 
471 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 307. 
472 In discussing these aspects, I was inspired by Hamid Dabashi’s article “Ali ShariÝati’s Islam: 
Revolutionary Uses of Faith in a Post-Traditional Society,”Islamic Quarterly (1983): 203-224.  
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to be understood as part of the divine project for humankind. It aimed at the realisation 
of transcendental values that are in harmony with the ultimate interests of Man. 
FaÃlallÁh did not interpret the Qur’Ánic references from a revolutionary point of view 
without contextualising them in the salvation history. While urging resistance, he 
emphasised the unity of God as a foundational Islamic precept that excludes submission 
to oppressive worldly powers.  
 FaÃlallÁh addressed a religious audience, aiming to explain that their salvation 
demands their contribution as individuals and as a community. He uses traditional 
registers to construct a narrative of empowerment based on the idea that the faith of 
believers brings them victory. Goals always point towards sacred values that must be 
realised as religious obligations. He raised awareness to what Islam wants from Man in 
a given situation and offered an aspect to consider the most appropriate modes of 
reaction. In this, faith, religious knowledge and devotion remained the primary sources 
of decision-making regarding the actual goals and tactics. His theology of force is 
intended to free individuals and the community from hesitation and impotence. At the 
same time he reminds that any worldly enterprise such as resistance or liberation is only 
one necessary step in the salvation history but not the final aim. For FaÃlallÁh, the 
revolutionary objectives that are detached from the supreme values of Islam lead only to 
traps, and in the long run, to the same distorted systems that they oppose. 
 FaÃlallÁh’s al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa is one of those endeavours that aim to 
conceptualise how and on what grounds power and force can serve the implementation 
of the divine message. In the ShÐÝÐ circles, MuÔahharÐ’s thought seems to be the closest 
to that of FaÃlallÁh’s. For both thinkers, religious faith inspires and encourages Man to 
resist tyranny.
473
 MuÔahharÐ’s idea of Man’s responsibility applies the same argument as 
FaÃlallÁh’s concept. One must put all his / her efforts to achieving the desired change. If 
one cannot accomplish the task with success or gain victory due to objective reasons, 
God will compensate him in the Hereafter. For all these reasons, the writings of 
MuÔahharÐ and FaÃlallÁh share the notion of “call to action”. 
 To mention only one from among the most prominent SunnÐ jurists, for al-
QaraÃÁwÐ too, it is faith that by essence prompts the believer to resist and throw off 
                                                             
473 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 46. 
  111 
oppressors.
474
 Standing up for the truth constitutes the essence of the Islamic message, if 
this is not met, then Islam loses what makes it special. Being a Muslim is conditioned 
on fulfilling this duty.
475
 The scope of this obligation is universal; it refers to the whole 
world and to every aspect of life. This is what the obligation of “commanding right and 
forbidding wrong” refers to.476 
 FaÃlallÁh’s perspective is remarkable because he links voluntarism with activism 
without transforming religion to a mere tool of a social-political programme. FaÃlallÁh’s 
concept of power is a return to the original message of Islam as an inherently liberating 
theology. FaÃlallÁh’s liberation theology refers to the kind of liberation which is rooted 
in, and stays in harmony with the core message of the Islamic revelation, the strict 
monotheism and the proclamation of a divine plan of justice for humankind. The 
function of theology in the system of force is to supervise and guide the continuous 
implementation of religious principles in the practice of force and power. 
 
 
 Concluding remarks 
 
 
 This chapter has shown that FaÃlallÁh’s theology of force displays two 
components. First, it is a refutation of any connection between religion and weakness 
and the idea of determinism. Second, it is an affirmation of human free-will, and the 
reconciliation of divine and human powers. He constructs a hierarchy of powers where 
God, the Almighty, provides his creatures with power to sustain divine order and to 
counterbalance nature. 
 The investigation of FaÃlallÁh’s sources has found a structuring function of ShÐÝÐ 
ÎadÐth and MuÝtazilÐ theology. From these traditions FaÃlallÁh constructed a voluntarist 
theological attitude which is emphatic about human being as an active agent. His 
theology also promotes free will and responsibility. That is to say, FaÃlallÁh mobilises 
all theological elements, which in other contexts such as QuÔb’s Egypt and SharÐÝatÐ’s 
Iran led to revolutionary movements. Although similarities do exist between FaÃlallÁh 
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and other influential Islamist thinkers, he approaches the theology of power as part of 
the system of quwwa, which in his view, encompasses supreme Islamic values.  
 FaÃlallÁh in his book developed a method by which he placed the particular 
situation and human needs – of the Lebanese ShiÝa in the 1970s – in the context of the 
universal perspective of religious goals. Through this approach he managed to fill the 
gap that separates idealism and pragmatism. This makes his ideas adaptable to the 
various realities in which Muslims live in and outside the Middle East. 
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Chapter V: Spiritual Power 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
 FaÃlallÁh interprets the Islamic concept of faith as faith-in-movement, and links it 
to the call to action. As we observed in his theology of power, FaÃlallÁh claims that 
faith is manifested in the whole existence of the community, harmonious with the laws 
of nature, and embedded in the system of causality. In the third chapter of al-IslÁm wa-
manÔiq al-quwwa dedicated to spiritual power (al-quwwa al-rÙÎiyya), FaÃlallÁh 
elaborates on the specific role of spirituality in relation to faith and action. In this, he 
adopts a common motif among Muslim reformists and thinkers since the 19
th
 century, 
that of criticising the negative role of ÑÙfÐsm in weakening the umma, collaborating 
with despots and serving the enemies. However, FaÃlallÁh could not discard mystic 
ideas and practices all together. As a ShÐÝÐ authority, he had to deal with Twelver ImÁmÐ 
spirituality whose vision of history, concept of leadership, and spiritual literature are 
imbued with mysticism. FaÃlallÁh considered colonialism and what he perceives as its 
allies (Orientalism, Christian missions) as forces the aim of which is to weaken the 
spirit of the umma.  
 In the following, I will examine how FaÃlallÁh responds to the internal spiritual 
challenge, in particular his reinterpretation of ÑÙfÐsm and ShÐÝÐ spirituality as 
spirituality-in-action. Subsequently, FaÃlallÁh’s response to external spiritual 
challenges, namely colonialism and Orientalism will be explored. In both sections, I 
contextualise his thought, compare it with some of the leading ShÐÝÐ revivalist thinkers, 
inspect his sources and highlight the function of spiritual force within his system of 
quwwa. 
 
 
1. FaÃlallÁh’s definition of spiritual power 
 
 In FaÃlallÁh’s system of thought, faith functions as a generator of spiritual 
strength that consequently guarantees material power. To put it differently, spirituality 
is the embodied faith, and as such, itself is a source of power. For FaÃlallÁh, spiritual 
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force is “a solid foundation upon which the physical strength is built”.477 It is rooted in 
and inspired by faith in God as provider, as well as in Man as receiver of power. This 
link between the Creator and the creation generates the energy that FaÃlallÁh calls 
spiritual power. Spirituality is the awareness of this process and the conscious use of it 
for spiritual empowerment. For that reason, spiritual power is considered as a 
characteristic of the Muslim individual who embodies confidence, will, and 
steadfastness.
478
 Second, FaÃlallÁh maintains that spirituality is crucial for building a 
strong community capable of responding to challenges. In this context, spirituality is not 
an abstract or gnostic concept; it is spirituality-in-action. 
 In FaÃlallÁh’s vocabulary, al-quwwa al-rÙÎiyya is sometimes used as a quality of 
the self, nafs.479 This implies necessarily that spiritual power is an attribute of the 
individual. He uses quwwa rÙÎiyya and quwwa shakhÒiyya, spiritual and personal force 
interchangeably.
480
 However, FaÃlallÁh often speaks of quwwa rÙÎiyya as the spirit of 
the community, thus the meaning of spiritual force often becomes a general concept in 
his treatise. For instance, when he discusses the role of colonialism in destroying 
nations, he describes the “spirit of resistance” (rÙÎ al-muqÁwama) as the equivalent of 
spiritual power.
481
 They are interchangeable if the context concerns collective force. In 
several instances, FaÃlallÁh considers the spirit (rÙÎ) and the psyche (nafs) as the 
same.
482
 This is the case when he emphasises the psychological war of colonial powers 
against Islam. 
 FaÃlallÁh claims that spiritual strength is a transformative energy that turns 
religious conviction – faith – and theory – creed – into practice. In his words, it  
 
                                                             
477 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 104. 
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influence[s] a human being’s practical behaviour regarding the great or the small 
issues in life. In truth, the strength of one’s personal incentives for work provides 
the body with double strength that enlivens him and increases his energy.
483
 
 
 Thus, spiritual power is an existential necessity, manifested in all fields of life. It 
invigorates the personality and provides the necessary energy to act according to one’s 
convictions. Moreover, it is objective and measurable since it has a direct effect on 
Man’s choices and enables his actions. It exerts both qualitative and quantitative 
influences. Spiritual strength is essential for mastering life and determines even success 
or failure.
484
  
 
 
2.      Internal spiritual challenges and the road to spiritual force   
 
 For FaÃlallÁh, challenges generate opportunities for empowerment.
485
 As a ShÐÝÐ 
jurist, he prepares a roadmap of spiritual empowerment and overcoming internal 
challenges. This process starts with transforming faith into reality. Islam, FaÃlallÁh 
claims, guides people to put principles into practice. The necessity to realise ideas – that 
faith should be embodied in thought and practice – is a recurrent motif in his argument. 
A constant meeting with God in devoted prayer activates the strong divine presence in 
the heart of the human. In other words, emotion nourishes faith.  
 
 
2.1      Reinterpreting spiritual traditions  
 
 FaÃlallÁh opposes any understanding that considers spirituality as an aim in itself. 
As reflected both in the SunnÐ and the ShÐÝÐ traditions, spirituality is a praised way of 
life. However, FaÃlallÁh rejects the historical interpretation of this spirituality as 
withdrawal from the herein, taking refuge in asceticism and passivity. For him this 
constitutes negative spirituality, according to which human beings should stay passive 
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amongst worldly tribulations. Neither does he see in the self qua self an enemy; he 
advocates moderation in spirituality. 
 FaÃlallÁh quotes seven ÎadÐths, reinterpreting them as incentives of spiritual 
power. First, he quotes two traditions attributed to the Prophet about self-control which 
he interprets as a criterion of strength. Thus, he understands the Prophetic statements as 
demands for awareness and command rather than for suppression. Subsequently, 
FaÃlallÁh quotes a ÎadÐth in which the Prophet admonishes ImÁm ÝAlÐ that the best jihÁd 
is to restrain the inclination towards injustice. For FaÃlallÁh, inclination towards 
injustice is the greatest challenge for Man. At this point, he turns to ImÁmÐ ÎadÐth and 
quotes JaÝfar al-ÑÁdiq saying that self-restraint is a guarantee for one’s salvation in the 
hereafter. Moreover, based on the same authority, FaÃlallÁh asserts that a true believer 
once in the position of power by essence cannot let subjective emotions direct his / her 
actions or consider oneself as the ultimate source of truth. He quotes the famous 
tradition that “the strong believer is better than the weak one” to emphasise the 
individual’s capacity of self-empowerment. Here, he refers to MajmaÝ al-baÎrayn by 
Fakhr al-DÐn al-ÓurayÎÐ (d. 1674) to support his argument that strength “is regarded as 
another religious merit, in addition to faith”.486  
 FaÃlallÁh reiterates that amidst the ongoing war between truth and falsehood, 
weakness results from fearing the forces of corruption. Believers, who represent the 
truth, have the religious responsibility “to establish justice and annihilate falsehood”;487 
therefore, it is compulsory to become empowered. Consequently, FaÃlallÁh perceives 
spiritual strength as essential for winning the battle of material forces. In the same vein, 
quoting a ÎadÐth by JaÝfar al-ÑÁdiq stating that “nothing is impossible for a body if intent 
is sufficiently strong to want it”, he asserts that spiritual strength has direct practical 
consequences on the result of an action. It functions as a tool in multiplying the physical 
strength of the individual as well as that of the community. Spiritual strength is not an 
abstract quality neither it is constant. There are means to stimulate it as part of the 
psychological preparation of a community before combat. 
 Finally, FaÃlallÁh quotes from the Supplication of Kumayl attributed to ImÁm ÝAlÐ 
a passage in which God is invoked “to strengthen my body parts to serve you and my 
feelings to be resolute”. This implies complementarity between the physical and 
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spiritual aspects of strength. For FaÃlallÁh, this confirms the aforementioned importance 
of developing spiritual strength as a way toward material force.  
 As we can see FaÃlallÁh integrates various – SunnÐ and ShÐÝÐ – traditions and 
reinterprets them in order to serve his idea on the necessity and the virtue of self-
empowerment. He perceives spiritual strength as a response to the divine call to 
empowerment. For him, spiritual strength is inseparable from physical force. The 
former is a commitment to overcome human desires, intentions for injustice or 
resignation. Physical force takes this commitment further and implements it in the 
material reality. For FaÃlallÁh, declaring the strong believer better than the weak 
originates from the every-day experience of power-struggle. It is to be understood in the 
context of obligation of “commanding right and forbidding wrong”. In FaÃlallÁh’s 
system of thought, promptness to confront the challenges of the contemporary reality is 
the first step in fulfilling one’s Islamic mission. 
 
 
2.2      Reinterpreting ÑÙfÐ concepts  
 
 FaÃlallÁh’s attempt at reinterpreting spiritual traditions to argue for “spirituality-
in-action” had to be accompanied by a similar re-reading of major ÑÙfÐ concepts, 
traditionally understood as quietist. He chooses four concepts among the most popular 
in ÑÙfÐ literature: reliance on God (tawakkul), contentment (qanÁÝa), renunciation (zuhd) 
and struggling against the self (jihÁd al-nafs). In each of these concepts, FaÃlallÁh 
refutes what he considers to be the false interpretation, the one that justifies resignation. 
His purpose is to lead his audience to believe that these very concepts should be 
understood as elements of mobilisation. Thus, FaÃlallÁh responds to the internal 
challenge of a “ÑÙfÐsm of weakness” with a “ÑÙfism of force”.  
 It would be necessary to begin with FaÃlallÁh’s understanding of ÑÙfÐsm as such. 
In KhiÔÁb al-islÁmiyyÐn wa’l-mustaqbal, FaÃlallÁh argues that taÒawwuf should stick to 
the simple spiritual method of the Qur’Án. He accepts the spiritual openness ÑÙfÐsm 
offers towards God and its effect on spiritual practice. However, he rejects all 
philosophical elements and discards ÑÙfÐsm as a doctrine of knowledge and as practice 
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all at once.
488
 He particularly insists on the spontaneous nature of Qur’Ánic spirituality 
as opposed to the gnostic rites of ÑÙfÐ brotherhoods.
 
Therefore, he sets out to reconsider 
the ÑÙfÐ legacy. He starts with the concept of tawakkul (reliance on God).  
 According to the ÑÙfÐ understanding, tawakkul means absolute dependence on 
God, and sometimes, it is described as the opposite of “earning a living” (kasb) or as a 
negation of human force and will. The majority of ÑÙfis would accept his reading of 
tawakkul “as abandonment of freewill and volition whilst beholding God as the supreme 
source of causality”.489 However, the issue of earning a living is debatable.490 
FaÃlallÁh’s reinterpretation transforms reliance on God into a movement of liberating 
the self from fear. He emphasised tawakkul as a source of composure and strength, 
which is inherently linked to human effort: first of all Man has to be determined to act 
and strive for meeting all conditions of victory. FaÃlallÁh cites the Qur’Án (3:159) to 
prove that tawakkul is the fruit of human decision. He also quotes a Prophetic ÎadÐth to 
clarify the meaning of dependence in considering God as the sole object of veneration 
and the only source of sustenance. 
 FaÃlallÁh does not deal with this concept at an individual mystic level. Rather, as 
he does in every aspect of quwwa, he relates reliance on God to the heart of struggle. 
There are human and natural forces that generate destructive anxiety that impedes 
human beings and weakens them. Here comes the role of tawakkul, which restores the 
feeling of confidence, stillness and safety. Inherent to FaÃlallÁh’s conception is that 
submission to God would lead to freedom from fear of others. However, this can work, 
FaÃlallÁh reminds us, only if it is coupled with the will of movement and action.
491
 
Once more, FaÃlallÁh insists on the social and political function of spirituality; tawakkul 
inspires strength while engaging in action and struggle. The primary function of 
tawakkul is the annihilation of any feeling that prompts Man’s submission to another 
human being. For FaÃlallÁh, dependence on others leads to weakness, while dependence 
on God is the only enduring source of strength that consequently leads to freedom and 
justice. 
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 To eliminate the quietist meaning of reliance on God as resignation, he quotes two 
statements attributed to JaÝfar al-ÑÁdiq. Both traditions are commonly used to support 
the ÑÙfi and quietist understanding of reliance on God (tawakkul). According to the first 
ÎadÐth, wealth and dignity are worthless without tawakkul. It is not sure that JaÝfar al-
ÑÁdiq, to whom later authors ascribe an abundant mystic literature, would promote 
worldly wealth and dignity. The second tradition states that reliance on God is the proof 
of firm belief (yaqÐn). Nevertheless, in both cases FaÃlallÁh reinterprets this notion as a 
source of strength that enables the believer to promptly face challenges. 
 Subsequently, FaÃlallÁh re-reads the concept of contentment, qanÁÝa. The latter is 
widely understood among ÑÙfis as an acceptance of any condition God has bestowed on 
the human being. This presupposes patience, gratitude and trust on the part of the 
believer. FaÃlallÁh, without modifying the essence of the concept, suggests a shift in the 
emphasis. Gratification for him does not refer to external facilities, rather to self-
contentment, the conviction that one’s abilities are sufficient to carry out change in any 
imposed condition. FaÃlallÁh’s premise is that the call to be strong is an obligation, and 
the believer cannot respond to this requirement without nurturing the feeling of 
contentment that results from detecting and activating one’s own sources of power 
regardless of the circumstances one has to face. Contentment and strength are linked in 
a causal relationship, and the “object” of contentment is to be found in the spiritual 
resources of the person. The readiness to explore this is the responsibility of the 
individual. 
 FaÃlallÁh’s understanding of qanÁÝa rejects acquiescence to injustice and 
deprivation but requires a sense of realism in directing one’s will and in setting one’s 
goals. Thus the primary function of contentment, similarly to tawakkul, is the 
elimination of dependence and fear of any external human power. FaÃlallÁh argues that 
fear results from a feeling of inability to fulfil a desire. He quotes four statements by 
ImÁm ÝAlÐ that share a common perspective: possessing material goods or abilities does 
not make its owner potent, since there is always more to desire. FaÃlallÁh goes even 
further when – referring to ImÁm ÝAlÐ, al-BÁqir and JaÝfar al-ÑÁdiq – he declares that 
greed and unrealistic ambitions are “evil” because they undermine self-confidence and, 
therefore, weaken the person. In FaÃlallÁh’s interpretation, the most important in 
“freedom from desire” is that it makes one strong. 
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 The section on contentment is supported by references to ImÁmÐ ÎadÐth. The idea 
that those who are humiliated are responsible for their humiliation is found in the 
statements of all three ImÁms quoted by FaÃlallÁh. His aim, therefore, is to raise 
awareness of the fact that the oppressed do bear responsibility for their situation and 
they are to be called to account for their impotence. This is so because human 
conviction shapes the tangible reality.
492
 For him, there is always a battlefield and one 
should not depend on others. For depending on others means being doomed to failure 
out of weakness. In this process, contentment based on patience, gratitude and trust provides 
the believers with freedom from servitude, and consciousness of human dignity.  
 Related to contentment is the notion of asceticism, zuhd.493 It is well known that 
in early Islam, asceticism was associated with ÑÙfÐsm. Later, zuhd remained a central 
ÑÙfÐ practice and highly praised as a first step towards purification of the soul. However, 
here too FaÃlallÁh rejects what he labels as the inauthentic meaning of zuhd that implies 
absolute renouncement. For him, the true meaning of zuhd is “not to be possessed by 
anything”, as a tradition attributed to ÝAlÐ confirmes.494 This seems to be a key point in 
his argument. Lacking the inner sources of power is destructive because it would 
prevent the community from responding to the call to strength. In his KhaÔawÁt ÝalÁ ÔarÐq 
al-IslÁm, FaÃlallÁh makes his argument more explicit and defines zuhd as a deviation if 
understood merely as renunciation of possessions. He vehemently criticises the Hindu-
Buddhist philosophies and the ÑÙfÐ brotherhoods for disabling man (shalal).495  
 In addition, FaÃlallÁh devotes a detailed sub-chapter to spiritual struggle (jihÁd al-
nafs),496 which implies a fight against one’s self. He defines it as a process of 
empowerment that enables Man to discern his / her desires and to take the necessary 
steps. Self-struggle has three interrelated aims such as to prevent deviation, to establish 
and maintain the harmony of thought and action, and to provide strength based on this 
unity and cohesion (waÎda wa-tamÁsuk). Self-control (murÁqabat al-nafs) and holding 
oneself accountable (muÎÁsabat al-nafs) are the main elements of this “straight plan” 
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(al-khuÔÔa al-qawÐma) through which “spiritual strength is transformed into an active 
constituent”.497  
 FaÃlallÁh evokes the famous Prophetic ÎadÐth of spiritual struggle as the greater 
jihÁd, explaining what makes it “greater”. He stresses that it takes place in one’s inner 
self against desires and ambitions that exercise pressure on the self, and thus cause the 
loss of internal balance and weaken one’s will.498 It is similar to a physical combat but 
fought against “the oppression of desires”499 with “unseen weapons [between] the two 
inharmonious opposing personalities”500 of the self. In this battle, the principles, the 
reason, and the will fight one’s instinctive side.501 For FaÃlallÁh, the strength gained 
through such victory is unbeatable because such struggle eliminates all elements of 
weakness.
502
 The fruit of greater jihÁd is what FaÃlallÁh calls “the spiritual immunity” 
(al-manÁÝa al-nafsiyya) that alleviates the internal and external pressures on the 
psyche.
503
  
 As for the challenges that one faces on the path of spiritual jihÁd, they are 
manifold: over-concern and negligence (ifrÁÔ wa-tafrÐÔ),504 inclinations towards 
pleasure,
505
 or its opposite, considering greater jihÁd as an end in itself.506 On the one 
hand, excessive self-restriction and self-imposed asceticism do not count as acts of faith 
since they are rooted in fear and paralyse the believer. On the other hand, pleasure-
seeking implies lack of control over one’s self, and, therefore, leads to weakness. 
Principles such as the right guidance (hudÁ) or the guide to victory (dalÐl al-naÒr) remain 
mere abstractions without acting accordingly in the various battlefields of life. Exposing 
oneself to combat is an opportunity to gain strength from experience.
507
 In this 
framework, determination and action guarantee victory in the hereafter or in the long 
run, regardless of the momentary outcome.   
 Preoccupation with weakness haunts the reader of FaÃlallÁh’s chapter on 
spirituality. In other writings, FaÃlallÁh seems to display the same concern. For instance, 
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in his al-RasÙl al-dÁÝiya fi’l-Qur’Án al-karÐm [The preaching messenger in the noble 
Qur’Án], an interpretation of MuÎammad’s life, he dedicates two chapters to weakness. 
In one of them, he warns against covering the defects present in the community, because 
this makes correction and reform impossible. Weaknesses should be faced with 
elements of force.
508
 In the other chapter, he claims that natural shortcomings do not 
pose an obstacle to victory since divine support and the movement of believers 
transform these weaknesses into force.
509
 These examples confirm my assessment about 
FaÃlallÁh’s dialectical idea of the constant struggle of opposing concepts, inclinations, 
and movements. 
 Another pitfall is to consider spiritual exercise (riyÁÃa rÙÎiyya) as an end in itself 
or a means to acquire special privileges. Here, FaÃlallÁh quotes ImÁm ÝAlÐ from the 
Nahj al-balÁgha to support his view that good things in life are blessings from God and 
Man’s approach must be based on a natural balance (tawÁzun ÔabÐÝÐ) between 
renunciation and pleasure.
510
 Stressing the value of self-restraint, he refers to ÎadÐths 
attributed to the Prophet and JaÝfar al-ÑÁdiq. FaÃlallÁh asserts that the prophetic and 
ImÁmÐ traditions – in addition to considering “greater jihÁd” as a valid measure of 
strength – define the basis upon which “greater jihÁd” should be founded.511 The three 
prophetic and two ImÁmÐ ÎadÐths emphasise the importance of self-control with special 
regards to one’s inclinations towards injustice and oppression.  
 Regarding the practical aspects of “greater jihÁd”, FaÃlallÁh stresses the 
importance of spiritual exercises as a means to realising the balance Islam promotes 
between anxiety and negligence. Balance is achieved through a process in which natural 
impulses and moral principles are integrated. For him, the aim is “to acquire natural 
strength (…) that fills the soul, increases the will and governs the individual as well as 
society as a whole”.512 FaÃlallÁh describes this as a twofold “training process” in which 
one first examines one’s weaknesses and strengths then uses one’s willpower to put the 
principles into practice.
513
 The method he suggests is a classical discernment regarding 
one’s motivations. In this regard, personal and natural needs are legitimate but are 
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brought under control by the power of will, and thus the individual reaches the “state of 
spiritual immunity”.514 
 As for the criteria of discernment, FaÃlallÁh involves complying with the sharÐÝa 
as part of the spiritual exercise. Referring to a ÎadÐth attributed to ImÁm ÝAlÐ, FaÃlallÁh 
employs a legal discourse in explaining how one’s attitude towards regulations can 
promote spiritual stability.
515
 FaÃlallÁh argues that the rules serve moderation, preserve 
and consolidate spiritual strength, and prevent any harmful exaggeration in 
spirituality.
516
 Religious law provides a practical guide to self-training and to strengthen 
the personality without futile self-imposed tribulations. 
 For FaÃlallÁh, the centrality of personal desires and incentives results in the 
human being’s detachment from the universality of religious precepts and in the reign of 
what is subjective, relative and arbitrary. This inclination causes an imbalance in the 
individual’s psyche and in the functioning of the society. Consequently, such tendencies 
weaken the personality and destabilise the community. For FaÃlallÁh, greater jihÁd 
serves to overcome internal weaknesses, a process in which the individual strives to 
control destructive sentiments such as desires, inclinations to oppress others or to take 
revenge. It also liberates the human being from excessive devotions that would 
otherwise generate passivity, fear, and weakness. The aim is the restoration and 
preservation of internal balance between natural needs and legal constraints. As such, it 
is essential for the empowerment of the individual and the community, and for any form 
of legitimate physical jihÁd. 
 FaÃlallÁh does not refer to any ÑÙfÐ literature. Instead, he relies on ShÐÝÐ 
collections of ÎadÐths as his main source. His most often cited source is WasÁ’il al-ShÐÝa 
(quoted five times) a compilation of earlier sources by al-Íurr al-ÝÀmilÐ (d. 1624). The 
second most cited collection in this chapter is Nahj al-balÁgha, a collection of prayers 
and meditations attributed to ImÁm ÝAlÐ. FaÃlallÁh uses this source three times. Al-
ÑaÎÐfa al-SajjÁdiyya, a collection of prayers attributed to ImÁm Zayn al-ÝAbidÐn is also 
quoted three times. Finally, he refers to al-KÁfÐ by al-KulaynÐ (d. 941) three times. Al-
KÁfÐ is the most authentic book of ÎadÐth for the Twelver ShÐÝÐs. The four books quoted 
by FaÃlallÁh are widely used texts in ShÐÝÐ scholarly circles as well as among ordinary 
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believers. Therefore, their influence is considerable. FaÃlallÁh, whose purpose is to 
reinterpret spirituality as élan vital – to borrow H. Bergson’s notion – most probably 
selected these sources to make his impact on his hesitant audience more effective. 
 In his critical evaluation of ÑÙfÐ concepts, FaÃlallÁh provides an activist 
interpretation of spirituality. He is not concerned with individual spirituality, rather 
criticises the traits that can generate passivity inside the community. The spirituality he 
aims for is a “call to strength”. He reinterprets the notions of reliance on God, 
contentment, renunciation, and struggle against the self by transforming them into 
elements of a spirit of action that liberates from fear. As he sees it, spirituality is not a 
“state of mind” or “an end in itself” but a tool of empowerment. Spirituality is an inner 
dynamics; it inspires the believer to be strong, to resist, and to fight in the ongoing 
combats.  
 
 
3.    External challenges to the spirit of the umma 
 
 According to FaÃlallÁh, colonialism and Orientalism are the main external 
challenges that aim to weaken the spirit of the community. His premise is that the great 
powers, by which he meant the West and the Soviet Union, are waging a concealed and 
psychological war that serves to dominate and subjugate Muslims in every possible 
way.
517
 However, he seems to be more critical of the West than of the Soviet Union. 
FaÃlallÁh meticulously describes the different instruments that colonialism uses to 
destroy the spirit of resistance in small nations, such as propaganda, disinformation – in 
academic research – by providing insinuating and biased evaluations – and the 
ideological rewriting of Islamic history.  
 To illustrate the Western intellectual challenge, FaÃlallÁh, similarly to most 
Islamic thinkers, takes the case of Orientalism. He argues that Orientalist 
representations of Islam “served an underlying political and religious purpose”.518 He 
highlights two major tendencies present in Orientalism that pose dangers to the self-
perception of Muslims. The first is partial and biased evaluation of the Islamic cultural 
heritage, by exaggerating the importance of certain marginal elements – such as Islamic 
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mysticism and jÁhilÐ literature – or by negating or belittling its civilisational 
achievements. Another strategy of this trend is to praise the “glorious past” and depict 
contemporary Islam as a system in decline that lacks vitality for revival. The second 
main tendency is to attack the fundaments of Islam by raising doubts concerning the 
authenticity of sacred religious texts or by interpreting them out of the historical 
context. For FaÃlallÁh, the aim of such tactics is “to detach the community (umma) from 
its intellectual and spiritual roots”519 and to “devalue Islam in the spirit of its 
followers”.520 As for disinformation and propaganda, FaÃlallÁh claims that its aim is to 
place the differences between the potentials of the West and the Muslim world in sharp 
contrast by belittling Muslims and venerating the West. As a result of such 
communication strategies, oppressed people lose self-confidence in their abilities to 
resist their oppressors.
521
  
 FaÃlallÁh insists that, the community must build spiritual strength that enables it to 
counter intellectual challenges strongly and authentically.
522
 He argues that colonialism 
and Orientalism 
523
are threats with political, social and intellectual impacts.
524
 He does 
not distinguish, as do many Islamic thinkers, between equitable Orientalism (istishrÁq 
munÒif) and anti-Islamic Orientalism usually called aggressive Orientalism (istishrÁq 
ÝadÁ’Ð). He does not mention the efforts made by Orientalists that revived the ShīÝī 
legacy in theology, law, and mysticism in a quest for alternative narratives to the SunnÐ 
orthodoxy.   
 
 
4. Spirituality and revolution: Is FaÃlallÁh’s project a duplicate of 
KhumaynÐ’s?  
 
 In the process of reading and analysing FaÃlallÁh’s discourse on spirituality and 
power, the question that arises is the following: to what extent does FaÃlallÁh owe his 
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spirituality of force to KhumaynÐ? For the latter incarnated the figure of a revolutionary 
mystic at its apogee, and FaÃlallÁh, has certainly reflected, in one way or another, on 
KhumaynÐ’s gnostic revolution. To answer this question, I proceed to a comparison 
between FaÃlallÁh and KhumaynÐ. This helps me to place FaÃlallÁh in his literary-
historic context; and to distinguish FaÃlallÁh’s system, showing, by the same token, his 
own angle within ShÐÝÐ political thought.  
 Similarly to FaÃlallÁh, KhumaynÐ’s argumentation has both psychological and 
political dimensions. The two ShÐÝÐ leaders believed that victory results from the 
spiritual transformation of the believers.
525
 Both jurists deemed that the transformative 
spirit of Islam was missing in the perception and practice of contemporary religiosity, 
and this resulted in the decline of the umma and in the continued subjugation of 
Muslims by colonial powers.
526
  
 Both KhumaynÐ and FaÃlallÁh reinterpreted greater jihÁd as individual and 
communal spiritual revival that in turn leads to social and political empowerment. As 
Sylwia Surdykowska summarised it, for KhumaynÐ “one of the most important tasks in 
man’s life is (…) to know one’s own vices and pursuit to overcome them (…)The inner 
fight is (…) the fight for one’s own manhood (…) This spiritual improvement is a kind 
of preparation for the protection of Islam.”527  
 For KhumaynÐ, as for FaÃlallÁh, greater jihÁd prepares the believers for the social 
and political jihÁds. KhumaynÐ perceived greater jihÁd primarily as a spiritual perfection 
that enables religious scholars to fulfil their role as leaders of the community. Therefore, 
he reminds his audience of the importance of humility and simplicity. He emphasised 
the importance of knowing God through meditation and supplication. In KhumaynÐ’s 
thought, spirituality – motivated by fear of God – is a constant awareness of the 
hereafter, a guarantee of individual salvation, and of just leadership for the community.  
 That said, there are significant differences between FaÃlallÁh and KhumaynÐ. The 
latter was a proponent of gnostic mysticism (ÝirfÁn),528 while FaÃlallÁh rejected ÑÙfism 
                                                             
525  Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, trans. by Hamid Algar. 
(Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), 336. FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 104-105. 
526 KhumaynÐ, “The religious scholars led the revolt,” in Islam and Revolution, 332. 
527 Sylwia Surdykowska, “The Spiritual Aspect of Jihad and Khomeini’s Doctrine,” in Shi’ism. Critical 
Concepts in Islamic Studies, eds. Colin Turner and Paul Luft (London: Routledge, 2008), 297-298. 
528 Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2000), 29-47. See also KhumaynÐ’s writings “Jihad al-Akbar, The Greatest Jihad: Combat with 
the Self,” accessed July 15, 2013. http://www.al-islam.org/jihad-al-akbar-the-greatest-jihad-combat-with-
the-self-imam-khomeini. “The Wine of Love, Mystical Poetry of Imam Khomeini,” accessed July 15, 
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as a doctrine. KhumaynÐ argued that spirituality eliminates or reduces temptations and 
illuminates the believer. For FaÃlallÁh, spirituality was a means of discovering human 
capacities and putting them at the service of the Islamic struggle against oppression and 
injustice. KhumaynÐ addressed the Iranian people who were receptive to mysticism as a 
component of later Iranian ShÐÝism, while the Lebanese context, dominated by secular 
Western ideologies and reformist Salafism required a tone that is cautious and critical of 
traditional ÑÙfism. 
 KhumaynÐ considered worldly aspirations as dangerous and hostile to human 
dignity. In describing them he used the metaphor of darkness and veil that separates the 
soul from God,
529
 and repeatedly called for the “purification” of the self, the full control 
of instincts and desires.
530
 FaÃlallÁh was less ascetic. He disapproved radicalism and 
excessive rigour. He sensed no sharp dichotomy between human desires and the 
realisation of Islamic values. 
 KhumaynÐ was convinced that the change in the legal framework of the society – 
the establishment of the Islamic state – will lead to the moral betterment of the 
individual. His language is rich in poetic imagery describing the illumination of the 
faithful and the condemnation or chastisement of the sinner. For him, the supplications 
of ÝAlÐ embody the peak of metaphysical knowledge and of spiritual insight. 
KhumaynÐ’s ideas are centred on sin and penitence, even human intellect serves none 
else than recognising the need for purification. In FaÃlallÁh’s thought, establishing a 
state based on the sharÐÝa is not a prerequisite to the moral betterment of the believers. 
Law serves to regulate and maintain balance in spiritual as well in practical matters.
531
 
 Spirituality is the path from doctrine to practice. Therefore, any element of 
spirituality must be understood as a means that takes the believer along this path. 
Similarly to KhumaynÐ, FaÃlallÁh refers to the ImÁms as the embodiments of spiritual 
strength whose faith is transformed into uncompromised action. However, he never 
hints at any supernatural characteristic of the ImÁms, rather depicts them as strong men 
par excellence. Their power is attainable for the common believers, without particular 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
2013. http://www.al-islam.org/wine-love-mystical-poetry-imam-khomeini. “Forty Hadith. An Exosition,” 
accessed July 15, 2013. http://www.al-islam.org/forty-hadith-an-exposition-second-edition-imam-
khomeini. 
529 KhumaynÐ, “The Fountainhead of Magnificence” in Islam and Revolution, 351. 
530 KhumaynÐ, Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist, chap. on “Program for the Establishment of 
an Islamic Government” in Islam and Revolution, 146. 
531 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 135. 
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practice or secret knowledge, merely based on a balanced approach towards pain and 
pleasure, both of which are to serve the physical and spiritual empowerment of the 
human being. It results in an attentive and agile perception of the opportunities that the 
“here and now” offers for action. 
 In FaÃlallÁh’s activist spirituality, ÑÙfi concepts become means of eliminating 
weakness and passivity. The believer’s faith and love for God is best expressed in 
responsible deeds resulting from a deep concern with the improvement of the world. 
Unification with the divine will occur through such action. Law defines and guides the 
realisation of ÑÙfi ideals, and as such, for FaÃlallÁh, there was no antagonism between 
legal thinking and ÑÙfi spirituality. However, as stated above, unlike KhumaynÐ, he 
showed no interest in mysticism, or transcendent philosophy, al-Îikma al-mutaÝÁliyya. 
Therefore, we can assume that he opened a third way in the ShÐÝÐ ÝulamÁ’’s approach 
towards ÑÙfism, a path that is embedded in the ideal of strength through which the 
message of Islam is realised.
532
 FaÃlallÁh’s spirituality is transformative; it forms part of 
what I call the ShÐÝÐ transformative paradigm of empowerment, oriented towards 
movement and action and devoid of any interest in mysticism as such. Being aware of 
the importance of the spiritual component of a ShÐÝÐ movement, his aim was to put it at 
the service of revolutionary activism. It can be said that FaÃlallÁh supported the idea of 
an Islamic revolution without Gnosticism. 
 For KhumaynÐ, mystic experience and tradition were the primary impetus for his 
leadership and vision of revival. It was not a mere tool, as FaÃlallÁh considers it, but 
also an end in itself. In Lebanon, a cosmopolitan, multi-denominational Levantine 
merchant society, ShÐÝÐ thought could not take refuge or gain legitimisation in 
mysticism. FaÃlallÁh rejected mysticism, an asset of quietist ShÐÝism, because it 
impeded the impulse of power. To sum up, although their aim was identical, namely 
that of reviving the spiritual force of the community, the discourses of FaÃlallÁh and 
                                                             
532 N. Pourjavady defines two main trends among the modern ShÐ‘Ð scholars concerning their reception of 
ÑÙfÐsm. “One group consisted of those who were exclusively specialized in law and who were against 
ÑÙfÐsm and the ÑÙfÐs. The second group of ShÐ‘Ð ÝulamÁ’ were those who believed in the theoretical aspect 
of ÑÙfism, particularly in the teachings of Ibn ‘ArabÐ, which they called ÝirfÁn and Îikmat-i mutaÝÁliyya 
whereas they objected to ÑÙfÐ practices, the institution of the khÁnaqÁh, and the organizational structure of 
the ÑÙfÐ orders.” Nasrollah Pourjavady, “Opposition to Sufism in Twelver Shi‘ism,” in Islamic Mysticism 
Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics, eds.  Frederick de Jong and Bernd Radtke 
(Leiden: Brill, 1999), 620. 
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KhumaynÐ approached the issue of spirituality and revolution from different 
perspectives.  
 This was a natural consequence of the different social and political contexts they 
lived in, and of the religious history of their respective communities. Therefore I oppose 
any assumption that considers FaÃlallÁh’s revolutionary activism as the Lebanonisation 
of KhumaynÐ’s ideas. Their approach shared the same goals and the widely known 
interrelatedness of spiritual and material strength, but their argumentation differs 
profoundly, and most importantly, their projects were parallel not subsequent.  
   
 
  Concluding remarks 
 
 The most important features of FaÃlallÁh’s reinterpretation of spirituality can be 
summarised in the following. First, his perspective is social. In his understanding, four 
key concepts of ÑÙfÐsm – tawakkul, zuhd, qanÁÝa, jihÁd al-nafs – have social impact on 
the individual’s relying on or renouncing the community. Second, FaÃlallÁh reiterates 
the enmity between reformists and ÑÙfÐs, a salient phenomenon since the 19
th
 century. 
Third, FaÃlallÁh argues against quietism, deeply rooted in traditional ShÐÝism, echoing 
the long struggle of political and activist ShÐÝism to mobilise the community. Fourth, 
being fully aware and critical of the passive resignation among the Lebanese ShÐÝa in the 
seventies, FaÃlallÁh dedicates much energy to describing and rejecting the kind of 
spirituality that generates weakness. Fifth, FaÃlallÁh constructs his model of spirituality 
on the basis of Qur’Ánic, prophetic and ImÁmÐ sayings and experiences. Sixth, for him, 
two spiritualities exist: invigorating and repressive. As a reformist, he rejects the 
repressive one as it prevents the community from involvement and fight, while he 
defines the invigorating one as the spirituality that inspires social and political action. 
 In FaÃlallÁh’s system of quwwa, the function of spirituality is to activate power 
embedded in faith as an essential component of transforming doctrine into practice. This 
pragmatic spirituality – each component of which promotes and supports strength in a 
concrete, practical way – serves the empowerment of the community. FaÃlallÁh’s 
language is devoid of any mysticism, it offers a simple and conceivable guidance 
towards a practical and purposeful spiritual empowerment which is a prerequisite for 
attaining material power. 
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Chapter VI: Social Power 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
 In the previous chapters, power and activism have been shown to constitute the 
essence of FaÃlallÁh’s theology and spirituality as put forward in his al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq 
al-quwwa. The present chapter analyses FaÃlallÁh’s concept of social power. In the 
aformentioned book, different social aspects of quwwa preoccupy FaÃlallÁh: social 
values, structures and actions as well as their social function in the empowerment of the 
community. Above all, FaÃlallÁh seeks to instil solidarity, justice, and the obligation of 
“commanding right and forbidding wrong,” (al-amr bi’l-maÝrÙf wa’l-nahy Ýan al-
munkar) as means to create the ideal of a strong society. He endorses a narrative of two 
societies: the weak and the strong, arguing that beliefs, unity, and values determine the 
power of a community. He claims that the first Islamic community illustrates best the 
strong society. He confronts it with the weak society which lacks unity and solidarity – 
echoing to a great extent contemporary Lebanon.  
 FaÃlallÁh’s social theory – embedded in his theology and spirituality of power – 
transforms individual power into a collective deployment of action. Social power could 
be seen as a mediator between the theory of power and its political application. The 
chapter on “Social power” comes after spiritual power and precedes a series of chapters 
on political power. Thus, in the book, social power constitutes a transition from 
individual power – as put forward in his concept of theology and spirituality – towards 
attaining political power through social mobilisation. Therefore, it can be said that 
social power is the bridge between belief and revolution. This structure suggests a 
position of mediation between theory and practice, individual and political power.  
 Probably, FaÃlallÁh’s specificity lies in his idea of a coherent system of power in 
which social power is an asset to the autonomy of the ShÐÝÐ community. Ideally, he 
sought to provide his community with permanent resources – institutions, charity 
networks, political organisation – and consequently social freedom before it claims a 
share in political power. For FaÃlallÁh, society is the sphere in which power is embodied 
and the tool by which the first concrete empowerment of the ShÐÝÐ community is 
realised. 
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 In the following, first, I analyze his views with regard to the ShÐÝÐ context. Second, 
I highlight his binary understanding of social weakness and strength as a narrative of 
social empowerment. Third, I emphasise FaÃlallÁh’s social functionalism, discussing his 
debt to Durkheim. Finally, it will be shown that his social thought found an echo in 
ÍizbullÁh’s social activism. 
 
 
1.    Social thought in modern ShÐÝism 
 
 Responding to social challenges from an Islamic perspective was a concern of the 
most influential thinkers of ShÐÝism in the last century. From among FaÃlallÁh’s 
contemporaries, ÝAlÐ SharÐÝatÐ and MuÎammad BÁqir al-Ñadr are considered as the 
leading ShÐÝÐ social theorists. Their primary aim was to define the Islamic social 
philosophy and to differentiate it from the Western intellectual tradition. Both al-Ñadr 
and SharÐÝatÐ aimed to provide Islamic answers to the most dominant and appealing 
Western ideologies such as Marxism and capitalism.
533
  
 In particular, Marxism was a direct rival to ShÐÝism in Iran and Iraq in the 1960s 
with its revolutionary call to the liberation of the oppressed. In this regard, Juan Cole 
maintains that the oppressive rule of the Pahlavi regime turned many students and 
intellectuals to a radical vision of ShÐÝÐ Islam or to Marxism.
534
 Due the great appeal of 
                                                             
533 Several studies dealt with the social thought of SharÐÝatÐ and al-Ñadr. For example, see: 
S. F. Alatas, “Islam and Socialism: Perspectives from Autonomous Social Science and Occidentalism,” 
in Investigating the South-South Dimension of Modernity and Islam: Circulating Visions, Intellectual 
Figures, Locations, eds. Georg Stauth and Helmut Buchholt (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2002), 113-129. 
Mir Mohammed Ibrahim, A Reconstruction of Social Thought in Islam: a Case Study of Dr. Ali Shariati 
(Srinagar: Valley Book House, 1997).  
Shahrough Akhavi, “Islam, Politics and Society in the Thought of Ayatullah Khomeini, Ayatullah 
Taliqani, and Ali Shariati,” Middle Eastern Studies 24 (1988): 404-431. 
Mohammad Yadegari, “Shariati and the Reconstruction of the Social Sciences,” American Journal of 
Islamic Studies 1 (1984): 53-59. 
Basheer Ahmad Dabla, “Sociology of Islam: Shariati’s Viewpoint,” Islamic Culture 57 (1983): 277-282. 
Akhavi, Shahrough. “Shari‘ati’s Social Thought,” in Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi‘ism from Quietism 
to Revolution, ed. N. R. Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 125-144. 
Rodney Wilson, “The Contribution of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr” to Contemporary Islamic Economic 
Thought,” Journal of Islamic Studies 9 (1998): 46-59.  
Nakash, Yitzhak. “The Shi‘ites and the Future of Iraq,” Foreign Affairs 82 (2003): 17-26.  
Hanna Batatu, “Iraq’s Underground Shi‘a Movements: Characteristics, Causes and Prospects,” Middle 
East Journal 35 (1981): 578-594. 
Keiko Sakai, “Modernity and Tradition in the Islamic Movements in Iraq: Continuity and Discontinuity 
in the Role of the Ulama,” Arab Studies Quarterly 23 (2001): 37-53. 
534 Juan Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), 11. 
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Marxist thought to the young and impoverished ShÐÝa, religious scholars and 
intellectuals had to craft a persuasive social thought in order to cope with the Marxist 
dominance in social theory. This meant the need to adopt some crucial Marxist concepts 
by reinterpreting the religious doctrines and “Islamising” its revolutionary agenda. 
  As for the impact of Marxism on the revolutionary activism of ShÐÝism, Hamid 
Dabashi meticulously highlighted how social and political discontent gave an impetus 
for the transformation of ShÐÝism into a revolutionary theology.
535
 This turn perfectly 
fitted to the “ipso facto religion of protest” as he calls it.536 However, after more than a 
millennium of quietism and collaboration with the state, ShÐÝism had to redefine itself 
and restore its credibility, and at the same time, compete with secular ideologies such as 
Marxism and nationalism. Dabashi asserts that it was inevitable that both intellectual 
currents influenced revolutionary ShÐÝism in its modern form.
537
 He claims that the 
ideologues of the Islamic Revolution – among them SharÐÝatÐ, MurtaÃÁ MuÔahharÐ, 
MaÎmÙd ÓÁliqÁnÐ, MahdÐ BÁzargÁn, AbÙ’l-Íasan BanÐ-Ñadr and even KhumaynÐ – 
sought to render the conceptual arsenal of secular ideologies operative in viable Islamic 
terminologies, and turn them into instruments of a mobilising force.
538
 Dabashi defines 
colonialism as “the principal cause of ShÐÝÐ political revivalism, its main interlocutor”.539 
In his view, it was the “nationalisation” and “socialisation” of ShÐÝism in Iran that 
prepared it for revolutionary mobilisation and rise to power.
540
  
 In Iran, SharÐÝatÐ set out to rediscover the Qur’Án in the light of Marxism and 
existentialism. The western-educated SharÐÝatÐ faced a situation in which official ShÐÝism 
became a tool of oppression. Sensing this fundamental contradiction between principles 
and reality, he became an ardent critic of the various socio-political manifestations of 
Safavid or “Black” ShÐÝism. At the same time, he argued for the existence of the ÝAlid, 
                                                             
535 Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, 1-38. 
536 Dabashi, Islamic Liberation Theology: Resisting the Empire (London: Routledge, 2008), 67. 
537 Dabashi, Islamic Liberation Theology, 79, 89, 91, 94, 98. 
538 Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, 368. 
539 Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, 76. 
540 Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, 76. A similar correlativity between Marxism and ShÐÝism can be 
observed in Iraq. For example, Y. Nakash in his book The Shi‘is of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994) emphasises the involvement of mujtahids in political activism to defend the ShÐÝÐ religious 
identity amidst the spread of communism. Orit Bashkin in her book The Other Iraq: Pluralism and 
Culture in Hashemite Iraq (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009) shows how Marxism became the 
main ideology of radical opposition in modern Iraq. Joyce Wiley’s book The Islamic Movement of Iraqi 
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communism and the ShÐÝÐ Islamic movement in Iraq. Finally, in his book The Shi‘ite Movement in Iraq 
(London: Saqi Books, 2003). Faleh Abd al-Jabbar maintains that the DaÝwa party, the main Islamist ShÐÝÐ 
movement, recruited among former leftist activists. 
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“Red” or revolutionary ShÐÝism that by essence resists oppression and promotes an 
egalitarian society.
541
 His ideas about society are compiled in a volume entitled On the 
Sociology of Islam that consists of his lectures given in 1968 specifically dedicated to 
the various aspects of his social thought. He presented revolutionary ideas by applying 
religious symbolism and transformed ShÐÝism into a theology of liberation.  
 The deadlock to which quietist perception leads was made explicit and plain by 
SharÐÝatÐ. For him, implementing religious ideals were not the primary goals, religion 
served as a powerful tool of mobilisation the aim of which was social transformation 
through liberation and revolution. FaÃlallÁh too, differentiated between the destructive 
and constructive elements of ShÐÝÐ tradition and discarded the former, but did so from a 
juristic perspective and interpreted religion as a system of empowerment, the final goal 
of which is the implementation of religious ideals. 
 In Iraq, MuÎammad BÁqir al-Ñadr, wrote a book specifically dedicated to the 
analysis of Islamic society: Contemporary Man and the Social Problem (al-InsÁn al-
muÝÁÒir wa’l-mushkila al-ijtimÁÝiyya), but his other works such as al-Madrasa al-
Qur’Ániyya or the posthumously published Our Society (MujtamaÝunÁ) also contain 
essays and lectures on social issues. In al-Madrasa al-Qur’Ániyya, al-Ñadr provides a 
detailed analysis of the various social segments based on their attitude, the degree and 
nature of their involvement in the operation of the illegitimate rule.
542
 He dedicates 
great attention to the ethics of weakness and differentiates between the deprived who 
collaborate with their oppressors and those who stand up against them.  
 Al-Ñadr’s perspective left recognisable marks on FaÃlallÁh’s commitment to 
activism, on his social criticism, and his refutation of Marxism. In the Íawza he set up 
in Beirut, al- Ñadr’s books were part of the curriculum, therefore it can be said that his 
influence on FaÃlallÁh is explicit. However, as the comparison of their social analysis 
shows, while al-Ñadr provided an analytical perspective, FaÃlallÁh’s approach was 
functional; he carefully selected elements of empowerment and integrated them into his 
system of power.   
 However, the Lebanese political and historical context differs from the Iranian 
and the Iraqi ones. The project of empowerment designed by FaÃlallÁh for the Lebanese 
                                                             
541 ‘AlÐ SharÐ‘atÐ, “Red Shi‘ism,” accessed February 9, 2013, http://www.al-islam.org/articles/red-shiism-
ali-shariati. 
542 MuÎammad BÁqir al-Ñadr, al-Madrasa al-Qur’Ániyya (Beirut: DÁr al-MaÝrifa, 1981). 
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ShÐÝa sheds light on these differences and raises attention to self-regenerating capacities 
inherent in ShÐÝÐ thought that proved to be another significant factor next to discontent in 
preparing the intellectual ground for political mobilisation. In Lebanon, FaÃlallÁh 
formulated his concept based on the ShÐÝÐ dissatisfaction with their social conditions. By 
the late 1960s, the social status of the ShÐÝa became a matter on which the survival of 
the community depended. He transformed the theology of weakness prevalent amongst 
the Lebanese ShÐÝa into the theology of force, by selecting and emphasising the 
elements of strength and discarding elements of weakness. However, as a jurist he 
considered religion as a solid basis and source of empowerment rather than a mere 
political tool.  
 FaÃlallÁh was concerned with the social structure and social values from the 
perspective of their relation to the quality and quantity of social strength they produce. 
Also, he was aware that several secular, revolutionary political factions were trying to 
attract and recruit the ShÐÝa. This fact prompted him to formulate his social concept as a 
prelude and prerequisite for activism and political change. He labelled any social 
philosophy other than the Islamic one as destructive for, in his view, all human social 
philosophies failed to respond accurately to the needs of human societies. Only a 
divinely-inspired social philosophy, the one that Islam exhibits, could provide such a 
solution.  
 
 
2.    FaÃlallÁh’s social theory 
 
 In FaÃlallÁh’s interpretation, society is the sphere in which the continuity of the 
Islamic message is maintained. Social power comprises social values, relations, and 
collective action. It allows, as a first stage, the building of bottom up power in contrast 
with bottom down empowerment through politics. This mechanism fits the paradigm of 
gradual transformation better as it engenders power in the various social structures – 
such as family, education, economy – rendering it sustainable, and helping to deracinate 
quietism and passivity. Social power contributes to the system of quwwa by establishing 
the social autonomy of the ShÐÝÐ community. It transfers the power of belief into 
collective acts and fosters solidarity and “commanding right” between its members. The 
next step following social unity and empowerment is direct political action. FaÃlallÁh 
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was aware of the importance of social power in providing the Lebanese ShÐÝa with their 
own social assets.  
 FaÃlallÁh’s starts his study of social power by stating that the Qur’Án or the 
reported traditions do not contain a comprehensive and detailed social concept. 
Therefore, he sets out to fill this gap, focusing on its intellectual, behavioural and legal 
aspects. His argument on the interrelatedness of salvation and the social formula, the 
characterisation of the first Muslim community, the description of weak society, the link 
between social cohesion and personal responsibility, and the importance of unity are 
substantiated by exclusively Qur’Ánic passages. His imÁmi references come from two 
ShÐÝÐ hadÐth-collections: WasÁ’il al-ShÐÝa and al-KÁfÐ.  
 FaÃlallÁh’s approach to power challenges Dabashi’s claim that since ShÐÝism is a 
religion of protest as soon as it succeeds politically, it negates itself metaphysically. As 
Dabashi writes “Shi‘ism cannot be in a position of political power because the state that 
it thus forms will have to have a claim on a monopoly of violence, and it cannot claim 
that monopoly without turning every mode of opposition to it as the de facto versions of 
ShÐÝism.”543 This might be the case in Iran where KhumaynÐ did not build a community 
with charity services, family links, and other social bodies. Dabashi ignores the 
mechanism of clientelism, omnipresent in both Iran and Lebanon (and the rest of the 
countries in the region). It was this mechanism by which FaÃlallÁh managed to carefully 
decouple the social and political spheres of power. Since they are autonomous spheres 
of power, the fact that the ShÐÝÐ community became politically dominant in Lebanon did 
not erode its social assets. For example, when ÍizbullÁh became part of the government 
in Lebanon, it acquired further credibility among its supporters as it turns political 
advantages into social privileges of the ShÐÝÐ community. FaÃlallÁh’s concept of social 
power supports my claim that the paradigm of transformation explains better the ShÐÝÐ 
impulse of power.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
543 Dabashi, Islamic Liberation Theology, 70. 
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3.    The weak society: FaÃlallÁh’s social criticism  
 
 From FaÃlallÁh’s perspective, a weak society is one that lacks social coherence. 
The lack of shared values, commitments and responsibilities exercises a centrifugal 
power that leads to destruction. He illustrates weak society by the Jewish community of 
the Prophet’s time. The Jews of Medina he writes  
 
had conflicting personal interests that made each faction or even each person an 
independent entity whose interests and goals conflicted with those of the others in 
the community (…) [The] difference in feelings, inclinations and orientations that 
turns into differing plans, actions, stances (…) is in fact internal fragmentation that 
evolves into an external one.
544
 
 
 As we can see, in FaÃlallÁh’s thought, weakness is not an attribute. Rather, it is a 
condition in which the community lacks the strategic power needed to maintain its 
integrity, exercise its interests and spread its values. FaÃlallÁh considers attitudes based 
on individual inclinations and aspirations as by-products of human civilisation. Decline 
occurs when the individual’s attachment to society is weakened and ego-centrism 
prevails. Such a society becomes defenceless and paralysed. The abandonment of 
supreme values that cement commitment and loyalty in the individual towards the 
community obliterates solidarity and creates a system of injustice and inequality. 
Religion, in general, and Islam, in particular, provides such values and guides their 
implementation.
545
 
 Nevertheless, by naming the Jews of Medina as representatives of the weak 
community par excellence, he politicises his argument by a purposeful overstatement 
regarding the supposed the divisions in contemporary Israeli society. Considering the 
repeated military successes of the Jewish State over the Arab states, the projection 
seems to be forced and ideological. Also, he claims that non-Islamic systems are prone 
to disequilibrium because they lack cohesion and become fragmented along “conflicting 
personal interests”,546 while in Islam the guarantee of equilibrium is solidarity.547 His 
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argument that non-Muslim societies despite their apparent strength suffer from 
individualism, disunity, lack of solidarity, immorality, and weakness is highly simplistic 
and built upon clichés.  
 In al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, manifestations of weakness are explored in three 
major aspects of social life: the intellectual, the emotional, and the practical domains. In 
his analysis of the weak society, FaÃlallÁh criticises certain groups whose views pose a 
direct threat to social unity. Based on Qur’Ánic principles, he singles out some deviant 
attitudes and identifies those who adopt them as elements that divide and thus weaken 
the society.
548
 He identifies three of them as particularly harmful: the luxury elite 
(mutrafÙn), who dominate and exploit the others, the dividing elite of religious scholars 
and politicians (mufarriqÙn), who seek to divide society so that they can exploit it to 
promote their own interests – and the heretics and non-believers (aÒÎÁb al-daÝawÁt al-
ÃÁlla wa ’l-kÁfira), who attack the belief of the Muslim society and thus shake the 
principles on which its system of values is based.
549
   
 Second, FaÃlallÁh depicts the emotional roots of weakness. He considers feelings 
based on kinship and not on merit as a threat because they turn the absolute religious 
values into contingent ideas and substitute faith with human considerations. Serving the 
interests and contributing to the mission of the community should enjoy priority over 
any personal concerns or bonds. Only if Islamic values determine the thoughts and 
actions of the people, can the society be protected from individualist and destructive 
trends.
550
 At the practical level, a weak society is characterised by corruption in all 
sectors of society. The only way to eradicate the roots of this corruption is to fulfil the 
individual duty of “forbidding wrong”, rather than leaving the responsibility of dealing 
with it to the official authority.
551
 There is a natural causality, through which passivity 
and negligence not only weaken a society but eliminate any chances for re-empowering 
it. 
 To support his argument, FaÃlallÁh quotes Prophetic ÎadÐths from SunnÐ 
collections compiled by al-BukhÁrÐ (and its commentary FatÎ al-bÁrÐ by Ibn Hajar) and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
responsibilities as manifestations of emotional and intellectual commitment.” al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-
quwwa, 143.   
548 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 128-132. 
549 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 127-132. 
550 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 139-41. 
551 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 152-154. 
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al-TirmidhÐ.
552
 The first of these SunnÐ traditions is a reminder to the ruled to oppose the 
rulers whose decisions have destructive consequences for the community. The second 
SunnÐ ÎadÐth declares that being a Muslim does not exempt the sinner from due 
punishment. His selection of sources is determined by the topic he elaborates on. In his 
study of social power FaÃlallÁh resorts to SunnÐ references to emphasise the 
responsibility of the governed for their just governance and to eliminate deviation from 
among their ranks. His choice can be attributed to two factors. On the one hand, 
highlighting the requirement of unity demands a discourse that embodies this value and 
makes it tangible for the reader. On the other hand, it reflects the author’s intent to 
address the broadest possible audience and shows his concern about the SunnÐ - ShÐÝÐ 
divide.  
      The Manichean social concepts of FaÃlallÁh remind us of al-Ñadr’s own binary 
divisions. They both differentiate between “good” social structures – called as 
appropriate (ÒÁliÎ)553 by al-Ñadr and strong (qawÐ) by FaÃlallÁh – and the bad one 
labelled as weak (ÃaÝÐf) by FaÃlallÁh, and termed as pharaonic (firÝawnÐ) by al-Ñadr. 
Both thinkers emphasise fragmentation and division as correlating with oppression and 
injustice, and dedicate attention to the corrupted structure and its agents who maintain 
and fossilise the destructive order. Even so, one can note a difference between the two 
perspectives: while al-Ñadr’s primary concern was one’s attitude towards the oppressive 
authority, FaÃlallÁh focused on the elements of unity and solidarity that guarantee social 
strength.  
 Furthermore, al-Ñadr’s differentiation along the lines of income, profession and 
world-view is supported solely by Qur’Ánic references, his analysis lacks clear and 
precise connections to contemporary social trends. In contrast, FaÃlallÁh’s classification 
is based on negative social behaviours and (a lack of) sensitivity towards the 
marginalised. The dissimilarity between the two approaches can be explained partly by 
the different contexts: al-Ñadr was writing under the growing pressure of the Iraqi 
BÁthist government and the unfolding terror orchestrated by ÑaddÁm Íusayn, while 
                                                             
552 FaÃlallÁh left this source unnamed and it was not corrected in later editions either. This quotation is 
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FaÃlallÁh was living and working in the divided and vulnerable ShÐÝÐ community of 
Lebanon in the evolving civil war. 
 
 
 4.      FaÃlallÁh’s vision of a strong society  
 
 In contrast to the model of the weak society – the Jewish community of Medina – 
MuÎammad’s community stands as the perfect ideal of a strong “society”. The first 
Muslim society, as FaÃlallÁh puts it, is a living, universal model, which should be 
followed in the present and the future. He offers a detailed analysis of how compassion, 
unity and common goals are embodied in social relations and practices, and eventually 
create indestructible social bonds. For FaÃlallÁh  
 
The term social strength refers to the strength that communities possess through 
unity the practical aspects of which are manifested in cohesion and mutual bonds 
(tamÁsuk, tarÁbuÔ) among its members based on shared thought, feelings, and 
action towards a common goal.
554
  
 
 FaÃlallÁh understands social strength as rooted in the interaction among the 
members of the society. Power in this sense is rooted in and secured by unity which in 
turn is constructed by the interplay of three major factors: cohesion, ideology, and joint 
effort. FaÃlallÁh sets out to show the elements of this utopia in three areas that aim to 
replace the elements of weakness: the bond of belief – thought – feeling, social values 
and organic unity. In al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa he mentions tawÎÐd as characteristic 
of a society that strives to be righteous (al-ahdÁf al-qÁ’ima ÝalÁ ’l-haqq wa’l-tawÎÐd).555 
The fact that he does not elaborate further on this essential Islamic doctrine may be 
attributed to his cautious awareness of the religious compositeness of the Lebanese 
society. While the obligation of “commanding right” has a distinct moral aspect that 
serves the purification of the Muslim community, emphasising the doctrine of tawÎÐd 
might have fuelled and intellectually consolidated the already flared up inter-sectarian 
clashes. 
 
                                                             
554 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 110. 
555 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 128. 
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 4.1  The Society of believers: bonds of belief, thought and feeling 
 
 FaÃlallÁh is convinced of the interrelatedness of the social and spiritual aspects of 
human life.
556
 He asserts that God’s mercy towards mankind must be manifested in 
human relations.
557
 Thus, in a community of believers it is faith that determines values 
and in an ideal state, values should govern human interactions. Consequently, the 
intellectual (fikrÐ), emotional (ÝÁÔifÐ or shuÝÙrÐ), and practical (ÝamalÐ or sulÙkÐ) aspects558 
are independent of material circumstances.
559
 We can detect the integral unity of these 
aspects in FaÃlallÁh’s definition of co-operation as 
 
based on compassion and internal collaboration in order to build the foundations 
(…) on harshness (shidda), power (quwwa), and violence (Ýunf) against the internal 
and external enemy, in order to protect the [social] structure against destruction and 
disintegration.
560
  
 
 As we can see, co-operation has an emotional basis, its aim is protection and its 
means may include the use of force. In this context faith has a tangible function: it 
generates the disposition that enables the believers to be compassionate and co-
operative. It creates reality by shaping the consciousness of the individuals and, 
consequently, the norms of the community. As such, it secures order based on shared 
values and conventions. Religious institutions and practices reflect, maintain, and create 
cohesion among those who participate in them.
561
  
 Furthermore, argues FaÃlallÁh, compassion is a general attitude, an outcome of the 
consideration of objective circumstances.
562
 By claiming that feelings and emotions are 
results of a personal internal process controlled by ideological convictions,
563
 
FaÃlallÁh’s aim is to build up a logical sequence (tasalsul manÔiqÐ) that leads from 
compassion through social cohesion towards social strength.
564
 In his view, religious 
                                                             
556 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 117. 
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562 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 116. 
563 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 136. 
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obligations function “as norms that govern relations, define behaviour, and constitute 
the unifying element that reconciles the diverse components of a community”.565 
 FaÃlallÁh’s focus on faith – as the primary and sole bond among individuals and 
groups – is supported by predominantly or exclusively Twelver ShÐÝÐ references. The 
first argument for which imÁmi tradition is extensively quoted – attributed to 
MuÎammad Ibn ÝAlÐ al-BÁqir and JaÝfar al-ÑÁdiq – considers devotion to God as the one 
and only base for human sentiments. In another part FaÃlallÁh – referring to ÝAlÐ ibn 
Íusayn – calls for opposition to fanaticism. Twelver ShÐÝÐ traditions are also 
predominant in his treatise on social solidarity.  
 On the one hand, for him, the intellectual bases of social unity, the doctrinal 
beliefs as well as the general principles of life must be derived exclusively from the 
Qur’Ánic revelation and must be preserved without any concessions to ambiguity or 
dualism.
566
 Therefore, propagating a view that challenges or attacks the ideological 
foundations of the society is forbidden. On the other hand, he accepts freedom in 
making individual choice in ideological issues, and considers conducting dialogue with 
those who have differing views as both a right and a duty. In the section on “the 
freedom of thought”, he reminds his audience of the examples set by JaÝfar al-ÑÁdiq and 
ÝAlÐ al-RiÃÁ who exchanged ideas with non-believers and representatives of differing 
schools and doctrines. The ImÁms appear as proponents of dialogue and co-operation 
based on shared values. However, FaÃlallÁh explicitly stated that dialogue and co-
operation in the final count were only tools to defend and spread the Islamic doctrine.
567
 
Therefore, we can conclude that FaÃlallÁh’s ideas regarding intellectual freedom carry 
considerable ambiguity. 
 
 
 4.2      Social values: justice, social responsibility and solidarity  
 
 FaÃlallÁh support his contention that every idea must have a practical application 
by the Qur’Án, Prophetic as well as Twelver ShÐÝÐ traditions. He maintains that the 
Qur’Án is explicit in declaring practical action as the only real proof of the sincerity of 
                                                             
565 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 122. 
566 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 125-7. 
567 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 132-134. 
  142 
belief.
568
 Man’s mission is to realise divine justice on Earth, as the ultimate goal of 
Islam. Justice creates equilibrium in the society, a context within which Man is able to 
use his full capacities as God’s vice-regent. FaÃlallÁh’s understanding of “justice” is 
based on the revelation. In individual life, justice is embodied in actions corresponding 
to the divine decrees that assure the ethical dimension of life, and thus serve the ultimate 
interests of human beings.
569
 Applied justice is the governance that bases decisions on 
the revealed distinction between righteousness and deviation (Îaqq wa-bÁÔil).570 
 FaÃlallÁh argues that in Islam, social strength presupposes social cohesion through 
general and individual responsibilities.
571
 This implies firmness and rigour against those 
whose ideas or actions weaken society from inside. Thus an internal cooperation based 
on harshness, power, and violence (al-shidda wa’l-quwwa wa’l-Ýunf) is indispensable 
against those internal and external elements that promote disintegration and 
destruction.
572
 Such actions are manifestations of the universal responsibility that each 
Muslim should bear.
573
 Practical involvement in social affairs can take many forms such 
as financial help, social awareness, forgiving and compassion, and fulfilling the 
obligation of “commanding right and forbidding wrong”.574 FaÃlallÁh states that the 
refusal of a duty – abstaining from action – equals disbelief.575  
 FaÃlallÁh believed that the distinct spirit of Islam is embodied in the traditions and 
institutions of the Muslim society, first of all in the form of solidarity among its 
members. The Qur’Ánic statement that “believers indeed are brothers” (49:10) implies a 
spontaneous and practical responsibility for one another by the members of the 
community.
576
 Solidarity as a factor of social cohesion (ÝÁmil tamÁsuk ijtimÁÝÐ) is a legal 
obligation, and falls under the scope of individual responsibility for the common goals 
of the community.
577
 The section on the universal responsibility and solidarity as 
compelling for Muslims contains two Prophetic and seven imÁmi ÎadÐths – attributed to 
MuÎammad Ibn ÝAlÐ al-BÁqir, JaÝfar al-ÑÁdiq and ÝAlÐ ibn al-Íusayn. 
                                                             
568 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 142. 
569 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 196. 
570 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 170. 
571 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 143. 
572 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 117-118. 
573 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 143. 
574 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 148-51. 
575 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 142. 
576 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 138. 
577 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 124. 
  143 
 FaÃlallÁh claims that social solidarity is more important than the accomplishment 
of certain rituals.
578
 He denies that there is such a thing in Islam as individual salvation 
– khalÁÒ579 – and claims that spirituality offers no salvation unless it is achieved within a 
society.
580
 He argues that law, ethics and society are so interrelated in Islam that no 
legislation that concerns the individual is devoid of social meaning, and a person’s 
evaluation is based on his social manners. FaÃlallÁh pushes this argument to the extreme 
when he declares that in Islamic law the individual, as such, does not exist separated 
from society.
581
 
 
 
 4.3      Organic unity  
 
 FaÃlallÁh compares social cohesion to the organising principle of a human body. 
He asserts that  
 
The social and collective life of Muslims is an organic unity (…) This suggests to 
man that he does not represent an independent entity, rather a part of an integrated 
whole.
582
  
 
 This concept assumes that society is a dynamic, continuously changing unit that 
functions by responding to internal and external influences. Consequently, social 
processes are made up of the web of human interactions. Individuals are mutually 
dependent, and there is no tension between the interest of the community and that of its 
members. The basic principles of the community are embodied in all social phenomena 
and movement. Individuals can function only as components of a society; their 
existence gains its deep meaning through their contribution to the common goals.  
 For FaÃlallÁh, what distinguishes the Islamic society from other contemporary or 
past formations is that those have been founded on ÝaÒabiyya (tribal bonds), ÝunÒuriyya 
                                                             
578 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 147. 
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(racism); while in Islam bonds are based on the commitment to the revealed truth.
583 In 
his view, shared visions on nature and society are indispensible for a community. The 
destruction of a normative order annihilates the morality built upon it and thus leads to 
chaos. Therefore, it is a collective interest to preserve and protect or to restore the 
ideological foundations of a common value system.
584
     
 Regarding the needs of the individual, FaÃlallÁh insists that Islam promotes a 
realistic stance. It does not demand the suppression of subjective desires and emotions; 
however it requires that these do not weaken one’s commitment to the Message.585 Man 
has the right to satisfy his natural needs but he has to set limits for himself to prevent his 
desires from becoming destructive. Religious regulations serve to assure integrity and 
equilibrium at the individual as well as at the social level. This way neither side is 
weakened or strengthened at the expense of the other. It is “a give and take process” that 
creates balance among the various constituents of the society.
586
 FaÃlallÁh’s Islamic 
social model reminds us of SharÐÝatÐ’s thought in many aspects. SharÐÝatÐ claimed that 
the basis of social strength is the responsible attitude of the masses
587
 and “the 
scientifically demonstrable laws existent in the society”.588 Both thinkers emphasised 
the importance of common faith and common goals. However, SharÐÝatÐ’s egalitarianism 
has clearly Marxist interferences by propagating “the ‘system of Abel,’ the society of 
human equality.
589
 In contrast, “brotherhood” in FaÃlallÁh’s interpretation is not related 
to the elimination of economic differences and social strata, rather to the practical 
solidarity among the members of the community. 
 
 
 4.4         FaÃlallÁh’s functionalist approach to social power 
 
 As it is to be proved in the following paragraphs, FaÃlallÁh’s model of the strong 
society reflects Durkheim’s approach in many instances. In both paradigms, society is 
an organic unity whose constituents are mutually dependent members. These 
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586 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 111. 
587 SharÐÝatÐ, On the Sociology of Islam (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 2000), 48. 
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individuals are neither independent nor isolated; they have a specific function in the 
operation and maintenance of the system. The unity of the society is based on the 
equilibrium of its parts to which organic solidarity is essential. Society as a living 
organism is responsive to internal changes and external influences. Certain inputs may 
divert the predominant values of the society from justice, fairness and equity. Thus they 
cause loss of balance that challenges the stability of the system, and result in its 
dysfunction.  
 For FaÃlallÁh, social cohesion as the major source of social strength is based on 
individual faith, the individual responsibility of fulfilling the legal commitments, and 
the common goals of the community.
590
 Society as a whole has a function in the context 
of the revelation: to implement divine justice on Earth. In his thought the individual and 
social aspects of the Islamist system are interrelated and consecutive. The state of 
disequilibrium occurs when the predominant values of the society diverge from the 
Islamic principles; that is, practice becomes detached from theory. 
 Functionalism considers the system as “homeostatic” or self-regulating, and thus 
able to restore the equilibrium or level negative influences in order to secure the 
stability of the establishment.
591
  However, the self-regulating mechanism of a social 
system cannot operate without the various manifestations of force. Thus force and law 
are functional in controlling the system and assuring the effectiveness of its parts. In 
FaÃlallÁh’s theory, force and primarily the “force of law” is essential in maintaining the 
equilibrium of the Islamic social order. FaÃlallÁh defines sharÐÝa as “laws [that] point 
(…) in the right direction and (…) show (…) how to take steps to avoid any elements 
that might weaken society.”592 In this sense the elements of the sharÐÝa are comparable 
to “social facts” in Durkheim’s definition. For Durkheim, social facts have an 
independent existence greater and more objective than individual perceptions. 
Furthermore, a social fact cannot be explained except by another social fact.
593
  
 In Islam – and thus for FaÃlallÁh – the principles of sharÐÝa are ordained by God. 
The elements of Islamic law are instrumental to the realisation of the just society. 
Consequently, FaÃlallÁh argues that “[i]t is the logical path towards social cohesion (...) 
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to [put] Islamic laws into practice”.594 The biggest challenge to social equilibrium 
appears in the form of individual inclinations and aspirations. For Durkheim, disorder 
results from the inappropriate functioning of “solidarity-producing social process[es]”, 
the most important of which is interaction between members of the society.
595
 Thus 
force in its various forms from regulation to punishment is indispensible for the 
individual and consequently for social equilibrium. 
 The first source FaÃlallÁh refers to in his treatise on social strength is an 
introduction to Western sociology written for an Arab audience.
596
 This implies that 
FaÃlallÁh benefited from Western social thought and his point of departure is sociology 
– as his choice of the term mujtamaÝ instead of umma reflects. He used a language that 
his audience is likely to be familiar with: the basic notions of Western and Marxist 
sociology. However, the lack of references makes it highly probable that he selected 
appealing notions and vested the ideal, strong Islamic community with them in a 
superficial, “impressionist” manner, and thus designed an utopia rather than provising 
an analysis. 
 
 
 5.       Commanding right  
 
 The last feature of a strong society is “commanding right and forbidding wrong”. 
It is a religious and political, communal and individual responsibility, and the success of 
its fulfilment presupposes individual awareness as well as social organisation. Solidarity 
as a comprehensive, practical attitude (sulÙk ÝamalÐ ÝÁmm) is a manifestation of divine 
mercy towards Man.
597
 It is also a legal obligation (fÐ’l-tashrÐÝÁt al-qÁnÙniyya al-
ilzÁmiyya) that creates social unity and integrity (waÎda wa-salÁma), and consequently 
cohesion and strength (tamÁsuk, quwwa).598 Society, as a whole, is able to assume this 
function only if its members fulfil their individual duties.
599
 In FaÃlallÁh’s view, 
individual inclinations and aspirations constitute a centrifugal force that can endanger 
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solidarity and justice, and as such need to be controlled. Therefore, social justice and 
cohesion is inherently linked to the obligation of “commanding right and forbidding 
wrong”. It serves to regulate and unify the society, to build the base for a strong 
community, and to protect it against the individual tendencies that could result in its 
destruction. 
 FaÃlallÁh defines al-amr bi’l-maÝrÙf wa’l-nahy Ýan al-munkar as the basis of 
Islamic obligations. It prompts the fulfilling of religious duties, and affects all branches 
of legislation. As a social and political organising principle it compels the rulers as well 
as the ruled to establish and maintain justice, order and security. For FaÃlallÁh, it 
constitutes a “kind of solidarity” that is binding on all Muslims, as an indication of the 
personal responsibility for the community.
600
 He states that the obligation of 
“commanding right and forbidding wrong” sets the perspective for human social 
awareness. For FaÃlallÁh evil does not occur by God’s decree. Social decline is the 
natural consequence of neglecting the duty of “commanding right and forbidding 
wrong” on a personal as well as on a community level.  
 In relation to al-amr wa’l-nahy FaÃlallÁh once again reiterates his position on the 
scope of individual freedoms. He asserts that since the consequences of doing wrong 
will not be limited to those who committed it, Man is free in his own issues but not in 
those that affect the society.
601
 Therefore, “Islam does not believe in absolute freedom 
only if subordinated to the requirements of the message and the society.”602 He 
considers this as a norm that harmonises and unites the freedom of the individual and 
that of the community. If deviation is not confronted, the measure of action is lost.
603
 By 
wrong – munkar – FaÃlallÁh means despotism, aggression, deprivation of rights, 
mistreatment, harm, injustice or oppression. The response to this belongs to the realm of 
“forbidding” – nahy – and includes armed resistance or – if the conditions are not 
guaranteed – boycott and exodus.604  Thus, it can be said that his concept of al-amr 
wa’l-nahy is politicised.  
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 Neglecting the duty of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” leads to the 
destruction of faith and justice.
605
 Therefore, those who do not comply with it deserve to 
be outcast.
606
 He emphasises the individual aspect once again by stating that the 
members of the community can detect deviation more quickly than the authorities.
607
 
FaÃlallÁh stresses that the religion of the person who commits the sin is irrelevant, 
because arguing in favour of those who have adopted Islam but betray it with their 
behaviour, would open the way for corruption in the Muslim community.
608
 FaÃlallÁh 
supports this argument mainly with Prophetic traditions but two ÎadÐths – attributed to 
JaÝfar al-ÑÁdiq and ÝAlÐ Ibn MÙsa al-RiÃÁ – are also quoted.  
 
 
6.      FaÃlallÁh’s strong society as a utopia  
 
 For FaÃlallÁh, Islamic society is the perfect social system in which the relationship 
between its members is that of brotherhood. It should follow the model of the Prophet’s 
city which established a unity of fraternity between the immigrants from Quraysh and 
MuÎammad’s supporters in Medina.609 This description of the first Islamic community 
is considerably utopian. He sets the community of Medina as a measure of evaluation 
for contemporary societies without specifying the application of principles in a modern 
context. Furthermore, he claims that there cannot be any reason serious enough to cause 
a fundamental rift in the Islamic community.
610
  
 Had he not mingled the ideal with the real, he would have discovered that the 
contemporary Muslim society such as the one in Medina according to Durkheim’s 
classification fell into the category of mechanical solidarity.
611
 He hints at the problem 
of hypocrites, who lived among the Muslim community, but he does not elaborate on 
the issue and leaves other well-known conflicts such as the one between the muhÁjirÙn 
and anÒÁr without mention. Moreover, he devotes no attention to the problem of the 
collapse of the MuÎammadian ideal following his death.  
                                                             
605 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 158. 
606 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 152. 
607 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 153. 
608 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 152-8. 
609 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 138. 
610 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 123. 
611 Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, 31-68. 
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 As with his thought on theology and spirituality, where he separates the weak and 
strong interpretations of Muslim traditions, FaÃlallÁh’s imagined society is selective. It 
carefully borrows elements of Muslim history, erasing SunnÐ – ShÐÝÐ differences and 
eliding the internal, structural, ideological issues that led to the disunity and 
fragmentation of Muslim societies. He attempts to derive the basic principles operating 
the imagined community of Medina without providing meticulous analysis a propos 
their implementation in the variously polarised modern world and especially that of 
Lebanon.  
 Also, he skips the questions regarding the connection between leadership and 
structure, and does not define clearly the scope of individual and communal 
responsibility. This is particularly conspicuous regarding the obligation of 
“commanding right and forbidding wrong”. Another problem with FaÃlallÁh’s use of 
this concept is that this basic principle is designed to govern an exclusively Muslim 
community. Without differentiating umma from society – delineated by the borders of 
the state – as inevitable in the Lebanese context – FaÃlallÁh’s thought loses its 
feasibility. He designs an Islamic social project without studying “whether” and “to 
what extent” the various element of this project fit into the very context in which it is 
articulated. 
 
 
 7.       Society in FaÃlallÁh’s other writings 
 
 FaÃlallÁh’s later writings on society deal with three major issues. The most 
recurrent of them is human responsibility in the formation of a society. In his book 
ÍiwÁrÁt fi’l-fikr wa’l-siyÁsa wa’l-ijtimÁÝ, FaÃlallÁh devotes several chapters to the 
assertion that believers bear intellectual and practical responsibility for the herein and 
for the hereafter by implementing justice in the private and public spheres. He relates 
this to the requirement to be strong that in turn enables the Muslim society to become a 
force of goodness, justice and cultural ingenuity.
612
  
   FaÃlallÁh connects the issue of freedoms and the obligation of commanding right 
and forbidding wrong in his various statements. In the book al-Íaraka al-IslÁmiyya mÁ 
                                                             
612 FaÃlallah, ÍiwÁrÁt fi’l-fikr wa’l-siyÁsa wa’l-ijtimÁÝ [Dialogues regarding ideas, politics, and society] 
(Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 2001), 198-205. 
  150 
lahÁ wa-mÁ ÝalayhÁ, he asserts that the individual and communal freedoms must stay in 
balance. The obligation of al-amr wa’l-nahy is a responsibility of every believer 
according to one’s capacities individually and in alliance with others.613  
 Another principle FaÃlallÁh never ceased emphasising is the inevitability of 
making Islam public by transforming its principles into practice manifested in all 
aspects of community life. Related to this in the Lebanese context, he devoted 
considerable attention to Islam as a social system and its relation to followers of other 
religions. He elaborated on the problem of religious minorities in an Islamic state in 
many of his writings, most importantly in FÐ ÁfÁq al-ÎiwÁr al-IslÁmÐ al-MasÐÎÐ. 
FaÃlallÁh’s position was that Islam as a socio-political-economic system offers a 
framework like that of capitalism or communism. However, since it is based on 
revelation and aims at justice, it fits the best to the followers of other monotheistic 
religions. Consequently he discarded and considered all non-Islamic elements as 
obstacles to social cohesion and justice.
614
  
 Another aspect of his ideas on the importance of social equilibrium appears in his 
commentary on SÙrat al-AÝrÁf, about the “life-span” of community (umma). FaÃlallÁh 
compares it to the lifespan of an individual which is connected to one’s decisions and 
actions as well as to the surrounding conditions that strengthen or weaken the body. He 
states that the vitality of the community depends on human equilibrium which is the 
outcome of many factors such as culture, society, politics, human relations, security and 
economics. This equilibrium helps the perfection of its members and unifies the 
community. The spirit of solidarity is manifested in common goals and plans. The 
vigour of the community lasts until forces and acts of dissolution upset this 
equilibrium.
615
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
613 FaÃlallah, al-Íaraka al-IslÁmiyya ma lahÁ wa-ma ÝalayhÁ, 133-136. 
614 FaÃlallah, FÐ ÁfÁq al-ÎiwÁr al-IslÁmÐ al-MasÐÎÐ [On the horizons of Muslim-Christian dialogue] 
(Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 1994), 103-107. 
615 FaÃlallah, Min waÎy al-Qur’Án, vol. 10 [From the inspiration of the Qur’Án] (Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 
1998), 107-108, on 7:34.  
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 8.       FaÃlallÁh’s social thought and ÍizbullÁh’s 1985 Open Letter 
 
 The aforementioned social empowerment of the ShÐÝÐ community is best 
illustrated in the social activism of ÍizbullÁh that fills the gap in social services where 
the Lebanese state fails. Islamist movements (e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood and its 
affiliated organisations in Egypt, Jordan and elsewhere) start competing with the regime 
at the social level and end at the political one. A close reading of ÍizbullÁh’s 1985 
Open Letter616 reveals that it echoes some features of FaÃlallÁh’s social thought. Most 
importantly, it is emphatic about the cohesive force of common goals, and the 
commitment of the Islamic message to social justice and fighting oppression.  
 The Open Letter declares that resistance is an individual as well as communal 
responsibility.
617
 People are urged to unite for a major goal and step over minor issues – 
even differences in religion – that cause rifts.618 ÍizbullÁh’s Open Letter not only 
promotes solidarity with all Muslims in the world, but also extends the call for Muslim 
– Christian co-operation in “forbidding wrong”, that is, to resist oppression and colonial 
ambitions based on shared values and shared experience.
619
 The declaration draws 
attention to the dangers of fragmentation as serving the divide and rule policy of the 
oppressive powers.
620
  
 The manifesto defines Islam as a strong intellectual and political bond that creates 
and secures just rule. It insists that capitalism and socialism failed to set the foundations 
for a just and stable society, or to establish a balance between the individual and the 
community, between human nature and public interest.
621
 Such criticism reiterates 
FaÃlallÁh’s argument on the interrelatedness of social equilibrium, justice and strength. 
In the Letter, ÍizbullÁh maintains that Islamic governance must be based on the unity of 
the members of the community.  
 FaÃlallÁh’s influence on the organisation has never been admitted on either side; 
however, it is evident that their analysis of the societal reality shows significant 
similarities. ÍizbullÁh’s social strategy shows agreements with most values FaÃlallÁh 
                                                             
616 I read the text in Joseph E. Alagha’s Hizbullah’s Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 
Manifesto (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 39-56.  
617 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, 53-54. 
618 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, 44. 
619 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, 46-47. 
620 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, 53. 
621 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, 47. 
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sees as elements of strength. ÍizbullÁh put in place an effective and extensive chain of 
charitable institutions: schools, hospitals, surgeries, orphanages, and diverse social 
services that employ workers of various denominational background, and are open to 
serve clients of all faiths even though – following the Lebanese traditions – they are 
attended mostly by ShÐÝÐs. The first such institutions were set up as personal initiatives 
by FaÃlallÁh from the late 1960s.  
 His primary aim was to provide services to the poor ShÐÝa. However, since the 
suburbs of pre-war Beirut were inhabited by religiously mixed population, FaÃlallÁh’s 
institutions were always open to Sunnites, Druze and Christians. He considered social 
service as a means to create inter- and intra-religious cohesion, and also as the most 
authentic and peaceful tool of Islamisation. This tradition has been followed by 
ÍizbullÁh since its official formation and also as a means of its politicisation.
622
 This 
can be considered a practical application of the concepts developed in FaÃlallÁh’s book.  
 
 
 Concluding remarks 
 
 The narrative of the weak and the strong societies FaÃlallÁh endorses is a 
suggestive metaphor. In order to construct the basis of a strong ShÐÝÐ community, 
FaÃlallÁh reinterpreted the social principles of Islam. Similarly to his argument about 
the theology of power and spiritual force, he perceives social reality in dichotomies. His 
Manichaeism, a characteristic of radical and fundamentalist thinkers, becomes obvious. 
The principle of his evaluation of the various social and intellectual trends is twofold: 
whether they support the unity of the Muslim community, and whether they apply the 
principle of “commanding right and forbidding wrong”. For FaÃlallÁh, spirituality does 
not offer salvation unless it is realised within the social matrix and individualism is 
banned from his ideal society. 
 FaÃlallÁh selected his arguments consciously in order to support the absolute 
validity of his social system. In this process, he showed no concerns for the suitability 
of his ideals in a multi-confessional environment like Lebanon. Similarly, he did not 
hesitate to depict the first Muslim community vesting it with attributes such as organic 
                                                             
622 Eitan Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 116. Alagha, The 
Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, 14, 208. Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, 82, 104. 
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solidarity, a Western sociological term applied to modern societies. Nevertheless, 
FaÃlallÁh’s aim was not to measure the prevalent social concepts and to compare them 
with the Islamic norms following the requirements of a scientific analysis. He had to 
convince his ShÐÝÐ audience – “the despised” of Lebanon (a term applied by Kramer)623 
– of the self-sufficiency of the Islamic social formula in terms of its capacity of 
empowerment. For this, FaÃlallÁh combined elements of Medieval Islamic social 
thought (“commanding right and forbidding wrong”) with Western social concepts 
(organic unity, solidarity) and interpreted them in an Islamic way, to put forward a 
project of revitalising the ideal Islamic society in the modern age. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
623 Kramer, “The Oracle of Hizbullah,” 105, 128. 
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Chapter VII: Political Power 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
 As a result of more than a millennium of predominant quietism, the ShÐÝa were 
reluctant regarding active involvement in politics or transformation of the status quo. 
Reformist ShÐÝÐ ideologues felt the need to challenge the understanding of some 
traditional ShÐÝÐ concepts such as the postponement of the foundation of the Islamic state 
until the return of the MahdÐ,624 passivity and inward religiousness during the 
occultation of the Twelfth ImÁm,
625
 insistence on the idea of infallible leadership,
626
 and 
dissimulation
627
. Activist ShÐÝÐ clerics adapted the intellectual repertoire of ShÐÝism and 
evaluated the conditions necessary for action that includes violence on the part of 
Muslims in different ways.
628
  
 In particular, FaÃlallÁh’s whole project of transformative power revolves around 
political power. It has been shown that he takes the theological, the spiritual and the 
social fields of power as preparatory stages for political quwwa. His constant call to 
action, emphasis on political force and total adherence to change and revolution can be 
seen as a political project designed for the ShÐÝa of Lebanon.  
 To elaborate on FaÃlallÁh’s concept of ShÐÝÐ revolution, two aspects of the issue 
are studied in this chapter: his response to the socio-political context, and his 
reinterpretation of ShÐÝism as a doctrine of power. FaÃlallÁh reconstructed Islamic 
political theory with special attention to three distinct but interrelated spheres: 
revolution as a means of change, the functions of the state, and the rules of international 
relations.  
 He deals with political power in various chapters of al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-
quwwa. The second chapter is dedicated to the theoretical legitimisation of the use of 
force by the oppressed against their oppressors. In the fifth chapter, FaÃlallÁh re-
                                                             
624 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 262-4. 
625 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 274. 
626 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 269-71. 
627 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 274. 
628 See e.g. Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 530-549; Enayat, Modern Islamic Political 
Thought, 160-195. 
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evaluates the potentials of the Lebanese ShÐÝa by examining the significance of 
numerical ratio, and the importance of detailed action plans. In another section (Chapter 
7), he defined daÝwa as a tool that secures free “interaction” with reality629 but rejected 
the notion that Islam was or could be spread by force.
630
 Finally, in Chapter 8, FaÃlallÁh 
studied the scope and legitimacy of force in bringing about the transformation of 
deviant social reality. 
 FaÃlallÁh’s thought on political power articulates an inherently ShÐÝÐ theory but he 
communicates it to the wider Islamic public. This characteristic assures him a place in 
what Enayat calls a “cross sectarian current” in modernist Islamic political thought.631 It 
is suggested, here, that his ShÐÝÐ vision of power had a threefold aim: to assert the 
interests of the Lebanese ShÐÝa, to urge them to carry out radical change in the status 
quo, and to set up a plan regarding the possibilities and scope of Islamisation in 
Lebanon. 
 
 
1.     A Theory of ShÐÝÐ revolution632  
 
 In FaÃlallÁh’s thought, standing up against injustice is a religious duty and a 
political obligation.
633
 This distinction is mere rhetoric. For, in reality, he does not 
distinguish between them insofar as the Message of Islam, risÁla is both the religion of 
Islam and its political order. Here, political obligation is not a commitment to a 
government or a movement in particular, but to the Islamic social-political order.
634
 In 
order to provide his theory of revolution with the best chances to appeal to a quietist 
audience, FaÃlallÁh sought to define what makes rule and revolt legitimate, to place the 
                                                             
629 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 228. 
630 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 226. 
631 Enayat notes that “[W]ith modernistic trends gaining ground among religious circles in the Muslim 
world from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, the barriers between Sunnis and Shi‘is 
gradually became less insuperable, allowing a good many cross-sectarian currents.” Enayat, Modern 
Islamic Political Thought, 41.  
632 This question is a very challenging one to revolutionary ShÐÝism. See for example Abdulkarim 
Soroush’s claim that “The Islamic Revolution Lacked a Theory”. 
http://www.drsoroush.com/English/Interviews/E-INT-20090504Shie-Paris.html. Accessed 12 September. 
2013. 
633 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 63-64. 
634 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 78-79 and 260-262. 
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fight in the context of belief against disbelief, relating it to the obligation of 
“commanding right and forbidding wrong”.  
 In view of the historical-political context, FaÃlallÁh’s revolutionary theory aimed 
to promote the interests of the ShÐÝÐ minority in a system dominated by the Maronite and 
SunnÐ elites that thwarted the ShÐÝa’s rise to power. FaÃlallÁh reconfigured the notion of 
force as an ideology of power the aim of which is to offer political and social justice to 
the disinherited ShÐÝa. He attempted to uproot the hesitant attitude regarding any action 
that aims at change including violence by delegating it into the realm of individual 
responsibility and religious obligation.
635
 
 
 
1.1      History as battleground 
 
 FaÃlallÁh points to the inherent unity of the natural law and the dynamics of 
history as both follow the divine plan.
636
 In his view, history is a series of clashes 
between those who stand up for justice – the righteous oppressed minority – and that of 
falsehood – the supporters of the oppressors.637 Thus, history and politics are about 
force and fight in which power is essential to victory. This dynamic is perfectly 
manifested in the Prophet’s battles and the fights of ÝAlÐ and al-Íusayn. In the context 
of the Qur’Ánic revelation, the struggle between truth and falsehood has metaphysical 
significance – regardless of the actual outcome of the conflict – by proving the 
liberating power of human efforts. Thus, in his analysis, FaÃlallÁh defines resistance to 
tyranny as a primary duty.
638
  
 Consequently, the oppressed must strive for change and if defeated in one area, 
look for another opportunity to fight.
639
 He urges the weak and dispossessed to act by 
stating that the Qur’Án does not promise forgiveness to the deprived for their passivity 
in order to prompt them to act and to arouse “the spirit of rebellion” in them.640 He 
asserts that the fight and revolution of ÝAlÐ and al-Íusayn were the outcome of 
                                                             
635 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 57. 
636 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 44. 
637 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 17-8. 
638 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 61. 
639 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 55. 
640 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 58. 
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circumstances that are not confined to a specific date and time but are to be repeated at 
the various stages of history.  
 
 
1.2      Legitimisation of rule and revolt  
 
 The lack of justice deprives any authority of its legitimacy. Change should bring 
in ideal governance, characterised by its dedication to implement justice among the 
governed. FaÃlallÁh argues that the core issue is not the presence of an infallible leader. 
Rather, it is the security of order and state. Quoting JawÁhir al-kalÁm,641 FaÃlallÁh states 
that the legitimate ruler at the time of the “occultation” was authorised to establish law 
and order in the community.
642
 The condition of legitimacy is, therefore, not to comply 
with a transcendental criterion but the ability and commitment to implement the sharÐÝa 
and safeguard stability. FaÃlallÁh writes extensively about the interconnectedness of 
Islamic law and righteous governance through its commitment to divine supremacy. 
 For FaÃlallÁh, Islam is a religion that came to change the world and uproot the 
existing reality in order to base it on the principle of justice.
643
 As such, it contradicts 
any form of tyranny and demands resistance to oppression.
644
 For him, accepting 
oppression sets in motion a vicious circle by generating a feeling of vulnerability and 
need for protection that, in fact, turns into another form of oppression. Whenever the 
oppressed renounce their “power of the self” (al-quwwa al-dhÁtiyya)645 they assist 
injustice for which they will be accountable.
646
 In his perception, weakness is the 
negation of Man’s responsibility towards the created world; therefore, it is a sin. 
FaÃlallÁh delegates the notion of responsibility into the scope of the divine-human 
relationship.   
 
 
 
                                                             
641 A comprehensive and encyclopedic work on ShÐÝÐ jurisprudence by MuÎammad Íasan NajafÐ (d. 
1850). 
642 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 264. 
643 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 255. 
644 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 55. 
645 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 57. 
646 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 56. 
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 1.3  The use of force and revolutionary change  
 
 The chapter on the legitimisation of force against the oppressors (Chapter 2) 
follows immediately the chapter on the concept of theological force. This organisation 
and the inclusion of resistance in the compass of “commanding right and forbidding 
wrong” illustrates that the idea of resistance to tyrannical power has an emphatic 
position in FaÃlallÁh’s thought.647  
 In accordance with his theology of force, FaÃlallÁh considers human beings as the 
agents of change. The process presupposes human free will, starts from inside and 
extends to the public order.
648
 At the practical stage, the problem of forms of change 
arises. If the public order resists attempts at change by peaceful means, can the Muslim 
community carry it out by force? FaÃlallÁh justifies violence by justifying first the 
necessity of an Islamic state and all the means – including violence – that facilitate the 
realisation of such a state.  
 He opposed the separation of religion and state claiming that Islam is both a 
religious call and governance. Therefore, it pragmatically adopts all necessary means – 
aggressive or peaceful – to administer private and public affairs according to the 
requirements of a particular situation.
649
 FaÃlallÁh obliges every citizen – even non-
Muslims – to recognise the rule of Islam, in order to control their potentially dangerous 
activities. In the case of Jews and Christians, this is meant to be an accommodation to 
the Islamic social-political order with no pressure to convert. As for the followers of 
non-monotheistic religions, conversion is obligatory even if nominal.
650
 His concern 
with order and stability, however, leaves a margin for some degree of tolerance, by 
claiming that the first Islamic authority did not interfere with the “hypocrites” unless 
they attempted to create chaos.
651
  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
647 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 268. 
648 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 257. 
649 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 260-262. 
650 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 241-243. 
651 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 244. 
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      1.4        “Commanding right and forbidding wrong” and revolutionary change  
 
 For FaÃlallÁh, confronting deviation is based on general juristic rules (al-qawÁÝid 
al-sharÝiyya al-ÝÁmma) such as “commanding right and forbidding wrong”.652 He 
explains the fights led by ÝAlÐ and al-Íusayn in this context as based on and guided by 
Islamic norms.
653
 His notion of Islamic norms is vague and does not indicate a precise 
or juridical meaning. On this basis, standing against injustice and oppression is 
obligatory (ÃarÙrat al-wuqÙf).654 Accordingly, the legitimate means (asbÁb) of the fight 
can be peaceful or aggressive depending on the demands of the situation, as indicated in 
the Qur’Án and in the Tradition.655  
 Michael Cook emphasised the change in requiring the ImÁm’s approval and in the 
consideration of the ‘danger condition’ as two major aspects of uprooting political 
quietism in activist ShÐÝism.
656
 FaÃlallÁh’s argumentation perfectly supports and 
illustrates Cook’s remark. As for the need for the ImÁm’s permission when the duty of 
“al-amr wa’l-nahy” involves violent acts,657 FaÃlallÁh adheres to the concept of 
regulating order through the authority of the imÁm. He asserts that violence is 
legitimate, but should be authorised by the imÁm.658 However, his use of the notion of 
“imÁm” is close to the SunnÐ understanding, with the meaning of state authority. With 
regard to the context, we can assume that what FaÃlallÁh meant, here, is the approval 
and supervision of the most qualified jurist of the ShÐÝÐ community. As such, his 
position is close to that of KhumaynÐ who argued that the most learned faqÐh can lead 
the community in acts that imply the use of force.
659
  
 As Cook observed, the danger condition “voided not only the duty to proceed but 
also the virtue of doing so”.660 In the quietist tradition, danger comprised risking one’s 
life, property and even untoward side-effects.
661
 With activist thought a new “category 
of wrongs” (ahammiyya) emerged in “that the obligation to right them overrides the 
                                                             
652 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 276. 
653 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 269. 
654 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 61. 
655 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 264. 
656 Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 533. 
657 Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 285. 
658 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 265. 
659 Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 540. 
660 Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 533. 
661 Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 276. 
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danger condition (…) typically such wrongs involve some threat to the very basis of 
Islam.”662 This phenomenon is well exemplified by FaÃlallÁh’s argumentation. He urges 
jurists  
 
to take ‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’ as an ultimate proof that 
legitimates the revolutionary and reformist movements that resort to violence to 
achieve their mission, no matter how much loss it causes, provided that they stick 
to the principles in planning and executing, and take into consideration, as much as 
possible, the potentials of victory and safety.
663
 
 
 FaÃlallÁh makes this statement in the context of the call to Islam, daÝwa, 
emphasising the vital necessity of spreading the Islamic message. He takes the latter to 
be the sole guarantee of securing the happiness of humankind. In his analysis of 
revolutionary action, FaÃlallÁh distinguishes two major approaches in the jurists’ 
attitudes. The first group refrains from action if there is a risk of being harmed or 
injured. The other group suggests that every situation must be considered in its own 
right. FaÃlallÁh agrees with those who support action with no conditions and no 
restrictions in cases when the foundations that preserve the sharÐÝa, order or justice are at 
stake, even if action carries risk and danger.
664
  FaÃlallÁh’s position lays the foundation 
for a theology of martyrdom. 
 He refers to ImÁm ÝAlÐ and ImÁm al-Íusayn as leaders of a movement of 
revolution or reform. He quotes ÎadÐths by al-BÁqir about al-Íusayn’s fight at KarbalÁ’, 
and al-ÓabarÐ’s account of ÝAlÐ to support his argument that these revolutionary or 
reformist movements (al-Îaraka al-thawriyya aw al-iÒlÁÎiyya) were nothing but the 
practical implementation of “commanding right and forbidding wrong”.665 In 
FaÃlallÁh’s use thawra and iÒlÁÎ appear as synonyms, which is nevertheless a disputed 
issue among quietists and most Sunnites.  
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 FaÃlallÁh has recourse to the principle of “commanding right and forbidding 
wrong” in two senses. First, as an element of SunnÐ public law designed to respond to 
the needs of the Caliphate. Second, when justifying the necessity of revolution FaÃlallÁh 
uses “forbidding wrong” in its theological-political meaning – rendering it obligatory 
and associating it with action and the necessity of rebellion – in a similar manner to the 
MuÝtazilÐ and KhÁrijÐ thought.
666
 According to FaÃlallÁh, the comprehensive Islamic 
plan for change is associated with “forbidding wrong” in this second meaning. This 
second interpretation is understood as rebellion, khurÙj by Sunnites. At this point, 
FaÃlallÁh seems to endorse a QuÔbian (or KhÁrijÐ) discourse like in his justification of 
revolution against corrupted reality and unjust rulers.
667
  
 As for the condition of knowledge – to acquire the capacity to differentiate the 
wrong from the right
668
 – it is a duty and personal responsibility of all Muslims in 
FaÃlallÁh’s argument.669 Regarding the condition of persistence – possessing proof that 
the offence is going to continue in the future
670
 – FaÃlallÁh repeatedly stresses the 
dangers of prolonged oppression, and in his analysis of global injustice, he depicts it as 
long-lasting and quasi normalised status-quo of humankind.
671
 
 
 
 2.       Downplaying democracy 
 
 In line with his conceptualisation of force, FaÃlallÁh plays down numerical 
superiority and democracy as valid means to acquire and hold power. The standard 
Muslim rhetoric on the relationship of quantity and power encourages the outnumbering 
of the rival communities. FaÃlallÁh challenges this position and connects it to his 
criticism of the view that numerical superiority necessarily correlates with the rightness 
of opinion. He maintains that the opinion of the majority does not necessarily respect 
the transcendental norms of justice. Therefore, democracy does not guarantee 
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  162 
righteousness; it is only a reflection of the philosophy and interests of the dominant 
groups.
672
   
 In contrast, FaÃlallÁh propagates consultation (shÙrÁ), the decisions of which can 
be in agreement with or in opposition to the opinion of the majority, but most 
importantly they correspond to the divine norms. He also claims that shÙrÁ – a common 
idea propagated in Islamist and reformist literature – is the best way to avoid tyranny.673 
This is a holistic approach that secures the universality of the Islamic model as opposed 
to any other solution that in one way or another create divisions in the society. In the 
traditional SunnÐ understanding, shÙrÁ presupposes the principle of election (ikhtiyÁr), 
while in ShÐÝism authority is based on the idea of designation (naÒÒ). Therefore, in the 
context of ShÐÝÐ thought, it is a vague notion that may carry autocratic tendencies.  
 In FaÃlallÁh’s interpretation, shÙrÁ serves above all one goal: to secure the control 
of the “right” – even if it is in minority – over the “wrong” – even if it is in majority. 
However, FaÃlallÁh did not specify what makes one eligible for taking part in the 
council neither did he detail its decision-making process. As for the notion of wilÁyat al-
faqÐh, in the 1980s, FaÃlallÁh supported KhumaynÐ’s ideas. However, from the 1990s 
on, due to his claim of marjaÝiyya he rejected wilÁyat al-faqÐh as a universal 
institution.
674
 FaÃlallÁh defined the post of the marjaÝ al-taqlÐd as an exclusive, 
supranational, non-ethnic, merit-based authority.
675
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 3.      Islam as a religion of daÝwa and jihÁd  
 
 FaÃlallÁh claims that the message of Islam demands the total transformation of the 
world according to the divine will.
676
 As a ShÐÝÐ jurist and ideologue, FaÃlallÁh 
consistently refers to the Islamic character of his project of resistance and liberation. 
Regarding the Islamic character of the state, he asserts that  
 
What Islam does is just forcing others to accept the laws of Islam, since they are 
under the roof of the Islamic state, a state that must be protected from any danger, 
since it is the state of God.
677
  
 
 This statement shows that, for FaÃlallÁh, accepting the Islamic character of the 
state is primarily an issue of security and not that of creed or ideology. In contrast to 
MÙsÁ al-Ñadr, FaÃlallÁh claimed that the best form of governance in Lebanon would be 
an Islamic one. As noted before, FaÃlallÁh understands Islam to be, above all, a system 
of thought and life that embodies the divine norm of justice and to which submission is 
the prerequisite. However, contrary to KhumaynÐ, in the Lebanese multi-confessional 
system, FaÃlallÁh did not demand a total and rapid Islamic turn. He called it as a change 
for justice, the long-term guarantee of which is the Islamic order. This logic made 
Islamisation and change inseparable, but he designed his tactic with due respect to the 
reality on the ground.  
 FaÃlallÁh dedicates an entire chapter (Chapter 7) to the spread of Islam as 
universal message in relation to the use of force. In this claim, he disagrees with the 
jurists who consider jihÁd as a means of daÝwa and asserts that force is needed to oppose 
aggression, to protect and ensure the freedom of the Message. However, he strictly 
forbids coercion in conversion. Furthermore, he relates daÝwa to liberation by defining it 
as “a means to free people and to protect them, after they had joined Islam.”678 
Similarly, FaÃlallÁh claims, jihÁd and the conquests did not serve conversion, but to 
bring people under the control of the Islamic state and Islamic laws, and liberate them 
from oppression. We can notice the same phenomenon as in the case of his equating 
umma with society. Here, FaÃlallÁh considers Islamic rule as normative – which gives 
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Islam a political superiority even when the subjects are non-Muslims. Therefore, his 
perception cannot be considered as realist in general and in the Lebanese context in 
particular.  
 In FaÃlallÁh’s view, any idea or practice that negates human dignity and generates 
a feeling of weakness institutes practical paganism (wathaniyya Ýamaliyya) which must 
be annihilated by all means.
679
 JihÁd serves to secure the space for daÝwa, and for state-
formation without which this “practical paganism” cannot be uprooted and the ideal of 
justice cannot be implemented. As for the means of change, they can be peaceful – 
including persuasion and guidance – or violent such as revolt.680 Fighting for freedom 
means supporting God’s cause by using the divinely legitimised methods as defined in 
the Qur’Án. These means correspond to the laws of nature (yaltaqÐ bi’l-sunna al-
ÔabÐÝiyya). Thus, fighting and annihilating “the enemies of freedom and life” acquire 
religious and natural justification (al-tabrÐr al-sharÝÐ wa’l-ÔabÐÝÐ)”.681 Such acts serve “the 
cause of God” who, in turn, provides the necessary strength for those who resort to 
arms.
682
  We can assume that in FaÃlallÁh’s view the two most important legal duties for 
activism are al-amr bi-’l-maÝrÙf wa’l-nahy Ýan al-munkar and jihÁd. 
  Regarding the principle of freedom of religion, FaÃlallÁh does not recognise 
individual freedom in the western understanding. He even explicitly states that: 
 
The Islamic idea of freedom agrees with all states that root their governance in a 
complementary and comprehensive idea, to which all laws and practices are 
related; with those states whose democracy is called “directed democracy”.683  
 
 
 As it appears from the quote, in FaÃlallÁh’s thought Islam exceeds human 
measures; it is linked to the interest of humanity as dictated by God, the Creator, and 
this leaves no room for counter-freedom against God.
684
 In other words, FaÃlallÁh 
adheres to the concept of “controlled” or limited freedom. Accordingly, on the status of 
non-Muslims in a Muslim state, FaÃlallÁh is apologetic and radical. He isolates the 
polytheists, the disbelievers and the atheists from ahl al-kitÁb (who should pay jizya). 
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Then, he states that Islam should convert the former because they represent an element 
of corruption on earth. There is only one way to do so, asserts FaÃlallÁh: using force. 
Here, he considers force to be a way of reforming them. This verbal fallacy, typical of 
religious-political apologies, allows him to depict this group as uncivilised and to justify 
discrimination in the name of Islam.
685
 Submitting disbelievers, FaÃlallÁh states, to the 
sovereignty of the Muslim state is not coercion even if it means that Christians and Jews 
should pay jizya and polytheists must convert to Islam.686  
 In the next step, FaÃlallÁh arrives at the question of whether Muslims can declare 
an aggressive war on disbelievers (including Jews and Christians). He reconfigures the 
classical theory of jihÁd, claiming that the normal state of relations between Muslims 
and non-Muslims is peace, if peace secures the objectives of Muslims.
687
 In cases where 
peace becomes a weakness or a danger for Islam, war is legitimate. FaÃlallÁh is a 
pragmatic radical for whom peace is accepted inasmuch as it is favourable for Islam. He 
defines two cases of such favourable peace: the voluntary conversion or the surrender of 
the enemy.
688
 Otherwise, in normal conditions, jihÁd is a necessity.689 FaÃlallÁh is 
reluctant to accept jihÁd as a continuous total war against disbelievers. He rather wants 
it to be waged according to the interests of Islam. This stance endows his radicalism 
with a hue of reluctance.  
 Recently, Sami Emile Baroudi investigated FaÃlallÁh’s thought on international 
relations in the period between 1976 and 2006.
690
 The author points out that for 
FaÃlallÁh, the Islamic use of power serves the defence of freedoms and Muslim 
territories, and to eliminate any obstacles to the peaceful spread of the Islamic message. 
In such cases, resort to the use of force is an obligation.
691
 Baroudi’s evaluation of 
FaÃlallÁh’s concept of jihÁd – as expounded in his various writings including al-IslÁm 
wa-manÔiq al-quwwa – is that it contains some contradictions that stem from the lack of 
differentiation between rhetoric and content.  
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 Baroudi claims that FaÃlallÁh detached the notion of armed jihÁd from its broader 
definition as “all individual and collective endeavours in the name of Islam”; and for the 
former he prefers to use the term qitÁl.692 In Baroudi’s interpretation, for FaÃlallÁh jihÁd 
is not the essence of Islam, only a means that serves specific goals.
693
 On the other 
hand, he admits that for FaÃlallÁh the spiritual dimension of the fight is as important as 
its military aspects.
694
 Baroudi seems to disregard the fact that, for FaÃlallÁh, the use of 
force is embedded in a coherent system where jihÁd has a multi-faceted meaning. These 
different layers complement each other. For this reason, qitÁl by essence has to be 
placed in the context of the spiritual aspects of jihÁd. 
 At the communitarian level, as it seemed to FaÃlallÁh in 1976, the reality on the 
ground provided no compass for a peaceful political process, and amidst the escalating 
violence, passivity risked the annihilation of the community. The deprived ShÐÝÐ masses 
aspired to transform the internal power structure of the community. At the national 
level, FaÃlallÁh’s main concern was to change the patterns of power sharing in Lebanon 
and to extend and secure their participation in the Lebanese political and economic life. 
His uncompromising rhetoric served primarily to convince his own community that 
Islam is the only possible solution to their weakness. However, in practice, within an 
explosive national and international context, he had to be careful not to destroy the 
possibilities of future reconciliation and cohabitation. 
 
 
 4.       FaÃlallÁh’s ShÐÝÐ political project in context 
 
 Before evaluating FaÃlallÁh’s political theory in terms of coherence and 
effectiveness, it is necessary to contextualise it in the rising revolutionary ShÐÝism of the 
1970s and contrast it with the competing ShÐÝÐ views. 
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 4.1       Lebanese context: FaÃlallÁh and MÙsÁ al-Ñadr  
 
 FaÃlallÁh’s contribution to ShÐÝÐ political thought could be best understood in light 
of the Lebanese context. In the sixties, a fervent movement, led by MÙsÁ al-Ñadr, 
incarnated ShÐÝÐ aspirations for power and ascendency in Lebanon. To some extent, al-
Ñadr prepared the field for FaÃlallÁh. As FaÃlallÁh’s immediate predecessor on the ShÐÝÐ 
Lebanese political scene, with a different and competing vision of Lebanese ShÐÝism, it 
is necessary to pay due attention to how the two projects interpret ShÐÝism in a context 
of rising to power. It is argued, here, that there is a correlation but no causality between 
al-Ñadr’s strategy of ShÐÝÐ revival and FaÃlallÁh’s project. 
 MÙsÁ al-Ñadr (1928- disappeared in 1978), a religious and political leader was the 
first politically active ShÐÝÐ cleric in Lebanon. He offered a new and radical 
interpretation of ShÐÝism that served the program of social-political empowerment for 
the marginalised ShÐÝÐ community. Upon his arrival to Lebanon in 1959, he engaged in 
institution-building and political activism. He was a man of action rather than a 
systematic scholar, spontaneous and agile with an outstanding sense for revitalising 
religion and transforming it into a means of mobilisation.  In his discourse, as put by 
Shaery-Eisenlohr, he aimed to “position Shiites within the Lebanese national narrative” 
asserting “that the labels of underclass and rural are in fact the two components that 
make the ShÐÝa the most authentic Lebanese citizens”.695 However, as an Iranian-born 
newcomer to Lebanon he – as Ajami writes – “had to demonstrate his fidelity to the 
institutions and the welfare of the state”.696  
 Al-Ñadr was a reformer who attempted to change the position of the ShÐÝÐ 
community within the confines of the established political system. Fu’Ád ShihÁb’s six-
year rule (1958 – 1964) of étatisme offered a reasonably flexible framework for such an 
endeavour.
697
 For more than a decade, al-Ñadr did not call for revolution. Up to the 
outbreak of the civil war and the subsequent formation of the AMAL militia in January 
1975, al-Ñadr used dialogue and peaceful mass mobilisation to express the ShÐÝÐ 
demands. It was only after his efforts fell on deaf ears that his tone became more 
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threatening.
698
 For him, revolution was a radical, consistent, organised but not 
necessarily armed action, based on the mobilisation of the community’s resources and 
potentials and expressed by the symbols of ShÐÝÐ creed and history. He propagated 
nonviolence even after AMAL had been formed.
699
 Al-Ñadr wanted to assert the state 
authority in the south, and did not believe that his community was prepared enough to 
enter and profit from an armed conflict.
700
 He had no scenario for organised military 
activity and no systematic intellectual argumentation at hand to support the obvious 
need for the use of force.  
 By the mid 1970s, his tactic turned out to be outdated; he lost the control and 
power necessary to influence the events on the national political scene as well as in the 
diffused and proliferating ShÐÝÐ movement. In the summer of 1976, when FaÃlallÁh 
wrote al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, al-Ñadr had lost much of his influence on the 
Lebanese political scene as well as inside the ShÐÝÐ community. In Ajami’s words “The 
Shia establishment was still caught between the emblems of state authority and the new 
politics of militias and arms”.701 Al-Ñadr was continuously criticised and condemned by 
the conservative ShÐÝÐ religious authorities for his activism. Another stance of al-Ñadr 
that gave rise to controversy was that in the midst of the devastating Christian 
offensives from January 1976, MÙsÁ al-Ñadr entered into secret negotiations with AmÐn 
Jumayyil, the leader of the Christian Phalange (KatÁ’ib) resulting in an agreement on 
the withdrawal of the ShÐÝÐ population in NabÝa – FaÃlallÁh’s constituency – without a 
fight.
702
 However, Jumayyil broke his promise and made no distinction between the 
ShÐÝÐ and Palestinian residents. Following the deportation of the surviving inhabitants to 
west Beirut, their properties were subjected to looting and destruction.
703
 Al-Ñadr was 
heavily criticised for his ill-fated decision. FaÃlallÁh did not question him publicly but it 
is likely that the failure of al-Ñadr’s approach and the consequent devastation caused a 
major shift in FaÃlallÁh’s perception along with tensions between the two leaders.704 
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 By 1976, the situation in Lebanon was that of open war, and the ShÐÝÐ masses 
remained disorganised. Many of those who were ready to fight – having been 
disillusioned with the Palestinians and the Left or committed to their ShÐÝÐ background – 
joined the AMAL. However, there was need for much more and, above all, for a 
specific and supportive ideology that makes the community responsive to the 
radicalisation and the escalating violence. It was in this context that FaÃlallÁh 
formulated his ideas on the necessity and legitimacy of involving force in political 
action. FaÃlallÁh’s primary concern was to create an intra-ShÐÝÐ consensus on the use of 
force. The community was scattered, devastated and left to its own resources. 
FaÃlallÁh’s task was to mobilise all the spiritual, social and political resources that were 
available to the ShÐÝa. Supported by a combination of tradition and action, he formulated 
a flexible theory that provided guidelines to a framework for ideology-formation as well 
as for finding solutions to the burning issues of the day.  
 First and foremost, FaÃlallÁh’s theory offered justification for the use of force. It 
aimed to persuade the ShÐÝa belonging to the broadest possible social, intellectual and 
political spectrum and standing. It was designed to be convincing for the religious and 
competitive for the leftists who attracted the ShÐÝÐ youth. It helped the community define 
its “friends and foes”, enabled them to form strategic alliances based on common values 
and in particular, on their common enemies. This theory was born amidst chaos; 
accordingly it distilled principles and set directives for quick and spontaneous action 
rather than offering a scrupulous, detailed long-term road map. Certainly, FaÃlallÁh 
shared the opinion of al-Ñadr on ShÐÝism as a theology of liberation and the necessity of 
organisation and self-empowerment of the ShÐÝÐ community. 
 Nevertheless, with the escalation of violence their views on tactical action and on 
the nature of the ShÐÝÐ response diverged. FaÃlallÁh embraced the need for a 
comprehensive theory, which is transformable into tangible power in a situation of war. 
He set out to explain how the intangible potential could be converted into tangible force. 
FaÃlallÁh re-conceptualised force and claimed that standing up to injustice with the use 
of force if necessary, is the essence of Islam. He endorsed a pan-Islamic tone, giving the 
ShÐÝÐ movement the shape of an Islamic movement, thus appealing to Sunnites and 
Palestinians in Lebanon. He avoided references to class struggle and evoked social 
solidarity of believers, thus diluting all classes. FaÃlallÁh addressed the umma, the 
community of Islam, also beyond the borders of Lebanon. 
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  4.2  ShÐÝism as a power of change: FaÃlallÁh and KhumaynÐ  
 
 For any ShÐÝÐ political project to succeed, it must deal with a long tradition of 
quietism. Above all, the nature of waiting for the return of the MahdÐ (intiÛÁr), the 
necessity of the presence of an infallible leader (ÝiÒma), and dissimulation (taqiyya) 
considerably challenged modern ShÐÝÐ thinkers. In his monumental study, Commanding 
Right and Forbidding Wrong, Michael Cook showed how KhumaynÐ was a turning 
point in modern ShÐÝism as he transformed its doctrine from quietism to a power of 
revolution.
705
 Reinterpreting these ShÐÝÐ beliefs would also have to deal with a corpus of 
traditions that support quietism. Thus, ShÐÝÐ revolutionaries instigated a new political 
theology of action that swept away centuries of immobility. 
 However, unlike Iran, in Lebanon, the ShÐÝÐ movement is relatively recent and 
quietism was strongly rooted among the ShÐÝa, especially among religious scholars. In 
this context, FaÃlallÁh undermines quietism in two ways. On the one hand, by unveiling 
its political agenda, stating that behind quietism there is a political will that aims to 
silence dissident voices and prevent organised action.
706
 Moreover, he considers 
quietism as corrupted ShÐÝism based on falsified ÎadÐth that serves “political agendas 
and the confessional trends”.707 On the other hand, he has recourse to hermeneutics, 
claiming that quietist ShÐÝÐ traditions are valid only in specific cases (khÁÒÒ), while the 
general rule (ÝÁmm) supports activism.708  
 Thus, FaÃlallÁh deconstructs the legitimacy of quietism as negative ideology and 
defines it as a state of exception. He perceives an alliance between quietist ShÐÝism and 
the dominating political systems. As he puts it, quietist ShÐÝism purposefully simplified 
the ImÁms’ attitude towards political activism and made their temporary abstaining 
from public action a general rule in order “to suit their own personal, political and 
confessional interests. These fabricators added all that could restrict people’s actions, 
dissuade them from rebelling or criticising.”709 Here, FaÃlallÁh uses a Marxist argument 
against quietist ShÐÝism calling it a social ideology that justifies exploitation of the 
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masses. Furthermore, FaÃlallÁh, as a jurist, deals with quietism as a manifestation of 
forged and unlawful ShÐÝism. 
 Arguably, the political role of the ImÁms in the post-KarbalÁ’ era is a major 
milestone in the quietist justification of accommodating the political order. FaÃlallÁh 
revisits this aspect, differentiating between two attitudes of the ImÁms with regard to 
action. These two attitudes varied according to the circumstances and followed 
meticulous consideration of the chances of victory or defeat. He asserts that 
 
[T]he ImÁms supported some of the movements that rebelled against corrupt rule 
and they sympathized with their leaders. The ImÁms believed in the great cause and 
the motives behind those movements, in so far as they were convinced that their 
leadership adhered to righteousness and to the true Islamic rule. These rebellions 
were not organised for personal gains, but sought to destroy oppression and wrong, 
in order to establish justice and righteousness.
710
 
 
 FaÃlallÁh – as mentioned above in relation to his concept of realism – claims that 
the ImÁms sometimes supported, while in other cases opposed action by taking the 
“greater Islamic interests”711 into consideration. He puts great emphasis on the 
deliberate considerations that preceded any decision taken by the ImÁms and the 
Prophet. He attributes their occasional refraining from action to their pre-knowledge 
that it would not fulfil the conditions of righteousness and, therefore, would lead to 
failure. For him, the competence and the purity of the goals of the movement were the 
obligatory preliminary of any activism that may imply the use of force.
 
FaÃlallÁh 
warned against selfish and reckless adventures. It is on these bases that he differentiates 
between a righteous and a corrupt revolution (thawra mustaqÐma vs. thawra 
munÎarifa).712  
 Closely connected to the issue of the political role of the ImÁms, is the ShÐÝÐ belief 
in infallibility (ÝiÒma) of the ImÁm, which imbues every political action, he takes. Since 
for the time being, no infallible ImÁm leads the community, quietist ShÐÝa exclude 
political action. FaÃlallÁh demystifies the political action of the ImÁm as stemming from 
ordinary planning rather than from their infallibility: 
 
                                                             
710 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 272. 
711 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 278. 
712 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 272. 
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The revolutions of ImÁm ÝAlÐ and ImÁm al-Íusayn were not the outcome of some 
unique directives or some hazy thinking, they were rather the result of ordinary 
circumstances; resulting from decisions (...) regarding the situations that make the 
battle an inescapable choice, the people who should participate (...), the military 
plans (...), and the legitimate principles that motivate the act.
713
 
 
 FaÃlallÁh criticises quietists for taking fallibility and human imperfection as 
excuses for passivity.
714
 His position could be understood as a criticism of all passive 
political agents, especially Muslims. However, understood in the Lebanse context, one 
could hardly see him encourage other factions to raise weapons. In the same vein, he 
discarded all forms of esoteric thought that delegates perfection and truth to the domain 
of transcendence. Dedicated human action guarantees the power to uproot corruption, a 
state of mind to which every believer should aspire. 
 Besides, FaÃlallÁh distinguishes between ShÐÝÐ political order and ShÐÝÐ 
messianism. Struggling to triumph over evil should not be related to the return of the 
MahdÐ. He opposes those who hold Mahdism to be a central position in practical 
religiosity with two arguments. First, intiÛÁr carries the danger that the social aspect of 
religion will be neglected. Second, there has always been a need for state and order, and 
once these aspirations are marginalised, jurisprudence becomes meaningless.
715
 
 Another notion FaÃlallÁh reconsidered critically is taqiyya. He deals with it “as 
one of the most fundamental elements that affect the practical pattern of behaviour, in 
relation to the corrupt government”.716 FaÃlallÁh maintains that quietist ShÐÝism 
misinterpreted the notion of taqiyya endorsing unnecessary compromise with deviation 
and paralysed resistance. In this sense, taqiyya hinders the fulfilment of the obligation 
of forbidding wrong. He perceives it as excused and permitted only in exceptional 
cases, when disclosing identity would endanger action.  
 In his interpretation of taqiyya, FaÃlallÁh displays similarities with KhumaynÐ who 
considered it as a temporary exception applied exclusively to protect religious goals 
rather than securing the life and status of the believers.
717
 Beyond taqiyya, the two 
                                                             
713 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 270. 
714 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 55-56. 
715 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 263. 
716 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 271. 
717 See, for example, his statement that “our Imams were sometimes subject to conditions that prevented 
them from pronouncing a true ordinance; they were exposed to tyrannical and oppressive rulers who 
imposed taqiyya and fear upon them. Naturally, their fear was for religion not themselves, and if they had 
not observed taqiyya in certain circumstances, oppressive rulers would have entirely rooted out true 
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jurists share many similarities although they expressed their ideas in different 
frameworks and rhetoric. For one, KhumaynÐ explained intiÛÁr as a phase of active 
preparation in which fighting can hasten the arrival of the MahdÐ.
718
 As it has been 
shown, FaÃlallÁh eliminates mystic interpretations and derives the legitimacy of action 
from the practical necessity of establishing an Islamic order.
719
 In the same vein, neither 
the MahdÐ nor infallibility count as factors of victory in FaÃlallÁh’s thought. In the 
Iranian revolutionary rhetoric, the eschatological notion of the MahdÐ was used, together 
with the concept of ÒÁÎib al-zamÁn, as mystically present and providing guidance to the 
revolution. Also, KhumaynÐ, in a few instances, was referred to as the nÁ’ib of the 
Hidden ImÁm.
720
  
 Although both thinkers explained al-Íusayn’s sacrifice as a rational endeavour, 
KhumaynÐ referred to his plan as a continuation of al-Íusayn’s legacy, while FaÃlallÁh 
did not go that far. Rather, he explained it as being rooted in, and legitimised by the 
same principles endorsed by al-Íusayn, that is, justice and legitimacy. KhumaynÐ as 
well as FaÃlallÁh praised ÝAlÐ as a warrior and a statesman.
721
 For KhumaynÐ, the 
launching and maintenance of Islamic political power for Islamic goals – including the 
reform of the religious institutions – had to be followed by the establishment of the 
Islamic state. Therefore, political revolution that aims to sweep away tyranny is 
unavoidable. This project implies the enforcement of the sharÐÝa, the unification of 
Islamic umma, and finally, liberating the oppressed of the world as a religious duty of 
all Muslims.  
 In this project, KhumaynÐ invested the scholars with special responsibility. For 
him, as for QuÔb, the Islamic state was a precondition for realising the Islamic goals. 
The final aim behind activism was the foundation of an Islamic state, which in a 
downward process enforces the principles and goals of Islam. He wanted a strong ShÐÝÐ 
state that can equal SunnÐ powers and fulfil a universal mission of political liberation. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
religion.” KhumaynÐ, Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist, chap. on “The Form of Islamic 
Government,” in Islam and Revolution, 72. 
718 Saskia Gieling, Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), 121, 125. Also 
see, for example, KhumaynÐ’s declaration that: “We cannot accept Saddam and wait until the earth is 
filled with injustice and the Mahdi appears. We must act in accordance with Islam and the Qur’an and 
fulfil the obligation of al-amr bi’l-maÝrÙf wa’l-nahy Ýan al-munkar. We must pave the way for the 
appearance of the Lord of the Age’”. IÔÔilÁ‘Át, 15/1/67, cited by Gieling, 53. 
719 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 262-4. 
720 Gieling, Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran, 125. 
721 Gieling, Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran, 108-9. 
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view of this, KhumaynÐ’s project appears as a somewhat elitist enterprise with special 
roles assigned to the representatives of the religious establishment. 
 FaÃlallÁh, as mentioned before, did not consider the Islamic state as a 
precondition for the success of the Islamic project. However, he agreed that renouncing 
the idea of establishing an Islamic state means the nullification of the sharÐÝa.722 Still, he 
does not dedicate detailed attention to the legitimacy of the state in the period of 
occultation neither does he provide, in this book, a detailed plan for takeover. This can 
be explained by the fact that in Lebanon in the 1970s, the establishment of an Islamic 
state was absolutely out of question, and his main concern was to mobilise the biggest 
number of ShÐÝa from the widest possible political background.  
 Before outlining a project of state building, FaÃlallÁh had to create a unified mass 
of devoted activists. While KhumaynÐ was concerned with the details of Islamic 
governance, FaÃlallÁh’s emphasis is on the transformative power inherent in religion. 
He is specific about two goals: the Islamisation of governance and that of the society.
723
 
In al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, he expounds the two projects as inseparable. 
However, with respect to the social political reality, he gave precedence to the second 
one, which is to prepare the ground for change at the institutional level.  
 Both KhumaynÐ and FaÃlallÁh considered opposition to tyranny as part of 
“commanding right and forbidding wrong”.724 As Saskia Gieling points out, according 
to KhumaynÐ, it was a legal obligation to rise against Ûulm (injustice) and jawr 
(transgression). In this, he refers to a tradition of ÝAlÐ, according to whom “commanding 
right and forbidding wrong” is a branch of jihÁd.725 However, KhumaynÐ did not use this 
obligation as an ultimate justification to activism. Rather – with a mystic undertone – he 
emphasised it as part of the universal combat of truth, Îaqq against falsehood, bÁÔil, an 
Islamic notion particularly stressed in ShÐÝism.   
                                                             
722 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 263. 
723 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 265. 
724 For example, KhumaynÐ states that “The expression of opposition by religious scholars is a form of 
“forbidding the evil” on the part of the religious leadership, which creates in its wake a wave of broad 
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Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist, chap. on “The Form of Islamic Government,” in Islam 
and Revolution, 114-115.  
725 Gieling, Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran, 53. 
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 FaÃlallÁh was a pragmatic activist and preferred a down-to-earth approach to 
revolution. In his words 
 
The wars of the Prophet were also subject to the natural conditions of war 
including consultation, planning, and application and met with different results, 
varying between victory and defeat.
726
 
 
 This approach demystifies divine intervention and makes it contingent on 
thoughtful action. The fact that FaÃlallÁh defines consultation, planning, and application 
as constituents of “natural conditions,” leads us to the so-called efficacy condition in 
ShÐÝÐ jurisprudence. The notion of efficacy – ability and preparedness for action – in 
activist ShÐÝism is linked to the importance of being organised, and became primarily a 
matter of “social engineering” and power.727 
 Efficacy in FaÃlallÁh’s understanding is primarily the conviction that Islamic 
revolutions must be based on and stick to a rational plan, and must be devoid of 
personal interests and ambitions.
728
 That said, complying with the obligation of al-amr 
wa’l-nahy presupposes individual preparation as well as social organisation. Besides, he 
warns against acts that may lead to foreign powers taking advantage of internal disputes, 
insisting that activists “must assure that there is adequate protection against opposing 
reactions that might put the country under the control of non-believers”.729  
 Put in context, FaÃlallÁh aimed at a political project that changes the reality of the 
ShÐÝa in Lebanon but is cautious enough to master the calculations of the political 
games, national or international, which limit ShÐÝÐ aspirations. ÍizbullÁh might be 
considered to be the embodiment of this ShÐÝÐ political project in the sense that it 
accepted to accommodate itself to the Lebanese system and act as a political party from 
the 1990s.
730
  
 The role that ShÐÝÐ mysticism played for KhumaynÐ was given to the more tangible 
and intrasectarian concept of al-amr wa-l’nahy by FaÃlallÁh. KhumaynÐ had to represent 
himself as a charismatic leader in a society where the majority of the population was 
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ShÐÝÐ and supported revolution, while FaÃlallÁh had to offer a point of reference that 
convinces the quietists and unifies Muslims facing the danger of losing any influence 
over Lebanese politics. Both leaders aspired to power for the ShÐÝa, but as already noted 
in Chapter 5.4 they considered different aspects of the ShÐÝÐ creed as resources of self-
empowerment. 
 
 
 5.  FaÃlallÁh’s ShÐÝÐ discourse 
 
 When FaÃlallÁh reinterprets ShÐÝism as a movement of change, he consciously 
adheres to the common SunnÐ activist concepts, however, he substantiates them with 
predominantly ShÐÝÐ references.
731
 By this, he presents ShÐÝism as a system of thought 
that carries a flexible but purist interpretation of Islam. Regarding the ShÐÝÐ elements of 
FaÃlallÁh’s discourse, Baroudi claims that FaÃlallÁh’s primary concern was the 
formation of a united Muslim position against Western (and Soviet) hegemony in the 
region. He also argues that FaÃlallÁh was “far less interested in promoting the ShÐÝÐ 
doctrine” than in creating a universalist Islamist tone.732 Baroudi accepts that 
“FaÃlallÁh’s ShÐÝÐ background leaves a distinctive imprint on the style of his discourse 
(…) [however its] substance (…) essentially boils down to that of SunnÐ Islamists”.733 
He adds that FaÃlallÁh’s counter-hegemonic language shares major similarities with 
secular Arab nationalist authors although it differs from the latter due to its 
“morphology within the sacred text (the Qur’an)”.734  
 One probable reason for Baroudi neglecting the importance of ShÐÝism in 
FaÃlallÁh’s thought is that he did not investigate al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa 
thoroughly. Rather, he relied in his sermons and interviews with the press. The wider 
the public FaÃlallÁh addressed was, the more he applied a universalistic Islamist 
rhetoric. A close reading of his sources and ideas, however, shows that FaÃlallÁh’s use 
of ideas and strategies of Arab nationalism and Marxism did not substitute in any way 
                                                             
731 See, for example: “ImÁm ÝAlÐ regarded his battle in ÑiffÐn against MuÝÁwiya (…) as a practical 
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the ShÐÝÐ core of his thought.
735
 Besides, when a ShÐÝÐ thinker uses pan-Islamic rhetoric, 
he identifies Islam in its ShÐÝÐ interpretation. The two are inseparable. Similarly, Islam in 
SunnÐ ideology is the SunnÐ orthodoxy.  
 FaÃlallÁh entertains traditional ShÐÝÐ themes such as commitment to justice, the 
special emphasis on “commanding right and forbidding wrong” and on resistance to 
oppression as religious duty in the focus of his discourse. These notions are not foreign 
to the SunnÐ political expression but nor are they the most emphatic elements of it. In 
view of a supposed coherence of style and content, FaÃlallÁh’s aim could have been not 
only to promote intra-Muslim reconciliation but also, to imbue the modern Islamist 
discourse with ShÐÝÐ elements. Similarly, his agreement with secular nationalists on 
certain issues was articulated in the language of religion with obvious ShÐÝÐ undertone. 
Such discourse proves that modernist Islamism contains the major values – such as 
social transformation, a particular understanding of freedoms, and representation of 
national interests – propagated by the secular nationalists.  
 Besides the Qur’Án, FaÃlallÁh’s references include ShÐÝÐ ÎadÐth collections as well 
as SunnÐ ones, works of fiqh by the representatives of modern ShÐÝÐ scholars such as 
MuÎammad Íusayn KÁshif al-GhiÔÁ’ (d.1954), Íusayn BurÙjirdÐ (d. 1961) as well as 
                                                             
735 After 1976, FaÃlallÁh produced a rich collection of writings on various political issues. His most 
important books on the topic are IrÁdat al-quwwa [The Will to power] (Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 2000) in 
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DÁr al-NahÁr li’l-Nashr, 2003), he examines the scope of use of force in activist Islam, while in al-Íaraka 
al-IslÁmiyya mÁ lahÁ wa mÁ ÝalayhÁ (Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 2004), FaÃlallÁh elaborates on the constant 
and the variable in Islamic political action. In al-IjtihÁd bayna ÝaÒr al-mÁÃÐ wa-ÁfÁq al-mustaqbal 
[Independent legal reasoning between the past and the horizons of the future] (al-DÁr al-BayÃÁ’: al-
Markaz al-ThaqÁfÐ al-ÝArabÐ, 2009), FaÃlallÁh details his views on the realistic political structure of an 
Islamic state.  
Apart from his books, a remarkable collection of political fatwas are available on his official website 
(bayynat.org) on the rules of self-defence, commanding right and forbidding wrong, and his statements 
on various current political issues. This site provides his answers to questions such as the attitude towards 
a democratic system in the absence of conditions for establishing an Islamic state, his views on civil 
society, what makes a governance just and unjust, suicide operations that affect civilians, principles and 
exceptions in politics, participation in the Iraqi elections, the legitimacy of the Iraqi government, attitude 
towards the coalition troops, intellectual extremism, working with foreign investors, terrorist attacks in 
Western capitals, tackling differences in political opinion. These answers are much telling on how 
FaÃlallÁh applied his theory on practical, day to day issues. 
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classical SunnÐ authors like Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), and secondary literature by Muslim 
(ShÐÝÐ) authors and Orientalists.  
 In Chapter 2, entitled “Strength against tyranny”, his major sources are the Qur’Án 
and the Prophetic tradition. Remarkably, he applies an important account of al-Íusayn 
from al-ÓabarÐ’s (d. 923) TÁrÐkh and not from ShÐÝÐ compendiums. In the quoted texts, 
al-Íusayn states that those who do not oppose oppression with words and deeds, will 
face the same eternal condemnation as their oppressors.
736
 However, in the last section 
on “commanding right and forbidding wrong”, he quotes traditions from Nahj al-
balÁgha and WasÁ’il al-ShÐÝa by al-Íurr al-ÝÀmilÐ (d. 1623). 
 In Chapter 5, which deals with numerical strength, FaÃlallÁh supports his 
argument that the minority can be the agent of righteousness by mostly SunnÐ sources. 
In the section (no. 2) in which he stresses the qualitative aspect of numerical strength, 
he frequently draws on Prophetic ÎadÐth.737 Similarly, his argument on the fickleness of 
majority opinion is substantiated by predominantly Qur’Ánic statements. In the part 
entitled “Several small communities defeated big ones” (no. 7),738 he avoids ShÐÝÐ 
references and relies on the Qur’Án and Ibn SaÝd’s (d. 845) account of the Battle of 
Íunayn (no. 9) in the biographical compendium entitled KitÁb al-ÓabaqÁt al-
kubrÁ.739As for the ShÐÝÐ sources, in addition to Nahj al-balÁgha and WasÁ’il al-ShÐÝa, 
FaÃlallÁh quotes MajmaÝ al-bayÁn li-ÝulÙm al-Qur’Án, the most well-known ShÐÝÐ tafsÐr 
from the 12
th
 century by Shaykh ÓabarsÐ (d. 1153) which is based largely on MuÝtazilÐ 
sources. 
 In Chapter 7, where he deals with the relationship between daÝwa and jihÁd, he 
interprets relevant Qur’Ánic statements. In addition, he quotes traditions from Badr al-
DÐn al-ÝAynÐ’s (d. 1451) ÝUmdat al-qÁrÐ fÐ sharÎ ÑaÎÐÎ al-BukhÁrÐ as well as from Ibn 
Íajar al-ÝAsqalÁnÐ’s (d. 1448) FatÎ al-bÁrÐ fÐ sharÎ ÑaÎÐÎ al-BukhÁrÐ740 and WasÁ’il al-
ShÐÝa.741 From among the fiqh compendiums, he refers to Ibn Rushd’s BidÁyat al-
mujtahid wa-nihÁyat al-muqtaÒid, a book on SunnÐ legal schools, as well as the views of 
the renowned ShÐÝÐ scholar KÁshif al-GhiÔÁ’.742 FaÃlallÁh re-interprets these traditions 
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742 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 224. 
  179 
and legal opinions in light of ImÁmi ÎadÐth with special emphasis on harmony between 
political action and the Islamic values and interests.  
 In the section on conversion, FaÃlallÁh quotes Orientalists who held a positive 
view on the Islamic conquests such as Thomas W. Arnold’s The Preaching of Islam: A 
History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith (1896),743 and H. J. Deschamps’ Les 
religions de l'Afrique noire (1954). He refers to a book entitled MuqÁranat al-adyÁn 
(Comparative religions) which contains quotations from western authors on this 
topic.
744
 This serves the apologetic of Islam as a religion of daÝwa. 
 Chapter 8 on change and power contains a section (no. 4) on the unity of religion 
and state. On the political and social nature of Islam, FaÃlallÁh refers to al-Badr al-zÁhir 
fÐ ÒalÁt al-jumÝa wa’l-musÁfir by Íusayn BurÙjirdÐ – the marjaÝ of the ShÐÝa between 
1945 and 1961.
745
 The choice is interesting, since BurÙjirdÐ is known for his apolitical 
approach. This quote, which – rather unusually – supports activism, could be used as a 
powerful argument against BurÙjirdÐ’s quietist followers. In the section on change by 
peaceful or violent means (no. 7), FaÃlallÁh summarises ÀyatullÁh MuÎsin al-ÍakÐm’s 
(d. 1970) opinion.
746
 A statement of JaÝfar al-ÑÁdiq substantiates the section on the 
ImÁms’ support of revolutionary movements (no. 12).747 In the subchapter (no. 17) 
dealing with falsification of ÎadÐth (of which he accuses the quietist ShÐÝa), FaÃlallÁh 
refers to a saying by ÝAlÐ from Nahj al-balÁgha in which he emphasises the unity and 
integrity of the Islamic community as priorities, and the importance of eliminating fears 
of action.
748
 This is meant to support FaÃlallÁh’s argument on two crucial issues: on the 
necessity of strategic cooperation between the ShÐÝa and the Sunna, and on the 
inevitability of activism. 
 Undoubtedly, FaÃlallÁh does not reduce the ShÐÝÐ component of his references. He 
quotes from ÎadÐth and fiqh compilations to make a case for activism. In addition, and 
for apologetic purposes, he relies on a wide range of sources, and his selection is rather 
eclectic. This explains his choice to quote SunnÐ authors as well as relying extensively 
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on Orientalists who held positive views on Islam. This is in sharp contrast with his 
earlier negative remarks on Orientalism,
749
 and most probably intended to leave space 
for an Islamist stance applicable in the Lebanese context. FaÃlallÁh’s ideas on the value 
of the righteous minority and the moral corruption of the majority are substantiated with 
almost exclusively non-ShÐÝÐ sources.
750
 Using such references can be read as part of a 
tactical dialogue with the various denominational groups of the Lebanese society. 
 
 
 6.  Evaluation of FaÃlallÁh’s political theory 
 
 FaÃlallÁh’s assertion that every political decision must be accommodated with 
“the prevailing circumstances”751 leads to a discourse somewhat vague and plastic. If 
“lenience and violence”, refraining from action and activism are equally justifiable tools 
as long as their outcomes are favourable to the community,
752
 then pragmatism is 
limitless and absolute. This undermines the very principle of responsibility FaÃlallÁh 
promotes, and makes his concept similarly adaptable for passivity and activism, radical 
Islamism and multi-confessional liberalism. For example, one could always find an 
excuse or a reason to fight or not to fight occupation and oppression. Put in the ShÐÝÐ 
perspective, one could hardly imagine al-Íusayn’s revolution if he had considered “the 
prevailing circumstances” before taking his decision.  
 FaÃlallÁh does not show the same degree of radicalism as KhumaynÐ. His primary 
followers would be reluctant radical – to use Mohsin Hamid’s term753 – ShÐÝa who are 
sufficiently motivated, for social and political reasons, to revolt, but who take into 
account the compelling Lebanese environment and their lack of preparedness. Thus, 
they are expected to rise into power within the realm of the possible. Probably for this 
reason, FaÃlallÁh remains theoretical. He avoids providing an exact road-map for the 
various aspects of revolution – such as the political party to lead the revolution, the 
priorities to pursue and the tasks to assume – neither does he detail the hierarchy of 
                                                             
749 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 73-79. 
750 See: al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 168-170. 
751 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 265. 
752 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 273. 
753 Mohsin Hamid, The Reluctant Fundamentalist (Orlando: Harvest Books, 2008). 
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Islamic values and goals that provide the basis for the use of force. After all, all these 
details matter only in proportion to the space acquired on the ground. 
 He provides guidelines for a system that embodies Islamic values, but without 
being specific about the structure of the resulting establishment. He gives no details on 
the structures of the Islamic state nor on the selection of the decision-makers. This 
vagueness in terms of means and outcome secures the flexibility of the project and 
leaves it open to a wide range of interpretations. His ideas as set out in 1976 provided a 
valuable theoretical back-up for the Lebanese ShÐÝÐ activists, although, without the 
desperate political situation and the Islamic revolution in Iran, it would have needed 
much more and explicit elaboration to achieve the same effect in transforming the 
Lebanese political landscape. 
 
 
 Concluding remarks 
 
 The key notion of FaÃlallÁh’s political theory is his understanding of change as 
both an attitude and an aim that realises the establishment of a just political system 
based on Islamic values. Change presupposes contextualised discernment regarding the 
means of the process. Since confrontation with the enemies is unavoidable, the notion of 
change embraces jihÁd. Also, value-based transformation cannot go without 
Islamisation. FaÃlallÁh elaborated on the concept of revolution to make it adaptable to 
diverse and antagonistic social and political environments. The combination of absolute 
goals and relative tools and strategies makes his approach fundamentalist, flexible and 
also reluctant at the same time. 
 For FaÃlallÁh, revolution is both internal as well as a social and political process. 
It starts with greater jihÁd and continues with political and social organisation without 
specifying the end-result of the process. Any revolutionary act implies confronting 
internal weakness and dismantling oppressive forces and structures. In al-IslÁm wa-
manÔiq al-quwwa, FaÃlallÁh focused on the attitude and principles that govern the 
transformation and described it as a gradual procedure based on intellectual and 
emotional conviction.  
 As a matter of fact, FaÃlallÁh had to refute the objections of ShÐÝÐ quietism to 
change by force. He reinterpreted the notions of waiting for the return of the MahdÐ 
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(intiÛÁr), the passivity of ImÁms, the necessity of the presence of an infallible leader 
(ÝiÒma), and dissimulation (taqiyya) as exceptions. In his view, the ImÁms and the 
trusted traditions call to responsibility, action and confrontation. In this regard, ÝAlÐ and 
al-Íusayn set the example for activist ShÐÝism.  
 For FaÃlallÁh, revolution is a gradual procedure that presupposes greater jihÁd and 
aims at dismantling oppressive forces and structures. His description of the desired 
outcome, just order is utopian and theoretical. FaÃlallÁh attempted to present Islamic 
values as appealing and beneficial for the entire population, in order to convince them 
that they would all benefit from a state based on such values. As far as international 
relations are concerned, FaÃlallÁh appears to be a “reluctant radical”. He endorses jihÁd 
claiming that, in virtue of Islamic legitimacy, the war must be waged to respond to the 
challenges and to secure the spread of the Message. However, he asserts that Muslims 
should consider peace as the ordinary state of relations with non-Muslims as long as 
peace assures the interests of Muslims.  
 In FaÃlallÁh’s line of thought, there is a conscious interplay between the Islamic 
ideals and reality. On the one hand, he reassures his audience of the supremacy of Islam 
and urges them to act and change the status quo according to the tenets of Islam. 
However, his insistence on considering the “prevailing circumstances” in the 
employment of his Islamist theory provides a unique flexibility to his ideas which is 
well reflected in the transformation of the militia of Hizbullah into a political party 
following the Ta’if accords. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  183 
Chapter VIII: Ethics of power 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
 For FaÃlallÁh, the use of force and aspiration to power must be ethical, that is 
justified according to the tenets of Islam. In al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, he set out to 
define the moral rules that harmonize activism with self control, and promote just war 
but avoid the self-serving cult of power. He attempted to differentiate between the 
legitimate and illegtimate uses of force. Having considered some kinds of force as right 
and others as wrong, his next concern was to define its limits. As a finale to his 
exposition on legitimate power, he sought to state what differentiates power in the 
Islamic sense from the cult of power propagated by Nietzsche.  
 FaÃlallÁh elaborates the ethics of power in two chapters. In Chapter 6, he deals 
with negative and positive force in addition to “just war”. In Chapter 10, he describes 
the ethics of weakness and the ethics of force. FaÃlallÁh distances himself, and the 
Islamic concept of quwwa, from the cult of power as represented in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. He frames his discussion within the divine command ethics in which the 
source of morality is God’s revealed law, MuÎammad’s practice, and the ImÁms’ 
traditions. These sources of morality govern war and peace, violence and leniency. 
However, by the nature of the revelation, divine commands and models can only set the 
principles and not the details of a moral behaviour, leaving room for pragmatic thinking 
about the right action in a given situation. 
 This chapter aims to offer an in-depth analysis of ethical rulings as adapted and 
applied by a prominent and revivalist ShÐÝÐ jurist. First, I will explore FaÃlallÁh’s 
understanding of the justification and the limits of force.
754
 Second, I will compare my 
findings on FaÃlallÁh’s ethics of force to Morgan Clarke’s analysis of FaÃlallÁh’s 
bioethics. Finally, I will interpret FaÃlallÁh’s endeavour within the ShÐÝÐ tradition. Put in 
a wider ShÐÝÐ context, we will gain a fair assessment of the representativeness of his 
                                                             
754 As I indicated in the introduction, the notion of quwwa can be translated, as a rule, as force or power 
interchangeably. In few instances, force entails a degree of materiality and physicality while a spiritual 
being can be said to be powerful (God, for example). Thus, quwwa is power in general and force in 
particular uses (such as using force). For violence, FaÃlallÁh uses the term Ýunf and distinguishes it from 
power as violence per se is evil.  
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ethics of power. The ethical dimension of modern Islamist thought and that of ShÐÝism 
in particular, is usually neglected in Western scholarship.  
 
 
 1.      Positive and negative power 
 
 For FaÃlallÁh, power has to be exercised in the framework of an action plan which 
is based on Islamic moral principles.
755
 These consider power as legitimate as long as it 
serves the divinely revealed goals of Islam. Taking sharÐÝa as the ultimate source of 
ethics seems to be evident for FaÃlallÁh.
756
 At times, he refers to the Qur’Ánic ethics, 
while in other instances he takes the practice of MuÎammad and the ImÁms as a model 
for moral behaviour. In his view, reason is not the source of morality, but a 
complementary tool which allows a moral agent to act according to the Islamic 
principles on particular conditions. He differentiates between two sorts of Islamic 
objectives: those that come into existence as negative power and those that represent 
positive power.
757
 This distinction, however, does not imply outright value judgement as 
they both have a specific function. 
 FaÃlallÁh’s use of the adjective “negative” needs clarification. As we could see in 
his chapter on social power,
758
 negative position is the refusal of an un-Islamic attitude 
or a practice.
759
 It stands for “forbidding wrong” in the social as well as in the personal 
sphere. With regards to power, in FaÃlallÁh’s understanding, “negative power” 
(literally: the negative aspects regarding the major goals of power in Islam)
760
 is the one 
that impedes human beings from belligerence. He asserts that this “power protects itself 
from corruption or deviation”.761 Negative power is a sublime energy which develops in 
the Muslim individual as an element of good rather than of evil, controlling Man’s 
inclinations towards aggression. In the exercise of power, it eliminates arrogance, istiÝlÁ’ 
                                                             
755 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 181. 
756 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 299. 
757 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 181-182. 
758 See Chapter 4 section 22 in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa. 
759 “This means that all Muslims should reject and forbid all social, economic, political or educational 
evils, including deviation or corruption in any form. This is a practical way of eradicating elements of 
corruption and encouraging good works…” See: al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 152-3. 
760 al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 181 
761 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 183. 
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and absolute hegemony.
762
 Here, FaÃlallÁh uses istiÝlÁ’ in a similar sense to that of 
istikbÁr, made famous by KhumaynÐ who applied it to denote mainly the politics of the 
United States. Indirectly, FaÃlallÁh criticises powers that use force to impose their 
interests on other peoples even by bringing about destruction. FaÃlallÁh, like KhumaynÐ, 
considered the “Third World” in general and the Middle East in particular as grounds 
exploited by the great powers for their own benefits. 
 Negative power appears in four elements. First, belief in God leads human beings 
to submit to a higher supernatural and absolute power in face of which they realise their 
inferiority. As such, faith dissuades human beings from hostility.
763
 Second, Islamic 
power rejects all forms of ostentation. Thus, the Qur’Án mocks those who act with 
arrogance, vanity and overconfidence.
764
 Another element of negative power lies in 
purifying the soul from the inclination to destroy others as a means to ease one’s 
inferiority complex.
765
 Finally, the Qur’Án rejects tyranny which leads human beings to 
divide, colonise and exploit others.
766
 Therefore, we can state that for FaÃlallÁh 
“negative power” is that which restrains the individual from going beyond the justified 
power. It is good and legitimate.  
 Below, I shall define positive power. It suffices, here, to note that “negative” 
power – even if at first glance the reader might think that it is a vice – prepares the stage 
for “positive” power. “Negative” power purifies the soul, at an internal level, whereas 
“positive” power projects action at the external level. However, unless one is thinking 
from the vantage point of ÑÙfism or ShÐÝism (in which the apparent/latent ÛÁhir / bÁÔin 
category is an essential tool of thought), the presence of negative power does not imply 
necessarily the presence of positive power. 
 In his elaboration on negative power, FaÃlallÁh is preoccupied with convincing 
the quietist ShÐÝa who considered power and the use of force in any form as immoral 
and illegitimate in the absence of the ImÁm, or had fears from retaliations by the SunnÐ 
majority. Finally, power is immoral because it entails violence at some point. To 
reassure the quietist ShÐÝa, FaÃlallÁh introduces “negative power” to denote the capacity 
to control violence and aggression. Thus, the believer whose motivation in the use of 
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force is not harming others can never be inhumane or oppressive, but stays in control of 
his animalistic instincts. 
 If “negative power”, which should be understood as passive power, makes human 
beings immune to ideas and practices that Islam rejects, positive power is what Islam 
aims to realise and embody.
767
 Thus, positive power is active. FaÃlallÁh considers 
positive power as the struggle in the way of God.
768
 Since power is the gift of God, it 
should be used only in the way of God. FaÃlallÁh’s Manichaeism is nowhere more 
evident than in this section. While any act by the enemies of Islam is necessarily evil, 
believers incarnate “positive power” which is in motion towards the implementation of 
Islamic law.
769
 In other words, positive power is physical jihÁd while negative power is 
spiritual jihÁd. 
 FaÃlallÁh divides positive power into five elements. The first one, faith, as 
elaborated in the chapter on the theology of power, sets the basis for practical power. 
The second element is the protection of religion from persecution. The third element is 
assisting the persecuted against unjust powers of colonisation, exploitation and 
aggression. The fourth one is abating disbelief so that Islam could spread its message. 
The fifth element is self-defence and countering the aggression against Muslim peoples 
and lands.
770
 
 In this distinction between “negative” and “positive power”, FaÃlallÁh aims to 
reassure his readers that his call to power is free from antagonism. In the introduction, 
he asserts that the poor and the oppressed must “look for new types of strength that they 
could use to defend themselves”.771 FaÃlallÁh makes clear that resorting to force can be 
inevitable but it can never be detached from the Islamic principles.
772
 He acknowledges 
that human nature enjoys power because it satisfies its desire for assertion and glory. In 
history, movements and states such as Fascism push this tendency towards absolute 
power and self-serving violence. But Islam, which is rooted in and implements the 
divine will, sets clear moral guidelines that define such behaviour as indictable 
deviation. Moreover, FaÃlallÁh asserts in an apologetic tone, that the internalised rules 
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of Islam free human beings from the desire for self-serving violence.
773
 As a Muslim 
theologian, FaÃlallÁh believes that just war can only be such if sanctioned by Islam. 
There cannot be another just war, let us say for the sake of argument, declared by the 
Americans. For, as he thinks, Islam is the only true religion while other religions are 
false or deviated.  
 FaÃlallÁh’s distinction is detailed; it provides theoretical guidelines for major 
issues relating to power such as its purpose, means and limits, and the individual’s 
approach to human potentials. Negative and positive powers in FaÃlallÁh’s description 
complement each other and seem, at times, to be a re-wording of his ideas on 
“commanding right and forbidding wrong”. His core idea is that Islamic moral 
principles guide any thought and action which, in turn, are to implement these very 
principles. This technique makes FaÃlallÁh’s argument circular with a considerable 
degree of tautology.  
 The section on positive power repeats some observations already stated in relation 
to social power and the necessity to resist tyranny. While positive power is related to 
unity, solidarity and righteous action; negative aspects of power seem to resonate with 
the explication of spiritual power where he wrote extensively on the value of self-
restraint. Moreover, the abundant Qur’Ánic quotations about the awaiting punishment 
that can even take the form of natural disasters, provide an eschatological perspective 
that emphasises the inevitability of the failure of oppressive practices. This reasoning 
gives the impression of a somewhat utopian idealism. A factual juxtaposition would 
rather require a detailed analysis on the abuse of power, and the dangers inherent in the 
misinterpretation of the Islamic message. However, FaÃlallÁh does not elaborate on 
these problems. 
  
 
 2.      Characters of weakness vs. characters of power 
 
 FaÃlallÁh’s ideas on the morality of strength and weakness (Chapter 10) are rooted 
in his differentiation between “positive” and “negative” powers as presented in his 
chapter on the moral dimension of power (Chapter 6). In both cases, FaÃlallÁh 
                                                             
773 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 182. 
  188 
repeatedly distinguishes power – which is right in both its negative and positive forms – 
from self-serving violence which is wrong whoever commits it. He makes a similar 
distinction between peaceful attitude and weakness. Force, in the Islamic sense, is never 
a goal in itself, but rather a tool to implement justice.  
 FaÃlallÁh rejects violence whose aim is destruction and lacks the “negative 
power” of self-restraint. In contrast to what quietists might think, fighting the other is 
never Islamic without fighting one’s own self, and as such, it does not equal aggression. 
He aims to convince the quietist ShÐÝa that the conventional understanding of these 
concepts is simplistic and raises a major obstacle to the protection and implementation 
of the Islamic message. Thus, FaÃlallÁh attempts to reconstruct the meaning of strength 
and weakness by applying the criteria of “negative” and “positive” powers. 
 In FaÃlallÁh’s argument, the ImÁms – who carefully decided upon whether to 
adopt a peaceful attitude or resort to force – are the embodiments of strength. They are 
depicted as strong even if they renounce the exercise of “positive power” in order to 
serve supreme values. FaÃlallÁh praises patience which is by no means passivity. He 
quotes JaÝfar al-ÑÁdiq who described it as a major virtue, the manifestation of inner 
freedom.
774
 He also cites Zayn al-ÝÀbidÐn’s supplication for forgiveness and self-
restraint in al-ÑaÎÐfa al-SajjÁdiyya.775 FaÃlallÁh believes that these traits should be 
understood as signs of a noble sense of power, and delegates them into the realm of 
spiritual force or “negative power” in which manifestations of activism and power are 
inseparable from self-restraint and benevolence. In this sense, FaÃlallÁh reiterates the 
concept that considers jihÁd al-nafs and jihÁd al-ghayr as an inseparable unity.  
 He draws attention to the fact that in the Qur’Án as well as in the Gospels, 
peaceful behaviour, patience, forgiveness, modesty, and tolerance appear as supreme 
values.
776
 On this basis, it might be assumed that God appreciates such attitude more 
than the use of force but also that these characteristics are only expressions of 
weakness.
777
 In response to these assumptions, he argues that withdrawal, non-violent 
protest, and forgiveness can be signs of strength inasmuch as they are part of a strategy 
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or result from self restraint.
778
 In another place, he defines violence as the power of 
justice and non-violence as the power of love that brings Man to God.
779
  
 In light of the redefined meaning of weakness, FaÃlallÁh attempts to evaluate 
force, and the role of violent means (Ýunf). He claims that the use of force appears as 
weakness whenever it serves arrogance, injustice, and oppression. He quotes Zayn al-
ÝÀbidÐn declaring that arrogance manifests the oppressor’s fear of the people.780 For 
FaÃlallÁh, the legitimate use of force must accord with the demands of both “negative” 
and “positive” powers. In other words, it can be applied only to protect values, prevent 
destruction and, therefore, it is a combination of self-control and determined action. 
FaÃlallÁh quotes the passage from the Gospel in which Christ declares that his teachings 
would cause rifts among the people. He claims that both Islam and Christianity foster a 
balanced attitude and acknowledge violence in defence of the revealed truth and justice 
after all peaceful means have been exhausted.
781
 We can assume that, for FaÃlallÁh, 
there is no contradiction between religious principles and using force in defence of 
religion.  
 The criteria of differentiation between the deep meaning of weakness and strength 
supports the main thesis of the book. The aim of the argument is to prove that peace can 
never be realised in an unjust framework. Therefore, passive suffering denies the 
Islamic Message the power that creates and assures justice. Through this interpretation, 
FaÃlallÁh wants to convince the quietist ShÐÝa that the ShÐÝÐ tradition which is committed 
to justice and peace has in fact always promoted power – and the means to acquire it – 
too. Moreover it considered them as the essence of religion. To support his argument, 
FaÃlallÁh quotes JaÝfar al-ÑÁdiq stressing the duty to protect the oppressed.
782
 
  FaÃlallÁh’s exposition is repetitive. Much of what he says has already been 
stated in earlier chapters on spiritual strength and jihÁd. Probably, his aim is to 
reconnect the various topics into a coherent unity thus providing guidance for practical 
decision-making. It might also help him convince his audience and reassure them that 
all aspects of power he calls to are governed by Islamic ethics.  
                                                             
778 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 301.  
779 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 308. 
780 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 310. 
781 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 308. 
782 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 184. 
  190 
 The numerous references to Christian teachings provide his argument with a 
universal shape, allowing him to broaden the scope of his ethics of power. Besides his 
probable goal of preventing the further alienation of Lebanese Christians, in this case, 
arguments from outside the Islamic tradition serve to illustrate that religion as such does 
not exclude the use of force. Moreover, every religion approves violent means once its 
values and believers are endangered. So, there is nothing particularly ShÐÝÐ or Islamic 
about it. FaÃlallÁh’s choice exemplifies well the hybrid nature of modern ShÐÝÐ thought. 
He borrows from various – SunnÐ, Christian, Marxist – sources, then blends and 
harmonises them with the KarbalÁ’ narrative in order to promote the actual political 
goals of the day, skilfully and cautiously.  
 
 
 3.        Just war 
 
 FaÃlallÁh tackles the issue of jihÁd in his sixth chapter on ethics of power.783 Here, 
he focuses on the purpose of the fight and evaluates violence on the basis of its relation 
to Islamic ethics. The hardest thing to justify for a ShÐÝÐ thinker or jurist is jihÁd. Besides 
the dilemma posed by the lack of infallible leadership – as I detailed in sections 7.1.2, 
7.1.4, 7.4.2 – the believer might be perplexed by the definition of Islam as a religion of 
peace and the promotions of violent means such as jihÁd.  
 In the introduction of the chapter, FaÃlallÁh specifies a twofold perspective for his 
analysis. 
 
The first is the relation between the general goals of the use of force in Islam and 
the religious foundation of morality. The second is the practical implication of the 
general idea based on the Prophet’s legislative practice in situations of wars as a 
legislative basis for its implementation in Islam.
784
 
 
 
 As it appears from the quote, the major issues for FaÃlallÁh to accommodate are: 
conciliating religious morality and the use of force, and its realisation in legislative 
practice. The passage thus summarizes the main elements of FaÃlallÁh’s ethics of 
power. He asserts that the use of force must be related to the Islamic principles and, 
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therefore, it is inseparable from religious morality. The decisions and attitudes of the 
Prophet embody these supreme, transcendental goals and as such provide the legal 
directives to the contemporary ethics of practical warfare.  
 Corresponding to the criteria of Just War Theory, FaÃlallÁh treats the subject from 
two perspectives, namely the cause of the fight and the conduct of warfare. For both, the 
standards are set by the Prophet and the ImÁms. War is never an aim in itself; it must 
take place “in the path of God… in order to maintain life with its values”.785 Based on 
the Qur’Án and the Tradition, jihÁd is permissible for two reasons: preventing greater 
destruction and defending the lives, the values, and the properties of Muslims. In more 
details, it serves to defend the dignity of human being, to confront oppression, to protect 
the oppressed, and to secure the implementation of the Islamic message. Once the 
conditions are fulfilled, resort to arms becomes a necessity imposed by the 
circumstances.
786
 Furthermore, he claims that the sacred nature of jihÁd requires a purity 
of motivation which is free of hatred and destruction.
787
 
 Jus ad bellum – the legitimised resort to war – is, therefore, exclusively dependent 
on whether the actual fight is deemed permitted in the Islamic law. This necessitates a 
three-fold consideration: the legitimacy of the cause, that of the authority who declares 
the war, and the just intention of the fighters. In FaÃlallÁh’s thought, “just cause” refers 
to the purpose of the act which is to halt an unlawful practice. In this system, any act is 
nothing but a mere means in achieving divinely set goals. Consequently, its value is 
determined by its purpose. This makes FaÃlallÁh’s divine command ethics purposeful, 
and places his Machiavellian concept in a frame controlled by religious law. Indeed, the 
end justifies the means, but the end there is God’s law, which, for a Muslim jurist 
brings, by definition, universal good to humanity. It sets the rules of war in the 
scriptures and the jurists take the charge of adapting them. This legal reasoning is 
typical of just war theologians and ideologues. 
 As for the eligibility of the authority, FaÃlallÁh seemingly skips the problem since 
defensive or preventive war does not equal “fight for the sake of the call”.788 In the 
former cases, therefore, any learned man “who possesses the competence of science, 
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religion, and governance”789 can lead the community. The emphasis is again on the 
circumstances: it is the specific causes that necessitated and legitimised the wars led by 
the Prophet and the ImÁms not the exceptional capacities of the leader. The same cause 
can legitimise contemporary warfare as well. In acts that may imply killing, FaÃlallÁh 
endorses the opinion that the imÁm’s permission is needed to avoid chaos resulting from 
individual actions.
790
 However, the term “imÁm” here denotes leader in the SunnÐ 
understanding of the notion rather than its ShÐÝÐ one. 
 While the problematic of the authority appears only as third in importance, 
intention precedes it as second since it is inherently related to the purity of cause and 
purpose. This criterion serves to exclude utilitarian tendencies and to secure the primacy 
of religious principles. FaÃlallÁh denounces individual ambitions and emotional 
reactions such as revenge. The promotion of Islamic principles is the ultimate objective. 
Whether by peace or war, does not matter to FaÃlallÁh. It is only in the Islamic 
framework that both can be right. The Islamic principles, by essence, are in harmony 
with the interests of the Islamic community and lead to the implementation of Pax 
Islamica. 
 An additional question emerges here. Does power serve truth or peace? FaÃlallÁh 
repeatedly states that peace is the priority for Islam,
791
 while the resort to violence is an 
exception. This might contradict the main idea of his theory of power, namely that 
power is ubiquitous. A closer look at his argument shows that peace in Islam is a 
desideratum, indicating its final victory. That is to say, what seems to be two opposing 
orders: nature (power pervades human existence) and norm (Islam shall bring in peace) 
are in fact the two faces of the same reality in FaÃlallÁh’s system, and indeed in the 
perspectives of most Muslim thinkers today. The variable that links the two is God. That 
is why God, the source of power and the guarantee of Islam’s victory and peace, is 
important in FaÃlallÁh’s system. He created nature as power, but chose Islam to bring it 
to peace. When a peaceful attitude appears as a sign of weakness and submission, Islam 
“prefers confrontation”.792  
 Furthermore, the juxtaposition of peace and truth is attested in Islamic milieus, 
especially in the ShÐÝÐ tradition. Sunnites had, in the majority areas of the Muslim world, 
                                                             
789 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 263. 
790 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 265. 
791 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 210, 265, 283, 299. 
792 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 204. 
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power while ShÐÝÐs claimed to possess truth. In fact, FaÃlallÁh starts from the following 
dilemma. There are two things: the logic of power (mere power) and the power of logic 
(that corresponds to the revealed truth). To remove the opposition between the two, 
FaÃlallÁh claims that Islam is not only truth, but also the power that implements it. It is 
then better than the logic of power because it puts this logic in the service of truth. 
Peace as such is not a value in itself for FaÃlallÁh. Islamic principles equal peace in all 
Islamic-based systems of thought. The Islamic solution, so to speak, is a Pax Islamica. 
In this line of thought truth, Islam, power, and peace are all but faces of the same divine 
order. 
 Last resort in this context means that when the local and global political order 
leaves no space and chance for other than armed fight, justice must uproot injustice out 
of existential necessity. For FaÃlallÁh, conforming to the religious criteria deprives 
violence of its negative connotation and transforms it into a tool of sacred goals. This 
understanding distinguishes primary values compared to which the rest of the principles 
appear as secondary. On the one hand, compliance with the primary principles, 
therefore, excludes the arbitrary or unjust use of force. On the other hand, justice, order, 
sovereignty appear as supreme values that are worthy of the utmost sacrifice. 
 FaÃlallÁh places equal emphasis on the requirements of jus in bello – the right 
conduct of war – as on jus ad bellum (conditions that legitimate the declaration of war), 
claiming that “Everything in wartime should be subjected to the laws of what is allowed 
and what is prohibited (…).”793 He states that the use of force must be proportionate to 
the danger and the importance of the objective.
794
 FaÃlallÁh’s assertion, that human 
losses and the costs of fight must be minimised,
795
 implies that self-serving destruction 
and vandalism are not legitimate means of deterrence or retaliation. In this, he refers to 
the warnings of the Prophet and ImÁm ÝAlÐ against encroachments in warfare from 
WasÁ’il al-ShÐÝa.796 He calls for a careful consideration of the benefits and 
disadvantages of the struggle. He asserts that “the morality of war is based on the 
principle of importance as set by the Islamic legislation that contrasts the expected gains 
with the [predicted] losses”.797 Applying classical fiqh reasoning, he arrives at the 
                                                             
793 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 212. 
794 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 206. 
795 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 210. 
796 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 209. 
797 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 212. 
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conclusion that if the benefit of an action is less than the harm caused, it is as if there 
was no benefit but if there is less harm than benefit in it, it is as if there was no harm.
798
 
 Furthermore, FaÃlallÁh states that both violence and peace can be exercised and 
legitimised in view of the challenge the Muslim community faces.
799
 Consequently, the 
notion of transgression is evaluated in light of the Islamic principles and the actual 
situation on the ground. For FaÃlallÁh, then, it is a matter of finding the appropriate and 
proportionate means and degrees of action rather than elaborating on what is permitted 
and non-permitted in a combat situation.  
 In 1976, when he wrote al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, “martyrdom operations” 
had not yet started. The problem of suicide and discrimination between legitimate and 
illegitimate targets arose in the 1980s, and FaÃlallÁh treated the issue in several 
writings.
800
 He claims that “Man is ordered by God to use his strength and means wisely 
against evil”.801 Elsewhere, he asserts that “the oppressed are not accountable for the 
harm caused during the course of a battle”.802 These statements imply that the believer 
is responsible for resorting to action against injustice and for conducting war in 
harmony with the Islamic principles. However, he / she bears no responsibility for the 
destruction that results from armed fight. 
 In his article “The Unholy Uses of the Apocalyptic Imagination: Twentieth 
Century Patterns”, Scott Appleby provides an analysis of FaÃlallÁh’s jihÁdi thought. In 
this, he states that violence for Islamic fundamentalists is inherently linked to 
“apocalyptic imagination”. His other assertion is that FaÃlallÁh “sought to construe the 
violence as a moral and spiritual obligation within a religiously imagined world”.803 
Finally, Appleby claims that for FaÃlallÁh all the laws became subordinated to “the 
requirements of survival”.804  
 My observation is that although in FaÃlallÁh’s thought religion is the matrix 
within which every worldly concept and phenomenon gains a specific transcendental 
                                                             
798 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 213. 
799 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 205. 
800 He believes that any military act by a soldier is legitimate if the battle is legitimate. See e.g. 
FaÃlallÁh’s al-AkhlÁqiyyÁt al-Ôibbiyya wa-akhlÁqiyyÁt al-ÎayÁt (Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 2002), 42-43.  
801 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 198. 
802 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 62. 
803 See his article:  “The Unholy Uses of the Apocalyptic Imagination,” in Apocalypse and Violence, eds. 
Abbas Amanat and John J. Collins (New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 2004), 
69-87. 
804 Appleby, “The Unholy Uses of the Apocalyptic Imagination,” 2. 
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meaning, it does not evolve around apocalyptic notions. As we might notice from his 
shelving of MahdÐsm, for FaÃlallÁh jihÁd is a social-political act with concrete and 
tangible aims. On the one side, his approach substantiates the political aim of 
challenging the foreign and domestic agents of political and economic oppression with 
religious arguments. Thus, FaÃlallÁh lays the ground for a ShÐÝÐ just war in Lebanon by 
extending its scope as a new chapter in the universal struggle of the oppressed against 
injustice. On the other side, complying with religious law, at every instance, is a 
prerequisite for the legitimate use of force.  
 FaÃlallÁh’s position on the Islamic practice of war is evidently apologetic. He 
claims that Islamic battles, including the Prophet’s wars, evolved within the confines of 
defence or prevention, and served to liberate people.
805
 To support this statement, he 
refers to the contemporary Syrian SunnÐ jurist Wahba al-ZuÎaylÐ’s, ÀthÁr al-Îarb fi’l-
fiqh al-islÁmÐ in which he claims that the Prophet’s wars were always preventive or 
defensive.
806
 FaÃlallÁh’s interpretation of Islamic history is also simplistic. He does not 
acknowledge any discrepancy between MuÎammad’s prophetic vocation and his status 
as a warrior. Similarly, he does not detail the deviations that occurred during the 
conquests and denies their military aspects. Furthermore, he asserts that peace proposed 
by the opponent is to be accepted once Muslims achieve their goals.  
 The options FaÃlallÁh offers – such as the enemy embraces Islam, mutual 
agreement is signed, or the opponent accepts financial obligations
807
 – reveal that his 
long-term goal was to establish a universal Islamic order. On the importance of 
summoning the enemy to Islam before fighting he quotes a ÎadÐth from SharÎ al-Siyar 
al-kabÐr by MuÎammad b. AÎmad al-SarakhsÐ (d. 1090),808 and from MuÎammad al-
ShawkÁnÐ’s (d.1834) Nayl al-awÔÁr.809 FaÃlallÁh also recalls ImÁm ÝAlÐ’s postponement 
of fighting to summon the enemy to Islam from Nahj al-balÁgha.810 
                                                             
805 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 208. 
806 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 207. 
807 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 212. 
808 SharÎ al-Siyar al-kabÐr is a commentary on ShaybÁnÐ’s work al-Siyar, a ÍanafÐ legal treatise on war 
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today as international relations). See al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 211. 
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force is not essential for the call. al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 227. 
810 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 211. 
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 For FaÃlallÁh, jihÁd was a natural but controlled response to any situation that 
endangered the implementation of Islam and imperilled its community. Attributing the 
cause of jihÁd to social-political anomalies and exempting the Muslim combatants from 
any responsibility for the destruction caused in the course of self-defence or preventive 
fight, deprived quietism of its legitimacy. The argument was formulated to convince the 
hesitant ShÐÝa that in well-defined circumstances imposed from outside, it is against the 
religious tenets to stay passive, and resorting to arms is a proof of true spirituality. 
 
 
 4.     Against Nietzsche 
 
 FaÃlallÁh closes the last chapter of al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa by 
distinguishing his concept of power from the self-serving cult of power. He needs to do 
so since he relates the supremacy of Islam to an apology for power, bestows human 
strength with religious value, attributes great importance to the state – paraphrasing it as 
the rule of law and order – and openly promotes militarism. In his exposition of each 
element, FaÃlallÁh subordinates human power to divine power. However, in this final 
statement, he attempts to dispel all doubts regarding the cult of power as a totalitarian 
and discriminating project.  
 FaÃlallÁh claims that the project of empowerment proposed by Nietzsche is 
essentially different from his ShÐÝÐ concept of power. Quoting from a handbook entitled 
al-FalsafÁ al-khuluqiyya by TawfÐq al-ÓawÐl, FaÃlallÁh assumes that power in the 
Nietzscheian sense promotes violence per se, and attributes weakness to biological 
factors. FaÃlallÁh argues that Nietzsche redefines morality and deprives it of its sublime 
content. This theory depicts empowerment as self-serving and absolutely confined to the 
realm of the material world. Nietzsche condemns what FaÃlallÁh defined as “negative 
power” and attributes it to the weak “slaves” who constitute the majority of 
humankind.
811
 FaÃlallÁh considers Nietzsche’s argument as Darwinist and racist.812 
 FaÃlallÁh’s description of the slave mentality, however, contains elements 
applicable to the quietist mindset as well.
813
 He quotes a section in which “slaves” are 
                                                             
811 FaÃlallÁh al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 310-311. 
812 FaÃlallÁh al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 212-3. 
813 FaÃlallÁh al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 311. 
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depicted as wanting revolution and filled with desperate anger against their “masters” 
but unable to act. This description by all means reminds the reader of ShÐÝÐ history and, 
thus, can be interpreted as a call to self-reflection. FaÃlallÁh indirectly urges his 
audience to give an honest answer to the question regarding the true reason for their 
abstaining from action.  
 As for the different notions of power in his undersanding and that of Nietzsche, 
FaÃlallÁh elaborates on them in five points. First, he detaches violence from power, and 
defines violence per se as vice in opposition to power as virtue. Contrary to Nietzsche, 
FaÃlallÁh perceives obedience, patience, and modesty as powerful virtues if 
appropriately understood.
814
 Second, he states that in the Islamic perception, the genesis 
of power is spiritual while Nietzsche’s philosophy is materialist.815 Third, for FaÃlallÁh, 
power is not brute force but a reinvigorating potential and a tool of re-creation not of 
destruction.
816
 Fourth, FaÃlallÁh claims that adhering to righteousness and avoiding 
violence are in themselves manifestations of strength. This aspect recalls the notion of 
negative power.
817
 Fifth, FaÃlallÁh distances himself from contra-selection and 
cleansing out of evolutionist pretexts.
818
 
 In his refutation of Nietzsche, FaÃlallÁh once again calls for a re-interpretation of 
power, and defines it as a constructive potential that – in both its positive and negative 
forms – works in harmony with the revelation.819 It combines spirituality as a factor of 
self-control with the use of material force as an inevitable tool of maintaining order and 
progress. He asserts that the root and aim of power in Islam are inherently 
transcendental. FaÃlallÁh’s reinterpretation transforms the “slave” of Nietzsche into his 
ideal of “superman”. For FaÃlallÁh, it is personal attitude that turns Man into a slave. He 
offers the alternative of perseverance and immunity to material power, and elevates 
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quwwa above violence. FaÃlallÁh employs the means available to the deprived and 
converts them into tools of empowerment.  
 A recent article by ZahrÁ’ ÝAlÐ Makka in which she compares the philosophy of 
power of Nietzsche and that of FaÃlallÁh, provides a remarkable insight in the reception 
of FaÃlallÁh’s ideas among his followers.820 The author claims that for Nietzsche, Man 
who has a necessary existence (wÁjib al-wujÙd) is engaged in an existential struggle for 
power. In contrast, FaÃlallÁh is seen as a proponent of the idea that Man has a 
contingent existence (mumkin al-wujÙd), but bestowed with a message-oriented (risÁlÐ) 
vocation to develop social strength based on freedoms and change. Makka argues that 
Nietzsche holds to emotionalism and narrow interpretation while FaÃlallÁh’s philosophy 
of power is strategic and holistic. 
 Makka’s paraphrasing of FaÃlallÁh relies on the distinction between power, 
quwwa and violence, Ýunf. This verbal stratagem is typical of Muslim apologists, and 
shows their insistence on subjective assessment and conscious avoidance to evaluate an 
action based on its effect as exerted on others. Regardless of the labelling of an action as 
violence, force or power, the moment it harms another being, the victim, the 
terminological difference ceases to exist. Makka does not seem to be aware that 
FaÃlallÁh’s system is built on the same categorisation as Nietzsche’s. In both systems, 
there are two camps: the powerful and the weak. Besides, both thinkers exalt power. 
The fact that FaÃlallÁh considers power purposeful does not render his conception 
essentially different, since implementing a message which is deemed to bring justice 
into the otherwise unjust world in the name of a religion, is as destructive to humanity 
as any ideological project of power. Nietzsche and FaÃlallÁh set the same frame but 
filled it with different content.  
 FaÃlallÁh’s approach to Nietzsche is reductionist. He carefully selects the ideas to 
refute in support of his own argument. Similarly, he gives no definition of Fascism other 
than its promoting racism and stimulation of colonialism.
821
 Neither does he address the 
problem of praising state and order above all, militant activism, and the alleged 
superiority of a religious ideology and its followers. From this approach, it appears that 
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his intention is not to explain the Islamic concept of force to outsiders but to his own 
mostly quietist followers. FaÃlallÁh’s account is based on secondary sources which is 
probably attributable to the fact that he was interested in how Nietzsche’s ideas can be 
communicated and then refuted in an Islamic context. 
 
 
5.      FaÃlallÁh’s ethics in practice 
  
 Power and force denoted by the same term – quwwa – are not synonyms but they 
are interconnected. Aspiration to power implies the use of force and force is inevitable 
to keeping the attained power. Earlier – in chapters 8.2 and 8.3 –, I discussed the meta-
ethics of power according to FaÃlallÁh. The question that arises, here, is whether 
FaÃlallÁh’s applied ethics displays any consistency with his philosophy of power or not. 
To answer this question, I will deal with two issues that are subjects of heightened 
interest worldwide: suicide attacks and bioethics. None of them are elaborated on in al-
IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa but FaÃlallÁh’s views and statements on these issues best 
reflect how he applied these principles with regards to current, practical and 
controversial matters. The reason for I raise the question of his applied ethics is not 
about consistency but about clarity. One can get a better understanding of his 
conception of power if light is shed on how he actually answers concrete questions of 
ethics, as they occur in the real world. 
 As for suicide attacks, FaÃlallÁh claims that upon two conditions can they be 
considered as martyrdom operations carried out in war situations. First, the primary 
condition is that the war must be deemed legitimate by Islamic law. Second, such action 
can take place only if there are no other options left for achieving victory. Once these 
two conditions have been fulfilled, it is necessary to balance between priorities. That 
said, martyrdom is never symbolic, it must lead to tangible results. As I observed before 
in chapter 7.4.2, FaÃlallÁh praised ÝAlÐ as a warrior and a statesman, not as mythical hero who 
volunteered for self-sacrifice. Consequently, FaÃlallÁh arrives at the conclusion that since 
God has not revealed the mechanism of warfare it is possible to state that the loss of life 
with the aim to win over the enemy in an issue that has far-reaching consequences for 
humankind outweighs the death of a soldier by sacrifice. The sole difference from other 
military actions is that the combatant knows beforehand that he will die during the 
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operation. In his evaluation of the 9/11 attacks, FaÃlallÁh asserts that they were not 
legitimate since no open war
822
 is waged against the United States. However, he 
claimed that in the final count American politics is to be blamed for the situation that 
nurtured such actions.
823
 
 To take another example of FaÃlallÁh’s ethical thought, it is worth noting his 
position on cloning.
824
 FaÃlallÁh did not allow procedures using donor sperm; and 
claimed that “the origin of the relation of the child to its mother is its being from her 
egg”.825 This position has far reaching consequences regarding in vitro fertilisation, 
since it denies the filial relationship between the child and the woman who was the 
receiver of the fertilised egg. Her position is akin to the “milk mother”.826 Against this 
background of legal restrictions, FaÃlallÁh interpreted cloning as a permissible, but 
strictly controlled alternative of reproduction that eliminates legal problems existing in 
other solutions.
827
   
 This reasoning echoes FaÃlallÁh’s pragmatism and “theistic utilitarianism”, which, 
as explained above, does not contradict his divine command ethics. This system of 
thought pays due attention to the underlying general principle behind declaring certain 
means ethical while forbidding others, and examines the aim of the given action in view 
of its relation to the supposed general principles. As an indispensable element, reference 
to the “benefit of humankind” appears as an ultimate argument. 
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826 Clarke and Inhorn, 419-420. 
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[MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh explains his fatwa on cloning], al-SafÐr, 28 August 2001, referred to by 
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 6.      FaÃlallÁh’s ethics of power within the activist ShÐÝÐ tradition 
 
 In order to properly evaluate FaÃlallÁh’s contribution to contemporary ShÐÝÐ 
ethical views, it is worth comparing him with two notable ShÐÝÐ jurists and thinkers who 
displayed genuine interest in ethical issues: ÀyatullÁh KhumaynÐ and MurtaÃÁ 
MuÔahharÐ. Their theories exemplify the effort of activist ShÐÝÐ thinkers to redefine the 
categories of “forbidden” and “permitted” in light of the primary goal of the Message: 
the implementation of an Islamic order. This approach is explicitly voluntarist, however, 
similarly to modernist SunnÐ thought, it presumes that God’s will is purposeful.828 
 KhumaynÐ claimed that “The moral precepts of Islam are political as well.”829 His 
primary concern was the criteria that guarantees the legitimacy of power and explained 
its ethical aspects in this context. KhumaynÐ asserted that the ethical conduct of the ruler 
is essential for gaining the support of the governed.
830
 KhumaynÐ evaluated “anger” in a 
way that recalls FaÃlallÁh’s ethics of force. For him, anger is an instinct that needs to be 
regulated. However, its charge is determined by its goal. Anger is positive and 
necessary for securing the protection and survival of values and life. Without anger, 
Man would be unable to face oppression and tyranny, and thus live in a state of moral 
weakness. KhumaynÐ assumes that anger becomes a negative trait when it is detached 
from this function and becomes devoid of self-restraint.
831
 
 FaÃlallÁh and KhumaynÐ share a similar activist approach. They both reinterpreted 
concepts such as force and anger that were discarded and condemned by quietist 
ShÐÝism, and evaluated them based on their contribution to the Islamic goals. On the one 
hand, this conceptualisation defines force and anger as positive power, and self-restraint 
as negative power, each of which becomes futile without the simultaneous presence of 
the other. On the other hand, both arrogance and passivity – based on compromise 
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Khomeini’s Works, 2004), 119, fn. 3. Accessed 20 June 2013, http://statics.ml.imam-
khomeini.ir/en/File/NewsAttachment/2014/1926-LegitimacyofPower.pdf 
831 See: Chapter 6 on “GhaÃab” in KhumaynÐ’s Forty Hadith (Tehran: International Affairs Department, 
2003). Accessed 15 July 2013, http://www.al-islam.org/forty-hadith-an-exposition-second-edition-imam-
khomeini/seventh-hadith-anger-ghadhab 
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instead of justified resentment – generates weakness, and are, therefore, considered as 
un-Islamic. 
 MurtaÃÁ MuÔahharÐ represented a more theoretical approach than FaÃlallÁh and 
KhumaynÐ. He was concerned with the ontological basis of the universality of Islamic 
ethics. MuÔahharÐ distinguished inclination from will, and claimed that human weakness 
results from obeying inclinations and urges. In contrast, strength is related to will, which 
is governed by reason as well as by internalised norms. MuÔahharÐ claims that “moral 
imperatives relate to Man as a rational being”, and inspire acts that transcend the 
confines of one’s ego.832 This idea corresponds to the distinction made by FaÃlallÁh and 
KhumaynÐ regarding the evaluation of force and anger.  
 In his article “Islamic Ethics in Comparative Perspective”, Daniel Brown provides 
a detailed analysis of the main trends of Islamic ethical thinking. Brown claims that 
voluntarism fosters “a particular form of scripturalism which prefers specific, concrete 
cases over general rules”.833 Consequently legal decisions are derived from explicit 
instances as described in the Qur’Án and the ÎadÐth by qiyÁs (analogical reasoning). 
Studying the views of FaÃlallÁh, KhumaynÐ and MuÔahharÐ, an assumption can be made 
that the rejection of qiyÁs in ShÐÝÐ Islam prompted the activist thinkers to identify the 
general rules, and infer opinion from universal ethical principles as revealed in the 
Qur’Án. This conceptualisation gives much less scope for “scripturalist absolutism”,834 
and, at the same time, grants the natural presence of a teleological perspective in activist 
ShÐÝism. Without this teleological perspective, activism could never win over quietism.  
 Brown asserts that in SunnÐ Islam, teleology found its way through “a sort of 
theistic utilitarianism”835 that defines “the utility of an act (…) not by temporal goods, 
but in relation to eternal goods as defined by God”.836 At the same time, one of the main 
goals of activist ShÐÝism was to direct the believer’s attention from the awaited justice in 
the hereafter towards the demands and opportunities of the present. Brown claims that 
in (SunnÐ) Islam, “utilitarianism and scripturalist absolutism are in tension”,837 even if it 
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is resolved regarding some issues such as smaller jihÁd that required no special 
justification.
838
 Since, in traditional ShÐÝism, resort to fighting was restricted to self-
defence, in activist ShÐÝism, former principles (rooted in a sort of doctrinal absolutism) 
had to be unwaveringly overwritten. Based on this analysis, it can be said that, with the 
help of extrapolated general principles, FaÃlallÁh, KhumaynÐ and MuÔahharÐ attempted 
to dissolve tension between deontology and teleology, and mobilised their followers to 
resort to – even violent – action.  
 
 
 Concluding remarks 
 
 FaÃlallÁh’s ethics of power constitutes the first systemic ShÐÝÐ ethics of action. His 
conceptualisation of weakness and strength, negative and positive power, and just war 
promotes the idea that power should be under the control of Islamic purposes. That is to 
say, power should serve the objectives set by Islamic law and moral principles that stem 
from it. FaÃlallÁh’s approach to ethics is legalist and deontological. It relies on the 
divine command to set the confines to action. However, it also displays a considerable 
sense of utilitarianism. FaÃlallÁh provides the moral agent with the freedom to adapt the 
general principles to the given circumstances. Accordingly, his ethics could be best 
labelled as theistic utilitarianism or purposeful voluntarism. Since divine command is 
purposeful, whatever serves that purpose is legitimate and ethical. 
 Critics would argue that, put in the Lebanese ShÐÝÐ context; his enterprise could 
generate a deadlock conflict. If put in practice, it would be extremely difficult to secure 
co-habitance in a multi-confessional society. In FaÃlallÁh’s system, the intrinsic finality 
of the use of force to protect and secure the ShÐÝÐ community is embedded in its extrinsic 
finality which is the dominance of righteousness on Earth and the spread of the Islamic 
message. Thus, any action that serves the community could be interpreted as ethical and 
legal due to its inherent connection to the divine plan. 
 FaÃlallÁh’s ethics of action urges us to reconsider the way we read modern 
ShÐÝism. First, his references to the ShÐÝÐ tradition are cautious and limited. He does not 
confine himself to the ShÐÝÐ narrative of injustice. Instead, he selects elements familiar to 
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ShÐÝÐ thought and reinterprets them as inspiration to action and mobilisation. Even 
characteristics such as patience which is traditionally considered as weakness should be 
reinterpreted as an element of power. Second, FaÃlallÁh’s ethics is hybrid. He 
extensively uses SunnÐ sources to provide his project with a more consensual 
legitimacy. He also quotes and criticises Western moral philosophy. Here, FaÃlallÁh 
aims to defend himself against accusations of Fascism. Finally, FaÃlallÁh represents an 
example of ShÐÝÐ pragmatism. Contrary to the Salafi literature on jihÁd which declares 
total war to its adversaries, FaÃlallÁh wants his disciples to take into account the actual 
circumstances and balance of power in every action plan. Thus, action, caution and 
hybridity are the main characteristics of FaÃlallÁh’s project of power. 
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Chapter IX: Rhetoric of Power 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
 Any Islamist rhetoric of power aims both at persuasion and mobilisation. To 
mention only two from the prominent figures, Íasan al-BannÁ in Egypt and KhumaynÐ 
in Iran fully exploited its capacities to reach out to the masses. Since Islamism had to 
face doubts about its ability to provide an alternative to nationalist and liberal 
ideologies, its preachers had to convince the public that it offered a viable solution to 
the problems of the day. Furthermore, it had to be sufficient and effective in order to 
recruit followers and mobilise them. That is the reason any piece of Islamist literature 
necessarily contains elements of polemics and call to action. This gives rise to a 
distinctive Islamist rhetoric that has been little studied.  
 A first monograph dedicated to studying Islamist rhetoric has been written by 
Jacob Høigilt, entitled Islamist Rhetoric: Language and Culture in Contemporary 
Egypt.839 He covers three Egyptian SunnÐ preachers and intellectuals (YÙsuf al-
QaraÃÁwÐ, ÝAmr KhÁlid and MuÎammad ÝImÁra). Additionally, only a few articles 
analysed rhetorical devices frequently used in modern Arabic religious and political 
discourses. Against this background, I will analyse the rhetoric of FaÃlallÁh aiming at 
two objectives. First, I attempt to show how his rhetoric supports his system of power. 
Second, based on my findings, I will compare FaÃlallÁh’s rhetorical patterns to the 
patterns of Islamist rhetoric as defined by Høigilt.   
 In the previous thematic chapters, I analysed the way FaÃlallÁh attempts to 
construct a coherent system of power. I emphasised FaÃlallÁh’s philosophy of power as 
an alternative to other ideologies present in the same intellectual milieu. In the present 
chapter, I examine the rhetorical strategies by which he conveys his ideas. The use of 
rhetoric in his al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, as well as in his other writings and 
speeches, are manifold and predominant. They include arguments from scripture, 
necessity, virtue and instrumentality. FaÃlallÁh has recourse to rhetorical questions, 
antinomy, metaphors and repetition as well to make his discourse convincing and 
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effective. Moreover, he uses master narratives to frame his project of power in the ShÐÝÐ 
salvation history. As for the functions of his rhetoric, they aim mainly at reassuring the 
quietists that the quest for power is justified, and at mobilising the ShÐÝa to take action. 
 
 
1.     Argument from scripture 
 
 In al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, the Qur’Án stands as the primary reference in 
FaÃlallÁh’s argumentation. He quotes the Qur’Án in 204 places on 333 pages. His 
method of citation is threefold. Sometimes, he enumerates the verses in groups in order 
to support his statement with no comments placed in between the passages, only 
introducing the topic at the beginning and concluding it in the end. In other cases, he 
juxtaposes seemingly contradictory statements from the Qur’Án, groups them, 
comments on them and after introducing the circumstances of the verses, he argues for 
one interpretation while discards the other. A third way of citation is when the verses 
are not grouped, but embedded into FaÃlallÁh’s train of thought. Thus, the theme 
evolves through the Qur’Ánic passages carefully selected by FaÃlallÁh. The only link 
between them is that they support the various aspects of the author’s idea.  
 FaÃlallÁh draws on thematic exegesis to cement his rhetoric. At the beginning of 
the chapters and sections, he identifies the theme to be elaborated on and selects verses 
or group of verses that are linked to the selected theme. Subsequently, he comments on 
the idea present in the citations rather than engaging in an analytic exegesis of the terms 
and sequences, or giving details about the circumstances of revelation (asbÁb al-nuzÙl). 
Islamist rhetoric frequently employs this strategy. It consists in establishing an artificial 
coherence between the quoted verses and the author’s interpretation, leading the reader 
to assume the unity of meaning all through the passage or section. 
 From the frequency of the Qur’Ánic quotations, we can infer that he gives 
preference to the Qur’Án rather than to the ÎadÐth. The reasons of this method are 
numerous. First, the Qur’Án, as FaÃlallÁh perceives it, is a guideline for the prevailing 
state of affairs; it is about the renewal of the contemporary society, in terms of beliefs, 
ideas and practices. Already in the introduction, FaÃlallÁh defines it as a “constitution” 
that regulates the various aspects of strength in all domains of life (dustÙran Ýamaliyyan 
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li’l-quwwa).840 Besides, the Qur’Ánic milieu provides a context equivalent to the up-to-
date situation of ShÐÝa. As explained by Stephan Dähne, the rhetorical device called 
“equivalence of contexts” in classical Arabic literature meant the use of the Qur’Ánic 
text with the aim of creating an intellectual, emotional setting in which the idea or the 
situation depicted in the Qur’Án echoes the experience of the audience. Thus “one finds 
the object of the speech subtly interconnected with the object of the respective Qur’Ánic 
passage”.841 FaÃlallÁh’s Qur’Ánic quotes interweave and saturate his own discourse to 
an extent that the readers feel as if the Qur’Án was directly addressing them through his 
own ideas. As a result, the narrative is intermitted by exhortative passages and the 
audience gets carried away by the flow of the Scripture while being indoctrinated by 
FaÃlallÁh. Reading the Qur’Ánic passages in the book, oriented by FaÃlallÁh’s 
discussion, turns this experience into an act of participation.  
 Another reason for FaÃlallÁh’s preference of the Qur’Án to ÎadÐth is that Qur’Ánic 
statements are general, rich in rhetorical elements and open to a wide range of 
interpretations. Also, they provide the theoretical bases for evaluating any subsequent 
religious text or act. A ÎadÐth on the other hand, is a more detailed narration of a 
particular event. Thus, it is more specific and embedded in its context. A third reason is 
that the quietist ShÐÝa, being traditionists, build their argument mostly on ÎadÐth. 
Therefore, FaÃlallÁh quotes the Twelver ShÐÝÐ ÎadÐth only if it is in line with the activist 
stance of the Qur’Án. A fourth reason is that the Qur’Án transcends the SunnÐ-ShÐÝÐ 
divide and appeals to the entire community of Muslims.  
 A fifth motive is that FaÃlallÁh was a mufassir himself and authored a 22-volume 
exegesis entitled Min waÎy al-Qur’Án, while he was not a specialist in ÎadÐth 
(muÎaddith).842 Sixth, it is a characteristic of fundamentalist rhetoric to quote the 
Qur’Án rather than the ÎadÐth. This is so because many verses in the Qur’Án – contrary 
to the ÎadÐth – are definitive in their meaning and transmission (qaÔÝÐ al-dalÁla wa ’l-
thubÙt). Therefore, they can perfectly serve the Manichaean fundamentalist discourse 
that aims to construct a precise notion of the self and the enemy, and consequently a 
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homogeneous and exclusive enclave of “the righteous people”.843 This rhetorical device 
is an important tool to FaÃlallÁh’s notion of history as “the history of the strong and 
their opponents and of the followers of truth versus the followers of falsehood.”844 
 
 
 2.      Argument from necessity 
 
 Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings claim that in processes of the 
justification of political violence, rhetorical tools are strategies that make certain 
conclusions inescapable by demonstrating that there are no acceptable alternatives.
845
 
One such tool is called “necessity arguments”. Agents justify political violence by 
claiming that it is a necessity and what is necessary should be done for the survival of 
the individual or the community. Thus, the argument from necessity appeals to the 
human instinct of survival. This is a captivating rhetorical strategy in an Islamic context, 
all the more so given that it is justified by the Qur’Án and the sharÐÝa. The Qur’Án 
supports the permission to fight non-believers by the necessity to defend the community 
of believers. As for Islamic law, it allows forbidden acts in case of necessity, al-ÃarÙrÁt 
tubÐÎ al-maÎÛÙrÁt.  
 In Chapter 6 of al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, FaÃlallÁh argues for the right of the 
weak and oppressed to use force in confronting the oppressors. Here, the use of force is 
a legitimate right of self-defence. Besides, confrontation can serve to prevent greater 
destruction. FaÃlallÁh insists that, without permission to use force in case of necessity, 
no moral principles or nothing sacred could have survived.
846
 Furthermore, he adds that 
the legal permission addresses pious people who, having resorted to fight, are not 
accountable for the harm they cause. The exposition is designed to deal with the major 
concerns of the quietist ShÐÝa in order to convince them that they are not only allowed 
but also expected to rise and fight for themselves. FaÃlallÁh reminds them that piety is 
not enough, and in order to fulfil their religious obligations, they have to use force. 
Fight, therefore, becomes a must imposed by the circumstances. 
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 In Chapter 7, while examining whether jihÁd is a means to call to Islam or not, 
FaÃlallÁh maintains that there is no evidence that force is essential for the call. 
However, the early Islamic history shows that resisting aggression “needs an equal or 
more violent power”.847 The first Muslims left Mecca and engaged in fights with the 
non-believers to assure the freedom of religious practice and the spread of Islam. 
FaÃlallÁh concludes that “force is one of the means to protect the Call and defend it 
from the challenges posed by its infidel adversaries”.848  
 
 
 3.     Argument from virtue  
 
 Virtuous violence is defined by the values that motivate it and by “the character of 
those individuals engaged in it”.849 As a rhetorical tool, virtuous violence helps to avoid 
the conclusion that all kinds of political violence are necessary and rational. The 
argument from virtue reasons in two ways. The first one is the assumption that, in 
specific instances, force is virtue and since virtue must be realised, it follows that using 
force in specific instances is unavoidable. The other way focuses on virtuous agents. It 
assumes that everything done by virtuous people is good. Since virtuous people use 
force, it follows that using force is good. Both arguments are founded on the ethics of 
virtue inspired by Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 
 FaÃlallÁh differentiates between good and evil uses of force: between killing and 
“fighting in the path of God”,850 between the violence of the oppressors and the violence 
of the oppressed.
851
 He claims that attachment to material power makes Man 
disinterested in morality. In contrast to this, it is God who reveals the right use of force 
to Man through the sharÐÝa which is the base of ethics.852 Thus, FaÃlallÁh’s concern with 
Islamic morality serves to reject the idea that violence as such is always a natural and 
rational reaction. Instead, he prompts a further distinction between virtuous and vicious 
violence. FaÃlallÁh asserts that “The use of power that does not contradict Islamic 
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values is a moral virtue that helps to establish a decent life.”853 This redemptive and 
meaningful aspect of violence is rooted in the ethical teaching of Islam, which 
transforms human tendencies to selfish and oppressive violence into virtuous and heroic 
acts, including martyrdom. Consequently, the use of force is justified only if it reflects 
and embodies the virtues and values of Islam.  
 Besides the focus on virtues, FaÃlallÁh’s discourse is centred on prominent figures 
who embody these characteristics. He strongly contests the view that the peace-seeking 
attitude of the ImÁms validates lack of action for the contemporary ShÐÝa.
854
 FaÃlallÁh 
claims that the ImÁms refrained from action only when there was no leadership that 
possessed the necessary religious competence to lead the community to victory.
855
 
However, he stresses that the ImÁms supported all movements that acted according to 
the Islamic principles. Quoting a ÎadÐth by JaÝfar al-ÑÁdiq on the movement led by Zayd 
b. ÝAlÐ b. al-Íusayn, FaÃlallÁh insists that the core issue “is not the nature or the 
legitimacy of the rebellion, rather the objectives and the leadership of that particular 
movement”.856 FaÃlallÁh’s reference to the ImÁms as ultimate models of action is an 
affective argument through which he secures the legitimacy of his own discourse.  
 FaÃlallÁh dedicates two chapters to the ethics of power and several sections to 
interpreting “commanding right and forbidding wrong”, because his ultimate aim is to 
convince the quietist ShÐÝa that fighting for Islamic goals is virtuous. FaÃlallÁh 
reconstructs the meaning of violence as virtue inasmuch as it means righteous use of 
force. Through his references to virtuous figures such as the Prophet and the ImÁms 
who called to power, FaÃlallÁh urges the Lebanese ShÐÝa to take action and expects a 
“keen response” from his audience.857 
 
 
 4.      Argument from instrumentality 
 
 FaÃlallÁh’s repertoire of arguments contains end-oriented justifications that Frazer 
and Hutchings describe as arguments from instrumentality. Such substantiations 
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evaluate violence as “‘instrumental’ for politics because it is an effective means for 
achieving political ends”.858 However, this kind of justification leaves two major 
concerns un-addressed: the relationship between means and ends, and the 
unpredictability of the outcome. This is why supplementary arguments
859
 such as 
arguments from necessity and arguments from virtue are applied. This phenomenon 
points to the fact that various types of arguments cannot be clearly separated even inside 
the same text and in most cases they are present simultaneously. 
 In the Introduction of the book, FaÃlallÁh radically identifies power as the essence 
of life without which no self-esteem or progress is possible. Power helps to “put into 
practice righteous principles”.860 His assertion is that “the weak and oppressed were not 
able to win battles in support of their principles, thoughts and interests until they 
eventually got hold of the means or were in a position of power”.861 At this point, he 
carefully mixes arguments from necessity and arguments from instrumentality. 
Although FaÃlallÁh’s argument is seemingly built on existential necessity, it is a goal-
oriented ethics of existence. The implementation of Islam is the ultimate aim of human 
life. Thus, mere survival, or refraining from action, renders existence futile. Muslim life 
has a unique value only because it is instrumental to the victory of Islam. If the 
instrument is endangered, the supreme goal is imperilled as well. The use of force, 
therefore, is based on the necessity to secure the existence of the instrument and, 
consequently, on the realisation of the supreme Islamic goal. 
 In the conclusion of al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, FaÃlallÁh asserts that Muslims 
are expected to be strong in order to realise the major Islamic objectives, and to prevent 
the aggression of its enemies. For this, military, economic, political, and scientific 
power is needed, and force serves as a deterrent. Therefore, violence is justified 
inasmuch as it opposes and destroys oppressive systems and secures the necessary 
stability for implementing the Islamic order. Furthermore, he claims that “ability and 
weakness do not last for the entire life. Rather, they are restricted to limited phases.”862  
 We can conclude by saying that in FaÃlallÁh’s thought power is both a value in 
itself and an instrument. This approach addresses the quietist ShÐÝa claiming that force is 
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necessary, but always with the supreme goal of establishing an Islamic life, and never 
an end in itself. Also, by reminding the reader of the various aspects of force and the 
diverse manifestations of power, FaÃlallÁh wishes to inculcate in his activist ShÐÝÐ 
readers the idea that none of the aspects of power can be isolated from the rest. 
 
 
 5.  Rhetorical questions  
 
 FaÃlallÁh opens each chapter with a few rhetorical questions. This rhetorical tool 
is “an assertion in the form of an interrogative statement (…) characterised by (…) 
aggressive and polemical content in which two hostile voices are dialogically 
opposed”.863 A rhetorical question calls on the reader to choose from among two 
alternatives the one suggested by the author. Muhammad A. Badarneh identified four 
main functions of rhetorical questions in Arabic prose: 1. to confer a dialogic quality 
upon the text, 2. to launch a hidden polemic against those who have a differing view, 3. 
to question the foundation of differing views, and 4. to speak for and create 
identification with the reader. In the following, I am going to examine three sections in 
particular where FaÃlallÁh applies this tool with respect to his assumptions, the 
dialogical context and the structure of the questions. 
 In the first page of al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa he asks:  
 
If Islam believes in force, is it blind force that justifies everything including 
aggression? Or is it the force that does not reach the point of aggression (ÝudwÁn)? 
(…) How does all this comply with Islamic morals such as forgiveness, tolerance 
and patience? Are the latter regarded as weaknesses that encourage Muslims to be 
submissive? Or are they aspects of strength that is in line with the Islamic concept? 
And [if so], how could this be the case?
864  
 
 In these questions, FaÃlallÁh addresses some of the essential issues dealt with in 
the book, and right at the outset makes his style polemic. The first two questions are in 
fact clauses of one single statement in which the opinion of those who promote 
unrestricted violence is presented in the subordinate clause and as such it is undermined 
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by the rhetorical question in the main clause asserting that Islam does believe in force 
but not in a blind one. The following four questions embrace another topic, the problem 
of morality with respect to strength and weakness. Here, the answer is provided in the 
concluding question that refers back to his preferred interpretation, thus disqualifying 
any differing views.  
 In these questions, FaÃlallÁh summarises the essence of the book, declares his 
opinion, and addresses both the quietist and those who opt for spontaneous and limitless 
use of force. Later, in the middle of the book, in the chapter on the “morality of 
weakness and strength”, FaÃlallÁh rephrases and repeats the first part of the rhetorical 
question exposed in the introduction.
865
 Here too, he applies the same technique by 
offering two alternatives and discrediting the first one by the last question that is in fact 
an assertion. The cogency of the concluding rhetorical question lies in the fact that it 
contains the ideologically and commonsensically
866
 viable alternative which is in line 
with the cultural code of the readers who are, therefore, expected to take it as self-
evidently true.
867
 
 In Chapter 7, where FaÃlallÁh examines the relation between the call to Islam and 
the Islamic concept of strength, he poses a rhetorical question where he applies the 
technique of double voicing.
868
 
 
Are violence, force, compulsion, fighting and the like considered as acceptable 
ways to bring people into Islam? Was there no other option for those who refused 
conversion but submission regardless of their beliefs? And can we consider that the 
force used in the Islamic conquests was the prime means of spreading Islam across 
the world?
869
 
 
 Here, FaÃlallÁh expresses ideas that are associated with the critiques of Islam. He 
takes these questions as opportunities to present adversary opinions and at the same 
time reduce their weight through the interrogative form. Later on, he dedicates the 
whole chapter to denying these statements and bases his argument on primarily Islam-
friendly Western sources. With this, his aim is to question the very foundation upon 
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which critical discourse is built, to attack and cast doubt on the legitimacy and 
integrity
870
 of their argument. 
 FaÃlallÁh’s consistent resort to rhetorical questions – characteristic of khuÔba style 
rather than of a well-thought written treatise – proves his determination to further 
bolster the contrast between “us” and “them”. He sets the scene for two antagonistic 
discourses: that of his readers and that of his opponents inside and outside of his 
community. As the two types of rhetorical questions demonstrate, his aim was to 
persuade the insiders and to discredit those who are adversaries of Islam. This polemical 
tone is reflective of the style of al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa generally, and makes the 
book similar to a chain of extended khuÔbas. 
 In each case, FaÃlallÁh dedicates the entire chapter to answering the rhetorical 
questions posed in the introduction. As Badarneh terms it, he speaks for the reader.
871
 
He was aware that his readership was not a homogeneous group as they were composed 
of activist and quietist ShÐÝis, as well as Sunnites. Therefore, his discourse and 
references were primarily Islamic, focusing on the shared beliefs and values. His aim 
was to create further consensus built on this common ground. FaÃlallÁh skilfully creates 
the illusion that there is space for the reader to interact with the text, but in fact he 
establishes false dichotomies and designs the discourse in a way to leave only one 
option to the reader. 
 
 
 6.       Repetition 
 
 One of FaÃlallÁh’s most important rhetorical tools is repetition. He follows and 
makes use of a long tradition of Arabic prose in general, and religious-political 
discourse in particular in which redefinition of an idea is considered as a logical proof. 
As Barbara Johnstone indicates, the linguistic forms and expressions that provide the 
argument with cogency “are at the heart of the [Arabic] language, the discourse, and the 
rhetoric”.872  Furthermore, she claims that “persuasion is a result as much, or more, of 
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the sheer number of times an idea is stated and the balanced, elaborate ways in which it 
is stated as it is a result of syllogistic or enthymematic ‘logical’ organisation”.873 
 Johnstone’s remarks apply to FaÃlallÁh’s argumentation in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-
quwwa as well. He uses diverse tactics for repetition that include repetition of certain 
expressions, parallelism (repetition of form), and paraphrasing (repetition of content) in 
various ways. Out of the many examples of repetition that pervade the text and 
interconnect the various chapters, I highlight only showcases. The first one illustrates 
FaÃlallÁh’s use of syntactic parallelism, both “listing” – repetition of entire clauses cited 
to provide examples or details
874
 – and “cumulative repetition” – in which semantically 
each one builds on the previous one and thus has a kind of cumulative effect.
875
 In 
Chapter 6, on the moral dimension of power, FaÃlallÁh lists the reasons why Muslims 
need to resort to force in 5 points. 
  
1. Making efforts to construct a life based on faith in God (al-Ýamal ÝalÁ binÁ’ al-
ÎayÁt) (…) makes the movement stronger and faster (…) provides the actors with 
the feeling of confidence (…) 
2. Protecting (ÎimÁya) religion against the persecution of its enemies (…) 
3. Supporting (intiÒÁr) the oppressed, exploited, and helpless groups against the 
oppressors (…) 
4. Weakening (iÃÝÁf) the power of the nonbelievers, so that disbelief cannot hinder 
Islam from progressing (…) 
5. Defending (difÁÝ) ourselves, and stopping all kinds of aggression against people, 
lands and sacred places, and fighting oppressors.
876
 
 
 In the passage quoted above, the goal of using force is emphatic, placed at the 
beginning in each statement, and put in maÒdar form. The use of verbal nouns provides 
the required action with a somewhat abstract sense – describes it as a value – but 
without depriving it of its dynamism, and thus presents it as a tangible duty for the 
reader. In the same section applying the same pattern gives the passage an internal 
rhythm. Two of the maÒdars are synonymous (protect, defend), the rest – “making 
efforts to construct”, “weakening the nonbelievers”, “supporting the oppressed” create 
an intellectual context in which the use of force appears as constructive, purposeful, 
value-based. The explanations that follow the introductory statements cited above repeat 
the very same values and tasks: protecting Islam and the oppressed and weakening 
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disbelief and oppressions. This common motif is present as a central idea in each of the 
five statements however extended with a particular additional aspect in each instance. 
 The second example from the Introduction of Chapter 3 on spiritual strength, 
illustrates FaÃlallÁh’s use of reverse paraphrase “in which the same action or event is 
described from two opposing perspectives”.877  
 
It is spiritual strength that generates the sense of value in the human soul and 
detaches life from feelings of fear, sadness, anxiety, loss and laxity, and fills it 
instead with feelings of confidence, happiness and resoluteness in order to provide 
it with confidence, steadfastness, and clarity [of vision] in planning and stance. It is 
through spiritual strength that Man possesses power to confront his enemies. 
Lacking this would cause a sense of weakness, uncertainty that leads to internal 
destruction, fills the soul with terror, and crushes all preparations for resistance 
(…)878 
 
 The extended paragraph combines reverse paraphrase with cumulative repetition. 
FaÃlallÁh makes the same statement twice to emphasise importance of spiritual strength. 
In the first half of the passage, FaÃlallÁh states that possessing spiritual strength 
generates further values, while lacking it leads to the reverse of those values (fear vs. 
confidence, happiness vs. sadness etc.). In the second half of the passage, he repeats the 
same features and broadens the perspective with the anticipated consequences of both 
attitudes. This method carries away the reader’s attention and creates an emotional 
identification with the message in which happiness is inherently linked to the capacity 
of resistance. Linking instinctive human desires to political stance through their 
connection to the identical source actually creates an imprinting in the reader’s mind. 
 FaÃlallÁh uses paraphrase on a large scale and in diverse ways. One of them is 
summarising of the “above stated”, such as in the following: 
 
[Quote from ÎadÐth] On this basis, we can see that carrying out the mission of 
commanding right and forbidding wrong is part of a move to change the corrupt 
society into a righteous one and to resist injustice and oppression as the Prophet’s 
words [above] clearly state.879  
 
 As we can notice in Chapter 2 on the use of force against tyranny from which the 
quote is taken, FaÃlallÁh’s method of presenting a topic follows a stable pattern. First, 
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he presents his hypothesis regarding the issue in question. Second, he provides quotes 
from the Qur’Án and the ÎadÐth. Third, he summarises the content of the quotes. Fourth, 
he relates their content to his hypothesis. Fifth, he draws the conclusion in which he 
paraphrases the hypothesis. Any resort to non-Islamic sources carefully and 
purposefully supports his premise. Thus, practically, he never leaves behind the 
confines of the Islamic horizon. FaÃlallÁh uses “summarising” as a tool of repetition in 
two ways: following the quotes from the Qur’Án or the ÎadÐth as seen above, or 
following his own statements. An illustrative example of the latter is his exposition on 
the relationship between God’s power and human power. Following two extended 
sections on each aspect, he inserts a third one in which he summarises what he had just 
stated in order to exclude any contradiction between the two assertions.
880
 
 Another means of paraphrasing is applied by FaÃlallÁh in the case of some ideas 
that pervade the texture of the book such as the obligation of “commanding right and 
forbidding wrong” and its interpretation as a call to force. FaÃlallÁh deals with the topic 
in three chapters: in Chapter 2 on “the use of force against tyranny”, in Chapter 4 on 
“social strength” and in Chapter 8 on “change and force”. In each case, the core 
message is repeated and broadened with new elements corresponding to the main theme 
of the respective chapter. Thus, the idea becomes dominant in the book and provides a 
legal perspective to FaÃlallÁh’s arguments for power and force. 
 Finally, it is necessary to mention some key expressions in the book such as 
“realistic vision / perception”, “corresponding to Islamic goals”, “standing up to tyranny 
/ oppression”, “Islamic morality”, “defending the oppressed”, “resisting exploitation”, 
“complying to responsibility”. These words and notions and their synonyms are 
repeated in each chapter countless times. As a result, the reader has no choice but to 
remember them and becomes intellectually disposed to construct his / her own phrase 
from these expressions in any situation and recall it at any time. 
 Johnstone raised another highly relevant point in her analysis of repetition, 
namely the relation between truth and argumentation, saying: “argument rests on 
established truths, and truth emerges through argument”.881 FaÃlallÁh considers his 
argument as realistic but without aspiring to rationalism. Instead, he refers to reality as 
construed by him, as a universally acceptable, tangible human experience. The reality 
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he explains is deeply rooted in and inseparable from the Islamic perception of life and 
politics, and embedded in the ShÐÝÐ experience. Out of the elements of this construed 
reality, he creates a coherent structure by the re-definition and contextualisation of its 
elements, and thus aims to convince the reader that his perception reflects the universal, 
objective reality.  
 With Johnstone’s words in mind – “repetition... is the key to the linguistic 
cohesion of the texts and to their rhetorical effectiveness”882 – we can assume that 
repetition guaranteed the coherence of FaÃlallÁh’s system of thought. Also, it provided 
the text with an internal logic, even if this logic can be considered more of a verbal than 
a rational kind. Although sometimes annoyingly repetitious, the text is able to fulfil its 
primary goal: to inculcate in the reader a sense of identification with the author’s point 
of view.
883
 
 
 
 7.      Master narratives 
 
 FaÃlallÁh’s interpretation of the master narratives of ShÐÝism resulted in a novel 
and persuasive message through which he managed to prompt radical change in the 
worldview and mentality of the Lebanese ShÐÝa. In my attempt to study the elements of 
FaÃlallÁh’s narrative of ShÐÝÐ history, I rely on the categorisation of J. R. Halverson [et 
al.].
884
 They define master narrative as a comprehensive and “culturally embedded view 
of history” that provides a systematic understanding of the past, the present and the 
future of a community.
885
 It shapes the communal as well as the individual identity and 
merges them into a coherent whole through ideology and required action.
886
  
 Any master narrative is made up of narratives, a “coherent system of stories”887 
that aim to provide a solution for a problem in the present by creating “a narrative 
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trajectory”888 of conflicts, participants, actions, and events. Narratives employ 
archetypal characters – set in binary oppositions – relationships – alliances or conflicts – 
and “standard actions” required from the agents of the story.889 The solution to the 
ideological problem exposed in the narrative can only be found through the resolution 
of the original, real life conflict.  
 FaÃlallÁh’s narrative comprises all the key elements of the ShÐÝÐ master narrative: 
the KarbalÁ’ event, history as a venue of salvation from corruption, and the problem of 
occultation. The elements of his master narrative convey one message, that of the 
Manichaean perception of history that permeates FaÃlallÁh’s discourse. The basic 
conflict to be solved is the prevailing injustice and oppression in the contemporary 
reality. This generates the desire to change the state of affairs in accordance with the 
divine law that grants righteousness. The “narrative trajectory” constructed by FaÃlallÁh 
explains that this desire can only be satisfied by acquiring inner strength and tangible 
power so that people wipe out injustice, as part of the divine mission assigned to them. 
Thus, FaÃlallÁh constructed a new, universalistic master narrative of power as an 
essential means for realising justice that ultimately brings about salvation.  
 
 
 7.1      The account of KarbalÁ’ in FaÃlallÁh’s narrative of power 
 
 The heroic battle at KarbalÁ’ in itself cannot be presented as a solution to the 
problem of oppression since its outcome did not result in deliverance. Nevertheless, in 
FaÃlallÁh’s understanding, what happened at KarbalÁ’ is not an event in the past, rather 
a starting point of the ongoing effort to “change the corrupt society into a righteous one 
and defy injustice and oppression”.890 As such, it is part of the obligation of 
“commanding right and forbidding wrong”. 
 FaÃlallÁh claims – contrary to the prevailing perception – that al-Íusayn engaged 
in the fight not only “to carry out the ImÁm’s divine duty” with full awareness of his 
destiny, but he was above all determined to restore “the just Islamic rule”.891 In 
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FaÃlallÁh’s narrative, KarbalÁ’ took place as a result of circumstances that are “familiar” 
(ma’lÙf ) 892 to his readers, an act of resistance to be repeated by all the faithful.  
 Besides the already highlighted antithesis of good and evil, FaÃlallÁh introduces a 
new dichotomy between strength and weakness. Put in the new frame, KarbalÁ’ is not 
only an open-ended conflict, but also a manifestation of power, courage, and hope. It is 
about accepting the allotted mission as well as about transforming the reality. The 
reinterpreted KarbalÁ’ is the symbol of “noble sacrifice”893 but also that of determined 
action. Thus, the fruits of al-Íusayn’s fight are still to come, and in FaÃlallÁh’s words 
“allure of a preferred ending is a powerful inducement to do whatever work is required 
to bring it about”.894 Therefore, remembering KarbalÁ’ must take place not through 
grieving but through action.  
 Furthermore, FaÃlallÁh does not linger on portraying MuÝÁwiya and YazÐd as 
archetypes of oppressors in order to describe the nature of evil. His narrative focuses on 
mobilisation and change. The inner conflict between weakness and strength is resolved 
by al-Íusayn the warrior, whose figure takes primacy over the archetype of al-Íusayn 
the martyr. For ShÐÝÐ revivalism, “the trajectory of the master narrative of KarbalÁ’ was 
satisfied by defiant martyrdom and not by a miraculous victory” – assert Halverson [et 
al.].
895
 FaÃlallÁh in his treatise on power, gives a new direction to this “trajectory” in 
which martyrdom and resistance are not values in themselves, but only means leading to 
the final goal: power and justice. 
 
 
 7.2       The role of the MahdÐ in FaÃlallÁh’s narrative of power 
 
 Belief in the MahdÐ who will lead righteous Muslims to final victory over 
deviation and injustice is a dominant master narrative in ShÐÝÐ thought. Traditionally, an 
essential role is attributed to the MahdÐ in the cosmic conflict between the forces of 
good and evil. As Halverson [et al.] observe, the archetype of the hero and that of the 
saviour are united in the figure of the MahdÐ.896 For hundreds of years, the archetype of 
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saviour – projected into the future –dominated the MahdÐ master narrative of ShÐÝism. 
Later on, ShÐÝÐ revivalism emphasised the image of the hero – tied to events in the past – 
whose second arrival can be hastened by revolutionary activism. 
 FaÃlallÁh tackles the issue from a de-mystified and pragmatic perspective. He 
inserts two brief sections on the problem of the absence of the MahdÐ in the context of 
the necessity of Islamic governance (“Islam – a call and a state”)897 and the permitted 
means of change (“Change by leniency and violence”).898 This framing renders the 
problem of occultation secondary and deals with it simply to deny any views that 
oppose activism in the absence of the ImÁm. FaÃlallÁh asserts that true change is never 
detached from the Islamic path and the final victory of the movement is realised with 
the return of the MahdÐ.899 However, he insists that “the need for an order and state”900 
is not restricted to the era of the Prophet and the ImÁms. Therefore, fallibility does not 
exclude claims to power and authority. And, in turn, power and authority put at the 
service of implementing the sharÐÝa that “lays the foundations of justice in life”901 are 
detached from the requirement of infallible leadership. With this statement, however, 
FaÃlallÁh echoes the SunnÐ position and puts aside a basic ShÐÝÐ condition of legitimacy. 
Power inasmuch as it serves justice is legitimate, it enjoys priority over infallibility, and 
it is accessible to every committed Muslim. 
 
 
 7.3  Salvation history in FaÃlallÁh’s narrative of power 
 
 In FaÃlallÁh’s narrative, all the stories evolve around the importance of liberating 
Man from internal and external shackles, and serve to perceive the present conflict as 
part of a long “history of war and peace, [between] the followers of truth versus the 
followers of falsehood”.902 This cosmic battle, however, must lead to the redemptive 
victory of righteousness over deviation, an outcome that can be guaranteed only by 
divine help and intervention. 
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 For FaÃlallÁh, the events of salvation history as described in the Qur’Án – and thus 
preserved in the collective system of belief – are to prove the legitimacy and necessity 
of resorting to violence in certain situations. In order to make the contemporary ShÐÝÐ 
community part of this history, FaÃlallÁh “travels” back and forth in time: from the 
present to the past then back to the present. In this way the plight of the Lebanese ShÐÝa 
is set in the frame of divinely guided history. In FaÃlallÁh’s reasoning, the first Muslims 
did not resort to force out of mere habit. Rather, they fought for the just cause, in the 
same way as the contemporary Lebanese ShÐÝa are expected to do. He invokes relevant 
episodes of this salvation history and interprets them as necessary manifestations of the 
legitimate use of force. Thus, FaÃlallÁh provides a constant moral framework of using 
force for his audience.
903
 This connection between the narrative of the past and the 
mobilisation in the present is a crucial aspect of Islamist discourse. 
 FaÃlallÁh’s narrative of KarbalÁ’, his interpretation of the dogma concerning the 
MahdÐ and the evolution of history all evolve around the same axis: the necessity of 
power. As Halverson [et al.] explained, narratives “provide every society with its own 
sense of rationality”.904 To understand how a narrative gains this logic-constructing 
capacity, its rhetorical organisation needs to be studied. FaÃlallÁh’s narrative is based on 
coherent scriptural master-narratives of empowerment. To reassure the contemporary 
ShÐÝa that their battle now is a continuation of past struggles, FaÃlallÁh provides 
analogies that help them reinterpret the experienced reality. His premise is that the 
present is overwhelmed with deviation and corruption taking the form of injustice and 
oppression. FaÃlallÁh prompted his audience to identify with the courageous oppressed 
who have always resisted tyranny in the course of history, and to stand up for justice.  
 FaÃlallÁh’s aim with reinterpreting master narratives was to put the problem of 
power in the centre of the consciousness of the quietist ShÐÝa. He provided a frame 
within which his audience could evaluate events and attitudes through their relation to 
the desired strength and power. Moreover, this perspective gave justification for 
acquiring power as well as for actions that imply the use of force. FaÃlallÁh portrayed 
power – inasmuch as it is applied to oppose truth against falsehood – as a supreme 
value. His narrative offers not only an understanding of the reality but also an action 
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plan to change it by mobilisation and power. His argument was that fighting oppression 
is a sacred obligation of the faithful, and power that serves this supreme goal is a means 
of salvation. 
 
 
 8.     Antinomy (ÔibÁq) 
 
 In the justification of the use of force, FaÃlallÁh’s argument is based on the claim 
that it is Islamic as opposed to other non-Islamic forms of power and aggression. This 
approach necessitates the perception of a bipolar world in which what is Islamic is by 
essence good, and what is non-Islamic is essentially bad. Maintaining the constant 
tension between the two is indispensible for the internal logic of his reasoning. 
Therefore, in order to preserve the coherence of the argument, FaÃlallÁh depicts the 
world through mutually exclusive antinomies (ÔibÁq) a prominent rhetorical feature 
extremely popular in the current and past Arabic political and religious discourses. In 
this rhetorical figure, concepts with irreconcilably opposing meaning are juxtaposed in 
the same sentence or paragraph and shape the style and the argument of FaÃlallÁh’s 
discourse. Ideally in the rhetorical contrasts, words, clauses, or sentences are 
approximately equivalent in length and balanced by parallel arrangement in adjacent 
grammatical structures.
905
 
 From among the most prevalent ÔibÁq pairs in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, I 
will examine the following: positive (ÐjÁbÐ) vs. negative (salbÐ); goodness (khayr) vs. 
evil (sharr); falsehood (bÁÔil) vs. righteousness (Îaqq); strength (quwwa) vs. weakness 
(ÃaÝf); faith (ÐmÁn) vs. disbelief (kufr); right (maÝrÙf) vs. wrong (munkar); leniency 
(luÔf) vs. violence (Ýunf ); realistic (wÁqiÝÐ) vs. idealistic (mithÁlÐ). 
 The juxtaposition between “positive” and “negative” is used to describe attitudes 
and perceptions. In the text, they are directly contrasted nine times
906
 besides the titles 
of eight subchapters (six times in Chapter 4 and twice in Chapter 6), where FaÃlallÁh 
denotes the topic by these concepts. Thus, he contrasts the positive and negative aspects 
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of the morality of power,
907
 as well as that of the theoretical, emotional and practical 
aspects of social strength.
908
 In each case, the term “negative” stands for rejection of 
what is opposed to the Islamic principles, while “positive” means what is in accordance 
with them. 
 The concepts of “goodness” and “evil” denote the intentions behind an action. 
They are directly juxtaposed ten times.
909
 Regarding the position of non-believers in an 
Islamic state, FaÃlallÁh claims that they “must be acquainted with Islam, its justice, 
security, and goodness, away from the influence of atheism and its corruption (...)”910 
As such, evil is synonymous with corruption (fasÁd) and exploitation (istighlÁl), while 
goodness stands for justice (ÝadÁla) and security (amn) that serves the interest of human 
beings.
911
  
 The contrast between “righteousness” and “falsehood” is emphasised fifteen times 
in the book.
912
 The following quote summarises FaÃlallÁh’s position on the Islamic 
goals and the necessity of human action put in the Manichaean framework of good and 
bad: 
 
God does not like corruption [that opposes] the greatest aims of Islam, which 
establishes life on the basis of righteousness (...) [However,] it is not realised 
unless Man works on the basis of justice and reform.
913
  
 
Thus, righteousness sometimes appears synonymous with justice, reform and also unity 
of God (tawÎÐd), while falsehood equals corruption and tyranny (ÔughyÁn). The 
antinomy of strength / force / power as opposed to weakness interweaves al-IslÁm wa-
manÔiq al-quwwa; it appears approximately 40 times.914 In various forms, FaÃlallÁh 
repeatedly reminds his readers that renouncing strength consciously and voluntarily 
counts as a sin and even as disbelief, while “the Islamic use of power does not lead to 
corruption, but seeks to promote the welfare of mankind in life”.915 
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 FaÃlallÁh uses ÐmÁn and islÁm as oposites of disbelief (kufr) and polytheism 
(shirk) fourteen times in the book.916 Furthermore, shirk and kufr appear as inherently 
associated with oppression and injustice. Consequently, FaÃlallÁh defines the primary 
goals of Islam as “establishing justice and removing oppression”.917  He also condemns 
the governments that “take an Islamic character” but in fact discard the religious 
principles, accusing them of deviation, which is not differentiated from shirk.918 Related 
to this is the distinction between maÝrÙf and munkar which is central to Islamic legal 
thought. It appears in three sub-chapters, in the contexts of resisting tyranny, the social 
importance of legal commitments, and the use of force as a means of change.
919
 
FaÃlallÁh sets another antinomy between the realistic approach as opposed to groundless 
idealism, stressing that Islam demands the practicality of ideas and emotions; otherwise 
they will turn out to be a dream or a mirage.
920
  
 Sometimes, FaÃlallÁh reconciles binary oppositions such as lenience vs. force, 
freedom vs. compulsion
921
 presenting Islam as a comprehensive system. For example, 
he asserts that “strength is neither the tolerance in times of peace to preserve life, nor is 
it the violence in times of war that demolishes life (…) Islam advocates both peace and 
war to preserve freedom, as well as all the virtues and principles it believes in”.922 Thus, 
FaÃlallÁh attempts to go beyond the “phenomenon” and declares the value-based 
inclusiveness of Islam in which the seemingly mutually exclusive means can be equally 
legitimate by rendering them Islamic.  
 The governing idea underlying FaÃlallÁh’s bifurcation of all material and spiritual 
phenomena is his conviction that  
 
The righteous, helpless people are left with two choices: either to abandon the call 
to Islam so that the oppressors enjoy corruption on Earth, or to confront the 
oppressors with all the means available: their property and their entire existence.
923
   
 
                                                             
916 See eg.: al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, pp. 50, 60, 127, 142, 173, 240, 242, 248, 257, 260, 278, 279, 
289. 
917 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 65. 
918 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 234. 
919 See eg.: al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, pp. 63-68, 96, 153, 155, 266-8. 
920 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 141-142. 
921 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 243. 
922 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 205. 
923 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 204. 
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For FaÃlallÁh, neutrality is not a legitimate response to the challenges of life. Rather, it 
counts as weakness. Human beings are expected to draw a dividing line between what 
they seek and what they renounce.
924
  
 This overuse of antinomy emphasises FaÃlallÁh’s Manichaeism, which is a salient 
characteristic of religious fundamentalist rhetoric. Besides promising salvation in the 
hereafter, he sets clearly defined political goals for this world as well. FaÃlallÁh divides 
the world into “us, the believers” and “them, the infidels”, and exempts the believers 
from the burden of rationally defining what is right and what counts as wrong. In H. L. 
Goodall’s words, this approach “serves to simplify a complex world that is otherwise 
threatening, unknown, ambiguous, different, and often unfair, so much so that it 
becomes the duty of all true believers to rid the world of “them” [even] by force” 925 
Describing reality in binary oppositions is necessarily essentialist and offers a simplistic 
view of human existence. As such, it is valid only among the confines of a particular 
system of thought. 
 Used by a ShÐÝÐ religious authority words such as “justice”, “oppression”, 
“sacrifice”, “martyrdom”, “steadfastness” – as Charteris-Black puts it – “evoke iconic 
images that resonate with historical myths”, in the present case with the events of 
KarbalÁʼ. In his reasoning, FaÃlallÁh applies “paired dualities” such as “just” and 
“unjust”, “good” and “evil”, “freedom” and “subjugation”, “morality” and 
“immorality”. Following Charteris-Black’s approach, these “are mythic archetypes that 
evaluate human experience as either positive or negative”. FaÃlallÁh applies 
dichotomies in order to establish a new – political – myth in which collaboration, 
quietism, compromises are associated with decay and deviation, while resistance, revolt, 
and activism equal life force. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
924 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 97. 
925 H. L. Goodall, Jr., “Blood, Shit, and Tears: The Terrorist as Abject Other” (a paper presented at the 
conference on “Managing and Legislating Workplace Abjection,” University of York, United Kingdom, 
September 23, 2009). Quoted in Halverson et al., 22. 
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 9.  Metaphors of battle(field) 
 
 Metaphors are essential to any rhetoric.
926
 They extend the meaning of a word into 
an imagined space in which the speaker, indirectly, influences the cognitive perception 
of reality held by his audience. In his Poetics Aristotle defined metaphor as “giving the 
thing a name that belongs to something else”.927 Thus, the metaphorical world of a 
rhetor creates an alternative “particular reality”,928 which interacts with “the conceptual 
system”929 of its receivers.  
 This shift is manifested in the “psychological association between the attributes of 
the original referent of a metaphor (that of a word in its source domain [where it 
‘normally’ occurs], and those of the metaphor target [where it does not]”.930 The task of 
a rhetorician is to persuade the audience that the target (imagined world) is as true as the 
source (reality). A social and cultural value system can turn a metaphor into a myth. By 
myth, I mean “a narrative that embodies a set of beliefs expressing aspects of the 
unconscious [and] provides an explanation of all the things for which explanations are 
felt to be necessary”.931 “Political myths” are created by binding novel modes of action 
to traditional values through metaphors. The evaluation implicit in figurative language, 
thus, appeals to the emotions of the audience and the resulting political myth becomes a 
venue for a new perception of a given problem. 
 Among the rhetorical tools applied by FaÃlallÁh, metaphors have a special 
significance. In the following, I will look at one of the most recurrent of them in al-
IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa: the notion of maÝraka battle(field). Battle or battlefield is 
the place or act in which force in any form is manifested. In my analysis, first I located 
all the occurrences of maÝraka and its synonyms in the text. Second, I distinguished the 
                                                             
926 On the use of metaphors in early Arabic literature see: Wolfhart Heinrichs, The Hand of the 
Northwind: Opinions on Metaphor and the Early Meaning of istiÝÁra in Arabic Poetics (Wiesbaden: 
Steiner, 1977). 
927 Aristotle, The Poetics of Aristotle, transl. by S. H. Butcher (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902), 
accessed 12 February, 2014. http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1974. 
928 Souhad Kahil, “A Rhetorical Examination and Critique of Hezbollah” (PhD diss., Graduate College of 
Bowling Green State University, 2006), 17. 
929 Jonathan Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave-MacMillan, 2005), 15.  
930 Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric, 15, 14. 
931 Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric, 22. 
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metaphoric from the literal use of the word. By identifying the target (the reference) and 
the context in the third step, I highlight the message conveyed by the metaphor.  
 Arabic provides a rich collection of synonyms for the concept of battle and fight. 
FaÃlallÁh uses the words qitÁl, ÒirÁÝ, Îarb, but the most often applied expression in the 
book is maÝraka. It is a locative that literally refers to the place of the confrontation, 
sometimes substituted with the expressions sÁÎat/ ÎÁlÁt al-ÒirÁÝ, majÁl al-ÒirÁÝ, or sÁÎat 
al-Îarb wa ’l-qitÁl (the place of combat).932 FaÃlallÁh’s choice of referring to the various 
situations embedded in human existence as maÝraka offers broad interpretation to the 
reader. The battlefield can be concrete or abstract, and the act itself violent as well as 
non-violent. The Arabic word maÝraka is translated as battle or battlefield, depending on 
the context. 
 As we have seen in the sections dealing with the various forms of jihÁd, change 
and resistance, fight is a positive notion for FaÃlallÁh. All through the book, his aim is 
to demystify the resort to violence in order to defend and secure the values and interests 
of the community. With this goal in mind, FaÃlallÁh imbues the book with the notion of 
maÝraka, insinuating that life in its all aspects is a battlefield where violence can be a 
basic and natural human response to the various challenges and dangers posed to the 
individual and to the community.  
 In FaÃlallÁh’s text maÝraka provides the source domain. The target domain is any 
perceived or real field where threat is probable. In fact, as I showed in the section on 
antinomies all fields of human activity could oppose Islam, therefore, any field is a 
battlefield. In the following, I detect the transformation stimulated by the use of 
metaphors that secure the persuasive capacity of FaÃlallÁh’s argument. I argue that the 
number and the extent of battle metaphors prove the martial character of FaÃlallÁh’s 
philosophy of power. 
 Jonathan Charteris-Black claims that metaphors relate abstract notions and 
“ideologies” to daily experience and thus make them affective and accessible.933 
Consequently, it is necessary to point to the context, the tangible reality that inspires the 
use of a particular metaphor, which in turn legitimates a proposed ideology or policy. 
FaÃlallÁh’s use of the notion “battlefield” both metaphorically and literally connects the 
two realms into a coherent unity. On the one hand, this strategy demystifies violence as 
                                                             
932 See: al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 28, 95, 97, 302. 
933 Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric, 22. 
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a concrete act. On the other hand, understood metaphorically, it integrates the daily 
human – not necessarily violent – reactions into the dominant ShÐÝÐ myth of cosmic 
battle against injustice and oppression.  
 FaÃlallÁh uses the word maÝraka and its synonyms in two ways: literally and 
metaphorically. The two uses intertwine and provide the text with semantic coherence. 
Considering the context in which the book was published – 1976 Beirut – it is not 
surprising that the literal and metaphorical meanings of battle and power are 
inseparable. The literal meaning refers to historical events as well as actions in physical 
combat. The metaphoric use connects the literal with the figurative meanings through its 
capacity to understand it in both ways. In some cases, the various uses are applied in the 
same statement. 
 FaÃlallÁh refers to a wide range of Islamic battles such as ÍiÔÔÐn,
934
 Badr,
935
 
UÎud,
936
 al-AÎzÁb,
937
 and Íunayn
938
. Apart from the ideological significance of these 
events which is inherent to FaÃlallÁh’s argument, these battles carry a political meaning 
as well. Considering the political situation in Lebanon at the time, the inferior position 
and fragmentation of the ShÐÝa, the early battles of the Muslim community recall the 
potentials of the righteous minority and the importance of faith and organisation. In this 
discourse, the problems and enemies of the past are re-materialised in the present, with 
the same significance although in a different setting.
939
 The sections where battlefield is 
mentioned in its literal sense deal with topics such as the problem of material strength 
                                                             
934 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 236.  
935 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 293-296. 
936 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa,  270. 
937 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 270. 
938 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 175-8. 
939 Other examples in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa: “Some people believe that the numerical strength 
secures victory and makes the losses not significant in the battlefield.” p. 163, “[There is a commonly 
held belief that] large quantity provides the basis for victory in the battlefield rather than the quality (...)” 
p. 173; “This feeling of weakness could have led to their defeat if some conscious people did not wake 
faith in them that pushed the battle towards victory.” p. 175; “The call to Islam is a supreme goal that 
justifies entering the battlefield for its sake.” p. 222; “The regulations of this faith calls for defiance in the 
battle till martyrdom (...) no matter how serious it is. (...)” p. 291; “The revolutions of the ImÁm ÝAlÐ and 
al-Íusayn were (…) the result of known circumstances (…) whether regarding the situations that made 
entering the battlefield inescapable or the (...) legitimate principles that motivate the action of the battle. 
Thus the outcome of the battle differs according to the various objective circumstances.” p. 270; “The 
Imams' lack of support for revolts against the prevailing ruler (...) was based on the inability of their 
leadership to govern (...) and to achieve the desired victory in the battlefield.” p. 272; “Believing in AllÁh 
makes the believer (…) rewarded in the hereafter, and in case of victory he earns God’s satisfaction in the 
herein with governing life in the battle of life (...) we have to believe in Allah with a faith that calls us to 
prepare for the battlefield of victory through understanding faith.” p. 292; “If there is no balance in the 
military power then the imposed battlefield becomes suicidal in which the opponent can easily and 
quickly win.” p. 303. 
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and numerical inferiority, the significance of having a specific strategy,
940
 and 
estimating the possibility to effect change in the status quo.  
 A more complex example is the issue of the so-called martyrdom operations. 
FaÃlallÁh’s practical stance is as follows:  “...only in cases when sacrifice and suicidal 
operation is part of the strategic plan to buttress the stance amidst violence can we 
regard such [acts] as manifestations of strength complying with the nature of the 
battlefield.”941 In other cases, battle can be understood literally by the context. However, 
its meaning can be extended to become metaphorical as in the following statement: “a 
few believers could win over a large number of non-believers when they transformed 
their faith into a new element of force in the battlefield.”942 This idea is applicable to 
every situation when one is confident of possessing the truth while facing a numerically 
superior group that holds an opposing view. 
 The notion of battle(field) is applied extensively and above all as a metaphor. The 
topics in which battle(field) is used in a metaphorical sense include the right to stand up 
to tyranny, the importance of spiritual strength in dealing with various challenges
943
 and 
instinctive pulls,
944
 as well as the pitfalls of excessive retreat from the world,
945
 the 
significance of social strength, the relation of force to the call to Islam, and the 
importance of faith in generating strength. FaÃlallÁh makes use of this metaphor also in 
                                                             
940 “How can we explain the victory of the infidels if faith in God was everything in the battle of life? (...) 
The case of victory and defeat in life is influenced by many objective causes related to the nature of the 
battlefield.” al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 289. 
941 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 304. The order of the clauses is inverted in the translation 
for facilitating the understanding. 
942 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 173. 
943 Other examples in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa: “The colonising powers’ resort to the destruction of 
spiritual strength in order to win in the battlefield as start for their combat with the smaller nations.” p. 
73. “These malicious claims aim at creating scepticism about Islam’s capacity to thrive in an 
environment where military power is totally absent and where there is freedom of thought, confined only 
to the battlefield of ideas.” p. 217. 
944 Other examples in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa: “They do not seek to win over themselves in the 
battlefields of desire (…) they do not feel the presence of any sacred battlefield in such domains.” p. 96. 
“[Those who seek pleasure excessively are] the same as the previous group [ascets] in being defeated in 
combat situations (mawÁqif al-ÒirÁÝ).” p. 97. “[Islam urges] to always engage in a battle against the means 
of oppressive deviation that weaken the will in the same way as we fight in the battlefield against 
external enemies (…). Therefore, we perceive the internal enemy (...) a greater danger than the external 
enemy, and the battlefield in which one confronts his / her oppressive desires as more noble then the 
battlefield where one fights his / her other enemies.” p. 98. “If there was a spacious battlefield between 
you and your enemy you possessed freedom of action (...) as for the internal enemy (...) the two warring 
parties are you yourself (...) it is the most difficult battlefield (...)”p. 99. 
945  “Getting off from the challenges of life (…) hinders Man from the opportunity to acquire strength 
through facing the challenges of the battlefield (sÁÎat al-ÒirÁÝ).” al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 95.  
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his definition of morality, the problem of change and the demand of infallible 
leadership, and in his concluding remarks on the ideal nature of power.
946
  
 An example for the metaphorical use of maÝraka is the following: “The state of 
anger prevents man from being consistent and stable in opposing the challenging forces. 
It leads to the loss of the reins of power in the battle, in which there is need for a 
personality who has the power of nerves to control the battlefield.”947 This statement is 
in the conclusion of the book. Thus, it provides a kind of synthesis of how FaÃlallÁh 
imagines the righteous and purposeful use of force in all possible domains, in the battles 
of war as well as in the battles of everyday life. In each case, acting out of pure instinct 
can be fatal.  
 Battle(field) as a metaphor can refer to acts of resistance as well as the social, 
economic, political, and intellectual fields of life,
948
 and to the psyche of the believer
949
. 
Accordingly, the enemy can be all those who criticise Islam in any form, who cause a 
rift in the society, who resort to quietism, and those who act without self-restraint. 
FaÃlallÁh returns to the old myth of the united, responsible, and determined Islamic 
community and personality.  
                                                             
946 Other examples in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa: “Material strength is not decisive in itself for 
winning in the battlefield without its being based on spiritual strength.” p. 7; “Fragmented society is not 
able to win in the battlefield regardless the strength it has. A society in which solidarity and unity prevails 
balances the scale of the battlefield no matter how limited its strength is.” p. 8; “There are many other 
situations in which precaution is needed (…) before entering into the battlefield.” p. 210; “Some people 
might make a direct connection between these actions and the case of infallibility (...) guarantees the 
safety of the battlefield (…) and directs it to achieve legitimate objectives through righteous and lawful 
means (…)”p. 269; “Military conflict forces the two warring sides to fight in order to win in the 
battlefield. (...) withdrawal can be a sign of strength if it is part of a military strategy based on the 
objective conditions of the battlefield.” pp. 301-2; “Patience (...) enables the person (...) to bear the pain 
that is imposed on him as a natural characteristic of the battlefield.” p. 305; “(...) the need to protect Islam 
from its enemies, whom it is fighting in the battlefield of belief (Ýaqida) and life.” p. 320. 
947 FaÃlallÁh, al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 323. 
948 Other examples in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa: “[The] spiritual destruction that precedes the war of 
nerves determines victory or defeat in all battlefields of life.” pp. 86-87. “Jewish community and the (...) 
Muslim community when they stood face to face in the battleground of life and belief (ÝaqÐda) (...) the 
[solidarity] of the Muslims enlivened them in the centre of the battlefield. The same comparison can be 
made with the on-going battles between our societies and other societies in the battlefields of the present 
and that of the future, in the fight between strength and weakness and between truth and falsehood.” p. 
120. 
949 Other examples in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa:  “(...) submission to injustice means lack of faith 
(...) and deviation (...) The collaborators and those who are neutral standing in the battlefield between 
justice and oppression, and watch the battle from the sidelines, without helping the battle or participating 
in the fight, are responsible.” p. 69. “[The colonizers want] to weaken them psychologically (...) until 
they reach their specific goal in subjugating them without any effort or engagement in confrontation in 
the political and intellectual battlefield.” p. 78. “[V]ictory is being steadfast in the battlefield (...) the one 
who flees gets defeated.” al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, 95-6. 
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 FaÃlallÁh’s technique is based on reification, the reference to abstract phenomena 
– such as tensions and confrontations characteristic to human existence – by the 
concrete notions of battle and battlefield. As Charteris-Black observed, the systematic 
nature of metaphor choices informs us how social relations are perceived in a given 
context, and how beliefs “are conceived and communicated”.950 In FaÃlallÁh’s use, the 
metaphor of battlefield is ascribed to various actions suggesting an underlying 
“conceptual metaphor” that life is conflict. The conceptual (underlying) metaphor, “life 
is a battlefield” determines the choice of words such as “submission”, “collaboration”, 
“destruction”, “subjugation”, “destruction”, “confrontation”, “escape”, “neutral”, 
“steadfast”. Acts of the believers are described with the terminology of warfare, leading 
to either victory or defeat as if they were part of a military campaign.
951
 Inherently 
related to this perception is the idea that religion was revealed to guide Man in the 
ongoing mythic cosmic clash of the good and bad. This affirms that religious metaphors 
can lead to a radical confrontational attitude. Furthermore, religion can provide the 
goals, the strategies, and even the tools of the combat.   
 The evaluation implicit in this semantic transfer is that the believer is a combatant, 
witness to his faith, a shahÐd in all meanings of the term. The other party is depicted as 
an adversary to Islamic values and goals, alien, unjust, oppressive, and invading. In 
Charteris-Black’s analysis, “enemies can be classified into groups based on the targets 
of [the] metaphors”.952 FaÃlallÁh names the tangible enemies such as the imperialist 
powers, oppressive rulers, the rich, the corrupt religious leaders and politicians, the 
atheists, and their collaborators, and those who stay neutral.
953
 From among the abstract 
or unseen enemies he identifies exploitation, oppression, injustice, desire, ambition, 
fear, lack of faith, lack of confidence or excessive asceticism.  
 In this conflict model, the various tangible and intangible enemies are 
interchangeable since they share the same characteristics. Often they are made identical 
through the application of metonymy in which the tangible enemy such as the 
collaborators stand for weakness, colonisers stand for injustice, while activist Islam 
represents justice and its agents embody strength. The metonymy can be based on 
evaluations or causation but in each case the link is primarily emotional. In FaÃlallÁh’s 
                                                             
950 Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric, 3. 
951 Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric, 90. 
952 Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric, 90. 
953 Chapter 4 on “Social Strength” in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa. 
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argument, we can also detect “a slippage from a metaphoric relation of association to a 
logical relation of causation”.954 In the “metaphor frame”, the political establishment, 
the quietist ShÐÝÐ tradition, and non-Islamic ideologies are related as causes to the social-
economic problems, and to the political weakness and deprivation of the community as 
effects.  
 As Charteris-Black rightly observed, the persuasive capacity of metaphors lies in 
the fact that they are culturally embedded and thus capable of arousing “hidden 
associations that govern our systems of evaluation”.955 FaÃlallÁh, thus, faced the task to 
transform the negative resonance of fighting in the ShÐÝÐ circles into a positive one. In 
order to convince his audience, he had to appeal to the reason as well as to the emotions 
of his followers. Terming every aspect of human life as a potential or actual battlefield, 
FaÃlallÁh made use of the power of metaphors in binding the “conscious and 
unconscious means of persuasion – between cognition and emotion – to create a moral 
perspective on life”.956 Thus, through the use of metaphors, FaÃlallÁh managed to 
influence the emotional associations of the Lebanese ShÐÝa and re-interpret the ShÐÝÐ 
ethos.  
 
 
 Concluding remarks 
 
 As Charteris-Black rightly observed, “[p]ersuasion is a multi-layered discourse 
function that is the outcome of a complex interaction between intention, linguistic 
choice and context.”957 In this chapter, I highlighted some of the rhetorical strategies 
employed by FaÃlallÁh to persuade the quietist ShÐÝa and analysed the way these tools 
transmit his message of power. Thus, I studied FaÃlallÁh’s discourse of power as a text 
and a rhetorical strategy, closely related as they are in Islam and beyond. FaÃlallÁh’s 
rhetoric constructs a religious ideology in which force is understood as virtuous, 
instrumental and necessary to promote the interests of the ShÐÝa minority. He also uses 
the argument from the Qur’Án as an ultimate authority and quotes it widely to legitimise 
power. Moreover, repetition and rhetorical questions help FaÃlallÁh create a coherent 
                                                             
954 Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric, 100. 
955 Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric, 2. 
956 Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric, 13. 
957 Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric, 30. 
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discourse. His ShÐÝÐ master narratives, antinomies and metaphors foster a salvation 
history in which the good, oppressed ShÐÝa oppose the camp of evil, disbelief, and 
tyranny.  
 FaÃlallÁh’s discourse reproduces some of the main features of Islamist rhetoric, 
the main patterns of which are identified by Jacob Høigilt as authority, emotion and 
polemics.
958
 In al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa, FaÃlallÁh does not make emotion central 
to his argument. However, it is present due to the extensive use of figurative language. 
He talks as an authority in declaring the need for a comprehensive Islamic theory of 
power, based on scriptural arguments and including ethics of power. Furthermore, as I 
showed above, he talks as an “aggressive polemicist”959 with one aim in mind: to 
convince the ShÐÝa of the inevitability of activism, and to provide them with the 
necessary self-confidence to engage in it. 
 In addition to authority and polemics, FaÃlallÁh’s rhetoric suggests three patterns 
that differ from the ones identified by Høigilt. These are justification, 
comprehensiveness and hybridity. Justification, a central pattern to Islamist rhetoric as a 
whole, consists in legitimating the use of force all along the discourse. Different 
arguments such as virtue, necessity etc. are used to persuade his audience of the 
legitimacy of violence. This pattern aims at the Islamisation of power. That is, while 
Islamist rhetoric acknowledges the difficulties of dealing with power from a religious 
point of view, it justifies force and ultimately Islamises it. Justification is also closely 
related to apologetics. Often, FaÃlallÁh employs models of justification to counterattack 
criticism directed at Islam as a violent religion, based on jihÁd.  
 As for comprehensiveness, it arises from the idea that Islamic power is a totality 
that encompasses all aspects of life. To convince his audience, FaÃlallÁh relies on 
rhetorical questions, repetition, metaphors and Qur’Ánic verses to create an apparently 
reasoned and comprehensive representation of the world.  
 Finally, FaÃlallÁh sustains a pattern of hybridity in his use of various rhetorical 
devices and various references including SunnÐ, quietist ShÐÝÐ sources, Orientalist, and 
other Western references. This intermingled variation creates a composite rhetoric that 
aspires to persuade through the multitude of rhetorical tools. However, the diverse 
elements add up to a coherent rhetorical strategy due to their interrelatedness serving 
                                                             
958 Høigilt, Islamist Rhetoric, 177-181. 
959 Terms applied by Høigilt in Islamist Rhetoric, 179. 
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the underlying idea: discourse of power. FaÃlallÁh substitutes logical reasoning with a 
complex rhetorical sleight-of-hand, leading his audience to believe in the validity of his 
ideology. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The main purpose of this dissertation was to determine the contribution of 
MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh’s concept of power to modern ShÐÝism. Accordingly, the 
present study offers the first comprehensive research on FaÃlallÁh’s theory of power 
which he developed in his al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa. This book provides a 
systematic and complex theory of power in which FaÃlallÁh redefined ShÐÝism, against 
quietism, as an Islamic activist movement of change and justice. He covered the 
theological, social, political, and ethical aspects of power in a de-mystified, pragmatic, 
hybrid discourse that greately determined the path taken by ShÐÝÐ Islamists in Lebanon. 
 I argued that FaÃlallÁh’s concept of power represents a transformative paradigm 
which best explains the mindset and pragmatic characteristics of the ShÐÝÐ impetus for 
power. His theory has two angles: one that could be labelled – based on S. Clegg’s 
theory – as “the circuits of power”. According to this perception the different 
constituents of power form a system in which they appear as both instruments and 
goals. The second is the modalities of power in which FaÃlallÁh elaborates on the ethics 
and rhetoric of power.  
 The thematic analysis of al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa and of his other writings – 
studied in chapters 3-7 of the present dissertation – covers the “circuits of power” such 
as theology, spirituality, society and politics. The study has found that FaÃlallÁh 
construes the notion of power as an overarching system that embraces the spiritual and 
material realms of life, and equates Islam with just power. I argued that it is this 
systemic approach to power that allows and sets the ground for transforming faith, 
spirituality, social order, and politics into tools of empowerment. As a result, Islam 
appears as the sole legitimate holder of power which in turn necessitates a totalitarian 
order: divinely vested and submissive. 
 I also showed that FaÃlallÁh centred his theology of power on linking tawÎÐd to 
justice and transforming both notions into doctrinal bases of the believer’s 
empowerment. Here, I highlighted the interconnectedness of faith and power, and the 
significance of causality and human free-will in FaÃlallÁh’s system of power. 
Furthermore, I showed that by these features FaÃlallÁh transforms theology into a 
revolutionary doctrine. 
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 An additional finding to emerge from this study is that FaÃlallÁh’s transformative 
ShÐÝism reinterprets ÑÙfÐsm and ShÐÝÐ spirituality as “spirituality-in-action”, turning it 
into an effective tool against colonialism and Orientalism. This invigorating spirituality 
contributes to transforming the theology of power into practice. FaÃlallÁh’s 
interpretation of mysticism enabled his theory to provide practical guidance to spiritual 
as well as to tangible empowerment. 
 The study of the social dimensions of FaÃlallÁh’s theory suggests that solidarity 
and the obligation of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” are intertwined in 
FaÃlallÁh’s perception of social power. I argued that FaÃlallÁh’s social theory – rooted 
in his theology and spirituality of power – transformed individual faith into a collective 
project of action. Furthermore, I emphasised FaÃlallÁh’s perception of social power as a 
venue for building power from below that turns social bonds into political action. In this 
regard, my analysis affirmed that his social thought found an echo in ÍizbullÁh’s social 
activism. 
 FaÃlallÁh’s ideas on political power enhance the transformative paradigm as an 
effective way to read the history of modern ShÐÝism. FaÃlallÁh’s reinterpretation of some 
traditional ShÐÝÐ concepts regarding the MahdÐ, quietism during the occultation of the 
Twelfth ImÁm (intiÛÁr), the necessity of infallible leadership (ÝiÒma), and dissimulation 
(taqiyya) are consistently marked by the call to action and the commitment to change 
and revolution. The transformative interpretation of theology, spirituality, and social 
values was a prelude to his concept of political power. I examined how FaÃlallÁh 
reconstructed Islamic political theory regarding revolution as a means of change, the 
functions of the state, and the rules of international relations. I also analysed FaÃlallÁh’s 
concept of jihÁd and Islamisation. I showed that his pragmatism as reflected in his 
remarks on tactics and strategy made his Islamist approach flexible and even reluctant at 
the same time. 
 An original contribution of my dissertation is the study of the modalities of power 
in which I investigated the ethical and rhetorical aspects of FaÃlallÁh’s discourse on 
power. Both dimensions of modern Islamist thought and that of ShÐÝism in particular are 
not sufficiently studied in Western scholarship. In my last two chapters (chapters 8 and 
9), I offered an in-depth analysis of the ethical rulings set by FaÃlallÁh and the rhetorical 
tools he applied in his argumentation. 
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 With reference to FaÃlallÁh’s ethics of power, I claimed that his ideas as 
expounded in al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa constitute the first comprehensive ShÐÝÐ 
ethics of action, by providing a theologically justified alternative to quietism. In this, he 
covered every aspect of life that had been affected by the quietist interpretation of the 
religious tradition, and which FaÃlallÁh perceived as an obstable of change. First, I 
established that FaÃlallÁh’s understanding of the justification and the limits of force is 
framed by the “divine command ethics”. In this system, whatever serves the purposeful 
divine will is legitimate and ethical. Accordingly, the forms, the conditions, and the 
scope of legitimate force are based on the Islamic revelation which makes this concept 
primarily legalist and deontological. This feature highlights the difference between the 
Nietzscheian cult of power and what FaÃlallÁh defines as Islamic. Another key 
observation of this chapter is that FaÃlallÁh vested human beings with a high degree of 
freedom in adapting general principles to actual circumstances. I illustrated this claim 
with some of his legal opinions from the field of bioethics too. This character provides 
his ethics with a significant utilitarian dimension. As such, I concluded that his ethics 
could be best labelled as theistic utilitarianism or purposeful voluntarism.  
 The concluding chapter of the dissertation examined a little studied aspect of 
Islamist writings, the rhetorical tools that guarantee the effectiveness of their polemics 
and that of their call to action. I examined the rhetorical strategies FaÃlallÁh uses to 
support his system of power. I showed that FaÃlallÁh reconstructed the value system of 
the believers in two ways. First, he turned the use of force into part of the shahÁda, and 
second, proved that every field of human existence is a battlefield. By interpreting life 
as a continuous combat he rewrote the myth of passive suffering and substitutes it with 
an activist – militant or political – Islamism. The rhetorical analysis suggests that 
FaÃlallÁh’s refutation of the image of Islam as a violent religion while still 
acknowledging the need to justify aspirations to power is built on his tactics of 
Islamising power and force. By his rhetoric, FaÃlallÁh constructed a religious ideology 
in which power is understood as virtuous, instrumental, and essential to promote the 
interests of the ShÐÝa minority. 
 FaÃlallÁh’s al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa was shown to be an alternative ShÐÝÐ 
narrative of power the aim of which was to transform the ShÐÝÐ community from 
quietism to activism. This narrative can be summarised in three features: compositeness 
(or hybridity), comprehensiveness, and concern with empowerment. Each of them is 
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simultaneously present in FaÃlallÁh’s work and they complement one another, giving it 
complexity and uniqueness. 
 First, the compositeness of FaÃlallÁh’s theory stems from his attempt to answer 
various challenges that Western thought (mainly Marxism and Orientalism), SunnÐ 
fundamentalism, ShÐÝÐ quietism, and secular Arab nationalism posed to a specifically 
ShÐÝÐ mobilisation and activism. In his work, FaÃlallÁh integrated traditional references 
with modern ideologies and created a new ShÐÝÐ narrative of power, composed of leftist 
western notions and the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood in its Quṭbist trend. This 
heterogeneity gives his system of power pragmatism and flexibility. 
 FaÃlallÁh’s perception of Islam as a system echoed some ideas by KhumaynÐ and 
MuÎammad BÁqir al-Ñadr, as well as Sayyid Quṭb’s radical conception of Islam, tawÎÐd 
and power, and Arab Marxist ideology. FaÃlallÁh’s voluntarist theological attitude 
comprises the refutation of the Marxist views, references to ShÐÝÐ ÎadÐth and ideas from 
MuÝtazilÐ theology. Regarding spiritual power, FaÃlallÁh based his ideas on the 
reinterpretation of ÑÙfÐ concepts. In his concept of social power, he combined elements 
of medieval Islamic social thought (“commanding right and forbidding wrong”) with 
Western social theory such as Functionalism. In his ethical views, FaÃlallÁh did not 
limit himself to the ShÐÝÐ narrative of injustice. Instead, he made extensive use of SunnÐ 
sources, quoted and criticised Western moral philosophy. In general, we can conclude 
that FaÃlallÁh’s references to the ShÐÝÐ tradition were cautious and limited. He constantly 
selected elements that were part and parcel of quietism and turned them into an 
inspiration for mobilisation and action.  
 Second, the comprehensiveness of FaÃlallÁh’s concept is rooted in the same 
reasons as its compositeness. He had to address social and political issues already dealt 
with by Marxists and SunnÐ Islamist thinkers. As a top-rank jurist, he carried out this 
task from the position of a traditional ShÐÝÐ authority and designed a concept of 
empowerment that encompassed all aspects of life. In FaÃlallÁh’s thought power is, 
therefore, a system that combines the spiritual and material realms of the created world.  
 Third, the concern with empowerment results from the will to provide the 
deprived ShÐÝÐ community of Lebanon with a project of acquiring power. In FaÃlallÁh’s 
concept, each aspect of quwwa serves the empowerment of the Islamic community and 
every single aspect of quieitism weakens it. Thus, he pursued two objectives. On the 
one side, he wanted to deconstruct the quietist ShÐÝÐ narrative. On the other, he aimed to 
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reinterpret Islam as just power. Faith and spirituality are essential to the empowerment 
of the believer while social and political power emerge as expressions for collective 
power.  
 The findings of this dissertation support the idea that modern ShÐÝÐ political 
thought underwent a transformative process, to which FaÃlallÁh’s theory was a 
significant contribution. The transformative paradigm I suggest helps to understand the 
ShÐÝÐ change from quietism to activism in all its dimensions. Namely, it provides an 
explanation for the pragmatism and the complexity of revivalist ShÐÝÐ political thought, 
contextualises it in its socio-political and intellectual background, describes its process, 
elements, and strategies and highlights its ultimate goal. This paradigm works 
particularly well in studying the ethical and rhetorical features of activist-revivalist 
narratives. I argued that understanding other ShÐÝÐ thinkers and movements – past and 
present equally – is greatly facilitated by detecting the comprehensive and composite 
nature of their discourse put at the service of the project of coming to power.  
 As recent developments proved, FaÃlallÁh’s theory of power has far-reaching 
practical implications. This fact shows the effectiveness of his rhetoric put at the service 
of a coherent ideology. FaÃlallÁh’s ideas inspired the Lebanese ÍizbullÁh on two levels: 
in its commitment to change the status quo, and in its pragmatic attitude in daily 
political strategies. ÍizbullÁh is active and resorts to force in issues that bear a regional 
significance and are related to its existence and material security, such as financial 
maintenance and arms supply. The cautious communication and successful propaganda 
of ÍizbullÁh – that caused a rise in its popularity even among the majority of Lebanese 
Christians in 2006 – echoes the rhetorical strategies deployed by FaÃlallÁh in his al-
IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa. Due to its radicalism, pragmatism and reluctance – 
regarding Lebanese internal affairs – ÍizbullÁh can be regarded as a proto-movement of 
Islamic power as FaÃlallÁh imagined it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  241 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
1. Books by MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh 
 
 
ÀfÁq IslÁmiyya [The Islamic horizons]. Beirut: DÁr al ZahrÁ’, 1980.  
ÀfÁq al-rÙÎ [Horizons of the spirit]. Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 2000. 
al-AkhlÁqiyyÁt al-Ôibbiyya wa-akhlÁqiyyÁt al-ÎayÁt [Medical ethics and the ethics of 
life]. Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 2002. 
FÐ ÁfÁq al-ÎiwÁr al-IslÁmÐ al-MasÐÎÐ [On the horizons of the Islamic-Christian dialogue]. 
Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk 1994. 
Fiqh al-sharÐÝa [Jurisprudence of the sharÐÝa] Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 2003. 
al-IjtihÁd bayna ÝaÒr al-mÁÃÐ wa ÁfÁq al-mustaqbal [Independent legal reasoning 
between the past and the horizons of the future]. al-DÁr al-BayÃÁ’: al-Markaz al-ThaqÁfÐ 
al-ÝArabÐ, 2009. 
IrÁdat al-quwwa [The will to power]. Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 2000.  
al-IslÁm wa-manÔiq al-quwwa. [Islam and the logic of power]. Beirut: al-Mu’assasa al-
JÁmiÝiyya li’l-DirÁsÁt wa’l-Nashr, 1985. 
al-Íaraka al-IslÁmiyya: humÙm wa-qaÃÁyÁ [The Islamic movement: concerns and 
issues]. Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 1993.  
al-Íaraka al-IslÁmiyya: mÁ lahÁ wa-mÁ ‘alayhÁ. [The Islamic movement: pros     and 
cons]. Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 2005. 
ÍiwÁrÁt fi’l-fikr wa’l-siyÁsa wa’l-ijtimÁÝ [Dialogues regarding ideas, politics, and 
society]. Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 2001. 
al-ÍiwÁr fÐ’l-qur’Án [Dialogue in the Qur’Án]. Beirut, DÁr al-MalÁk, 2001. 
KhaÔawÁt ÝalÁ ÔarÐq al-IslÁm. [Steps along the path of Islam]. Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 
2004. 
KitÁb al-jihÁd [The book of Jihad]. Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 1998. 
MaÝa rÙÎÁniyyat al-zaman [With the spirituality of the time]. Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 
2005. 
MafÁhÐm IslÁmiyya ÝÁmma [General Islamic Concepts]. Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk,  2001. 
MasÁ’il ÝaqÁ’idiyya. [Doctrinal matters].  Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 2001. 
Min wahy al-qur’Án. [From the inspiration of the Qur’Án]. Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 1998. 
  242 
QaÃÁyÁnÁ ‘alÁ Ãaw’ al-IslÁm [Our issues in the light of Islam]. Beirut: DÁr al- MalÁk, 
1996. 
al-RasÙl al-dÁÝiyya ( should be al-dÁÝ iya ) fi’l-qur’Án al-karÐm [The preaching 
messenger in the noble Qur’Án]. Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 2007. 
UslÙb al-daÝwa fÐ’l-Qur’Án. [The manner of calling to Islam in the Qur’Án]. Beirut: DÁr 
al-MalÁk, 1997.  
 
 
2.     Secondary literature 
 
 
 
Abd al-Jabbar, Faleh. The Shi‘ite Movement in Iraq. London: Saqi Books, 2003.  
 
AbuKhalil, As’ad. “Druze, SunnÐ and Shiite Political Leadership in Present-Day 
Lebanon.” Arab Studies Quarterly 7 (1985): 28-58. 
 ––––––. “Ideology and Practice of Hizballah in Lebanon: Islamization of Leninist 
Organizational Principles.” Middle Eastern Studies 27 (1991): 390-403. 
 
Abu-Rabi‘, Ibrahim M. Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab 
World. New York: SUNY Press, 1996. 
 
Akhavi, Shahrough. “Islam, Politics and Society in the Thought of Ayatullah Khomeini, 
Ayatullah Taliqani and Ali Shariati.” Middle Eastern Studies 24 (1988): 404-31. 
––––––. “Shari‘ati’s Social Thought.” In Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi‘ism from 
Quietism to Revolution, edited by N. R. Keddie, 125-144. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1983.  
 
Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1987. 
 
Alagha, Joseph Elie. “G. Banna’s and A. Fadlallah’s Views on Dancing.” Sociology of 
Islam 2 (2014): 60-86 
––––––. Hizbullah’s Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011. 
––––––. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology and 
Political Program. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006. 
 
Alatas, Sayyed Faris. “Islam and Socialism: Perspectives from Autonomous Social 
Science and Occidentalism.” In Investigating the South-South Dimension of Modernity 
and Islam: Circulating Visions, Intellectual Figures, Locations, edited by Georg Stauth 
and Helmut Buchholt, 113-129. Münster: LIT Verlag, 2002. 
 
Alexander, Jeffrey C. and Philip Smith, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Durkheim. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
 
  243 
Algar, Hamid. “Response to Browers.” Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies 5 (2012): 47-48. 
 
Amanat, Abbas. Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi‘ism. New York / London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2009. 
 
Appleby, R. Scott. “History in the Fundamentalist Imagination.” Journal of American 
History 89 (2002): 498-511. 
––––––.  ed. Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East. 
Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1996.  
––––––. “The Unholy Uses of the Apocalyptic Imagination: Twentieth Century 
Patterns.” In Apocalypse and Violence, edited by Abbas Amanat and John J. Collins, 
69-87. New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 2004. 
 
Amuzegar, Jahangir. The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution, The Pahlavis’ Triumph 
and Tragedy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. 
 
Arberry, A. J. ed. The Koran Interpreted: A Translation. New York: Touchstone, 1996. 
 
Aristotle. The Poetics of Aristotle. Translated by Samuel Henry Butcher, New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1902. Accessed 12 February, 2014. 
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1974.  
 
Arjomand, Kamran. “In Defense of the Sacred Doctrine: Mohammad Husayn al-
Shahristani’s Refutation of Materialism and Evolutionary Theories of History.” 
Hallesche Beiträge zur Orientwissenschaft 25 (1998): 1-18. 
 
Azani, Eitan. Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God: From Revolution to 
Institutionalization. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
 
Aziz, Talib M. “Fadlallah and the Remaking of the Marja‘iyya.” In The Most Learned 
of the Shi‘a: The Institution of the Marja‘ Taqlid, edited by Linda S. Walbridge, 205-
215. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
––––––. “The Role of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Shi‘i Political Activism in Iraq from 
1958 to 1980.”International Journal of Middle East Studies 25 (1993): 207-222. 
 
Badarneh, Muhammad A. “Exploring the Use of Rhetorical Questions in Editorial 
Discourse: a Case Study of Arabic Editorials.” Text & Talk - An Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Language, Discourse & Communication Studies 29 (2009): 639-659. 
 
al-BaÎrÁnÐ, JaÝfar al-ShÁkhÙrÐ. ÀyatullÁh al-ÝUÛmÁ MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh wa-
Îarakiyyat al-Ýaql. [Great ÀyatullÁh M. Í. FaÃlallÁh and the dynamic of reason]. Beirut: 
DÁr al-MalÁk, 1998. 
––––––. “NaÛra fÐ’l-manhaj al fiqhÐ li’l-Sayyid Íusayn FaÃlallÁh.” [A look at the 
jurisprudential method of Sayyid M. Í. FaÃlallÁh]. al-Ma‘Árij 8 (1997): 49-53. 
 
Bakhash, Shaul. The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution. San 
Bernardino: Millefleurs, 1991. 
 
  244 
Baram, Amatzia. “Two Roads to Revolutionary Shi‘ite Fundamentalism in Iraq.” 
In Accounting for Fundamentalism: The Dynamic Character of Movements, edited by 
Martin E. Marty and Scott Appleby, 531-590. Chicago: University of Chicago Press and 
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1994. 
 
Baroudi, Sami Emile. “Islamist Perspectives on International Relations: The Discourse 
of Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (1935–2010).” Middle Eastern Studies 49 
(2013): 107-133. 
 
Bashkin, Orit. The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2009.  
 
Batatu, Hanna. “Iraq’s Underground Shi‘a Movements: Characteristics, Causes and 
Prospects.” Middle East Journal 35 (1981): 578-594. 
 
Blankinship, Khalid Yahya. “Parity of Muslim and Western Concepts of Just War.” The 
Muslim World 101 (2011): 412-426. 
 
Browers, Michaelle. “Fadlallah and the Passing of Lebanon’s Last Najafi Generation.” 
Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies 5 (2012): 25-46. 
 
Brown, Daniel. “Islamic Ethics in Comparative Perspective.” The Muslim World 89 
(1999): 181-192. 
 
Bruce, Steve. “Religion and Violence: What Can Sociology Offer?.” Numen, 52 (2005): 
5-28. 
 
Byers, Ann. Lebanon’s Hezbollah (Inside the World’s Most Infamous Terrorist 
Organizations). London: Rosen Publishing Group, 2003. 
 
Carré, Olivier. “Khomeinisme libanais: Qutb, Fadlallah, même combat.” Social 
Compass 38 (1991): 187–200.  
––––––. Mysticism and Politics: A Critical Reading of Fi Zilal Al- Qur'an by Sayyid 
Qutb (1906-1966). Leiden: Brill, 2003. 
––––––. “Quelques mots-clefs de Muhammad Husayn Fadlallâh.” Revue française de 
science politique 37 (1987): 478–501. 
 
Chamas, Sophie. “Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah: Muslim Cleric and Islamic 
Feminist.” Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences 1 (2009): 246-257. 
 
Charteris-Black, Jonathan. Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2005. 
 
Clarke, Morgan. “Closeness in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction: Debating Kinship 
and Biomedicine in Lebanon and the Middle East.” Anthropological Quarterly 80 
(2007): 379-402. 
––––––. “Islam, Kinship and New Reproductive Technology.” Anthropology Today 22 
(2006): 17-20.  
  245 
––––––. “Kinship, Propriety and Assisted Reproduction in the Middle East.” 
Anthropology of  the Middle East 2 (2007): 70-88.  
––––––. “Neo-Calligraphy: Religious Authority and Media Technology in 
Contemporary Shiite Islam.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 52 (2010): 
351-83. 
––––––. “New Kinship, Islam, and the Liberal Tradition: Sexual Morality and New  
Reproductive Technology in Lebanon.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 
14 (2008): 153-169. 
––––––. “The Modernity of Milk Kinship.” Social Anthropology 15 (2007): 287-304.  
 
Clarke, Morgan, and Marcia C. Inhorn. “Mutuality and Immediacy Between Marja‘ and 
Muqallid: Evidence From Male In Vitro Fertilization Patients in Shi‘i Lebanon.” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 43 (2011): 409-27.  
 
Clegg, Stewart R. Frameworks of Power. London: SAGE, 1989. 
 
Cobban, Helena. The Making of Modern Lebanon. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985. 
––––––. “The Growth of Shi‘i Power in Lebanon and Its Implications for the Future.” In 
Shi‘ism and Social Protest, edited by J. R. I. Cole and N. R. Keddie, 137-155. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. 
 
Cole, Juan. Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi‘ite 
Islam. London: I. B. Tauris, 2002. 
 
Conteh-Morgan, Earl. Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories 
and Cases of Violent Conflicts. New York: Routledge, 2003. 
 
Cook, Michael. Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
 
Coser, Lewis A. Introduction to The Division of Labor in Society by Emile Durkheim, 
ix-xxiv. Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1984. 
 
Dabashi, Hamid. “‘Ali Shari‘ati’s Islam: Revolutionary Uses of Faith in a Post-
Traditional Society.”Islamic Quarterly 27 (1983): 203-224. 
––––––. Islamic Liberation Theology: Resisting the Empire. London: Routledge, 2008. 
––––––.Shi‘sm: A Religion of Protest.  Harvard University Press, 2011. 
––––––. Theology of Discontent. The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution 
in Iran. New York: New York University Press, 1993. 
 
Dabla, Basheer Ahmad. “Sociology of Islam: Shariati’s Viewpoint.” Islamic Culture 57 
(1983): 277-282. 
 
Davari, Mahmood T. The Political Thought of Ayatullah Murtaza MuÔahhari: an Iranian 
Theoretician of the Islamic State. London: Routledge Curzon, 2005. 
 
Dähne, Stephan. “Qur’anic Wording in Political Speeches in Classical Arabic 
Literature.” Journal of Qur’anic Studies 3 (2001): 1-13. 
 
  246 
Deeb, Lara. “Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah and Lebanese Shi‘i Youth.” Journal 
of Shi‘a Islamic Studies 3 (2010): 405-426. 
 
Durkheim, Emile. Rules of Sociological Method. New York: Free Press, 1982. 
––––––. The Division of Labor in Society. Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1984. 
 
Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. London: Macmillan, 1982. 
 
Euben, Roxanne L. and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds. Princeton Readings in Islamist 
Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009. 
 
FaÃlallÁh, JaÝfar al-Sayyid MuÎammad Íusayn. NaÛra fÐ al-manhaj al-ijtihÁdÐ li'l- faqÐh 
al-mujaddid al-ÝallÁma al-marjaÝ al-Sayyid MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh. [A glance at 
the discretionary method of the jurist, renewer and great scholar Sayyid M. Í. 
FaÃlallÁh]. Beirut: al-Markaz al-IslÁmÐ al-ThaqÁfÐ, 2011. 
 
Fisk, Robert. Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon. New York: Nation Books, 
2002. 
 
Frazer, Elizabeth and Kimberly Hutchings. “Argument and Rhetoric in the Justification 
of Political Violence.” European Journal of Political Theory 6 (2007): 180-199. 
 
Fuller, Graham E. and Francke, Rend R. The Arab Shi‘a: The Forgotten Muslims. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999. 
 
Gieling, Saskia. Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran. London: I. B. Tauris, 1999. 
 
Ghadiri-Orangi, Sedighe. Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah - Schiitischer Gelehrter oder 
politischer Führer?. Hamburg-Schenefeld: EB-Verlag, 2009. 
 
GhallÙm, al-Shaykh Íasan. AfkÁr wa- ru’Á al-faqÐh al-mujaddid al-Sayyid FaÃlallÁh. 
[Thoughts and visions of the jurist and renewer M. Í. FaÃlallÁh]. Beirut: al-Markaz al-
IslÁmÐ al-ThaqÁfÐ, 2011. 
 
GhallÙm, al-Shaykh ÝAlÐ Íasan. IÃÁ’Át ÝalÁ fikr al-faqÐh al-mujaddid al-marjaÝ al-Sayyid 
MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh. [Shedding light upon the thought of the jurist, renewer 
and marjaÝ M. Í. FaÃlallÁh]. Beirut: al-Markaz al-IslÁmÐ al-ThaqÁfÐ, 2011. 
 
al-GhurayfÐ, al-Sayyid ‘AbdallÁh and al-Sayyid Íasan al-NÙrÐ. “al-Manhaj al-istinbÁÔÐ 
‘inda al-Sayyid MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh.” [The method of deduction according to 
Sayyid M. Í. FaÃlallÁh]. al-MaÝÁrij 8 (1997): 46-48.  
 
Gonzalez, Justo L. The Story of Christianity. New York: HarperOne, 2010.  
 
Grotius, Hugo. Commentary on The Law of Prize and Booty. Liberty Fund, INC. 
Indianapolis, 2006. 
  247 
 
Halawi, Majed. A Lebanon Defied: Musa al-Sadr and the Shi‘a Community. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1992. 
 
Hallett, Brien. “Just-War Criteria.” Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict. 
Edited by Lester Kurtz, vol. 2. 283-293. Academic Press, 1999. 
 
 
Halverson, Jeffry R., Steven R. Corman., and H. L. Goodall. Master Narratives of 
Islamist Extremism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.  
 
Hamid, Mohsin. The Reluctant Fundamentalist. Orlando: Harvest Books, 2008. 
 
Hamzeh, A. Nizar. In the Path of Hizbullah. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004. 
 
Hanf, Theodor. Co-Existence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a 
Nation. London: I. B. Tauris, 1994. 
 
Heinrichs, W. P. “ÓibÁþ,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. edited by  P. Bearman, Th. 
Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W. P. Heinrichs, vol. 10. 450-452. Leiden: 
Brill, 2000. 
 
Hefner, Robert W. and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds. Schooling Islam: The Culture 
and Politics of Modern Muslim Education. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 
 
Hildebrandt, Thomas. Neo- MuÝtazlismus? Intention und Kontexts im modernen 
arabischen Umgang mit dem rationalistischen Erbe des Islam. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 
2007. 
 
Hodgson, Marshall G. S. The Venture of Islam. Vol. 1: The Classical Age of Islam. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. 
 
Høigilt, Jacob. Islamist Rhetoric: Language and Culture in Contemporary Egypt. 
London: Routledge, 2011. 
 
al-Íulw, WaÃÃÁÎ YÙsuf, IsmÁÝÐl al-FaqÐh, eds. As’ila wa-rudÙd min al-qalb maÝa al-
Sayyid MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh. [Questions and responses from the heart with M. 
Í. FaÃlallÁh]. Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 2004. 
 
Hume, Mo. “Questioning Violence: Meanings, Myths and Realities.” Bulletin of Latin 
American Research 28 (2009): 22-51. 
 
el-Husseini, Rola. “Women, Work, and Political Participation in Lebanese Shi‘a 
Contemporary Thought: The Writings of Ayatollahs Fadlallah and Shams al-Din.” 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 28 (2008): 273-282.  
 
Ibn JaddÙ, GhassÁn. KhiÔÁb al-IslÁmiyyÐn wa ’l-mustaqbal. [Discourse of the Islamists 
and the future]. Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 1995. 
 
  248 
Ibrahim, Mir Mohammed. A Reconstruction of Social Thought in Islam: a Case 
Study of Dr. Ali Shariati. Srinagar: Valley Book House, 1997.  
 
Islami, Sayyid Hasan “Imam Khomeini, Ethics and Politics.” Al-Islam.org. Accessed 
June 21, 2013. http://www.al-islam.org/imam-khomeini-ethics-and-politics-sayyid-
hasan-islami. 
 
Jaber, Hala. Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997. 
 
Johnson, James Turner. “The Just War Idea: The State of the Question.” Social 
Philosophy and Policy 23 (2006): 167–195. 
 
Jamali, Fadil. “The Theological Colleges of Najaf.” The Muslim World 50 (1960): 15-
22. 
 
Johnstone, Barbara. “Presentation as Proof: The Language of Arabic Rhetoric.” 
Anthropological Linguistics 25 (1983): 47-60. 
 
Judy, Ronald A.T. “Sayyid Qutb’s fiqh al-waqi‘, or New Realist Science.” Boundary 31 
(2004): 113-148. 
 
Kadivar, Mohsen. NaÛrÐeh-hÁ-ye da½lat dar feqeh'e shÐÝah. [Theories of state in the Shi‘ite 
jurisprudence]. Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1998. 
 
Kelsay, John. Arguing the Just War in Islam. Harvard University Press 2007. 
KhumaynÐ, RuhollÁh MÙsÁwÐ. “Forty Hadith. An Exposition.” Al-Islam.org. Accessed 
July 15, 2013. http://www.al-islam.org/forty-hadith-an-exposition-second-edition-
imam-khomeini. 
––––––. Imam Khomeini’s Views on Ethics and Spiritualities. Tehran: Council for the 
Celebrations of the Third Anniversary of the Victory of the Islamic Revolution, 1982. 
http://www.hajij.org/library/component/k2/item/114-imam-khomeinis-views-on-ethics-
and-spiritualities. 
––––––. “Jihad al-Akbar, The Greatest Jihad: Combat with the Self.” Al-Islam.org. 
Accessed July 15, 2013. http://www.al-islam.org/jihad-al-akbar-the-greatest-jihad-
combat-with-the-self-imam-khomeini. 
––––––. “The Wine of Love, Mystical Poetry of Imam Khomeini.” Al-Islam.org. 
Accessed July 15, 2013. http://www.al-islam.org/wine-love-mystical-poetry-imam-
khomeini. 
––––––. Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini. 
Translated by Hamid Algar. Berkeley, Calif.: Mizan Press, 1981. 
 
Kenner, David. “The Sheikh Who Got Away.” Foreign Policy. 
         http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/07/06/the-sheikh-who-got-away-2/. 
 
Khaliqi, Ali. Legitimacy of Power from Imam Khomeini’s Point of View. (Tehran: The 
Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works, 2004). Accessed 
  249 
June 20, 2013. http://statics.ml.imam-khomeini.ir/en/File/NewsAttachment/2014/1926-
LegitimacyofPower.pdf. 
 
Khashan, Hilal. “The Religious and Political Impact of S. M.  Fadlallah 
on Arab Shi‘ism.” Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies 3 (2010): 427-441. 
Kinberg, Leah. “What is meant by zuhd?.” Studia Islamica 61 (1985): 27-44. 
 
Kramer, Martin. “Fundamentalist Islam at Large: The Drive for Power.” Middle East 
Quarterly 3 (1996): 37-49. 
––––––. “The Oracle of Hizbullah: Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah.” In 
Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders in the Middle East, edited by R. 
Scott Appleby, 83-181. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.  
 
Lammens, Henri and Abd al-Hafez, Kamal. “Íunayn.” In The Encyclopedia of Islam, 
edited by H. A. R. Gibb et al., vol. 3. 578. Leiden: Brill, 1986.  
 
Laurent, Annie and Antoine Basbous. Guerres secrètes au Liban. Paris: Gallimard, 
1987. 
 
Lewisohn, Leonard. “Tawakkul” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. edited by P. 
Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W. P. Heinrichs, vol. 10. 
376-378. Leiden: Brill, 2000. 
 
Lusthaus, Jonathan. “Religion and State Violence: Legitimation in Israel, the USA and 
Iran.” Contemporary Politics 17 (2011): 1-17. 
 
MaÎfÙÛ, MuÎammad. al-Sayyid MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh - FaqÐh al-mufakkirÐn 
wa-mufakkir al-fuqahÁ’. [M. Í. FaÃlallÁh: The jurist of the thinkers and the thinker of 
the jurists]. Beirut: al-Markaz al-IslÁmÐ al-ThaqÁfÐ, 2011. 
 
Makka, ZahrÁ’ ÝAlÐ. “Falsafat al-quwwa bayna NÐtshah wa’l-marjaÝ 
FaÃlallÁh.”Mu’assasat al-Fikr al-IslÁmÐ al-MuÝÁÒir li’l-DirÁsÁt wa’l-BuÎÙth, January 4, 
2013. Accessed July 07, 2013. http://www.islammoasser.org/ArticlePage.aspx?id=790. 
 
Mallat, Chibli, “Aspects of Shi‘i Thought from the South of Lebanon.” Papers on 
Lebanon: 7. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
––––––. The Renewal of Islamic Law: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf and the Shi‘i 
International. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
 
Martin, Vanessa. Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran. 
New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003. 
 
Al- MaÝÁrij  editorial team, “ al-Manhaj al-istidlÁlÐ li-fiqh al-Qur’Án ‘inda ÀyatullÁh al-
‘UÛmÁ MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh,” al-MaÝÁrij 4 (1996): 453-462. 
 
  250 
al-MayyÁlÐ, NizÁr MuÎammad. al-Fikr al-siyÁsÐ Ýinda al-Sayyid MuÎammad Íusayn 
FaÃlallÁh. [Political thought according to M. Í. FaÃlallÁh]. Beirut: Markaz Ibn IdrÐs al-
ÍillÐ, 2011. 
 
McDermott, Martin J. The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufid. Beirut: Librairie orientale, 
1978. 
 
Midgley, E. B. F. The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of International Relations. 
Barnes & Noble, 1975. 
Miller, Judith. “Faces of Fundamentalism: Hassan al-Turabi and Muhammed 
Fadlallah.” Foreign Affairs 73 (1994): 123-42.  
 
Montgomery Watt, William. “Badr.” In The Encyclopedia of Islam, edited by H. A. R. 
Gibb et al., vol. 1. 867-868. Leiden: Brill, 1986.  
 
Moseley, Alex. “Just War Theory | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.” Accessed 
April 8, 2011. http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwar/ 
 
Mottahedi, Roy Parviz. “The Quandaries of Emulation: The Theory and Politics of Shi‘i  
Manuals of Practice.”  In The Farhat J. Ziadeh Distinguished Lecture in Arab and 
Islamic Studies of the University of Washington (2014). Accessed in pdf form at:   
http://depts.washington.edu/nelc/pdf/eventfiles/ziadehseries/Ziadeh2011BookletFINAL.
pdf. 
 
al-Mu’min, ÝAlÐ, SanawÁt al-jamr: MasÐrat al-Îaraka al-IslÁmiyya fÐ’l-ÝIrÁq. [The years 
of  burning coal: the march of the Islamist movement in Iraq]. London: DÁr al-MasÐra, 
1993.  
 
al-MuÒÔafÁ, al-Shaykh Íusayn. IÔlÁla ÝalÁ al-ru’Á al-fikriyya li’l- faqÐh al-mujaddid al-
ÝallÁma al-marjaÝ al-Sayyid MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh. [A View into in the ideas of 
the jurist, renewer and great scholar M. Í. FaÃlallÁh]. Beirut: al-Markaz al-IslÁmÐ al-
ThaqÁfÐ, 2011 
 
MuÔahharÐ, MurtaÃÁ. “Eternity of Moral Values.” al-Tawhid Islamic Journal 14. 
Accessed 25 March 2013. http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/vol-14-no-3/eternity-
moral-values-ayatullah-murtadha-mutahhari.  
––––––. “Man and Universe.” Accessed January 28, 2012. http://www.al-
islam.org/man-and-universe-ayatullah-murtadha-mutahhari. 
 
Nakash, Yitzhak. “The Shi‘ites and the Future of Iraq.” Foreign Affairs 82 (2003): 17-
26.  
––––––. The Shi‘is of Iraq. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
 
Nakhleh, Emile A. “The Anatomy of Violence: Theoretical Reflections on Palestinian 
Resistance.” Middle East Journal 25 (1971): 180-200. 
 
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, Hamid Dabashi, and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, eds. Expectation of 
the Millennium: Shi‘ism in History. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989. 
  251 
 
Nasr, Vali. The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. New 
York: W. W. Norton, 2007. 
 
Norton, Augustus Richard. Amal and the Shi‘a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon. 
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987. 
––––––. “Hizballah of Lebanon: Extremist Ideas vs. Mundane Politics. (A Paper for the 
Muslim Politics Project).” Council on Foreign Relations, February 2000. 
 
Palmer Harik, Judith. Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2004. 
 
Picard, Elizabeth. The Lebanese Shia and Political Violence. Discussion Paper. United 
Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1993. 
 
Piscatori, James. Islam, Islamists, and the Electoral Principle in the Middle East. 
Leiden: ISIM, 2000. 
 
Pope, Whitney. “Durkheim as a Functionalist.” Sociological Quarterly 16 (1975): 361-
79.  
 
Pourjavady, Nasrollah. “Opposition to Sufism in Twelver Shi‘ism.” In Islamic 
Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics, edited by 
Frederick de Jong and Bernd Radtke, 614-623. Leiden: Brill, 1999. 
 
al-QaraÃÁwÐ, YÙsuf. al-ÏmÁn wa’l-ÎayÁt. Beirut: Mu’assasat al-RisÁla, 1979. 
 
QuÔb, Sayyid. Fi Z ila l al-Qur'a n [In the shade of the Qur'a  n]. Translated and edited by 
M.A. Salahi & A. A. Shamis. No publisher, 2003.  
––––––. KhaÒÁ’iÒ al-taÒawwur al-IslÁmÐ wa-muqawwimÁtuh. Cairo: DÁr al-ShurÙq, 
1988. 
 
––––––. MaÝÁlim fi’l-ÔarÐq. Cairo: DÁr al-ShurÙq, 1979. 
 
Randall, Jonathan. The Tragedy of Lebanon. London: The Hogarth Press, 1983. 
 
Ranstorp, Magnus. “The Strategy and Tactics of Hizbullah’s Current ‘Lebanonization 
Process’.” Mediterranean Politics 3 (1998): 103-134. 
  
––––––.Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crises. London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997. 
 
Renard, John. “al-JihÁd al-akbar: Notes on a Theme in Islamic Spirituality.” The 
Muslim World 78 (1988): 225-242. 
 
Rosiny, Stephan. “Muhammad Husain Fadlallah: Im Zweifel für Mensch und 
Vernunft.” In: Der Islam am Wendepunkt: Liberale und konservative Reformer einer 
  252 
Weltreligion, edited by Katajun Amirpur and Ludwig Ammann, 100-108. Freiburg: 
Herder, 2006.  
––––––. “The Tragedy of Fatima al-Zahra in the Debate of two Shiite Theologians in 
Lebanon.” In The Twelver Shia in Modern Times: Religious Culture & Political 
Culture, edited by Rainer Brunner and Werner Ende, 207-219. Leiden: Brill, 2001. 
 
Russell, F. H. “Love and Hate in Medieval Warfare: The Contribution of Saint 
Augustine.” Nottingham Medieval Studies 31 (1987): 108–24. 
 
al-Ñadr, MuÎammad BÁqir. “Contemporary Man and the Social Problem.” Al-Islam.org. 
Accessed March 22, 2013. http://www.al-islam.org/contemporary-man-and-the-social-
problem-muhammad-baqir-as-sadr. 
––––––.al-TafsÐr al-mawÃÙÝÐ, ÝulÙm al-Qur’Án, maqÁlÁt Qur’Ániyya [Thematic 
interpretation of the Qur’Án, Qur’Ánic sciences, Qur’Án essays]. n. p.: Markaz al-AbÎÁth 
wa’l-DirÁsÁt al-TakhaÒÒuÒiyya li’l-ShahÐd al-Ñadr, 2000. 
  
SaÝfÁn, Íasan. ÀsÁs Ýilm al-ijtimÁÝ. [The foundations of sociology]. Cairo: DÁr al-NahÃa 
al-ÝArabiyya, 1974. 
 
Sakai, Keiko. “Modernity and Tradition in the Islamic Movements in Iraq: Continuity 
and Discontinuity in the Role of the Ulama.” Arab Studies Quarterly 23 (2001): 37-53. 
 
Salibi, Kamal S. A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered. 
London: I. B. Tauris, 1988. 
––––––. Crossroads to the Civil War. Delmar: Caravan Books, 1976.  
 
Sankari, Jamal. Fadlallah: The Making of a Radical Shi‘ite Leader. London: SAQI, 
2005. 
 
Saouli, Adham. “Intellectuals and Political Power in Social Movements: The Parallel 
Paths of Fadlallah and Hizbullah.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 41 (2014): 
97-116. 
 
Shaery-Eisenlohr, Roschanack. “Constructing Lebanese Shi‘ite Nationalism: 
Transnationalism, Shi‘ism, and the Lebanese State.” PhD diss., University of Chicago, 
2005. 
––––––. Shi‘ite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. 
 
ShamÝÙn, ÝImÁd. Al-Sayyid MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh dÁÝiyat ÎiwÁr am 
dhimmiyya? [Sayyid M. Í. FaÃlallÁh: A preacher of dialogue or dhimmiyya?]. Beirut: 
BÐsÁn li’l-Nashr wa’l-TawzÐÝ wa’l-IÝlÁm, 1995.  
 
Shanahan, Rodger. The Shi‘a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties and Clerics. London: Tauris 
Academic Studies, 2005. 
 
Shapira, Shimon. “The Origins of Hizbullah.” Jerusalem Quarterly 46 (1988): 115-130. 
 
  253 
SharÁra, WaÃÃÁÎ. Dawlat Íizb al-AllÁh. LubnÁn mujtamaÝan IslÁmiyyan. [The State of 
Hezbollah: Lebanon as a Muslim Society]. Beirut: DÁr al-NahÁr, 1996. 
 
SharÐÝatÐ, ÝAlÐ. On the Sociology of Islam: Lectures. Edited by Hamid Algar. Berkeley: 
Mizan Press, 2000. 
––––––. “Red Shi‘ism.” Al-Islam.org. Accessed February 9, 2013. http://www.al-
islam.org/articles/red-shiism-ali-shariati. 
 
Shaw, Malcolm N. International Law. Cambridge University Press 2003. 
 
 
Shepard, William E. “Islam as a ‘System’ in the Later Writings of Sayyid Qutb.” 
Middle Eastern Studies 25 (1989): 31-50. 
––––––. “The Myth of Progress in the Writings of Sayyid Qutb.” Religion 27 (1997): 
255-266. 
 
al-Shaykh, Íusayn ManÒÙr. Íarakiyyat al-tÁrÐkh al-risÁlÐ fÐ-fikr al-Sayyid FaÃlallÁh. 
[The dynamic of the message-oriented history in the thought of M. Í. FaÃlallÁh]. 
Beirut: al-Markaz al-IslÁmÐ al-ThaqÁfÐ, 2011. 
 
Sicking, Thomas and Shereen Khairallah. “The Shi‘a Awakening in Lebanon: A Search 
for Radical Change in a Traditional Way.” CEMAM Reports 2, Beirut: Dar el-Mashreq 
(1974): 97-130. 
 
Silverman, Adam L. “Just War, Jihad, and Terrorism: A Comparison of Western and 
Islamic Norms for the Use of Political Violence.” Journal of Church and State 44 
(2002): 73-92. 
 
Sivan, Emmanuel and Menachem Friedman, eds. Religious Radicalism and Politics in 
the Middle East. Albany: SUNY Press, 1990.  
 
Sobelman, Daniel. “Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizbullah after the Withdrawal from 
Lebanon.” Memorandum, no. 69. Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, January, 
2004. 
 
Kahil, Souhad. “A Rhetorical Examination and Critique of Hezbollah.” PhD diss., 
Graduate College of Bowling Green State University, 2006. 
 
Sukkariyya, MunÁ. M. Í. FaÃlallÁh: ÝAn sanawÁt wa-mawÁqif wa-shakhÒiyyÁt. 
HÁkadhÁ taÎaddatha hÁkadhÁ qÁla. [M. Í. FaÃlallÁh: About years, standpoints, and 
personalities. Thus he spoke, thus he said]. Beirut: al-Markaz al-IslÁmÐ al-ThaqÁfÐ, 
2012. 
 
Surdykowska, Sylwia. “The Spiritual Aspect of Jihad and Khomeini’s Doctrine.” In: 
Shi‘ism. Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies, edited by Colin Turner and Paul Luft, 
291-303. London: Routledge, 2008. 
 
  254 
SurÙr, ÝAlÐ Íusayn. al-ÝAllÁma M. Í. FaÃlallÁh wa-taÎaddÐ al-mamnÙÝ. [The learned M. 
Í. FaÃlallÁh and defying the forbidden]. Beirut: DÁr al-MalÁk, 2004. 
 
Suwayd, MaÎmÙd, ed. al-IslÁm wa-FalasÔÐn, ÍiwÁr ShÁmil maÝa al-Sayyid MuÎammad 
Íusayn FaÃlallÁh. [Islam and Palestine: A comprehensive interview with M. Í. 
FaÃlallÁh]. Beirut: Mu’assasat al-DirÁsÁt al-FalasÔÐniyya, 1995. 
 
Toth, James. Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
 
TuwaynÐ, GhassÁn. al-UstÁdh GhassÁn TuwaynÐ yuÎÁwir SamÁÎat al-ÝallÁma al-Sayyid 
MuÎammad Íusayn FaÃlallÁh. [Ghassan Tuwayni interviews Sayyid M. Í. FaÃlallÁh]. 
Beirut: DÁr al-MujtabÁ li’l-ÓibÁÝa wa’l-Nashr wa’l-TawzÐÝ, 1993. 
 
Versi, Miqdaad. “Fadlallah: A Mainstream Radical.” Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies 3 
(2010): 443-464. 
 
Wahyudi, Yudian. “‘Ali Shariati and Bint al-Shati on Free Will: A Comparison.” 
Journal of Islamic Studies 9 (1998): 35-45. 
 
Wiley, Joyce. The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi‘as. Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1992.  
 
Wilson, Rodney. “The Contribution of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr to Contemporary 
Islamic Economic Thought.” Journal of Islamic Studies 9 (1998): 46–59.  
 
Yadegari, Mohammad. “Shariati and the Reconstruction of the Social Sciences.” 
American Journal of Islamic Studies 1 (1984): 53-59. 
 
  
 
  
